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Preface ix
Foreword 
In 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson transmitted to Presi-
dent Truman the original North Atlantic Treaty. In doing so, Acheson 
pointed out that in order for the Alliance to be “fully effective” it had to 
be open to “as many countries as are in a position to further the demo-
cratic principles upon which the Treaty was based, to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area, and … to undertake the necessary 
responsibilities.”
Within a decade, the Alliance’s twelve founding members began 
adding to their ranks. They brought Germany and Spain, two formerly 
fascist countries, into the family of European democracies. They wel-
comed Greece and Turkey, helping stabilize relations between those 
two countries. Each of these enlargement decisions helped the Alliance 
become stronger, overcome old divisions, and anchor more nations in 
the community of democracies that NATO was designed to unite and 
protect.
The strength, vitality and resolve of NATO helped tear down the 
Berlin Wall without firing a shot. But when the Cold War ended, and 
the Warsaw Pact dissolved, it left a security vacuum. Europe’s new de-
mocracies, after being forced by the Soviet Union to live behind an 
Iron Curtain for forty years, wanted control of their future and wanted 
to belong to Europe’s economic and security institutions. The Alliance 
therefore faced a dual challenge: first, how to preserve a favorable stra-
tegic environment into the next century; and second, how to seize the 
opportunity to build a Europe whole and free.
In meeting that challenge, NATO faced a blunt choice. Would it 
be the last institution in Europe to continue to treat the Iron Cur-
tain as something meaningful, or would it aid in Europe’s reunification 
and renewal? Would NATO exclude from its ranks a whole group of 
qualified democracies simply because they had been subjugated in the 
past, or would it be open to those free nations that were willing and 
able to meet the responsibilities of membership and contribute to the 
Alliance’s security?
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I believe Allied leaders made the right choice. They saw an oppor-
tunity to do for Europe’s East what NATO and the Marshall Plan had 
done for Europe’s West. Their goal was to create a sphere of common 
interest in which every nation could live in security. To this end, they 
established linkages through the Partnership for Peace between NATO 
and other European democracies. They transformed the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe into an arena for supporting 
democracy and human rights. And as chronicled in the ensuing pages, 
they undertook a gradual and deliberate process for enlarging NATO.
Many of the contributors to this edited volume played a critical role 
in that process. Their accounts greatly enrich the historical record, at 
a time when the legacy of NATO enlargement deserves to be revisited 
and better understood. 
For my part, I was serving as President Clinton’s Ambassador to the 
United Nations when many of the key decisions about NATO expan-
sion were made. Although I was in favor of bringing new members into 
the Alliance, I had kept my counsel when the prospect was first raised. I 
did not want anyone to suspect me, a Czechoslovak by birth, of special 
pleading on behalf of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, or other potential 
NATO candidates. I was also focused on my portfolio in New York. 
But as the debate gathered momentum and I took office as Secretary of 
State, I became a vigorous advocate for expansion. 
One did not have to be a native of the region to see the logic of 
NATO opening its doors again to new members. After four decades of 
Communist subjugation, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe 
were eager to join an enlarged NATO. If they were denied NATO 
protection, they would be left in political limbo and might well seek se-
curity through other means, resulting in unpredictable alliances, efforts 
at rearmament, and the possible use of force to settle disputes.
All this seemed obvious, but many in the U.S. foreign policy estab-
lishment took a different view. One can easily forget how strong the 
opposition was. George Kennan, the ageless icon of U.S. diplomacy, 
denounced NATO enlargement as “the greatest mistake in Western 
policy in the entire post-Cold War era” (few recall that he had op-
posed NATO’s creation in 1949). More than 50 prominent political 
and academic figures accused the Clinton Administration of “making 
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an error of historic proportions.” And an informal Council on Foreign 
Relations poll showed experts opposing NATO expansion two to one.
The Clinton Administration was determined to overcome these crit-
ics by making the case that a larger NATO—with the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland as the first new members—would serve American 
interests. 
We argued, first and foremost, that enlargement would make Amer-
ica safer by expanding the area of Europe where wars did not happen. 
By making it clear that America would fight to defend its new Allies, 
we believed it would be less likely that we would ever be called upon 
to do so.
We also pointed out that the prospect of a larger NATO had given 
the nations of Central and Eastern Europe an incentive to strengthen 
their democratic institutions, improve respect for minority rights, es-
tablish civilian control over their militaries, and peacefully resolve bor-
der and ethnic disputes. This progress would help ensure that outside 
powers were never again dragged into a conflict at the heart of Europe.
A final reason why enlargement passed the test of national interest, 
we argued, was that it would make NATO itself stronger and more co-
hesive. The prospective allies were passionately committed to NATO, 
and had risked their lives alongside U.S. troops in the Gulf War and in 
Bosnia. They saw membership not as a burden, but as an opportunity 
to show the world that they were able to give something back to the 
community of freedom that stood by them in their years of darkness.
Still, we also had to address concerns about Russia. President Bo-
ris Yeltsin and his countrymen were strongly opposed to enlargement, 
seeing it as a strategy for exploiting their vulnerability and moving Eu-
rope’s dividing line to the east, leaving them isolated. 
I spent much time while in office talking through these objections 
with my Russian counterparts and NATO leaders, eventually reaching 
an agreement—the NATO-Russia Founding Act. This document pro-
vided an institutional means for Russia to participate in transatlantic se-
curity deliberations, without giving them a veto over Alliance decisions.
Perhaps no aspect of NATO enlargement has proven as controver-
sial as the impact on Russia. As of this writing, there are still legions of 
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critics who argue that it poisoned the relationship with Russia, and is 
therefore to blame for all of the geopolitical problems facing the world 
in 2019.
 This is ludicrous. It is a huge mistake to think that every time Russia 
does something we do not like, it is to “punish” us for bringing Hunga-
ry or Poland or the Baltic states into NATO.
Our disagreements with Russia in the Middle East or in Ukraine 
have come about because of the manner in which Russia defines its 
national interests in those parts of the world. These differences existed 
long before NATO decided to open its doors to new members. If we 
had kept NATO a closed shop, we still would not have resolved those 
differences with Russia. We would, however, have turned our backs on 
nations that stood with us on a range of security issues that mattered 
to the Alliance.
History will show that the United States and its Allies did seek a 
true partnership with Russia. But we did not want that partnership to 
be purchased by denying a dozen European countries the right to seek 
membership in NATO. A partnership built on an illegitimate moral 
compromise would not be genuine and it would not last.
For all these reasons and more, the story of NATO opening its doors 
to new members and new missions—the story told in these pages—in-
volved much, much more than the immediate future of the countries 
in question. It involved the future security of the United States; the 
future of an undivided Europe; the future of Russia and the character 
of NATO’s relationship with it. 
While it is impossible to prove a counterfactual, it is clear to me that 
the world would be far more dangerous, and Europe far less prosper-
ous and stable, had NATO not helped in erasing the continent’s old, 
artificial divisions. 
That makes this a story worth telling. So I am grateful to the editors 
of this volume for capturing this moment and for teaching a new gen-
eration about the importance of the decisions that we made.
Madeleine K. Albright 
Washington, DC
April 2019
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Introduction
Daniel S. Hamilton and Kristina Spohr 
This book is a highly unusual blend of memoir and scholarship 
that takes us back to the decade when “post-Wall Europe” was made. 
Drawing on newly-released archival material, each scholar offers his 
interpretations. Drawing on memory, experience, and personal notes, 
each protagonist retraces his or her original impressions, choices and 
contributions to how NATO, in its exit from the Cold War, came to 
reaffirm its purpose while revising its missions, opening its door to new 
members, building new relations with other institutions and partner 
countries, and attempting cooperation with Russia.
On April 4, 2019 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
celebrated its 70th anniversary. Few would have expected this when 
the Alliance was born. In 1951, when General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
assumed command of NATO forces in Europe as the first Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), he mused that “if in 10 years, 
all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes 
have not been returned to the United States, then this whole project 
will have failed.” The U.S. commitment was intended to get war-torn 
Western Europe on its feet and off America’s back. But the Allies hung 
together, for fear that otherwise they might hang separately. 
NATO saw off the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. Yet 
when the East-West conflict ended, the United States did not reduce 
its commitment to Europe, it extended it. 40 years after Eisenhower’s 
prophecy, some 150,000 American troops remained in Europe.1 On 
NATO’s 50th birthday in 1999, its leaders not only welcomed three 
new members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), they ap-
proved the blueprint for a larger, more flexible Alliance that would re-
main committed to collective defense but be capable of meeting a wider 
range of threats to common Alliance interests.2
This mixture of solidarity and flexibility proved to be an essential 
combination in helping NATO see out the Cold War. There were times 
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when the Alliance had seemed under impossible strains, for instance 
when trying to respond to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles. But 
the Alliance managed to craft the so-called ‘Dual Track’ policy in 1979 
that ultimately led to the withdrawal of all intermediate-range missiles 
in Europe. NATO was also an essential factor in the process of German 
unification. The insistence by U.S. President George H.W. Bush and 
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that unified Germany must remain 
a member of the Alliance assured Moscow against German revanchism 
and also justified the continuing presence of U.S. military forces in 
post-Cold War Europe.3 
But what would NATO look like in post-Wall Europe? In their Lon-
don Declaration of July 6, 1990 NATO leaders stressed their intent 
to “remain a defensive alliance” while espousing the goal of becoming 
a more “political” community, so that members of the disintegrating 
Warsaw Pact could “establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO.” 
The aim was to “work with all the countries of Europe” in order “to 
create enduring peace” on the continent.4 In the fall of 1991 they cre-
ated the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). NACC was 
intended to represent the Euro-Atlantic Community at large—from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok—and symbolize NATO’s stretched-out 
“hand of friendship” to the formerly antagonistic East—the Warsaw 
Pact states including the USSR.5 
Ironically, however, the Cooperation Council’s very first meeting on 
December 20, 1991 coincided with the Soviet Union’s dissolution into 
“sovereign states.” NACC suddenly found itself dealing with a multi-
tude of separate entities in the post-Soviet space. The question quickly 
became whether NACC would “remain the embodiment of the liaison 
program” or become “a way station on the road to Alliance member-
ship.”6 How should NATO differentiate between the new democracies 
in Central and Eastern Europe eagerly looking to join the West and 
former Soviet states still in the orbit of Moscow’s “Near Abroad”?7 
As America and its Allies worked to design and build a post-Cold 
War Euro-Atlantic security architecture, their biggest challenge in this 
chaotic situation was forging a partnership with the new post-Soviet 
Russia und President Boris Yeltsin. How would such a partnership look? 
How could Russia’s transformation be supported—both economically 
and politically? Could that now highly volatile country be engaged in a 
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cooperative relationship? How could stability and security be secured 
in Central Europe after the Balkan powderkeg exploded anew with the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia?
Various options for the new architecture were gradually ruled out. 
French President François Mitterrand’s vague model of a “European 
Confederation”8 (excluding the United States) quickly fell by the way-
side because American power clearly remained a crucial element in the 
security equation. The eastern enlargement of the European Union 
(EU) was still far off, and it lacked a hard security component. It was 
increasingly clear why Eastern European eyes, including those of the 
Baltic trio—at the interface of Europe and Russia—turned towards 
NATO and the United States.9 George H. W. Bush could not solve 
that conundrum in 1992. It was left to the Clinton Administration from 
1993 to move from loose ideas about “liaison” to offer a concrete re-
sponse to the growing desire of Eastern Europe to formally join the 
Western Alliance.
Opening the Alliance’s door and enlarging its territory were crucial 
for the “new” NATO. But more was at stake. In the post-Wall world, 
NATO needed to redefine its mission if it wanted to stay in business.10 
Although it remained the politico-military institution that integrated 
the armed forces of much of Europe and provided the United States 
and its Allies with a unique capacity to influence each other’s policies, 
the NATO Alliance would have to modify its modus operandi. That 
meant being able to engage militarily “out of area,” manage crises, 
consider peace enforcement missions and even undertake humanitar-
ian interventions. Through all of this America remained the leading 
“ordering power.” 
* * *
NATO’s decision to open itself to new members and new missions 
is one of the most contentious and least understood issues of the post-
Wall world. It has now been twenty years since the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland entered the Alliance in 1999, yet controversy sur-
rounding the motives and choices of that time continues to accompany 
contemporary debates about the bonds between Europe and the Unit-
ed States, the future of East Central Europe, and relations between 
Russia and the West. Seen from our point of view—one of us a protag-
onist and the other an historian of that period—many of those debates 
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have become narrow, one-dimensional caricatures of a more complex 
story. In this volume we have sought to present that story in a richer, 
multi-dimensional perspective—not least to counter the abuses of this 
history that are increasingly undertaken by politicians as they seek to 
“rewrite” the past to serve their current political purposes. 
Rashomon (羅生門 Rashōmon), the classic Japanese film directed by 
Akira Kurosawa, has become synonymous with the struggle to uncov-
er “objective” truth. The film is known for a plot device that involves 
various characters providing substantially different yet equally plausible 
accounts of the same incident. The film shows how the same events 
can be viewed in completely different ways by different people with 
different backgrounds, expectations, and experiences. The “Rashomon 
effect” is a term used by scholars, journalists and film critics to refer to 
contradictory interpretations of the same events by different persons. It 
highlights the subjective effect of perception on recollection.11
A number of the officials who participated in this project, including 
at our Washington workshop, told us they felt like a character from Ra-
shomon. The analogy is helpful yet somewhat dangerous, because at the 
end of Rashomon it actually turns out each of the characters was lying, 
and the film intentionally fails to offer any accompanying evidence to 
elevate or disqualify any version of the truth. 
Nonetheless, Rashomon underscores how individual interpretations 
of events can be deeply intertwined with subjective personal memories 
and perceptions at the time. It also highlights the need to supplement 
personal narrative with evidence, as we have done by including contri-
butions drawing on newly-released archival materials. 
A related guide is the ancient fable of the blind men who each feels 
a different part of an elephant:
My friends and I can’t seem to figure out what this thing in front of 
us is. One of us thinks it’s a wall; one thinks it’s a snake; one thinks 
it’s a rope, and one thinks it’s four tree trunks. How can one thing 
seem so different to five different people?” 
“Well,” said the zoo-keeper. “You are all right. This elephant 
seems like something different to each one of you. And the only 
way to know what this thing really is, is to do exactly what you have 
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done. Only by sharing what each of you knows can you possibly 
reach a true understanding.12
The fable teaches a lesson about the limits of individual perspective. 
One person’s view of an ultimate truth may not tell the whole story. 
Perception is influenced by the truth each individual is able to touch. 
Each protagonist creates his own version of reality from a limited per-
sonal perspective. He may be tempted to believe he has a better handle 
on the truth than others. Yet only when each protagonist shares his 
individual perspective does a fuller picture come into view. 
The problem, of course, is that the men in the fable were blind. Our 
authors, in contrast, were key decision makers at the time. Each saw a 
part of the elephant—their personal role and that of their country/gov-
ernment—and can tell that part of the story. By asking them to share 
their observations with each other and us in our intense one-day parley 
and then combining them in essay form into one volume, we are able 
to offer a fuller view of the whole elephant. This is important because 
NATO’s post-Wall enlargement and the decisions of the 1990s are still 
the elephant in the room when it comes to current debates about the 
future of NATO and relations with Russia.13
The final context for our collection of articles is what cinematog-
raphers call the Reveal Shot. When a camera focuses narrowly on a 
particular actor or actors, viewers can’t see the whole set. When the 
camera pans out, or cuts to a wider view, the audience can see other 
aspects that can entirely change their understanding of the story. By 
delineating specific details and documents while putting them in larger 
context, our authors offer the broader perspective that is necessary to 
a clearer understanding of the security dynamics of post-Wall Europe. 
Perhaps the most useful contribution this book can make is as a cau-
tionary tale for those who seek to promote absolute truth, ascribe ma-
levolent intent to others, or overreach in their interpretations. Differ-
ent actors have different impressions of the same issue, depending on 
their individual mental maps, vantage points and national interests. As 
a result, their outlooks and goals, perceptions and experiences differ. By 
seeing through their eyes, looking over their shoulders, and studying 
meticulously the contemporary written and spoken record, we are able 
to re-examine and explore: 
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• how leaders and their administrations across the Euro-Atlantic 
space reacted to the upheavals of 1989–1991;
• how they imagined the future and what realities they were up 
against—in the domestic arena and international politics at large;
• why NATO survived the Cold War;
• why its strength—collective defense, rather CSCE-style collec-
tive security—mattered to members and aspirant countries;
• why and how the Alliance was revived and reinvented as a cen-
tral pillar of the Euro-Atlantic security framework; and
• how key protagonists sought to find a place for Russia. 
Together, these essays help us understand the origins of today’s 
transatlantic relationship and can inform debates about its future. 
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Chapter 1
Piece of the Puzzle:  
NATO and Euro-Atlantic Architecture  
After the Cold War 
Daniel S. Hamilton
Much debate about NATO’s post-Cold War enlargement has suf-
fered from three weaknesses. 
The first has been a tendency to view NATO and its enlargement ex-
clusively through a Russian prism. Russia-firsters worried that NATO 
enlargement would exacerbate Russian insecurities and further divide 
the continent; Russia skeptics supported enlargement because they be-
lieved NATO needed to capitalize on a period of Russian weakness 
and disorientation by expanding its frontiers. What united the two 
camps was the view that NATO was a threat-based institution whose 
sole purpose was to deter, and if necessary, repulse, an attack on West-
ern Europe by the Soviet Union and its satellites in the Warsaw Pact.1 
Now that the threat that had given rise to NATO’s creation was gone, 
many Russia-firsters asked why the Alliance would even continue to 
exist, much less expand. Russia skeptics, in turn, asked why the Alliance 
didn’t expand as quickly as possible; just because the Soviet Union had 
collapsed didn’t mean that the Russian bear wouldn’t be back.2
These views were short-sighted in many ways. The Russia skeptics 
only exacerbated the very Russian insecurities the Russia-firsters high-
lighted. Many Russia-firsters, in turn, treated as secondary the security 
concerns of hundreds of millions of non-Russian Europeans who lived 
outside the institutionalized order in which Western societies were 
free, largely prosperous, and secure. Both camps’ Soviet/Russia-cen-
tric, threat-based view of NATO blinded them to the fact that the end 
of the Cold War did not solve Europe’s security issues. Europe and 
the United States faced a host of other security challenges for which 
NATO could be extremely relevant. Some of those challenges did not 
stem from or even have much to do with Russia; some were not even in 
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Europe; and some were such that NATO-Russia cooperation could be 
of considerable value.3
This one-dimensional, Russia-centric caricature of NATO also ig-
nored the Alliance’s various purposes. Three days after the North At-
lantic Treaty gave life to NATO in 1949, the great political commenta-
tor Walter Lippman wrote that it would be 
remembered long after the conditions that provoked it are no 
longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes 
and proclaims a community of interest which is much older than 
the conflict with the Soviet Union and, come what may, will sur-
vive it…[This community] would be a reality if we were at peace 
with the Soviet government and it will still be the reality when at 
long last we are again at peace with the Russian people and their 
government.4
Since its inception the Alliance not only provided for the collective 
defense of its members, it institutionalized the transatlantic link, offered 
a preeminent framework for managing relations between Allies on is-
sues of security and strategy, and provided an umbrella of reassurance 
under which European countries could focus their security concerns 
on common challenges rather than on each other. In the aftermath of 
two World Wars and throughout a half-century-long Cold War, that 
latter purpose, so often underplayed or misunderstood, was critical to 
Europe’s recovery, prosperity and security. As U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright commented at the time, “Certainly, NATO’s cold-
war task was to contain the Soviet threat. But that is not all it did. 
It provided the confidence and security shattered economies needed 
to rebuild themselves. It helped France and Germany become recon-
ciled, making European integration possible. With other institutions, it 
brought Italy, then Germany and eventually Spain back into the family 
of European democracies. It denationalized allied defense policies. It 
stabilized relations between Greece and Turkey. All without firing a 
shot.”5 These functions of the Alliance—reconciling adversaries and 
reassuring allies in a frame of common security—was as relevant at the 
end of the Cold War as it was at the beginning.6 “The security NATO 
provides,” Albright notes, “has always been essential to the prosperity 
the EU promises.”7
Piece of the Puzzle 5
Even today it is difficult to go to any conference on NATO with-
out someone lazily parroting the simplistic—and incorrect—bromide 
attributed to Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General from 1952-
1957, that the goal of NATO was to keep the Russians out, the Ameri-
cans in and the Germans down.8 While the first two purposes were es-
sentially correct, the third evolved to such an extent that by 1989 it was 
no longer apt. NATO’s role, together with other institutions, had been 
to embed West Germany within mutually reassuring structures that 
assuaged doubts by neighbors—and many Germans—about West Ger-
many’s growing weight. Far from keeping the Germans down, NATO, 
the European Communities and other institutions helped the new Ger-
many stand back up. If this were not true, Germany would never have 
unified with the support of the four former allies who vanquished Hit-
ler. While much credit must go to the Germans, without the security 
provided by the embedded framework, neither the Germans nor their 
neighbors are likely to have had the confidence to reconcile, to inte-
grate, and to reach across European divides.9 
Over the decades the Alliance proved that it could adapt its purpos-
es in response to changing strategic circumstances. In the late 1960s 
NATO’s original strategy of deterrence and defense evolved to com-
plement the emergence of political détente. In 1991 the George H.W. 
Bush Administration and all Allies agreed in NATO’s new Strategic 
Concept that “risks to allied security are less likely to result from cal-
culated aggression against the territory of the allies, but rather from 
the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the seri-
ous economic, social and political difficulties” arising from ethnic and 
territorial disputes in central Europe.”10 The Alliance looked to such 
new missions as peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, crisis management, 
and humanitarian assistance. By the end of the Bush Administration, 
NATO’s static defense posture, anchored by heavy armored divisions, 
was giving way to lighter, more mobile forces for projection into areas 
beyond NATO borders.11 
These evolutionary changes underscore that alliances do not neces-
sarily exist solely to wage or deter war, they can also manage relations 
among member states. Over decades NATO followed in this tradition; 
the end of the Cold War afforded it the opportunity to extend its man-
agement function to neutral and non-aligned states as well as former 
members of the Warsaw Pact, including Russia. By reaching out to 
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Moscow with a range of partnership initiatives, the Clinton Adminis-
tration and European Allies worked to temper the other third of Lord 
Ismay’s witticism: keeping the Russians out.12 
This relates to a third weakness of the debate: the tendency to focus 
on NATO alone rather than on the Alliance’s role within a broader 
framework of European and Euro-Atlantic architecture. Critics who 
believed the Atlantic Community was nothing more than a creature 
of the Cold War ignored the fact that at the end of WWII the United 
States and its partners set forth a vision based not only on the need to 
contain Soviet power and communism in the east, but also to draw to-
gether allies and partners in the West. They were as much focused on 
the continent’s overall instabilities as on the Soviet threat. 
During the Cold War, attention focused naturally on the first goal—
containing the East. But the second part—reordering and adapting the 
West after two world wars, depression and the rise of fascism—was 
equally important, and in fact preceded the Cold War and the creation 
of NATO. The vision for this political order was articulated in such 
statements as the Atlantic Charter of 1941, the Bretton Woods agree-
ments of 1944, and the Marshall Plan speech of 1947. The founding 
of such institutions as the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and 
its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD)—helped to stabilize and liberalize postwar market 
economies, structure cooperative relations within Europe and across 
the Atlantic, and promote unprecedented peace and prosperity. West-
ern Europe’s own integrative mechanisms, starting with the European 
Coal and Steel Community and leading to the European Communities, 
both reinforced and gave deeper meaning to these efforts. Even the 
North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 was aimed as much at generating con-
fidence among Western European peoples that they could tame their 
conflicts by binding democracies together as it was an alliance created 
to balance Soviet power.13 
The leaders of the Atlantic Community realized that Europe’s secu-
rity could not be based solely on external guarantees; it had to be built 
from within societies. They knew they would be able to deal with the 
external challenge from the East only if they could draw effectively on 
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the inner resources of the West. The two goals were mutually reinforc-
ing; the strategic vision was enormously successful. The Atlantic Alli-
ance created an umbrella under which European unity could develop, 
and together these institutions helped produce unparalleled peace and 
prosperity for half a century—even if for only half a continent.
This context is important to understand because the decision to en-
large the Alliance was not taken in isolation; it was part and parcel of 
the Clinton Administration’s broader efforts to update and realign the 
entire “architecture” of relations between the United States and Eu-
rope. The goal was to put to rest residual problems not just of one 
war, but of all the European wars and instabilities of the 20th centu-
ry.14 For President Clinton and his team, opening NATO’s door was 
not a threat-driven or Russia-centric decision, it was part of a broader 
strategy of projecting stability, unifying Europe, and positioning the 
U.S.-European relationship for the opportunities and challenges of a 
new and uncertain era.15 
Bush, Clinton and Europe
In a number of ways neither former Clinton or Bush Administration 
officials are probably wont to acknowledge, the Clinton Administra-
tion’s efforts built on those of the Bush Administration. Both sought to 
operationalize President Bush’s vision of a “Europe whole and free.”16 
Both were convinced that U.S. engagement on the continent remained 
essential. So did the Europeans—certainly during the German unifi-
cation debate. The Germans themselves, as well as their French and 
British partners, but also other neighbors in East and West, saw NATO 
as a stabilizer on the European continent. All understood that a single 
“overarching structure” could not deal with the great variety of security 
challenges facing such a diverse continent, and so sought to construct 
an integrated Euro-Atlantic security architecture in which existing in-
stitutions such as NATO, the European Union (EU), and the CSCE/
OSCE could be adapted and transformed to play complementary and 
mutually supporting roles across a wider European space. All worked 
intensively with Moscow to dampen, and where possible, eliminate the 
most dangerous legacies of Cold War competition and to support Rus-
sia’s own democratic reforms.17 
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While both administrations had a general sense of where they want-
ed to go, neither operated from a pre-set playbook. William H. Hill 
characterizes Bush Administration actions as “a set of apparently ad hoc 
reactions to unforeseen and unprecedented events and opportunities, 
in particular responses to sudden conflicts and emergencies.”18 Ronald 
D. Asmus acknowledges that the Clinton strategy “was not the product 
of a single decision or a sudden epiphany. Instead, it evolved over the 
course of President Clinton’s two terms in office into an increasingly 
coherent policy in response to events on the ground and as the Admin-
istration’s own views matured.”19
President Clinton was guided by his political instincts rather than a 
detailed blueprint. He admired Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman 
for intuitively understanding what their world required of them; nei-
ther had grand strategies but were guided by “powerful instincts about 
what had to be done.” Strategic coherence, he said, was largely imposed 
after the fact.20 In each administration, even those engaged in one el-
ement of the “architecture” often had little time for, or awareness of, 
how other potentially complementary elements were proceeding. That 
is how the sausage is made.
Of course, differences were also significant. The Bush Administra-
tion was overwhelmingly focused on peacefully managing the Cold 
War’s denouement and moving to design a “new Europe and new At-
lanticism” (as Secretary of State James Baker put it); the Clinton Ad-
ministration faced the task of peacefully managing the emergence of 
the post-Cold War world. By the time the Bush Administration came 
to an end, two states—the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia—had dissolved 
into no less than twenty new countries in Eurasia. The future of vio-
lent conflict in Europe seemed likely to stem more from the disinte-
gration of states rather than from disagreements between them.21 The 
Bush Administration, together with its Allies, especially the Germans 
as “partners in leadership,” had begun the process of updating and 
reorienting Euro-Atlantic architecture, but the relationship between 
the various institutions was left unclear, as was the process of potential 
membership. 
The violent breakup of Yugoslavia and a series of conflicts between 
and within some of the new states on the periphery of the USSR pre-
sented an especially daunting challenge for peace and stability in the 
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rest of Europe. Post-Wall Europe’s remade institutions were untried. 
It soon became apparent that the EU and the CSCE lacked the mecha-
nisms and institutional capabilities to prevent, suppress or mediate the 
conflicts arising in this broad area. NATO alone had the structures and 
forces for engage in such tasks, but many of its members did not have 
the will do to so.22 With nations at odds and America initially leaving 
the ball in “Europe’s” court, NATO appeared to have turned into a 
bystander, more misalliance than alliance.23 
Crucially, the Bush and Clinton administrations differed about what 
all of this meant for U.S. interests. Watching the Yugoslav tragedy un-
fold, Secretary of State James Baker famously declared “we ain’t got no 
dog in that fight,” a stance Richard Holbrooke decried as “the greatest 
failure of the West since the 1930s.”24 Serbian President Slobodan Mi-
lošević later told U.S. diplomat John Kornblum that Baker’s words had 
electrified him: “That was my go-ahead to start a war.”25 
The changing domestic context in the United States was also cru-
cial. Despite President Bush’s masterful orchestration of the unifica-
tion of Germany, the peaceful end of the Cold War, and victory in 
the Persian Gulf war, enough voters believed he had taken his eye off 
the ball on problems at home to elect a new President committed to 
domestic renewal and “the economy, stupid.” The mood was decidedly 
inward-looking; there was talk of a peace dividend and retrenchment 
from global exertions.26 A new case would have to be made for con-
tinued U.S. engagement in Europe. This was the context in which the 
Clinton Administration came into office in January 1993. 
Euro-Atlantic Architecture
Behind the twists and turns of politics, underlying continuities were 
visible in the U.S. approach to Europe. A relatively coherent strategic 
vision was emerging of how the various pieces of Euro-Atlantic archi-
tecture had to transform and adapt. That included but went far beyond 
NATO. The question was as much how NATO should fit as what it 
should do.
This focus on “architecture” does not necessarily come naturally to 
Americans, who by tradition and instinct are often inclined to want to 
solve foreign policy problems rather than manage them. From the end 
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of the Cold War in 1989 until Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014, 
hardly a week went by without a U.S. pundit heralding the end of Eu-
ropean security problems, or a U.S. politician, in good Yankee jargon, 
proclaiming Europe ‘fixed.’ The implication of these pronouncements, 
of course, was that NATO, mission accomplished, could be dissolved. 
This view not only ignored the fact that Europe’s security issues 
were not “solved” by the Cold War’s end; it underestimated the con-
tinuing relevance of institutions to Europe’s security. Europe’s diversity 
and historic rivalries remain a determining aspect of efforts to maintain 
stability. Maintaining peace in Europe has traditionally depended on a 
complicated set of structures that balanced often-conflicting interests. 
From the European perspective, the many contradictions and strains in 
European power relations have become more manageable largely as a 
result of institutional devices, none more imaginative or successful than 
NATO, the European Union, and the OSCE. 
Euro-Atlantic Architecture in 2000
For additional details about this diagram, see Strobe Talbott, The Great Experiment: The Story of 
Ancient Empires, Modern States, and the Quest for a Global Nation, Simon & Schuster Paperback 
(New York, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster, 2009), pp. 319-321.
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At one point along the way Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Tal-
bott asked for a visual depiction of the emerging architecture. I worked 
with colleagues to craft a solar system of 13 colored overlapping circles, 
with the names of countries grouped according to the institutions to 
which they belonged. It was complicated. Secretary of State Madeleine 
Albright joked that “you have to be either a genius or French to keep 
it all straight.” 27
Despite its complications, this dense web of interlocking institutions 
and mechanisms was essential to Euro-Atlantic and European security 
and prosperity. It was how Europeans built their security. Albright said 
the Euro-chart reminded her of an inscrutable comment a French dip-
lomat actually made once in response to an American proposal: “It will 
work in practice, yes. But will it work in theory?” 28
Strobe Talbott later said that “I saw NATO enlargement as an objec-
tive that not only made sense in theory but might work in practice—as 
long as we could avoid causing a train wreck (a phrase common in the 
predictions of the policy’s opponents) in our relations with Russia.”29
This story is how decision-makers sought to align practice with 
theory.
Distractions and Divisions
Bill Clinton came into office in January 1993 focused on his domes-
tic agenda. When it came to foreign policy, the President’s priorities 
were to ramp up U.S. support for democratic reform in Russia and to 
raise the profile of economic themes in U.S. engagement abroad by rat-
ifying the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), finalizing 
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, and jumpstart-
ing Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The Administration’s 
attention was further diverted by crises in Somalia and Haiti. 
When it came to Europe, the administration was beset by a welter of 
discrete challenges, most left on the Bush Administration’s plate when 
it walked out the door. Bosnia preoccupied attention, but there was 
little appetite for U.S. engagement—in spite of Clinton’s emotive rhet-
oric and accusation during the election campaign that Bush was doing 
too little to address the humanitarian crisis in Yugoslavia.
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Debates over the appropriate role for post-Cold War NATO were 
inconclusive; at a cabinet meeting on October 18, 1993 the Adminis-
tration decided, in Strobe Talbott’s words, to “kick the can” down the 
road.30 
Clinton was more preoccupied with growing instability in Rus-
sia. Meeting in March of that year, Clinton and German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl declared that ensuring Russian democracy was a “para-
mount challenge” and that “the rest of the G7 countries must cooperate 
with us and each other to vigorously produce a program of support for 
Russia.”31 Both worried that Boris Yeltsin could be toppled if economic 
and political transformation did not soon take root. A failed coup at-
tempt in September heightened those fears. “This guy’s in the fight of 
his life,” Clinton exclaimed.32 He was intent on doing what he could 
to help Yeltsin. He managed to secure Congressional support of $2.5 
billion for the post-Soviet nations, two-thirds of which would go to 
Russia. Kohl urged Clinton to include Yeltsin as a full participant in the 
G-7; objections by the U.S. Treasury Department, however, convinced 
the President to distinguish between a G7 without Russia on financial 
issues and a G8 with Russia on political issues. 
Other challenges revolved around defusing potential tensions re-
maining from Soviet era. One was to persuade Russia to withdraw 
troops from Estonia and Latvia, which it did in 1994.33 The other was 
to continue the Bush Administration’s efforts to reduce Cold War ar-
senals of weapons of mass destruction, including dismantling nuclear 
weapons stockpiles with the former Soviet Union. 
These issues were not easily subsumed under some grand vision for 
transatlantic partnership, nor was that the President’s inclination. A first 
effort to define an overarching “Clinton Doctrine” came when Presi-
dent Clinton’s National Security Advisor Tony Lake set forth a strategy 
of enlargement of the community of democracies and market econ-
omies in a speech at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced 
International Studies in September 1993. The Central and Eastern 
European region, located adjacent to the transatlantic community and 
showing prospects for success, was a perfect place to demonstrate that 
the Clinton Administration could implement that vision.34
Nonetheless, despite entreaties earlier that year by German Defense 
Minister Volker Rühe as well as Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa, József An-
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tall and other Central and Eastern European leaders, given the Clin-
ton Administration’s other priorities it was unclear how committed it 
was to having the United States integrally involved in European affairs 
overall, not to mention the particular concerns of Central Europeans.35
Nor had the Clinton Administration translated Lake’s broad doc-
trine of enlargement into an operational European strategy. While 
Clinton later said that he had already contemplated the enlargement 
of NATO as a way to secure the gains for freedom and democracy in 
Central and Eastern Europe during his election campaign in 1992,36 
Tony Lake described the President’s position as “not so much a policy 
as an attitude.”37
It was within this context that divisions became apparent within the 
Clinton Administration, as other authors in this volume explain. Dif-
ferences turned on interpretations of the Partnership for Peace (PfP), 
which became a temporizing compromise—construed as a first step to 
NATO enlargement by those who were inclined to support it, or as a 
holding station of undetermined duration by those who were not. The 
divisions within the administration were reflected by similar divisions 
within the Alliance.38 
The action-forcing event was President Clinton’s first trip to Europe 
in January 1994. The President set the tone. On the eve of his trip he 
said that he did not want to give the impression that the United States 
was creating another dividing line in Europe after it had worked for 
decades to get rid of the one that existed before. He added, however, 
that PfP would “permit the expansion of NATO, and I fully expect that 
it will lead to that at some point.”39
Each side of the debate thought the President had sided with them. 
Those opposing enlargement focused on the part of his statement about 
no more dividing lines. Those favoring enlargement focused on the 
President’s clear expectation that NATO enlargement would happen.
At the January NATO Summit, the President declared that PfP “sets 
in motion a process that leads to the enlargement of NATO.” And then 
two days later in Prague, he said “the question is no longer whether 
NATO will take on new members but when and how.” Clinton also 
raised the issue of what he called the architecture of European secu-
rity with Yeltsin in Moscow, but did not set forth a systematic view of 
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what that could be. 40 The Brussels NATO Summit had made clear that 
NATO “plainly contemplated an expansion,” he said, but that was for 
an unspecified future, and PfP was “the real thing now.”41
For several months after Clinton’s pronouncements in January, the 
issue of NATO enlargement had dropped down the Administration’s 
priority list. The Pentagon and the State Department had more press-
ing concerns, including continued denuclearization efforts in the for-
mer Soviet Union and the need to get the Partnership for Peace up and 
running. 42 Attention of senior officials remained on Bosnia after the 
horrific February bombing of the Sarajevo marketplace. As Christo-
pher writes, “Not only did this conflict occupy much of our time and 
energy, but psychologically we found it exceedingly difficult to focus 
on expansion while NATO groped for a way to stop the bloodshed in 
southern Europe.”43
America and the Berlin Republic 
“They’ve asked me to be Ambassador to Germany. You have to come 
with me.” 
Richard Holbrooke was on the line. I had worked closely with him 
when I coordinated two U.S. national commissions on the future of 
U.S. foreign policy at the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace. Holbrooke had been a member of the first commission, chaired 
by Winston Lord and Stephen Bosworth, which in June 1992 issued a 
report Changing Our Ways, intended as a bipartisan blueprint for a post-
Cold U.S. foreign policy. Mort Abramowitz, the Endowment’s presi-
dent, then asked Holbrooke to chair, and me to coordinate, a follow-on 
effort to propose ways to restructure the U.S. government’s foreign 
policy apparatus for a new age. Our proposals were instrumental to the 
Clinton’s Administration’s creation of the National Economic Council 
in the White House, the position of Undersecretary for Global Affairs 
in the State Department, and a variety of other innovations.44 
Following the 1992 election, Holbrooke and I parted ways—he the 
Asianist, I the Europeanist. Holbrooke was angling for a senior posi-
tion in the new Administration—preferably U.S. Ambassador to Japan. 
In the end, Walter Mondale expressed interest in the job. The next 
country on the list was Germany—not Holbrooke’s first choice. As he 
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considered, he called me to say that if he took the job, given his own 
relative inexperience with Germany he would need someone as his own 
personal policy advisor on German affairs (Mondale had done the same 
on Japan). I agreed, but told him that my wife and I were about to have 
a baby who would most likely need to undergo a bone marrow trans-
plant. I could not come right away. We discussed asking Fritz Stern, an 
eminent scholar of Germany, to join Holbrooke for the fall of 1993; I 
would come in early 1994.
We also agreed that I would use my remaining time at the Endow-
ment to chart how the United States should reframe its relations with a 
united Germany in the post-Cold War era. I asked a number of senior 
Democratic and Republican opinion leaders, including a few Clinton 
Administration officials (in their personal capacity) to join the project.45 
Our deliberations informed a short book I finished in the fall of 1993. 
Holbrooke, now in Bonn, received my drafts, providing comments and 
urging policy-relevant recommendations. 
In the book I suggested a variety of ways Americans might approach 
a Germany undergoing a significant transformation. I coined the term 
“Berlin Republic” to explain that while deep continuities bound united 
Germany to the West German “Bonn Republic” to which U.S. de-
cision-makers had grown accustomed, it found itself in a profoundly 
different situation. The “Berlin Republic,” I argued, would not simply 
be the “Bonn Republic” writ large. It was likely to be a more open 
yet less settled society, more volatile politically, more pressured eco-
nomically, and less circumspect internationally than the west German 
“Bonn Republic” to which Germany’s neighbors and allies—and the 
Germans themselves—had grown accustomed over forty years. The 
United States and Germany would remain pivotal partners, but would 
now need to harness their relationship to shape a new transatlantic ar-
chitecture.46
The first objective would need to be a German-American strategic 
partnership toward Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet succes-
sor states. This would be needed to revamp Europe’s collective defense 
and security organizations, which in turn would hinge on active U.S. 
engagement in Europe and a German commitment to establish the po-
litical and operational preconditions to fulfill its part of a new security 
bargain. Germany would need to “transform itself from an importer 
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to an exporter of security and stability.” I argued that there was a vital 
strategic convergence between the United States and Germany with 
regard to the east. “This can and should be translated into a strategic 
partnership that acts as the drivewheel of progress to export democrat-
ic structures, assist market-oriented reforms, secure arms reductions, 
develop habits of military cooperation and promote civilian control of 
the military throughout eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states, 
while facilitating their association and eventual integration into west-
ern structures.” Other Allies and partners would of course be included, 
but the bilateral relationship would be the essential fulcrum of change. 
The strategy would need to embrace a panoply of security, economic 
and political instruments, and seek to reshape and reorient the prima-
ry institutions of NATO, the U.S.-EU partnership, and the CSCE to 
these ends. 
While NATO’s core purpose of collective defense had to be main-
tained, “to it must now be added the purposes of collective crisis man-
agement, force projection “out of area” and export of stability to the 
east…NATO will be unable to guarantee security in the West unless it 
is able to operate with non-NATO members in the east.” While sup-
porting the principle of NATO enlargement, I argued that “precipi-
tous” enlargement “could undermine rather than enhance prospects 
for greater peace and stability in Europe.” That phrasing captured the 
prevailing thinking within the Clinton Administration at the time, with 
Holbrooke parsing the language as I was writing and with other se-
nior officials (and RAND analyst Ron Asmus) participating in the study 
group deliberations. The “practical reality,” I argued, was that east Eu-
ropean nations are not ready to become NATO members overnight. 
Moving NATO suddenly to the Russian border could easily be misun-
derstood: It could create a Russian threat where there is not one today.” 
At the time, the Partnership for Peace appeared to be a pragmatic 
effort to navigate these shoals. Joseph Kruzel, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for NATO and a member of my study group, argued 
strongly for its relevance. Ultimately, however, I wrote that the PfP 
could only be “a station along the way to a fundamentally new relation-
ship between east and west that will require the United States to clarify 
whether the consolidation of democracy in the region is of sufficient 
national interest to extend a security guarantee…It may well be in the 
U.S national interest to commit men and women from Montana, Wis-
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consin and Virginia to defend the eastern borders of Poland, Slovenia 
and Hungary—but not without a major national debate.” The possibil-
ity for enlargement was there, but I argued at the time that such a com-
mitment would be hollow unless anchored by a bipartisan consensus in 
the United States.
If NATO’s new outreach to the East was to work, it had to be cou-
pled with a rebalancing within the West. “The United States must be 
willing to allow Europeans to deal with crises on their doorstep should 
the United States be unwilling or unable. I welcomed the idea of 
Combined Joint Task Forces and with them the premise that Europe’s 
emerging defense identity should be “separable but not separate from 
NATO.”
Meanwhile, Richard Holbrooke arrived in Germany in September 
1993 with two notions. He was quickly disabused of both.
The first was that as Ambassador to newly unified Germany he should 
devote priority attention reaching out to the 16 million East Germans 
whose views of the United States had been shaped by life in the Soviet 
bloc. He soon understood, however, that it was the West Germans who 
needed tending. West German elites were deeply unnerved by the pros-
pect that the United States might disengage from Europe, which might 
also mean that NATO could also eventually disappear and with it the 
very foundation of Germany’s security. Holbrooke spent a good deal 
of his time reassuring primarily West Germans that the U.S. remained 
committed to Europe and would not abandon Europe for home or for 
a Pacific vocation. The Germans no longer feared a massive invasion 
across the Central European plain. But they were concerned that the 
aftershocks of the political and economic earthquakes that had shak-
en Europe’s East threatened to spill over into its West in the form of 
mass migration, xenophobia, economic dislocation, secessionist move-
ments and regional instabilities. German officials became increasingly 
concerned that their Western partners, including Washington, did not 
share their sense of urgency.
Holbrooke did share this urgency, especially with regard to the 
unfolding tragedy in the Balkans, which he often called the greatest 
failure of the West since the 1930s. Yet his second notion was that 
EU membership was the most important and quickest potential bond 
for East Europeans who had freed themselves from the Soviet em-
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pire yet found themselves in a grey zone—no longer “East,” but not 
yet “West.” NATO membership would come later. He was again dis-
abused of this notion: 
What turned me around was the realization that the EU, mired in 
its own Euro-mess (the common currency, the endless arguments 
about process, its inner-directedness, and its failure on Bosnia), 
was not going to invite any of these countries in, at the earliest, be-
fore 2003. They had lived through a terrible century, and were still 
plagued by instability, insecurity, and immaturity. In short, they 
were vulnerable to a number of different scenarios that would have 
sent them back into new darkness. 
I concluded it would be irresponsible and potentially dangerous 
to leave these countries outside the “West” for so long after the 
fall of communism. Close association with the West seemed the 
best inoculation against such an outcome—but only if it could be 
accomplished without a setback to Washington’s efforts to forge a 
productive relationship with Russia, the administration’s most im-
pressive and sustained foreign policy achievement. In short, could 
we have our cake and eat it too?47
Holbrooke’s considerations had been shaped by his conversations 
with German leaders, particularly Chancellor Helmut Kohl and De-
fense Minister Volker Rühe. Rühe had come out publicly to support 
NATO’s opening to the east. Kohl was more cautious, believing that 
such efforts had to be balanced with attention to Russian insecurities. 
Nonetheless, Holbrooke often cited Kohl’s powerful phrase that Ger-
many “cannot remain indefinitely Europe’s eastern border,” straddling 
a new front line between stability and instability, as an important con-
sideration. 
On Track . . . and Then Off the Rails
During the winter and spring of 1994, as the crisis in Bosnia contin-
ued to deteriorate, the Partnership for Peace was announced, and Pres-
ident Clinton issued his famous statement that the question of NATO 
enlargement was no longer “whether, but when,” there was a growing 
sense among the President’s senior advisors, principally Tony Lake and 
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Strobe Talbott, that the Administration’s Russia policy and its Europe 
policy were coming unstuck. 
Talbott had been appointed Deputy Secretary of State in February 
1994 and so now needed to focus on how to make his Russia portfolio 
align with overall U.S. foreign policy goals, particularly regarding Eu-
rope. He and Lake convinced the President that Holbrooke needed to 
come back to Washington as Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs. As Holbrooke told me upon breaking the news, “Dan, we’ve 
got two jobs to do: Bring peace to Bosnia and enlarge NATO.” He 
asked me to come back to Washington with him, as his policy advisor, 
to direct the European Bureau’s office of policy and public outreach. 
Holbrooke and Talbott agreed that they would need to reach a com-
mon position on NATO enlargement and its relationship to Russia pol-
icy and other elements of Europe’s security landscape before Holbrooke 
arrived back in Washington. As Holbrooke recalled, they agreed that 
“Central Europe needed the reassurance of an American commitment 
to their security; the issue was whether or not this could be accom-
plished without wrecking the emerging U.S.-Russian relationship.” 48
Meanwhile, Lake was frustrated that at such an historic moment for 
the U.S.-European relationship the Administration was not showing 
how various U.S. initiatives fit together into a coherent vision.49 He 
wanted to use the President’s visit to France on June 8, 1994 to move 
the ball forward. Speaking before the French National Assembly, the 
President alluded to the need to adapt the broad range of Europe’s 
security institutions “to meet new imperatives.” He expressed under-
standing for “the historical anxieties” of Central and Eastern Europe. 
He then declared that “The security of those states is important to our 
own security. And we are committed to NATO’s expansion.”50 
The President had again publicly expressed his support for enlarge-
ment of the Alliance. Those statements, however, had yet to be translat-
ed into operational policy. With the interagency debate at a standstill, 
Lake asked his own staff for a blueprint, which he received and sent to 
the President in late June. Talbott had commented and supported. It 
argued that the Administration had to make the case that expansion was 
not a threat to any other country, would be stabilizing and reduce the 
security vacuum in central Europe. It argued that the President had to 
take the ball forward on his July trip to Europe, which he did in War-
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saw on July 1 when he said “in my view, NATO will be expanded, that 
it should be expanded.” He characterized the Partnership for Peace as 
a “first step toward expansion of NATO,” and “now what we have to do 
is to get the NATO partners together and to discuss what the next steps 
should be.”51 He reiterated his stance a few days later again in Berlin, 
meeting with Kohl and with Holbrooke at his side. 
As Alexander Vershbow recounts in this volume, he and his NSC 
colleagues then moved the ball forward again with a memo to Lake 
on July 15 entitled “NATO Expansion—Next Steps.” He proposed 
launching exploratory discussions in September with key Allies on the 
issues of criteria and a timetable to be followed by a broader discussion 
in the Alliance as a whole. He suggested using the December meeting 
of NATO Foreign Ministers to launch a NATO enlargement study to 
start spelling out in greater detail U.S. and allied thinking on a NA-
TO-Russia relationship. Lake agreed.52
Holbrooke was also concerned that the foreign affairs and defense 
bureaucracy was bucking the President’s wishes when it came to en-
largement. By the time he returned to Washington, he and Talbott had 
reached a common position: “it was possible to bring new members 
into NATO, slower than the Kissingers and the Brzezinskis wanted but 
faster than the Pentagon and some others desired.” 53
The first job was to tame the bureaucracy and get it pointed in the 
direction of the President’s policy. The first occasion came on Labor 
Day weekend in early September. Vice President Gore was to give the 
keynote speech on the occasion of the departure of the storied Berlin 
Brigade, which had safeguarded the city’s safety during the Cold War. 
Holbrooke wanted to ensure that Gore would reaffirm President Clin-
ton’s statements that year in Brussels, Prague, Paris, Warsaw and Ber-
lin that NATO enlargement was moving forward. I worked with John 
Kornblum, now the Principal Deputy of the European Bureau, to craft 
strong language.54 The Pentagon wasn’t buying it, as Wesley Clark re-
counts in this volume. Drafts kept flying back and forth to Holbrooke, 
who was in Berlin for the speech. I was in Berlin with Holbrooke, who 
asked me to work with Kornblum and Tom Malinowski, a talented 
member of the Policy Planning Staff, to make sure the language re-
mained robust. In the end, Holbrooke prevailed. Gore tore his Achilles 
tendon and did not make the trip, but he still gave the speech via video 
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link. The key sentence was Gore’s public statement that “We will begin 
our discussions” on NATO enlargement “this fall.” 55
The next opportunity came with the interagency grouping Hol-
brooke was now leading in Washington. At the group’s dramatic first 
meeting, I watched as Holbrooke asserted clear control, as described 
by Wesley Clark and other authors in this volume. “When Holbrooke 
sat down with his colleagues in September and October 1994,” James 
Goldgeier recounts, “he was not reopening a discussion of the issue; 
rather, he was presenting his counterparts with a fait accompli.”56 
Meanwhile, the President continued to define the policy. At a pri-
vate lunch in the White House on September 27, Clinton told Yeltsin 
directly that “there will be an expansion of NATO.” He sought to re-
assure Yeltsin that the issue was about addressing Central European 
fears “of being left in a grey area or purgatory,” and it was about max-
imizing the chances of “a truly united, undivided, integrated Europe” 
in which Russia would be included. Clinton emphasized that there was 
no timetable, and that U.S. policy would be guided by “three no’s”: no 
surprises, no rush, and no exclusion of Russia.57 
Holbrooke was now accelerating NATO expansion discussions. 
When General Clark, Joseph Kruzel and other Pentagon officials ex-
pressed concern at the difficulties of enlargement because new mem-
bers would have to fulfill over 1000 standardization agreements, Hol-
brooke asked them to prepare a study on the “how” of enlargement, 
which they presented to the interagency group in October 1994, and 
which served as an initial framing document for NATO’s own 1995 
enlargement study. 
Meanwhile, as Alexander Vershbow recounts in his chapter, the 
NSC staff had prepared a strategy paper for NATO enlargement in 
which a timeline would be announced during Clinton’s first term and 
enlargement accomplished early in the second term.58 The paper listed 
five objectives for the end of the year: launching a formal Alliance re-
view on a framework for expansion; an initial sketch of benchmarks for 
potential new members; an expanded PfP program for future members 
and non-members alike; an expanded NATO-Russia relationship; and 
a strengthened OSCE to underscore Western interest to include Russia 
in a new European security architecture.59
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The next step was to build what Holbrooke called the “two-year 
plan” for the remainder of Clinton’s first term to upgrade and recast Eu-
ro-Atlantic architecture. The effort would be built on multiple pillars: a 
new NATO, a revamped U.S.-EU relationship, and transformation of 
the CSCE into the OSCE. Russia policy and European policy needed 
to move along parallel tracks, with the realization that in the end they 
were also intertwined. And Bosnia, if untamed, would cause all of it to 
crumble. The core rationale for an integrated approach would turn on 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
In November Holbrooke asked me to work with Bureau colleagues 
to articulate the Administration’s comprehensive approach to a trans-
formed Euro-Atlantic architecture for a speech Secretary Christopher 
was slated to give on November 28.60 The timing was important. Rus-
sia was teed up to join the Partnership for Peace at the NATO Foreign 
Ministers meeting on December 1, and on December 5 Boris Yeltsin 
would join President Clinton and the leaders of the CSCE states to 
herald its transformation into the Organization for Security and Coop-
eration in Europe—another pillar in the updated concept. It was im-
portant to signal to the Russians—as well as to Allies and other Euro-
pean countries—how the Administration was approaching the various 
pieces of the puzzle. 
Things did not go as planned. In the end, Christopher did not give 
his speech due to other conflicts. The Russians had learned of the inter-
agency group’s work and the Pentagon’s study on what it would take to 
actually enlarge the Alliance. On November 29 Yeltsin complained in a 
letter to Clinton about what he called U.S. efforts intent on “speeding 
up the broadening of NATO.”61 Three days later Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev unexpectedly refused to sign up for the Partnership of Peace, 
as he recounts in his own personal recollection in this volume. On De-
cember 5 in Budapest, Yeltsin lashed out publicly at a surprised and 
none-to-happy Clinton, accusing him of “sowing the seeds of mistrust” 
and plunging Europe into a “cold peace.”62 
Vice President Al Gore tried to patch things up with Yeltsin and 
other Russian leaders on a visit to Moscow December 16, underscoring 
that Washington was not subordinating relations with Russia to NATO 
expansion. Gore stressed that the two processes would move forward 
in tandem, with no surprises, and that no new countries would enter 
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NATO in 1995.63 Talbott and Christopher followed with their own 
conversations with Russian interlocuters in January 1995, but with lit-
tle progress.64 The only bright spot had been the December 1994 Bu-
dapest Memorandum, signed by the United States, the United King-
dom, and the Russian Federation, containing security assurances for 
Ukraine in return for renouncing its status as a nuclear weapons state.65
The situation was not good. NATO Allies wondered what was hap-
pening, Central Europeans were worried about abandonment, and 
Russian suspicions were high. The Republicans had taken control of 
Congress in the November 1994 elections, in part on the basis of their 
“Contract with America,” which included robust support for NATO 
enlargement. Pundits were also starting to shape the public debate. 
Former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski com-
mented in Foreign Affairs on the need to eliminate “any potentially 
disruptive geopolitical vacuum between Europe and the new Russia.66 
In Europe, Kohl confidante Michael Mertes joined with French com-
mentator Dominique Moïsi to urge Western governments to focus on 
“the security vacuum” between Germany and Russia, the area where 
European wars have historically started,67 a region described by Henry 
Kissinger as a strategic “no-man’s land between the German and Rus-
sian peoples.68 
These dynamics rendered more urgent the effort to articulate and 
operationalize President Clinton’s “predisposition” to enlargement and 
square it with his commitment to support Russian reforms within a re-
cast architecture for U.S. engagement in, and with, Europe. The draft 
speech now needed to be recast into an article, which was finished in 
January and published in the next issue of Foreign Affairs. It became 
the road map for U.S. European policy. Subsequent statements by the 
President and senior officials throughout the remaining six years of the 
Clinton Administration hewed closely to and expanded upon the ratio-
nale set forth in the article. 
The emerging architecture was based on six cornerstones. 
America, a European Power
The core premise of the article, as reflected in the title, was that 
America was a European power. “Should we add a question mark?” 
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Holbrooke asked me. The answer was a resolute no. The question 
mark had been the problem. 
For decades the United States had been a European power. By that 
we meant it had been integral to the continental balances, coalitions 
and institutions that maintained stability, protected democracy, and ex-
panded prosperity for half the continent. Now, with Cold War divides 
disappearing, Europeans across the continent were asking themselves 
whether the United States would remain as deeply committed and in-
volved in Europe’s security as it had been in the past.69 It was also not 
immediately obvious to Americans that the United States should be so 
engaged. With the Cold War over, it was tempting to say that it was 
time for the Europeans to work this out themselves, while Americans 
focused on problems at home.
The Administration itself had not decided whether Europe was a 
priority. The United States was in danger of drifting from being a Eu-
ropean power to a power in Europe—selectively engaged, distracted 
by other challenges, and less intuitively convinced of the link between 
European order and global order.
It was time to erase the question mark with a strong justification of 
American engagement in the post-Cold War era.70 After two world wars 
and a forty-year Cold War there was an enormous historic opportunity 
to build down Europe’s divisions. But dangers abounded. Europe was 
not yet there. It remained turbulent und unfinished. Without America’s 
active and comprehensive engagement, the continent was in danger of 
succumbing to new instabilities: “In the 21st century, Europe will still 
need the active American involvement that has been a necessary com-
ponent of the continental balance for half a century. Conversely, an un-
stable Europe would still threaten essential national security interests 
of the United States.”71 
The assertion that the United States remained a European power 
became a standard refrain of the President and other senior officials 
throughout the remainder of the Clinton Presidency.72
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Shaping a New Architecture
Second, understanding its role as a European power meant that the 
United States had to affirm its role as stakeholder and shaper of the 
post-Cold War architecture. “As far back as we can remember, ques-
tions of war and peace in Europe—with their vast effect on the rest 
of the world—have been decided by architecture—the architecture of 
security.” 73 Holbrooke cited Jean Monnet, the great architect of Eu-
ropean unity, who had said that “nothing is possible without men, but 
nothing is lasting without institutions.” The efforts of Monnet, Mar-
shall, and others, Holbrooke wrote, “produced unparalleled peace and 
prosperity for half a century—but only for half a continent.” 74 Now it 
was time for the United States to reach beyond old divides and to lead 
in the creation of a security architecture “that includes and thereby sta-
bilizes all of Europe—the West, the former Soviet satellites of central 
Europe, and, most critically, Russia and the former republics of the 
Soviet Union.” 75 
Cold War architecture was static; it reflected the nature of the East-
West stalemate. The new architecture, in contrast, had to be dynamic; 
it needed to address the open nature of the new Europe. While NATO 
was the “central security pillar of the new architecture,”76 others were 
also essential, including the EU and the OSCE. Each, however, would 
need to transform internally and be open externally. 
John Kornblum elaborated on the architectural metaphor: 
The history of Europe, the relationships among the countries of 
Europe, and in fact the relationships between the United States 
and Europe—at least in this century—have tended to be orga-
nized around structures of one sort or another…By architecture 
we mean relationships among peoples, among countries, among 
organizations which give both the sense and the substance of co-
operation, or maintenance of stability, or maintenance of predict-
ability…Since 1991, ’92, with the end of the communist regimes in 
Central Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe has 
been without a clearly defined security architecture. It has been in 
a period of considerable transition and this has led both to con-
flicts—many of which were papered over under the old security 
architecture—and to a good deal of uncertainty among peoples, 
both East and West, as to what, in fact the future security rela-
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tionships in Europe are to be…..building a security architecture 
in Europe really is the essential question of building democracy, 
building stable societies, and ultimately building a stable and just 
peace across the continent….
I want to stress that the approach of the United States is not to 
define NATO as the only aspect of the security architecture. It’s an 
important one, a very important one, but it’s not the only one. And 
we would never argue that you can have any kind of stable peace in 
Europe if you just base it on NATO.77
Strobe Talbott often used the architectural metaphor. “The goal,” 
he said, was to “help build a Europe that is whole and free and at peace 
for the first time in its history”:
The means, as we see it, are largely institutional—or, as is often 
said, architectural. We are building a structure in which we and 
our children and our grandchildren will make our homes. The 
foundation of that structure is a shared commitment to democrat-
ic governance, to civil society, to sustainable development through 
the dynamism of the free market, to the rule of law and human 
rights, to the principles of mutual respect, and to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes…The task of constructing a new Europe 
requires us to adapt existing structures where possible and build 
new ones where necessary…The size, the scope, the job descrip-
tions, and the membership lists of these institutions are different, 
but their missions and their compositions are often overlapping. In 
some key respects, they are mutually reinforcing. Together, they 
make up the superstructure of the new Europe.78
In 1991 James Baker had already set forth a U.S. vision for future 
European security structures based on an interlocking series of insti-
tutions based on NATO, the European Community and the CSCE 
grounded in common values of democracy and human rights. The 
Clinton Administration, however, had to put in place the operational 
strategy to realize that vision.79 As then-U.S. Ambassador to NATO 
Robert Hunter later recalled, “one reason that NATO took three and a 
half years from the moment of deciding to enlarge to the naming of the 
first invitees: it was essential to build a broad, encompassing architec-
ture that could include all countries engaged in European security.” 80
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The Challenge of Central Europe 
Third, to be effective, the new architecture needed to address what 
Holbrooke called Europe’s “greatest threat,” which was no longer So-
viet expansionism but “local conflicts, internal political and economic 
instability and the return of historical grievances…Any blueprint for 
the new security architecture of Europe must focus first on central Eu-
rope, the seedbed of more turmoil and tragedy in this century than any 
other area on the continent.” 81 Failed efforts of the past, from Ver-
sailles and Trianon to Yalta and Potsdam, and the collapse of the Sovi-
et empire had “left throughout central Europe a legacy of unresolved 
and often conflicting historical resentments, ambitions, and, most dan-
gerous, territorial and ethnic disputes. Without democracy, stability, 
and free-market economics, these lands remain vulnerable to the same 
problems, often exacerbated by an obsession with righting historical 
wrongs, real or mythical. If any of these malignancies spread—as they 
have already in parts of the Balkans and Transcaucasus—general Euro-
pean stability is again at risk.” 82
The dangers were apparent. “East-Central Europe is littered with 
potential mini-Weimar republics,” RAND analysts Ronald D. Asmus, 
Steven Larrabee and Richard Kugler had written some months earlier, 
“each capable of inflicting immense violence on the others.”83 
The opportunity, however, was historic. The wild mélange of post-
ers and placards borne by the many thousands of people who in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s had jumped into their Trabants, Skodas and 
Ladas and taken to the streets of Budapest, Gdansk, Prague, Leipzig, 
Bucharest and other central and eastern European cities essentially 
carried one message: “We want to return to Europe”—to be part of a 
Europe to which they had always belonged, and yet had been prevented 
from joining because of where the Red Army stopped in the summer of 
1945. Their message had unleashed an earthquake that was shaking the 
continent and its institutions. Their message was both opportunity and 
obligation: the opportunity to build a continent that was truly whole, 
free, and at peace with itself, and the obligation to see it through. “For 
the first time in history” the nations of central Europe have the chance 
simultaneously “to enjoy stability, freedom and independence based on 
another first: the adoption of Western democratic ideals as a founda-
tion for all of Europe.” 84 It was imperative that Western Europe and 
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the United States “jointly ensure that tolerant democracies become 
rooted throughout all of Europe and that the seething, angry, unre-
solved legacies of the past are contained and solved.” 85
Holbrooke underscored the urgency of action. “It would be a trag-
edy if, through delay or indecision, the West helped create conditions 
that brought about the very problems it fears the most. The West must 
expand to central Europe as fast as possible in fact as well as in spirit…
Stability in central Europe is essential to general European security, 
and it is still far from assured.” 86 
The Administration had come to understood both opportunity and 
obligation. It realized it would need to balance its message that the 
doors to the West stood open with a “tough love” message that only 
those countries who could consolidate democracy, build market econ-
omies, control their militaries, and reconcile with their neighbors had 
any chance of walking through those doors. 
The opportunity to develop the Central Europe theme came when 
Karsten Voigt, President of the North Atlantic Assembly, asked Hol-
brooke to join German Defense Minister Volker Rühe at the Assem-
bly’s spring meeting in Budapest on May 29. Holbrooke asked me to 
prepare his speech with a strong emphasis on the significance of Central 
Europe, but with a strong “tough love” message.87 We went through 
successive drafts; he was very focused on the importance of this talk. 
In many ways this speech was a bookend to the Foreign Affairs article. 
The United States, Holbrooke declared, would “support the entry 
of the nations of Central Europe into the institutions of Europe—the 
European Union, NATO, the OECD, and the Council of Europe.” 
88 Then came the tough love message. “The people of Central and 
Eastern Europe now have a real opportunity to create a lasting peace,” 
he said. “But to do so, they must be prepared for one final act of lib-
eration—this time from the unresolved legacies of their own tragic, 
violent, and angry past.” 
For the peoples of this region, the words Versailles, Trianon, Mu-
nich, Yalta, or Potsdam are not just names on the map; they are liv-
ing legacies of conflicting historical resentments, ambitions, and, 
most dangerous, unresolved territorial or tribal quarrels—quarrels 
that allowed the false ideologies of fascism and communism to 
Piece of the Puzzle 29
prosper, and that now threaten progress toward integrating Cen-
tral Europe into an undivided Europe.
Even as democracy and free markets sweep the continent, armed 
conflict and political instability are more pervasive and severe than 
at any time during the past half century. They are concentrated in 
Southeastern Europe, extending to the region beyond our NATO 
allies, Greece and Turkey. I submit to you that this vast region—
including its neighbors in the Transcaucasus, and Syria, Iraq, and 
Iran—has become the most explosive region on earth. Ottomans 
and Habsburgs, czars and commissars have left behind them un-
resolved legacies that continue to roil the entire area. Some, such 
as Bosnia, Croatia, Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechnya, 
have already exploded. Others continue to fester, such as tensions 
over Cyprus or those between Athens and Tirana, Athens and Sko-
pje, Bratislava and Budapest, Budapest and Bucharest, Bucharest 
and Kiev, Kiev and Moscow, even Rome and Ljubljana.
These forces, if not contained, risk holding the new Europe hos-
tage to its own history.
Every country in this region, no matter what the current state of 
its economy, can aspire to join in time this rich tapestry of nations. 
But joining the core institutions of the West is not the same as 
joining a country club. Countries aspiring to enjoy the benefits of 
membership also have the responsibility to meet its obligations. 
Holbrooke laid out the terms. Stability did not come solely from ex-
ternal guarantees; it must be built from within. Democratic structures 
were important. So was a vibrant civil society, independent institutions, 
a free press, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, includ-
ing the free expression of ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities in an 
area in which peoples and borders do not match. No one country should 
seek to join the European mainstream by leaving its neighbors behind. 
Democratic pluralism demands regional cooperation. Borders must not 
be changed by force. Holbrooke cited a host of examples where Central 
European countries were engaged in reconciliation and cooperation; he 
also admonished his Hungarian hosts and others for areas where such 
reconciliation had yet to take place. The message: The United States 
would stand with those ready to make the changes needed to truly “re-
turn to Europe”—but they would have to lead the way. 
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Secretary of Defense William Perry echoed these sentiments in a 
February 5 speech to the Wehrkunde Munich Security Conference. Per-
ry set forth what became known as the “Perry Principles,” the criteria 
by which NATO would judge the new members eligible: they had to 
make commitments to democracy and markets, to the sovereignty of 
others, to NATO’s consensus decision-making, to developing interop-
erability in doctrine and equipment, and to the defense of the other 
allies. 89
Holbrooke’s “tough love” message, together with the “Perry princi-
ples,” gave the Administration leverage and helped it to define a time-
table for deeper integration that would enable it to build support within 
the Alliance and align the Central European track with its efforts with 
Russia. It became a became a standard refrain for Administration offi-
cials. Kornblum brought home the point: “The most important securi-
ty architecture is to be found inside countries. It is democratic develop-
ment, democratic systems, free market economies.” 90  
A Place for Russia?
The next piece of the architectural puzzle was Russia. Holbrooke, 
Talbott and other senior officials were consistently clear that the dy-
namic of integration was not directed at Russia, in fact it could help de-
fine the role of Russia which, in Holbrooke’s terms, “has been outside 
the European security structure since 1917.” In Budapest he argued 
that this dynamism presented “the opportunity—indeed, the neces-
sity—to extend this Europe of the institutions to the Europe of the 
map.”91 As Talbott later commented, “Over the long term, pan-Eu-
ropean integration depended both on the Central Europeans joining 
the major structures of the West, including NATO, and on Russia’s 
remaining on a reformist track internally and a cooperative track in its 
foreign and defense policies. These goals were in tension but not nec-
essarily irreconcilable.”92
The Administration and its partners would need to move along par-
allel tracks. Moving too fast along the central European track could 
upset delicate developments in Russia. Moving too slow could mean 
losing the momentum for reform and opening oneself to the charge of 
sacrificing central European security in the face of Russian pressure. 
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Sandy Berger said the Administration had to navigate between “Scylla 
and Charybdis;”93 Talbott called it a Sisyphean task.94 
Political concerns over the U.S. budget deficit and Cold War legacies 
had left Clinton unwilling or unable to explicitly propose a Marshall 
Plan for Russia. However, his administration came up with $4.5 billion 
in bilateral assistance to Yeltsin’s government from 1993 to 1996. This 
aid helped facilitate economic reform in Russia by curbing inflation 
and stabilizing the ruble. As a result, by 1996 more than 60 percent 
of Russia’s gross domestic product was generated by its private sector. 
In fact, the Clinton Administration’s assistance helped Russia privatize 
more property in less time than any other foreign development venture 
in history. By September 1996 more than 120,000 Russian enterprises 
had been transferred to private hands, with foreign trade up 65 percent 
since 1993. Meanwhile, the United States became Russia’s largest for-
eign investor, with the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade and Develop-
ment Agency supporting commercial transactions with Moscow valued 
at more than $4 billion.95
The President was also keen to help Russia become part of the insti-
tutional architecture, not only the G-8 but the WTO, the Paris Club 
and the OECD. He favored a cooperative relationship with NATO, 
and never deviated from his view that should the day ever come, NA-
TO’s door also had to be open to Russia. As Talbott has noted, “Clin-
ton’s concept of NATO enlargement always included—for reasons that 
were strategic, not cosmetic or palliative—the idea of Russia’s eventual 
eligibility and indeed its entry.” Talbott adds: “He knew that the idea 
was, as he sometimes said, “blue-sky stuff.” If the day ever came when 
Russia entered NATO, it would obviously be a different Russia, a dif-
ferent NATO, and a different Europe. But, anticipating—and, better 
yet, inducing—transformation was what strategic policymaking was 
supposed to be all about.”96
In a letter to Congressman Benjamin Gilman on May 9, 1996, Pres-
ident Clinton reiterated the premise that it was essential “to place 
NATO enlargement in the context of a broad, balanced and integrated 
approach to increasing stability and security throughout the transat-
lantic area by building a cooperative security structure in Europe. This 
includes a revitalized NATO, support for enlargement of the European 
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Union, strengthening the OSCE and enhanced cooperation with other 
states not immediately aspiring to NATO membership of who may not 
be in the initial group of states invited to begin accession talks with the 
Alliance. It also includes a strong and productive relationship between 
the Alliance and Russia, given the key role Russia can play in shaping a 
stable and secure Europe.”97
“The problem,” Talbott noted at the time, “is that, historically, Rus-
sia has tended to define security in zero-sum terms—win/lose, or, as 
Lenin famously put it: kto/kogo. The Soviet Union seemed unable to 
feel totally secure unless everyone else felt totally insecure. Its pursuit 
of bezopasnost’, or absence of danger, posed a clear and present danger 
to others, especially small countries on its periphery. The issue on all 
our minds is whether post-Soviet Russia, as it goes about redefining 
its political system through elections, will redefine its concept of state 
security as well.”98 
Commenting on a report that Boris Yeltsin told Helmut Kohl that 
Europeans surely realized that “the security of all European countries 
depends on Russia feeling secure,” Talbott wrote that in “that one state-
ment, Yeltsin had captured the nub not just of the immediate problem 
but of much trouble in the century coming to an end: Russia had habit-
ually defined its own security at the expense of others’; many Russians 
seemed incapable of feeling secure unless others felt insecure.99
Upgrading U.S.–EU Relations
A fifth puzzle piece in the emerging architecture, one often over-
looked in many debates about NATO enlargement, was the need to 
make the transatlantic partnership more effective in addressing global 
challenges. A more secure, prosperous and confident Europe was po-
tentially our primary partner when it came to a range of issues that even 
a superpower could not address effectively alone. An unstable Europe, 
in contrast, would look inward and be less of the partner that the Unit-
ed States needed. This reinforced the U.S. stake in extending the space 
of democratic stability in Europe where age-old conflicts had healed 
and war simply did not happen. Moreover, those European areas that 
were not integrated into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream 
were themselves becoming focal points for many of the transnational 
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issues we needed to address—organized crime, human trafficking, crit-
ical energy flows, environmental degradation, terrorism and nuclear 
smuggling. And because this new partnership would be tied to clear 
transatlantic interests around the world, it would give the U.S. role in 
Europe new meaning and staying power. In that sense, the issue of new 
members in Europe and new missions beyond it were linked.”100 
The emerging architecture needed to give us the means to address 
those challenges more effectively together. For decades, NATO had 
been the institutional expression of the transatlantic link. There was 
no equivalent U.S. link, however, with the European Union (EU), even 
though the EU was the most important organization in the world to 
which the U.S. did not belong. The EU was increasingly the institu-
tion that European governments used to coordinate their policies and 
actions. It would be America’s essential partner in many strategic areas 
that were beyond NATO’s purview and capacities. If we were to ad-
vance a more effective transatlantic partnership, including a reformed 
NATO, we realized we had to build a stronger, more strategic U.S.-EU 
relationship.101
“The Problem from Hell”
Finally, it was clear that this grand architectural effort would fail 
if we were unable to contain the fire spreading from Europe’s south-
eastern corner. Secretary Christopher called the Bosnian conflict “the 
problem from hell.”102 Christopher recalls, “As long as Bosnia was 
unresolved,” he recalled, “it was a cloud that hung over our heads…
if NATO could not find a solution for Bosnia, then why think about 
enlarging it? Did NATO have a mission worth enlarging for if it could 
not solve Bosnia?”103 
In his article, Holbrooke made the challenge clear. “Bosnia is a brutal 
reminder of the power of ethnic and nationalist hatreds, how dangerous 
this power is to the peace not just of a particular part of Europe, but to 
Europe as a whole, and how important it is to defuse ethnic grievances 
before they explode…The tragedy of Bosnia does not diminish the re-
sponsibility to build a new comprehensive structure of relationships to 
form a new security architecture. On the contrary, Bosnia, the greatest 
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collective security failure of the West since the 1930s, only underscores 
the urgency of the task.” 104
Bosnia would be the litmus test of Holbrooke’s assertion that the 
United States would continue as a European power, and would occupy 
most of his energies throughout 1995. 
Meanwhile, other pieces of architecture needed to fit into place. 
A New Transatlantic Agenda 
Having set forth the interlocking elements of its European policy, 
during 1995 the Clinton Administration sought to advance each track 
in mutually reinforcing ways. Progress on NATO enlargement had 
been set for the year by the December 1994 NATO foreign ministers’ 
decision to use 1995 to address the “why” and “how” of enlargement; 
NATO’s study on the matter was completed in September. It reflected 
in large part the Perry Principles.105 Its conclusions were communicat-
ed to PfP members through the fall. Significant U.S. diplomatic effort 
was expended on engaging directly with central European countries 
with regard to political, economic and military reform and reconcilia-
tion with neighbors. Russia overcame its earlier hesitations and joined 
the Partnership for Peace in May. The OSCE was fully engaged in 
its transformation into a full-fledged organization following the De-
cember 1994 Budapest Summit. Holbrooke began his intense focus on 
Bosnia that was to lead to the Dayton Peace Accords that fall. 
The missing piece of the architecture was an upgraded U.S.-EU re-
lationship. Just as Russia policy had threatened to get ahead of Europe-
an policy during the first two years of the Administration, NATO and 
OSCE policy now threatened to get ahead of an updated U.S. approach 
to its relations with the European Union. 
With Holbrooke fully immersed in Bosnia and the other architec-
tural pieces on track, I turned attention to this theme, together with 
European Bureau colleagues, Ambassador to the EU Stuart Eizenstat 
and his key deputies E. Anthony “Tony” Wayne and Charles Ries, and 
Secretary Christopher’s Policy Planning Staff. 
We quickly agreed that it was increasingly urgent to upgrade the 
U.S.-EU relationship for a combination of positive and negative rea-
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sons. Trends in Europe were clearly unnerving political leaderships. 
The lagging pace of progress within the EU and a growing sense of 
insecurity in Europe as a whole were raising doubts about the pros-
pects for further integration and uncertainty how the task of EU con-
struction fit within the broader context of European and transatlantic 
change. The results of the November midterm elections in the United 
States reinforced European doubts about the steadfastness and dura-
bility of the Atlantic partnership. Western European doubts and Rus-
sian grumpiness, in turn, were raising anxieties among East Central 
Europeans who were almost desperate to establish a tight bond to the 
United States. We were concerned that the positive proposals being set 
forth by the United States could shift to a defensive debate over how to 
stave off the erosion of the transatlantic partnership. 
The best way to counter such fears, we believed, was to give further 
evidence of dynamism and cooperation. We also understood that the 
EU was embarking on a series of decisions—regarding its own future 
enlargement, a nascent economic and monetary union, defense and 
other issues—in which the United States had a stake but not a seat at 
the table. We were concerned that the multiple challenges of deeper 
and wider EU integration could turn many of our key Allies inward at 
a time when the United States increasingly needed an outward-looking 
partner who could deliver on a broad range of subjects of common 
concern. Finally, through an enhanced U.S.-EU economic and political 
partnership we could equip ourselves with a wider range of tools to ad-
dress the varied sources of instability now afflicting the continent. We 
needed a mechanism to engage the EU in ways that went beyond the 
1990 U.S.-EU Transatlantic Declaration. 
As we intensified our work, the public spark for an upgraded U.S.-
EU partnership came initially from Europe. In April in Chicago, Ger-
man Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel called for a Transatlantic Free 
Trade Agreement, or TAFTA, as a logical follow-on from the recent-
ly concluded NAFTA and Uruguay Round negotiations, and as a new 
binding glue between Europe and North America. Kinkel embraced 
President Clinton’s theme of integration as a binding force, and took it 
one step further. TAFTA, Kinkel said, should be part of “a trans-Atlan-
tic zone of close political, economic and military cooperation (that) is 
the logic of our common history.” 
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The idea gained force. That same month, British Prime Minister 
John Major pitched the idea to President Clinton. Spanish, Swedish, 
Italian and other European leaders signed on, as did business leaders 
and Lane Kirkland, the long-time head of the AFL-CIO labor union. 
In its May 27th issue, The Economist endorsed the idea, noting that 
“economics and security go hand in hand” and calling it potentially a 
first step toward a “shared foreign and security policy…a new NATO 
of tomorrow.” French politicians were notably silent.
The idea had supporters within the Clinton Administration. A 
TAFTA could complement NATO as a second anchor to the transat-
lantic partnership. There were also skeptics. Some argued that since 
the United States and the EU accounted for such a large part of the 
global economy, a transatlantic deal would be “too big,” meaning it 
could subvert multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO. Others 
argued it would be “too small,” meaning that the EU and the United 
States enjoyed such low tariffs that they were essentially already en-
gaged in free trade, so that the benefits of a deal would be marginal, and 
that precious time and energy would be better spent tackling high trade 
barriers imposed by others.106 Holbrooke asked me to bring together 
experts for one of his “Saturday seminars.” But distracted by Bosnia 
and ambivalent in his own mind, Holbrooke concluded that TAFTA 
was “an idea whose time has not yet come.”107
Nonetheless, the idea of reinvigorated transatlantic economic lead-
ership struck a chord with an administration committed to raising the 
profile of economic issues in U.S. diplomacy. It also resonated with 
those of us who were arguing that the U.S.-EU piece of the “architec-
ture” could complement and reinforce the other tracks of our policy 
and equip our partnership with more than military means to address 
“out of area” issues. We could build on the 1990 Transatlantic Dec-
laration to offer a comprehensive partnership that included but went 
beyond economic issues. 
This approach resonated with Secretary Christopher, who asked our 
team to be ambitious in our new vision for the U.S.-EU relationship. 
He unveiled the approach in Madrid on June 2, 1995. In his speech 
Christopher explained U.S. goals for a comprehensive partnership with 
the EU within the context of the emerging European architecture that 
Holbrooke had articulated in his Foreign Affairs article. He declared 
Piece of the Puzzle 37
U.S. support for EU and NATO enlargement, citing President Tru-
man’s Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, who in 1948 said that 
the objective “should continue to be the progressively closer integra-
tion, both economic and political, of presently free Europe, and even-
tually of as much of Europe as becomes free.” 108 
Christopher also framed the need for closer U.S.-EU cooperation 
within the context of the global economic architecture design the Clin-
ton Administration had been advancing. The United States was im-
plementing NAFTA, working to complete negotiations on a free trade 
area in the Americas by the year 2005; and advancing APEC’s deci-
sion to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific 
region by 2020. “Our vision for the economic relationship between 
Europe and the United States must be no less ambitious…Our long-
term objective,” he said, “is the integration of the economies of North 
America and Europe,” consistent with the principles of the WTO. 109
He proposed a comprehensive investment regime, innovation coop-
eration, aligning standards, opening skies, liberalizing financial services 
and telecommunications. He went further to call for greater coopera-
tion politically to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion, international crime, terrorism and narcotics trafficking, to coor-
dinate humanitarian and development assistance, to promote human 
rights, and to address regional challenges, particularly in the Middle 
East and Mediterranean. 
EU leaders responded enthusiastically. Intense negotiations began 
immediately. They led to the formation of the New Transatlantic Agen-
da, signed by President Clinton and EU leaders in December 1995. 
The 1990 U.S.-EU Transatlantic Declaration had primarily sought 
to ensure that the transatlantic relationship kept pace with accelerat-
ing European integration and the dramatic political changes unfolding 
in central and eastern Europe as the Cold War ended. It stressed the 
desirability of close consultation, but focused more on identifying the 
beliefs and values that united the United States and Europe than on 
actual policy cooperation. 
The 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) moved U.S.-EU rela-
tions from consultation to cooperation in four broad areas: promoting 
peace and stability, democracy and development; responding to glob-
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al challenges; expanding world trade and promoting closer economic 
relations; and building people-to-people bridges across the Atlantic. 
A Joint Action Plan identified some 150 measures to be advanced. 
Together, these agreements amounted to a framework for dialogue 
consisting of bilateral summits (initially twice per year) biannual dia-
logue at the level of EU Foreign Ministers/U.S. Secretary of State; a 
Senior Level Group at the level of U.S. Undersecretary of State and 
EU Commission Director General to oversee implementation of the 
NTA; and an NTA Task Force at Director level to facilitate exchange 
at the operational level. The NTA also gave rise to a variety of other 
dialogue structures, most notably varying economic innovations in the 
guise of the 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership and the current 
Transatlantic Economic Council; a series of stakeholder dialogues, the 
most durable of which proved to be the Transatlantic Business Dia-
logue (TABD) and Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue (TACD); and a 
Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue (TLD), which built on existing reg-
ular exchanges between the European Parliament and the U.S. House 
of Representatives. 
At the time, the NTA framework went considerably beyond other 
frameworks for bilateral cooperation—in terms of ambition, formal-
ity, and institutional procedures—than either partner had with other 
parties. Nonetheless, Christopher’s ambitious goal for the integration 
of the European and North American economies encountered consid-
erable headwinds on each side of the Atlantic. Even though the eco-
nomic pillar of the agenda was to be a Transatlantic Marketplace, to be 
achieved by “progressively reducing or eliminating barriers that hinder 
the flow of goods, services, and capital,” there were few specifics, no 
commitment to comprehensive coverage, and no deadlines for achieve-
ment of such a goal. The U.S. Trade Representative’s office and the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Trade agreed simply 
to conduct a “joint study” of trade liberalization possibilities, and the 
TAFTA boomlet subsided.
Tragedy and Triumph in Bosnia 
Meanwhile, after further tragedies, the intensive efforts of Hol-
brooke and his team to find a solution to the war in Bosnia bore fruit. 
The U.S. success in concluding the peace accords signed in Dayton, 
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Ohio, in fall 1995 gave U.S. and NATO officials more confidence to 
speak about how the emerging architecture, including NATO enlarge-
ment, could prevent future conflicts.110 NATO had gone out of area 
to end the Bosnian war. France had drawn closer to the Alliance and 
Germany was taking part in Allied military operations out of area. The 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) validated both the CJTFs 
and the PfP, which now provided an ideal framework to bring together 
allies and non-allies into an Implementation Force (IFOR). Of the ini-
tial 60,000 IFOR troops deployed in early 1996, one in six were from 
non-NATO countries. Aspirant countries took to heart NATO’s mes-
sage that closer integration into Western structures was also likely to 
be accelerated to the extent a country “acts like a member” even before 
it becomes a member. Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and other 
aspirants joined the peace implementation process.
IFOR also demonstrated that NATO and Russia could work togeth-
er. NATO ground troops were deploying—for the first time in Alliance 
history—with Russian soldiers at their side as partners, not enemies.111 
NATO, the EU, and the OSCE were working in mutually reinforcing 
ways to implement the peace. 
Holbrooke recounted that “three main pillars of American foreign 
policy in Europe—U.S.-Russian relations, NATO enlargement into 
Central Europe, and Bosnia—had often worked against each other. 
Now they reinforced each other.”112 Ian Davidson wrote in the Finan-
cial Times that Dayton was “having an electric effect on NATO” and 
ended the debate over whether NATO had a post-Cold War purpose. 
As French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette put it: “America was 
back.”113
NATO Enlargement: On Track  
After Dayton Holbrooke signaled that he was leaving the Adminis-
tration. James Steinberg asked me to succeed Steven Flanagan as Asso-
ciate Director of Secretary Christopher’s Policy Planning Staff, where 
we continued work on NATO’s enlargement and adaptation as part of 
the evolution of the broader security architecture. 
On January 26, 1996 the U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to 
ratification of the START II Treaty. Through the rest of the year we 
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continued to pursue the timetable that President Clinton had given 
to Boris Yeltsin. There would be no surprises, no rush, but we also 
needed to demonstrate our determination to open NATO’s door to the 
strongest candidates. The decision on “who” was for the second term; 
for the last year of the first term the key was to weather the Russian 
elections and to put other building blocks of the emerging architecture 
into place.
As we did so, it was important to affirm our continued momentum. 
East Central Europeans were anxious that the process was slowing 
down; they needed continual reassurance that things truly were on 
course. The Russians, in turn, were proving difficult; they needed to 
hear that they could not derail NATO enlargement and that it would 
proceed following the Russian elections. I worked with Tom Malinows-
ki, James Steinberg and John Kornblum to craft a clear statement for 
Secretary Christopher to deliver in Prague on March 20. At Prague’s 
storied Cernin Palace, Christopher again reviewed the different ele-
ments of the overall architecture, emphasizing that “NATO enlarge-
ment is on track and will happen.” As Christopher later recounted, 
“The speech marked a turning point in our policy: after it there was 
no doubt in Central Europe, among our allies, or in Russia that NATO 
expansion would take place.”114
After Yeltsin’s reelection on July 3, 1996, the U.S. Congress sig-
nalled its support for enlargement of the Alliance. On July 23 the 
House passed the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act by 353-65, and 
the Senate followed two days later, 81-16.115
The European Pillar 
Meanwhile, three more pieces of the puzzle needed to fit. The first 
was to demonstrate that we were not just enlarging the Cold War Alli-
ance, we were creating a new NATO for a new era. The second was to 
give the PfP a political dimension. The third was how to address Baltic 
fears of abandonment. 
The redesign of Euro-Atlantic architecture needed to adapt NATO 
to new challenges. Collective defense remained an essential anchor of 
the Alliance. But Bosnia underscored that NATO might be called on 
to perform new missions related to conflict prevention and peacekeep-
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ing, most of which were likely to be beyond Alliance territory. NATO 
would need to streamline its planning and force preparations, simplify 
and speed up its decision-making, provide for greater European re-
sponsibilities and capabilities, and be able to operate with a wide range 
of partners, including the European Union.
Bolstering the Europeans’ capacity to defend their interests in in-
stances where the United States might not be involved had been a re-
lated puzzle piece. France in particular sought to bolster the Western 
European Union (WEU) as the defense arm of the European Union. 
When it became apparent that there was no consensus within the EU 
for this approach, and as budget strictures began to weigh on French 
capabilities, President Chirac became more amenable to reintegrating 
France into Alliance structures if the Alliance could lift European lead-
ership of key commands and if the Alliance could adapt to new missions 
outside of Alliance territory.
U.S. officials remained ambivalent about efforts to build a Europe-
an defense profile. U.S. political leaders routinely expressed rhetori-
cal support for a more cohesive Europe that could act, effectively and 
confidently, as America’s partner on the European continent and in 
the wider world. Yet when Europeans actually moved to establish truly 
“common” foreign security and defense policies, they were often faced 
with U.S. concerns that such coherence could become inward-look-
ing and exclusive, or based on lowest-common-denominator consen-
sus-building within the EU, and thus weaken the primacy of NATO 
or impede U.S. leadership and freedom of maneuver. The Clinton 
Administration’s initial view had been summarized by Holbrooke in 
the Foreign Affairs article: “It would be self-defeating for the WEU 
to create military structures to duplicate the successful European in-
tegration achieved in NATO. But a stronger European pillar of the 
alliance can be an important contribution to European stability and 
transatlantic burden-sharing, provided it does not dilute NATO.” He 
then foreshadowed the growing interest of the second-term Clinton 
Administration in more effective European capabilities to address out-
of-area challenges: “The WEU establishes a new premise of collective 
defense: the United States should not be the only NATO member that 
can protect vital common interests outside Europe.”116
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The effort to balance these differing approaches was reflected at the 
June 1996 NATO ministerial, when Allies agreed that under certain 
circumstances, NATO could make available to the ten members of the 
WEU specific assets that would enable the WEU to be militarily effec-
tive. This included the provision of CJTF headquarters for WEU use, 
the double-hatting of some NATO officers, the identification of specif-
ic military assets that could be released to WEU, and the designation of 
the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (filled by a European) 
as the potential WEU strategic commander. Assets to be released to the 
WEU, subject to decision by the North Atlantic Council, could even 
include elements of the U.S. military, such as large transport aircraft, 
satellite-based communications, and sophisticated intelligence capabil-
ities. NATO support for an effective ESDI would enable the European 
Allies to take greater responsibility for meeting some security challeng-
es on the continent—if the political will to do so could be created and 
sustained. 
These reforms enabled the full integration of Spain into NATO’s 
military command. France inched closer, although in the end Chirac 
was not prepared to agree to full reintegration.117
The Baltic Action Plan 
The Baltic states were another piece to the architectural puzzle. As 
the Bosnian peace began to be implemented and prospects for concrete 
progress on NATO enlargement loomed, Tony Lake was adamant that 
the Administration had to move beyond its internal deadlock over the 
goals of U.S. Baltic policy and align its approach with broader Europe-
an strategy. The Baltic states were nervous that their security would be 
undercut if they were not among the first new members of NATO. We 
needed to devise an approach that would ensure this would not be the 
case, while working with the Baltic republics to facilitate their integra-
tion into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream, including walk-
ing through NATO’s door at some point. NSC Senior Director Dan 
Fried asked me and Carol van Voorst, the European Bureau’s Director 
of the Office for Nordic/Baltic Affairs, to move beyond the bureaucrat-
ic stalemate. We set to work.
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By spring 1996 we had crafted a “Baltic Action Plan” to foster the 
integration of the Baltic republics into the European and transatlantic 
mainstream. The plan consisted of three tracks. 
The first track sought to strengthen Baltic sovereignty and promote 
internal reforms by integrating the three republics into European and 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. This would include U.S.-Nordic coopera-
tion in support of Baltic efforts to integrate. Denmark, for example, had 
been instrumental already since 1994 in supporting the formation of 
the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), a peacekeeping battalion and training 
program of the three Baltic states, and had some of their forces partic-
ipating with the Nordic Battalion in Bosnia. 
The second track promoted the use of bilateral and multilateral 
efforts to encourage the development of good relations with Russia. 
This meant, for example, providing additional resources to the Baltic 
nations to encourage regional cooperation between the Baltic states 
and Russia in the areas of crime prevention, energy use, commercial 
cooperation, and education, and encouraging Estonia and Latvia to re-
solve their border disputes with Russia and to integrate their Russian 
minorities more fully into their nations’ political and social communi-
ties. The goal was to convince Russia to see the Baltic Sea region not 
as a zone of influence or a buffer against nonexistent enemies, but as a 
gateway outward to the new Europe, of which Russia could be an active 
participant.118 
The third track expanded U.S. efforts to demonstrate its commit-
ment to the Baltic states by developing a regional economic and com-
mercial strategy to bolster U.S. investment and to highlight the poten-
tial role of the three Baltic states as an economic platform from which 
companies could access markets in the European Union, the Baltic 
states, and in Northwestern Russia. The Baltic-American Enterprise 
Fund, for instance, provided an average of $1 million a month in loans 
and investments throughout the Baltic states.
Our ideas overlapped in some ways with those set forth by Ron As-
mus and Robert Nurick in an article in Survival that summer. While 
Asmus and Nurick used NATO enlargement as the pivot for their arti-
cle, proposing a U.S.-Nordic alliance to mute negative fallout from an 
initial round of NATO enlargement that would not include the Baltic 
republics, the Baltic Action Plan had a positive agenda that was focused 
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on fostering Baltic integration overall. It included the issue of NATO 
enlargement but was less defensive and did not make it the centerpiece 
of the approach. Nonetheless, since our thinking coincided in many 
ways, Talbott was able to distribute this public document around as 
something worth reading.
Meanwhile, Baltic leaders were increasingly concerned that they 
might be excluded from NATO. In late May President Clinton re-
ceived a letter from the three Baltic Presidents Algirdas Brazauskas, 
Lennart Meri, and Guntis Ulmanis asking him to publicly affirm U.S. 
commitment to eventual Baltic membership in NATO. When he met 
with the three Presidents on June 28, he reassured them that the Unit-
ed States wanted to see the full integration of the Baltic states into the 
West. NATO’s door would remain open after the first round of en-
largement, the President said. “Unfortunately,” he went on, “I cannot 
say to you today what you want me to say”: that the Baltic states would 
be in the first wave of new members to NATO. In a separate meeting, 
Republican Presidential candidate Bob Dole also did not give the Baltic 
Presidents that reassurance.
The Baltic Action Plan, not yet released, had framed U.S. prepara-
tions for the meeting of the President. That meeting helped us put to-
gether some finishing touches to the plan. On August 28 Strobe Talbott 
shared the Baltic Action Plan with the three Baltic ambassadors to the 
United States. Their reaction was muted. Their single-minded focus 
on getting into the Alliance in the first wave caused them to assign less 
importance to this comprehensive approach to their deeper integration 
into the architecture. Ojars Kalnins, the Latvian Ambassador, described 
the Baltic Action Plan as the American’s “best shot,” but then described 
“best shot” as “being one that does not provide security guarantees, 
no hard promises on NATO but a complex of programs and assistance 
wherein the hope is that the whole will appear to exceed the sum of the 
parts and convey the impression of security.”119
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry made it clear in October that the 
Baltic states were “not yet ready to take on the Article V responsibil-
ities of NATO membership,” but that “we should all work to hasten 
the day that they will be ready for membership.” NATO’s position for 
countries that would not be accepted in the first wave,” he said, “is not 
‘no,’ it is ‘not yet.’”120
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Despite initial Baltic disgruntlement, we moved ahead with the Bal-
tic Action Plan, which energized U.S. diplomacy in Northern Europe. 
An Atlantic Partnership Council 
The next piece of the puzzle was to give the Partnership for Peace 
a political dimension. That opportunity came April 22-23, 1996, when 
I attended a meeting of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group, which 
brought together policy planners from across the Alliance and now 
from partner countries as well. Such a grouping could offer a useful 
testing ground for policy. The Romanians had offered to host the 
meeting in Sinaia, a former casino resort town favored by Ceausescu. 
We were treated to freezing bedrooms, army blankets and bedbugs. 
Nonetheless, the atmosphere was collegial and the discussions substan-
tive and open. 
At Sinaia I presented a “non-paper” entitled “Europe’s Security Ar-
chitecture: The next phase,” in which I “test marketed” a new element 
in the security architecture. PfP had offered Partners an important 
military link to the Alliance, I argued, but it did not provide an equiva-
lent political link. NACC was moribund. Its original intent was as a fo-
rum for sharing information between now non-existent military blocs, 
not as a forum for political-military consultations on shared challenges 
and objectives. In addition, PfP was a hub-and-spokes arrangement; 
partners were linked to the Alliance but not necessarily to one anoth-
er. If we were to realize our goal of establishing an architecture that 
could project stability across the continent, we needed a mechanism 
that would enable strategic discussions among Allies and partners as 
well as among partners on their own. If NATO Allies and non-NATO 
partners were to engage on military-security activities together, they 
also needed a mechanism that provided for political discussion and de-
cision-making. I suggested retiring NACC and establishing a political 
counterpart to the PfP that I called an “Atlantic Partnership Council.” 
As soon as I had presented the idea, Mariot Leslie, head of the Policy 
Planning Staff in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (and later 
UK Ambassador to NATO) asked me, “Are you serious about this? If 
so, we should act on it right away.” Other colleagues were equally en-
thused. Momentum quickly built to implement the idea. 
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The opportunity to propose the Atlantic Partnership Council pub-
licly, as well as to move forward other key elements of the architecture, 
came in September 1996. Secretary Christopher had been invited by 
German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to speak in Stuttgart to com-
memorate the 50th anniversary of a landmark speech by former Secre-
tary of State James Byrnes that repudiated U.S. postwar policy toward 
Germany in favor of a policy of economic revival and democratic re-
newal, including support for German unity, that set the stage for the 
Marshall Plan and eventual U.S. support for German integration into 
Western structures.121 Christopher, Steinberg and Kornblum wanted 
the speech to reinforce the architectural design and chart a roadmap 
for advancing each element for Clinton’s second term. John Kornblum 
contributed building blocks; Tom Malinowski and I worked through 
a draft. 
The Stuttgart speech updated and expanded upon the architectural 
framework first introduced by Richard Holbrooke in his Foreign Af-
fairs article almost two years earlier. “The vision that President Clin-
ton and I have for the United States and Europe in the next century,” 
Christopher began, “is a vision for a New Atlantic Community. This 
community will build on the institutions our predecessors created, but 
it will transcend the artificial boundaries of Cold War Europe. It will 
give North America a deeper partnership with a broader, more inte-
grated Europe on this continent and around the world.”122 Christo-
pher affirmed the Administration’s core premise that the United States 
was a European power and mentioned each pillar of the architectural 
construct, including strong support for EU enlargement. He then pre-
viewed the Clinton Administration’s second term agenda by making six 
major architectural proposals. 
First, he recommended that NATO should hold a summit in early 
1997 “to agree on NATO’s internal reforms, launch enlargement ne-
gotiations for NATO, and deepen NATO’s partnership with Russia and 
other European states.” At the summit, Christopher said, “we should 
invite several partners to begin accession negotiations.” He reiterated 
that NATO’s door “will stay open for all of those who demonstrated 
that they are willing and able to shoulder the responsibilities of mem-
bership.”
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Second, he said it was time to “expand the scope of NATO’s Part-
nership for Peace…beyond its current missions. We should involve our 
partners in the Partnership for Peace in the planning as well as the 
execution of NATO’s missions. We should give them a stronger voice 
by forming an Atlantic Partnership Council.” 
Third, Christopher urged leaders at the OSCE Lisbon Summit in 
December to launch negotiations to adapt the CFE treaty and com-
plete the Forum for Security Cooperation.
Fourth, he proposed developing an enhanced partnership between 
Ukraine and NATO.
Finally, he proposed “the next logical step” in “Russia’s cooperation 
with NATO”: “a formal Charter” that “should create standing arrange-
ments for consultation and joint action between Russia and the Alli-
ance.”
Finally, he proposed moving “toward a free and open Transatlantic 
Marketplace,” saying that “We are already at a stage when we can re-
alistically discuss the true integration of the economies of Europe and 
North America. We should now pursue practical steps” to advance that 
goal. 
Christopher also highlighted a rationale for the new architecture 
that was to become ever more prominent during President Clinton’s 
second term, at which Holbrooke in his article had merely hinted. A 
more stable Europe was not only important to the United States in its 
own right; a more stable Europe could also become America’s partner 
to address other global and regional challenges, particularly terrorism 
and the environment. “Our New Atlantic Community will only be se-
cure if we also work together to meet the threats that transcend our 
frontiers—threats like terrorism, nuclear proliferation, crime, drugs, 
disease and damage to the environment.” The danger posed by these 
threats, he argued, were as great as any that we had faced during the 
Cold War. 
As American voters went to the polls in November 1996, the Clin-
ton Administration had put together the edifice of a new Euro-Atlantic 
architecture. Yet much still needed to be done.123 
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Chapter 2 
Opening NATO and Engaging Russia:  
NATO’s Two Tracks and the Establishment of 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
Stephan Kieninger
In the second half of the 1990s, when NATO was preparing to ex-
tend its membership eastward, Russian officials began to claim that 
the entry of former Warsaw Pact countries would violate a solemn 
“pledge”—made in the context of German unification diplomacy—not 
to include any former Communist countries into the alliance. Over the 
past decade or so a debate has been raging over the question whether 
or not Western policymakers made any legally binding commitment 
never to move NATO’s borders eastward.1 
As Philipp Zelikow and Mark Kramer have pointed out, the declas-
sification of documents from all sides bear out that neither the United 
States nor any other Western country pledged not to expand NATO 
beyond Germany.2 Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson has claimed that the 
United States was playing a double game, leading Gorbachev to believe 
that NATO would be subsumed in a new European security structure, 
while in truth working to ensure hegemony in Europe and the mainte-
nance of NATO.3 
In this chapter I emphasize that the West did not play a double game. 
I argue that NATO itself pursued a policy of two tracks. 
First, the aim was to open up NATO, but slowly, cautiously and 
combined with an expanded effort to engage Russia. NATO’s gradual 
approach was the means to secure Central and Eastern Europe and to 
support Mikhail Gorbachev’s and Boris Yeltsin’s reforms. 
Second, by working gradually, NATO hoped to buy time and to 
work out a cooperative relationship with Russia. The emergence of the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November 1991 re-
flected NATO’s gradual but also inclusive approach. 
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The initiative was designed to give the Central and East Europe-
an countries a perspective for closer association and eventual NATO 
membership.4 At the same time, the endeavor was intended to include 
Russia in the future European security system.
In Search of Security:  
The Countries of Central and Eastern Europe
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe had always been look-
ing West even when Europe was divided. Ronald Asmus pointed out 
that “rejoining the West had been an important leitmotif of the revo-
lutions of 1989.”5 The events of 1989 and Germany’s unification trans-
formed Europe. The Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991.6 The question 
now was, what would come next? 
NATO’s opening was not a predetermined affair. First of all, it was 
imperative for NATO to adapt itself and to change its doctrine. The 
process of NATO’s transformation was initiated at the London Summit 
in June 1990. U.S. President George Bush emphasized that we “must 
build a transformed alliance for the new Europe of the 21st century.” 
In the same vein, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said that 
“our signal from this meeting must continue to be one of resolve in de-
fence, resolve and unity in defence coupled with willingness to extend 
the hand of friendship to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.”7 At 
London, NATO extended a “hand of friendship” to the Warsaw Pact 
countries, inviting them to form a new relationship with NATO and 
to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO in an effort to think 
aloud with each other during a historic period of change. This involved 
meetings between the Ambassadors of the Central and East European 
countries in Brussels and visits by NATO Secretary General Manfred 
Wörner and his staff to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.8
Initially, the Central and Eastern European countries sought only 
closer ties with NATO, not membership. However, given the crisis in 
Yugoslavia and the aborted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August 
1991, the political leaderships of the Central and Eastern European 
countries were afraid of a security vacuum developing in their region. 
Starting in 1990, Czechoslovakian President Václav Havel, Polish Pres-
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ident Lech Wałęsa and Hungarian Prime Minister József Antall articu-
lated their desire to develop the closest possible relations with NATO. 
Equal security was a precondition for them also in their endeavor 
to join the European Community. But from their vantage point, only 
NATO was able to provide the kind of hard security they were seek-
ing. In September 1990, Poland’s Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
told George H.W. Bush that “no one doubts the direction of change—
toward the market—is irreversible, but Poland needs some signs that 
their economic problems are appreciated by the Western world.”9 In 
October 1990, in a conversation with Bush, Antall made the point that 
“economic problems can create social problems. I don’t know if we 
can control the situation. If we don’t, that would be a huge propagan-
da victory for conservatives in the Soviet Union and China.”10 In No-
vember 1990, Havel emphasized that “with the collapse of communism 
in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and other countries, we may be 
facing a temporary vacuum as all the old links cease to exist. It could 
be breeding ground for chaos and instability. Our democracies are just 
emerging. To fill this vacuum is not just our problem; it is also an obli-
gation of the West.”11 Therefore, the reformers in the East were seek-
ing Western assistance to transform their economies.
Western policymakers were meanwhile confronted with a multitude 
of challenges. In late 1990 and early 1991, Saddam Hussein’s invasion 
of Kuwait and the ensuring war in Iraq somewhat diverted the Bush 
Administration’s attention from Eastern Europe. The formation and 
the maintenance of the global coalition against Hussein took up most 
of Bush’s time.12 Against this background, in March 1991, Germany’s 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher reminded Bush that “with 
regards to Eastern Europe, this is critically important too. They badly 
need our economic help and we are prepared to work with you. [..] 
Also there is a security vacuum now in Eastern Europe. We need to 
give these countries an answer to the question they are asking. It must 
make them feel more secure but it also must be in our own interest and 
it must not be provocative to the Soviets. We need to give them this 
answer very soon.”13 
In 1991, the Central and Eastern European countries were in a chal-
lenging situation. In addition to complete economic transformation 
from plan to market with Western assistance, their leaders were eager 
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to establish the broadest possible ties. In March 1991, in a conversa-
tion with President Bush, Lech Wałęsa emphasized that “we resolutely 
desire to join Western Europe and the United States in political, eco-
nomic and military terms.” Wałęsa reiterated Poland’s need for inter-
national security. He argued that “we are ready for cooperation in every 
respect, even military. This doesn’t mean that we are anti-Soviet or an-
ti-German, but rather that we are pro-peace and security.” Meanwhile, 
the Warsaw Pact was effectively dissolved on March 30, 1991.
Bush did not feel in the position to give any sort of security guar-
antees. He emphasized the need to take a gradual approach. Bush un-
derstood Wałęsa’s “sense of urgency.” At the same time, he thought it 
impossible to provide immediate military assistance. Instead, he argued 
that “we still feel that the best assistance that we could possibly provide 
is to encourage our private sector.” 
Bush sensed Wałęsa’s concern over the situation in the Soviet 
Union. Wałęsa watched Bush’s diplomacy with Gorbachev very close-
ly. Bush argued that “we support Gorbachev because he has been right 
before. […] We must reward whatever he does that is cooperative. I 
know you are worried about gradualism on the part of the West and 
its response to Poland’s needs, and I know you are also worried about 
military security.”14
The West certainly rewarded Mikhail Gorbachev’s cooperative se-
curity policy. In 1990, Kohl’s financial help for the Soviet Union had 
been essential to buy his consent to Germany’s unification, basically 
offering cash credits and covering the cost of removing Soviet forces 
from East Germany.15 In 1991, the West Germans were unilaterally 
funneling massive amounts of assistance to Moscow to shore up the 
Soviet economy. Time and again, Helmut Kohl justified his actions 
stating “it certainly was not in the West’s interest for instability to reign 
in the Soviet Union. That country had to be integrated into the world 
economy.”16 
To that end, Mikhail Gorbachev was invited to participate in the G-7 
Summit in London in 1991. However, the USSR failed to stabilize. 
With the coup of August 1991, Gorbachev lost power and the USSR 
was on the path towards its dissolution.17 
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A Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative: The Establishment of the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
The August 1991 coup had affected the thinking in Central and 
Eastern Europe in profound ways. Ronald Asmus wrote that “the initial 
announcement of the coup had sent shivers down the spines of many in 
the region and reminded them how vulnerable their newly won free-
dom and independence might be.”18 
Central and Eastern European leaders immediately requested clear 
signal of support both from Washington and NATO headquarters in 
Brussels. Both Havel and Wałęsa worried about the lack of meaningful 
security guarantees. NATO’s hand of friendship and the establishment 
of NATO liaisons offices meant little in the fall of 1991. József Antall of 
Hungary felt that the coup in Moscow had been proof that it had been 
right to have acted in haste to get the Soviet troops out of Hungary. He 
emphasized that “it would have been horrible if this had taken place 
under the former situation.”19
The August 1991 coup highlighted the urgency to build a basis for 
a new peace order in Europe based on cooperative security as long as 
Mikhail Gorbachev was still in power. It underlined the need to con-
struct a “new Euro-Atlantic community” of nations in an effort to 
provide the Central and Eastern European countries a perspective for 
closer ties with the West going beyond NATO’s hand of friendship.20 
President Bush advanced two initiatives to address both challenges. 
First, following the aborted coup in Moscow, he proposed a unilat-
eral move on nuclear weapons. Bush was eager to make progress while 
he still had Gorbachev as a partner.21 His proposals entailed the idea of 
getting rid of all tactical nuclear weapons except those launched from 
the air. Other elements of the Bush initiative took bombers and missiles 
off alert, pressed de-MIRVing of missiles and canceled some nuclear 
modernization programs. The purpose of the Bush initiative was to 
signal to the leaders and the peoples in the Soviet Union that NATO’s 
policy would enhance their security and build stability.22
Bush’s second initiative was aimed at the transformation of Europe’s 
security architecture; Secretary of State James Baker and Hans-Diet-
rich Genscher issued a common declaration highlighting their ambi-
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tion to create a “Euro-Atlantic Community that extends East from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok.” This vague rhetoric pointed to moving on 
with something more tangible from London in 1990. They empha-
sized that “the Atlantic link, European integration and cooperation 
with our Eastern neighbors are the linchpins of this community.” And 
their premise was that promoting democratic institutions in Central 
and Eastern Europe “complements the maintenance of a common de-
fense in ensuring security”.23
The Baker-Genscher declaration was the birth hour for the estab-
lishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The 
aim was to institutionalize NATO’s new relationship with the new de-
mocracies of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and to 
formalize “the liaison relationship by establishing a more routine set 
of meetings among the sixteen and the liaison countries, perhaps as a 
“North Atlantic Cooperation Council.”24 
Genscher told Bush and Baker that it was imperative “to give the So-
viets some kind of a framework for continuing to participate in Europe 
and also to prevent Balkanization of the Soviet Union or Eastern Eu-
rope.” Moreover, he stressed that Germany wanted full associate and 
then full membership in the European Community (EC) for the Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries. His verdict was clear: “We now 
have to decide how to help the Central and Eastern Europe countries 
and the Soviet Union: We cannot let them fail.”25 
Genscher was for EC membership for the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries, and also for loose but formalized NATO ties with 
them and the USSR. The establishment of the NACC was a means to 
find a way to expand relations and dialogue between NATO and the 
Central and Eastern European countries. It was intended to provide 
assurance of U.S. participation and to place NATO in the forefront of 
European security.26 
The timing was as important as the content of the NACC initiative. 
There was as yet no blueprint for the transformation of Europe’s secu-
rity system. In December 1991, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
were granted associate EC status. However, their future relationship 
towards NATO remained unclear. 
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In October 1991, President Bush’s National Security Advisor, Brent 
Scowcroft, told Václav Havel that Czechoslovakia’s relations to NATO 
“is in the nature of the growing European community as it relates to 
NATO. […] We are interested in close relations, but there is a debate 
over how to expand and how fast. This is caught up in the question of 
Europe and its relation to NATO and the European defense system.”27
NATO’s Rome Summit in November 1991 was the birth hour for 
the NACC. NATO’s Heads of State adopted a declaration on peace and 
cooperation in order to define a new security architecture in Europe. 
Moreover, they welcomed the prospect of a strengthening of the role 
of Western European Union (WEU), both as the defense component 
of the process of European unification and as a means of consolidating 
the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. 
A month earlier, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner had 
stressed that, in a broader sense, the purpose of NATO’s Rome Sum-
mit was to “describe NATO’s role with the context of the Euro-At-
lantic framework and the transatlantic axis which is fundamental both 
to European order and to the new world order.” Wörner made the 
point that “we need a new picture of NATO, not as a military alliance 
confronting the Soviet Union, but as a military alliance confronting 
instability and uncertainty, and as a political alliance gaining in impor-
tance for establishing and carrying out this new European and world 
order.”28 
The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union, however, quickly outpaced 
NATO’s adaption. 
Central and Eastern European leaders were not content with closer 
institutional cooperation short of membership. Polish Prime Minister 
Krzysztof Bielecki highlighted his country’s need to join the institu-
tions of the West: “When we are members of the family of the demo-
cratic community, we will feel secure.” Bielecki favored a dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and its conversion to a collection of sovereign states. 
Only thus would the promotion of democracy be feasible, he argued. In 
fact, as he told Bush, “for me the Soviet Union doesn’t exist.”29 
Helmut Kohl held a different view. He favored cohesion, stabili-
ty and a continued role for Mikhail Gorbachev in a new Russian or 
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post-Soviet federation. Kohl believed that “a catastrophe awaits us if 
the USSR disintegrates completely.”30 
In the autumn of 1991, Bush held a middle position: He continued 
to support Gorbachev while he established contacts with the republics 
and its leaders such as Yeltsin, Kravchuk, Nazarbayev and others.
In, 1992, Russia’s need for economic assistance and the emergence 
of the Western relationship with Boris Yeltsin’s government overshad-
owed Central and Eastern European pleas for NATO membership. In 
February 1992, Russia’s domestic situation and its economic reforms 
were clearly the most pressing item on the agenda of President Bush’s 
first summit meeting with Boris Yeltsin.31 
Western policymakers did not address the issue of NATO’s open-
ing in public. George Bush thought that a public debate over NATO’s 
opening might upset the emergence of the Euro-Atlantic security or-
der. In June 1992, he told Antall that “we do have a responsibility to be 
a stabilizing force in Europe, also with Russia. In that respect we have 
unique responsibilities.”32
Nonetheless, behind the scenes a strategy debate was under way over 
NATO’s opening. In March 1992, Britain’s NATO Ambassador John 
Weston argued in favor of an early declaration by NATO “of its read-
iness to accept in due course enlargement by any new member state 
of the European Union that is willing to assume the full obligations 
of NATO membership.” Weston reiterated that there was an urgent 
need to address NATO’s enlargement question at a time when the fu-
ture enlargement of the European Union was taken for granted. His 
idea to meet potential Russian concerns was “to persuade them that 
they are sui generis because of Russia’s seize and importance and that 
these require a special relationship with major world players.”33 Rodric 
Braithwaite, one of John Major’s key foreign policy advisers, pointed 
out that “the trick would be to persuade the Russians that, as a Eurasian 
power, their future remained global, not narrowly European.”34
The public debate over NATO’s opening became more urgent with 
the outbreak of war in the former Yugoslavia, in particular Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, in April 1992. In May 1992, Havel, Wałęsa and Antall met in 
Prague to declare that their goal was full-fledged NATO membership.
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NATO’s opening, however, was not yet on the Western agenda. The 
Bush Administration did not take a position. When Braithwaite visited 
Washington in July 1992, his impression was that the Americans agreed 
with the premise that only NATO could provide the kind of security 
that potential new members of the European Community sought. But 
the Bush Administration was reluctant to take the lead. Braithwaite 
pointed out that “the British could not make the running alone. The 
Americans needed to be active now, without seeming to dictate.”35
In 1992, against the background of the Balkan wars and Russia’s eco-
nomic free-fall, NATO mostly avoided the delicate enlargement ques-
tion. At its Spring Ministerial Meeting in 1992, the Alliance mainly dis-
cussed its new responsibilities in crisis management: NATO committed 
itself to support peacekeeping missions under the roof of the CSCE.36 
The December 1992 NATO Ministerial produced an empty statement 
on “enhanced security from Vancouver to Vladivostok.”37 The debate 
on NATO’s opening was postponed until 1993—with a new American 
President. 
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Chapter 3 
The George H.W. Bush Administration’s 
Policies vis-à-vis Central Europe:  
From Cautious Encouragement to  
Cracking Open NATO’s Door
Liviu Horovitz
More than two decades after the 1997 Madrid NATO summit, 
scholars still debate why the U.S. government under President William 
J. Clinton favored inviting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
to join the transatlantic Alliance. Given that American foreign policy 
is often marked as much by continuity as it is formed by change, this 
chapter seeks to leverage the greater current access to the documents 
of the George H.W. Bush Administration to sketch the situation that 
Clinton officials found when assuming office. 
Overall, I seek to outline how the Bush Administration’s priorities 
towards Central Europe were embedded in its broader approach vis-
à-vis Europe. In a nutshell, I argue that U.S. views towards Central 
Europe evolved from cautious encouragement of politico-economic 
reform in 1989, to addressing regional concerns in order to achieve 
German reunification within NATO in 1990, and, by the time Bush 
left office, to a consensus around the necessity of opening the Alliance’s 
door to Central European states. 
To substantiate my arguments, I rely primarily upon internal Ad-
ministration memoranda—documents mostly collected at the Bush Li-
brary; upon U.S. exchanges with British officials—recently declassified 
by the UK National Archives; and upon numerous interviews with for-
mer Bush Administration policymakers.
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Struggling for European Stability and  
American Influence in 1989
As the Bush Administration assumed office in January 1989, its key 
players believed that they had to manage Soviet retrenchment, chap-
erone German ambition, and retain U.S. influence over European af-
fairs.1 With the Soviet economy crumbling, General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev was trying to reform his country. To gain the necessary 
breathing space, he was pursuing détente with the West. Moscow’s be-
havior could reduce tensions and, potentially, end the Cold War. Nev-
ertheless, U.S. officials concluded it also endangered cohesion within 
the Western Alliance.2 In addition, pressures were mounting in West 
Germany for the continent’s dominant economic power to take ad-
vantage of Soviet weakness to bring the two German states closer to 
each other.3 At the same time, the European Community was moving 
towards deeper economic integration, stoking fears of protectionism 
among Washington policymakers.4 Against this background, White 
House planners concluded that, if the United States wanted to avoid 
long-lasting instability or objectionable consolidation in Europe, it had 
to work to mitigate the continent’s existing explosive potential and to 
remain a European power over the long term.
The new foreign policy team held that a slowdown of European 
developments was necessary to secure these distinct American aims. 
This assessment had a major impact on the Administration’s views on 
Central European affairs.5 The Reagan Administration had embraced 
Soviet efforts at normalizing relations and reducing armaments.6 In 
contrast, some Bush officials thought the Kremlin’s reforms were not 
genuine, but just a ruse to rejuvenate the communist system.7 A major-
ity within the new administration, however, worried more about either 
perestroika’s failure or its success.8 Were Gorbachev to move ahead too 
swiftly either at home and abroad, he might be toppled from within. 
Change in both the Soviet Union and Central Europe would have to 
wait.9 Were the Soviet reformer to succeed in normalizing Soviet re-
lations to the West, the threat from the Kremlin would diminish and 
communism would probably vanish. And yet, such success could also 
flush U.S. forces out of Europe, unravel the transatlantic Alliance, and 
lessen American influence over the continent. Such an outcome would 
complicate the U.S. management of global economic and political re-
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lations—priorities that mattered a lot to many within the Bush Admin-
istration.10
Confronted with these trade-offs, the most cautious American pol-
icymakers thought best a U.S.-Soviet arrangement over Central and 
Eastern Europe. The Administration’s principal decisionmakers, how-
ever, believed Washington could achieve more. 
Days before Bush’s inauguration, former Secretary of State Hen-
ry Kissinger visited Moscow. He delivered a letter from the incoming 
President, one stating that the new Administration would need time 
to “reflect.”11 However, ostensibly in his personal capacity, Kissinger 
also hinted at the “idea” of a USSR-U.S. “condominium over Europe.” 
Such an agreement would ensure that the Europeans “do not misbe-
have,” Gorbachev told the Politburo, and noted that this was an op-
portunity not to be missed.12 Kissinger was concerned that the Krem-
lin would lure the Western Europeans into a deal. The Soviets might 
remain engaged in the continent’s affairs, while the United States—
having won the ideological confrontation—would return home. As a 
solution, Kissinger’s condominium arrangement could have had both 
powers retrench. 
Bush officials saw few reasons for such extreme cautiousness.13 So-
viet weakness involved risks, but also offered opportunities.14 Maybe 
it was possible to eradicate communism, have the Soviets out of Eu-
rope, and keep the Americans in—thereby retaining Washington’s say 
in Western European affairs.15
To achieve these multiple aims, the Administration not only needed 
to address German aspirations, but also for the Soviet Union to both 
implement reforms and avoid breakdown—a needle that proved any-
thing but easy to thread.16 
On the one hand, U.S. policymakers understood that if the Soviet 
Union were to stagnate in a “frustrating, seemingly endless, struggle” 
to “reform its society from above while preserving central control,” 
the states in Eastern and Central Europe would revert to a “historical 
pattern of fractious and unstable internal politics, persistent economic 
weakness, and bitter national rivalries,” and cause great problems for 
European stability.17 
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On the other hand, American officials knew that moving ahead too 
fast might bring Gorbachev down.18 There was “a big opportunity” in 
Central Europe, Bush told Canada’s Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
already in January 1989, “if we can get our act together.” However, he 
argued, “there is also danger,” as pushing too far might cause the situ-
ation to get out of control. At that point, the President believed, “the 
tanks might come in.” His conversations with British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher reveal that the West had neither the interest nor 
the willingness to intervene in such a situation.19
Working within these confines throughout 1989, the Administra-
tion concluded that promoting reforms in Central Europe aided overall 
U.S. goals but remained a risky business.20 As the region was becom-
ing more independent, the United States should “exploit” these open-
ings, but had to do so in a “prudent way,” a key official wrote.21 Thus, 
in his April 1989 foreign policy statement on the region, Bush stated 
that he wanted Central Europe to be “free, prosperous, and at peace.” 
However, to the dismay of many who sought a more resolute Washing-
ton push, the President added that his government was pursuing these 
goals “with prudence, realism, and patience.”22 In Eastern Europe, 
Bush’s overall goal was not to “stir up trouble,” but also not to pursue 
a “post-Yalta arrangement,” one in which he would be “sitting with the 
Soviets to divide spheres of influence,” he told the Italian leadership in 
May 1989. Instead, he wanted to promote democracy and capitalism 
without being so “flamboyant” that the Soviets would “feel the need” 
to take actions that would reverse “movement towards freedom.”23 
Numerous American Allies shared Washington’s concerns vis-à-vis the 
involved risks.24 Thus, when Bush visited Poland and Hungary in July 
1989, his message remained one of cautiousness and restraint.25
At the same time, other politico-economic constraints limited the 
Administration’s efforts. On the one hand, significant domestic pres-
sures from various supporters of Central European nations pushed for 
action, and U.S. officials were aware that economic assistance was their 
“best lever.”26 On the other hand, much stood in the way of employing 
such instruments. In contrast to Europe or Japan, the United States 
had few economic links to Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, 
separating dealings with the Soviet Union from those with its satellites 
proved a challenging feat. Also, if the United States was to offer Po-
land or Hungary “special treatment” on the “debt front,” this would 
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compromise Washington’s overall policy towards debtor countries, 
undermining negotiations with other key middle-income creditors.27 
Further, the foreign policy bureaucracy faced stark domestic fiscal con-
straints. The NSC staff reported that meetings broke down whenever 
the question of spending American taxpayer dollars came up.28 Last but 
not least, U.S. officials faced a chicken-or-the-egg-problem: they were 
not convinced that piecemeal economic and political reform would 
slowly lead to more reforms, stability, and prosperity; therefore, they 
were reluctant to invest too many resources before major reforms were 
implemented.29
Pursuing German Reunification within NATO in 1990
A year into the Bush Administration, it became clear that the Bre-
zhnev Doctrine was defunct. Gorbachev would neither employ force 
nor condone its use, German reunification was impending, and Wash-
ington needed to act if it wanted to secure its influence in Europe.30 
To avoid West Germany becoming a disenfranchised giant at the con-
tinent’s core, the White House had already supported the concept of 
eventual unification in spring 1989, and, by the beginning of 1990, de-
cided to reinforce Bonn’s efforts to achieve a rapid resolution.31 
To assuage the concerns of Germany’s neighbors and avoid Euro-
pean balancing against Bonn’s new-found power, the U.S. government 
pledged to uphold NATO and retain armed forces in Europe for years 
to come.32 Yet for Washington to be able and disposed to do so, a uni-
fied Germany had to remain in NATO, subordinating its military to 
the integrated NATO command, willing to host American troops, and 
ready to maintain U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil.33 Obtaining both 
Germany’s unification and sustaining its membership in NATO under 
such conditions was not going to be easy. Bush officials expected there 
would be opposition in both West and East.34 
Against this background, the White House also understood that 
U.S. policy towards Western, Central, and Eastern Europe was tight-
ly linked together.35 “Our future as a European power will depend in 
large measure on how well we grasp these new opportunities,” the NSC 
wrote to the President at the beginning of 1990. Germany was quickly 
filling the European power vacuum in Central Europe. Soon, the only 
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powers with “real influence” in the region were going to be Germany 
and the Soviet Union, the NSC argued. On the one hand, this was “not 
the architecture of a stable European security order,” American officials 
believed, as such a framework invited a return to the “cyclical pattern 
of Russo-German conflict and condominium that bedeviled Europe 
from 1870 to 1945.” On the other hand, U.S. engagement would help 
shape German reunification, manage “an eastward drift” in Germany’s 
policy, and strengthen the “future position” of the United States within 
European security and economic affairs. Thus, the NSC resolved that 
the United States had to remain engaged in Central Europe “between 
Germany and Russia.”36
To both tie Germany to the West and stabilize Central Europe, the 
Administration had to beat back alternative approaches to European 
security in the region.37 “The idea of a neutralized Germany would 
[…] fit into the fanciful visions among some in the new leadership [in 
Central Europe] of a demilitarized Europe of perpetual peace,” Scow-
croft wrote to Bush in January 1990.38 On the one hand, leaders like 
Václav Havel of Czechoslovakia not only harbored “pro-American sen-
timents,” but thought of future American engagement as a necessary 
“counterweight” to German economic and political power. Neverthe-
less, Bush officials believed these newcomers to power politics did not 
yet grasp the links between economic, political, and military affairs. 
Havel sought a bloc-free, demilitarized Europe. Scowcroft described 
him as “a man with a mission and in a hurry.”39
Therefore, in a number of subsequent meetings at the White House, 
the President sought to impress upon Havel the interconnecting nature 
of the numerous elements underpinning an American involvement in 
Europe. “It is clear that the presence of American troops is a stabilizing 
factor,” the Central European leader concluded, to the relief of his U.S. 
interlocutors.40
At the same time, the American government worked to dispel an 
emerging Polish-German border dispute. A solution was needed in or-
der to both ease unification and to have Warsaw distance itself from 
Moscow, abstain from balancing against Bonn, and see the new Ger-
man state in a positive light. During winter 1989, seemingly for do-
mestic political reasons, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl refused to 
state publicly that Poland’s Oder-Neisse Western border was a settled 
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matter. To gain leverage with Bonn, Warsaw dragged its feet on hav-
ing Soviet forces go home and kept talking about retaining Moscow 
involved in European security affairs.41 Polish decisionmakers started 
considering a return to European ententes—balances in which France 
and Britain would ally with Poland and others to counter German pow-
er.42 “In the past, peace was only guaranteed when a strong France was 
aligned with a strong Poland,” a Warsaw official told a policymaker in 
Paris. Last but not least, to have their voices heard, the Poles were also 
trying at the beginning of 1990 to insert themselves into the German 
reunification process.43
The U.S. government understood that it had to deal with the issue. 
Not only were Polish concerns by themselves hindering reunification, 
but the unsettled border question offered European powers in both 
West and East a convenient tool to delay—and, potentially, to derail—
reunification.44 
The White House pushed the German leadership to find a solu-
tion.45 By the end of March 1990, Kohl was telling Bush that he was 
“firmly determined” to accept the current border even if it was “a bitter 
burden of history.”46 
At the same time, Bush worked on the Poles to have them accept a 
compromise. Not only was Washington offering to put pressure on the 
German Chancellor, but the quickly emerging singular superpower was 
providing Polish decisionmakers with reassurances that a Germany in 
NATO and an American presence in Europe would limit Bonn’s future 
ability to leverage Warsaw.47 Maybe both Americans and Soviets “could 
remain in Germany,” Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki told 
Bush. “You may be right,” the President answered, but gently pushed 
in the opposite direction, arguing that the window of opportunity for 
Soviet “pulling back” was unlikely to last for all too long.48
Having successfully dealt with these crises of the day, Bush officials 
realized already by the spring and summer of 1990 that Central Eu-
ropean affairs were bound to remain in a state of flux. Soviet power 
would all but fade away—at least momentarily, while German influence 
would expand at a brisk pace. Thus, U.S. policymakers judged that all 
Central Europeans thought American “association” would be a “poten-
tial counterweight” to efforts by the French and Germans to establish 
political and economic “spheres of influence.” 
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At the same time, some in the region were already realizing that 
security concerns would not remain dormant forever, and were ask-
ing for institutional reassurance arrangements.49 “How would NATO 
respond if Czechoslovakia applied for membership?” Havel’s security 
advisor asked an NSC official. With the Warsaw Pact gone but outside 
of NATO, where would these states find security in the “Europe of the 
future,” White House analysts probed.50 In the short term, non-bind-
ing security assurances might suffice. Over the long term, however, this 
was questionable.51
Nonetheless, U.S. officials were still very cautious. They argued that 
before Germany was unified and Soviet forces were gone, Washington 
should “avoid being seen” as rushing in to “fill the void” left by a Soviet 
Union in retreat.52
Shepherding Integration and Cracking Open NATO’s Door 
in 1991–1992
The ink on Germany’s unification not yet dry, the Administration 
started worrying about the sustainability of U.S. influence in Europe—
the core concern vis-à-vis the continent during Bush’s last two years in 
office.53 With a unified Germany in NATO, the United States had made 
itself the renewed guarantor of European security.54 As a consequence, 
European powers were quickly developing contradicting incentives.55 
On the one hand, they wanted to ensure that Washington did not gain 
too much leverage over them—with Paris at the forefront of such ef-
forts.56 On the other hand, Europeans wanted to obtain credible assur-
ances that the United States was still willing and able to provide for the 
continent’s security—a goal particularly important to smaller powers.57
U.S. officials worried that the Europeans might pursue alternative 
security arrangements. Some worried that European decisionmakers 
might be “seduced” by “pan-European collective security.” Others were 
afraid that leaders on the continient might even be more inclined to 
pursue an independent Western European “defense pillar.”58 Bush pol-
icymakers feared that European security integration could potential-
ly render NATO obsolete, thereby depriving the United States of its 
main lever of influence over the continent and severing the transatlantic 
bond.59
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Managing European efforts at security integration proved a chal-
lenge.60 Offsetting attempts at limiting American influence worked best 
when Washington’s commitments were trusted. However, at home, 
political pressures for a “peace dividend” and the popular mood were 
pushing against America’s obligations—both in Europe and all around 
the world.61 Also, it quickly became clear (as had been the case during 
the Cold War and despite some Bush officials hoping the opposite) that 
America’s security position in Europe could not be easily or quickly 
translated into leverage over economic or political affairs—a fact that 
diminished domestic support for engagement even further.62 
Whereas the Iraq intervention gave Washington a credibility 
boost,63 the Bush Administration’s decision against going to war when 
the Yugoslav crisis erupted in 1991 reinforced doubts in Europe about 
U.S. willingness to spend blood and treasure to ensure the continent’s 
security.64 Within this context, and given that most threads of Europe’s 
future ran through Paris, throughout both 1991 and 1992 Bonn re-
mained reluctant to block a French push towards increased European 
security independence.65
Against this background of transatlantic relations, security questions 
in Central Europe were becoming more salient. With the Warsaw Pact 
now history, political leaders in East and West believed the region was 
sliding into a security vacuum. Washington tried reassurance. At their 
June 1991 meeting in Copenhagen, NATO foreign ministers conclud-
ed that security would be “safeguarded” through “interlocking insti-
tutions.” Two months later, the August coup in Moscow was a stark 
reminder that there was little beyond words to ensure security. “It was 
quite a shock,” a former Hungarian politician remembered.66 
Expanding German influence and Western European ambivalence 
posed other problems. All Central Europeans were looking to Ger-
many for trade and investment, but uncertain how Bonn would use its 
clout.67 Washington’s reticence to get involved and European inability 
to agree upon a common approach towards the breakup of Yugosla-
via suggested that in the absence of institutional frameworks, Western 
powers would be primarily looking out for themselves. Last but not 
least, neither Paris nor London envisaged the Central European states 
joining the European Community for at least two decades.68 
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Accordingly, the French foreign minister told Bush already in spring 
1991 that the former Warsaw Pact countries wanted to “join NA-
TO”—a longing that only intensified over the next months and years. 
“They realize that the only firm ground in Europe is the Atlantic Alli-
ance.”69
Bush officials believed that U.S. steps in Central Europe had to take 
into account Washington’s priorities relative to Moscow. The United 
States was facing a Russian “political landscape” that “few Americans 
understand,” Scowcroft told the president. He advised walking a fine 
line between encouraging reform and avoiding entanglement.70 U.S. 
Secretary of State James Baker sent a somewhat more ambitious mes-
sage from Moscow in September 1991: “We have a tremendous stake 
in the success of the democrats here.”71 And yet Americans officials 
were aware that the Russian economy was broken, the pace of reform 
slow, and the outcome uncertain.72 Becoming too involved bore certain 
risks and ambiguous benefits.73 At the same time, U.S. officials believed 
that much spoke against organizing an “anti-Soviet coalition” whose 
frontier would be the Soviet border. Moscow would react negatively, 
potentially leading to a “reversal” of the “positive trends.”74 
As 1991 ended, U.S. officials argued it was strategically wiser to hold 
NATO’s expansion as an ace up the Western sleeve. The NSC sug-
gested that the key to “keeping the Russians out of Europe” was “the 
unspoken but credible threat to extend the Alliance eastward if Russian 
expansionism is ever rekindled.”75
Over the subsequent months, Washington planners assessed that 
Central Europe’s yearning for American involvement offered both 
challenges to and unique opportunities for cementing U.S. influence 
in Europe—influence that was deemed necessary for achieving broader 
U.S. political and economic goals. In terms of challenges, the Central 
Europeans’ fears—rekindled by recent instability and American hesi-
tancy—ranked high. U.S. analysts concluded if the U.S. government 
blocked NATO expansion, the “new democracies” would lose interest 
in a transatlantic bond and seek entrance into Western European se-
curity structures.76 Nobody in the region believed seeking such shel-
ter was “ideal.” In America’s absence, there was “little military teeth” 
in European frameworks.77 And yet, within a decade, the Europeans, 
led by Paris, would merge security and economic institutions, with the 
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Community thus becoming the “de facto keeper of European peace.”78 
As a consequence, NATO would be marginalized. Washington would 
retain “indirect and implied” security responsibilities due to the link-
age between the Alliance and Western European security structures. 
Equally, the U.S. government would have “little to say” about Europe-
an decision-making.79
Nonetheless, American officials thought there was also opportuni-
ty, if only Washington would take advantage of the current “period of 
flux.”80 On the one hand, Western Europe was becoming more asser-
tive.81 Its leaders believed Washington wanted “a say” in European af-
fairs but was no longer willing to “invest the corresponding financial 
and security resources.” Hence, they were building parallel institutions, 
thereby limiting American clout. On the other hand, Central Europe-
ans were among the strongest proponents of Washington’s “continued 
involvement” in Europe. 
Against this background, the CIA argued that the U.S. position as 
“the only global power” still gave it “leverage with the Europeans.” The 
United States had a clear comparative advantage: Europe’s post-Cold 
War structure on the “political/military dimension of security” con-
tained a “glaring gap,” providing Washington with a “stronger hand.” 
Therefore, the analysts concluded that a “reliable and predictable” U.S. 
commitment to assist in dealing with regional tensions “in the eastern 
half of the continent” would increase the U.S. government’s sway in 
both West and East.82
During Bush’s final year in office, a consensus appears to have slowly 
emerged: Washington should offer the Central Europeans the perspec-
tive of joining NATO. The French believed already at the end of 1991 
that the Americans were tilting towards “seeking to offer” the countries 
in Central Europe “Alliance security guarantees.”83 During the same 
time period, analysts who would later serve in the Clinton Adminis-
tration argued for elaborating criteria for admitting new members to 
the NATO club.84 By the end of March 1992, the NSC was arguing 
that the United States should “signal” to the East Europeans that they 
“may become eligible” for NATO membership.85 By June 1992, policy 
planners seemed to believe that a consensus was emerging within the 
Administration towards opening “up the Alliance to new members,” 
although details had yet to be “worked out.”86
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Four months before Bush left office, a State Department memoran-
dum stated that that “the benchmark will be high (and will take years to 
achieve),” but that the United States “will finally be giving” the states 
from this region “a yardstick by which they can measure their prog-
ress.” American diplomats also admitted that “handling Russia will be 
critical.” The U.S. government could not accept the British view “that 
Russia can never join NATO.” Such a step would be interpreted by 
Russians as a “long-term strategy to isolate it from Europe.”87
Conclusion
Throughout Bush’s time in office, the dual goal of keeping Europe 
both stable and integrated within the quickly expanding American or-
der required Washington to maintain its influence on the continent. To 
that end, the Administration’s best bet was to carefully manage the de-
mise of communism, help ease the Soviets out of Europe, and arrange 
for the United States to remain the continent’s security guarantor. 
During 1989, this meant cautious encouragement of reform. During 
1990, it involved garnering support for German reunification in NATO. 
And during 1991-93, it meant pushing back against French-driven Eu-
ropean security integration efforts and a slowly emerging consensus 
that Central European states should be admitted into the Alliance. 
To the hard-nosed policymakers of the Bush Administration, keeping 
Central Europe away from NATO involved undeniable risks. Offering 
these states an accession perspective brought opportunities to advance 
both stability and influence. However, it also opened a “Russian Ques-
tion” in European politics. As they left the corridors of power, Bush 
officials passed on these trade-offs to the incoming administration. It 
might be that President Clinton and his associates built their choic-
es on a completely different set of concerns. And yet, if continuity is 
any guide, students of NATO enlargement could start by investigating 
whether Bush-era imperatives still applied in the mid-1990s.
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Chapter 4
NATO From Liaison to Enlargement:  
A Perspective from the State Department and 
the National Security Council 1990–1999
Stephen J. Flanagan
Introduction
This chapter offers perspectives on the development of the internal 
U.S. government debate on NATO’s transformation and enlargement 
and how these initiatives pursued by the George H.W. Bush and Clin-
ton Administrations supported a common strategy to shape a new post-
Cold War security order in Europe. It is written from my vantage point 
as a member and later Associate Director of the U.S. State Depart-
ment’s Policy Planning Staff 1989-1995, National Intelligence Officer 
for Europe 1995-97, and the Senior Director for Central and Eastern 
Europe at the National Security Council Staff 1997-99—during acces-
sion of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance. 
Throughout that period, I was deeply involved in the U.S. govern-
ment and public debate and Alliance consultations on NATO’s future 
missions and membership. This chapter draws on my recollections 
from that period, contemporaneous publications and speeches that 
I authored, and recently declassified government documents that I 
wrote, as well as the scholarly literature. 
My analysis focuses heavily on the earliest debates on NATO’s trans-
formation and enlargement within the U.S. government during the 
George H.W. Bush Administration, which has received less scrutiny by 
scholars than the period after 1994, which is addressed in several other 
chapters in this volume. 
The record illustrates that the framework for what became the Part-
nership for Peace (PfP), as well as considerable groundwork for NATO 
enlargement, was already well developed by the end of the 1992, as the 
Bush Administration was winding down. When the Clinton Admin-
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istration entered office in 1993, the lines of debate that had unfold-
ed quietly during Bush Administration were relitigated, and became 
more public after 1994. However, the critical questions of whether, 
why, when, and how NATO should invite any of the new democracies 
of Central and Eastern Europe to join the Alliance were examined by 
the Bush Administration during 1991-92. This debate was shaped by 
entreaties from Central and East European leaders as well as concerns 
in Washington and key West European governments about wider in-
stability in the wake of the Soviet collapse and Yugoslav Civil War. 
To be sure, many difficult questions required further, often conten-
tious, internal deliberations, diplomatic engagement, and political-mil-
itary assessments before NATO would open its door and the successful 
March 1999 round of enlargement could be completed. Nevertheless, 
the strategic rationale, political preconditions, and general military re-
quirements of enlargement had been framed by the time the Clinton 
administration took office. This reflected the broad, bipartisan political 
support in the United States during the 1990s that welcoming the Cen-
tral and Eastern European states into the Euro-Atlantic community 
after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact was the logical culmination of 
five decades of political support for their freedom, and that it would 
enhance both Alliance and overall European security. 
Europe Whole and Free
Even as the revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and other Central and 
Eastern European countries were still unfolding, President Bush ar-
ticulated, in his May 1989 speech in Mainz, Germany, the U.S. policy 
goal of working with other governments to realize a Europe “whole and 
free,” which was far from a sure thing. Bush advanced four proposals to 
heal Europe’s divisions: strengthen and broaden the Helsinki process 
to promote free elections and political pluralism; end the division of 
Berlin; pan-European action to address environmental problems; and 
accelerated negotiations to achieve dramatic reductions in NATO and 
Warsaw Pact conventional force levels and military capabilities, includ-
ing a detailed set of specific proposals.1
As most of those revolutions were completed, the Bush Administra-
tion articulated its strategy for adapting proven Western institutions to 
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lead and share responsibility in shaping the “architecture” for continued 
peaceful change. Secretary of State James A. Baker III first outlined the 
U.S. approach in a December 1989 speech in Berlin. Baker contended 
that no single institution would be capable on its own of addressing the 
complex political, economic, and security challenges required to real-
ize a new European order.2 He argued that NATO remained valuable 
and could serve “new collective purposes.” He labeled NATO’s first 
new mission Allied efforts in the ongoing Vienna talks on Conventional 
Forces in Europe (CFE) to realize deep reductions in military forces. 
He said that the Alliance could be a forum for coordination of other el-
ements of engagement with the East. The European Community (EC) 
could play a vital role in the economic and political development and 
integration of the Central and Eastern European states. He noted that 
the United States was committed to building up the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), particularly in the areas 
of promoting democratic institutions, peaceful resolution of disputes, 
greater openness in military affairs, respect for human and political 
rights, and adherence to the rule of law. 
During a period when some, including Václav Havel and West Ger-
man Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, were calling for disso-
lution of both Cold War alliances and development of a new, all-Euro-
pean security structure (around the CSCE), the Bush Administration’s 
planning was animated by the conviction that the new architecture 
should build on the strong foundations, core principles, and comple-
mentary capabilities of NATO, the EC, and CSCE.3 Administration 
officials believed this approach was prudent and that trying to establish 
entirely new structures in a period of rapid change and political uncer-
tainty—including about the scope of the EC’s further integration—was 
fraught with risk. Moreover, NATO was seen as the most effective in-
stitution to guarantee European peace and security, including among 
its members, and as a hedge against instability or the reversal of po-
litical reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and Soviet revanchism. 
NATO was also central to retaining U.S. influence in Europe.
German Unity and NATO Enlargement
With the opening of travel between and East and West Germany 
and the fall of the Berlin Wall, German unity became the focus and 
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a critical first step in the Bush Administration’s strategy in advancing 
wider European integration. The administration moved quickly to sup-
port the manifest aspirations of the German people for rapid unifica-
tion despite the strong reservations of other European governments, 
particularly those involved in the postwar occupation, about the se-
curity implications of a unified Germany. Before those three govern-
ments would relinquish their postwar rights, they wanted assurances 
that a reunited Germany with combined military forces would not pose 
a threat. To address these concerns, the February 1990 Ottawa Open 
Skies Conference—the first meeting of the 29 members of NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact since the revolutions of 1989—was repurposed as the 
United States worked nimbly to fashion the set negotiations that be-
came known as the “2+4 Talks,” involving the two Germanys plus the 
four occupying powers. 
A central question in the talks was the status of a unified Germany in 
NATO. The United States made clear that it supported German inte-
gration in NATO, and that while the USSR had no droit de regard over 
this decision in accordance with principles of the Helsinki Final Act, 
Washington would accomplish this goal through an inclusive dialogue 
and support measures to assure Moscow this would be achieved in a 
way that did not threaten the security of the Soviet Union or any other 
European state.4 German diplomacy served as an important lubricant 
in the negotiations with Moscow.5 Another key factor was close coordi-
nation among leaders and senior officials in Washington and key Euro-
pean governments. This negotiation approach would later be cited as a 
model that could be emulated during the early debates on enlargement 
during the Clinton Administration. 
In the September 1990 Treaty on The Final Settlement on German 
unity, the two German governments affirmed their commitment not to 
manufacture or possess nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and 
endorsed the declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
context of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotia-
tions to undertake deep reductions in the personnel strength of their 
combined German armed forces within three to four years. The two 
governments also agreed that only territorial units not integrated into 
NATO military structures would be stationed on the territory of the 
former German Democratic Republic (GDR), and that no forces of 
other states would be stationed or conduct military exercises there un-
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til the completion of the withdrawal of the Group of Soviet Forces in 
Germany. The Treaty established that after the Soviet troop withdraw-
als from the GDR and East Berlin were completed, German forces 
fully into integrated NATO military structures could be stationed in 
the territory of the former GDR—without nuclear weapons carriers—
but foreign armed forces and nuclear weapons or their delivery systems 
could not. Finally, the Treaty codified the right of a united Germany to 
belong to alliances with full rights.6
Assertions by Soviet and Russian officials—and some U.S. dip-
lomats—that U.S. and German leaders offered informal assurances 
during the 2+4 negotiations that NATO would eschew further enlarge-
ment remain contentious. These assertions have been roundly refuted 
by senior U.S. officials involved in the negotiations. Over the last de-
cade scholars have been able to examine the U.S., German, and Soviet 
archives on this matter. A number of scholars have presented findings 
that support the statements of U.S. policymakers that NATO enlarge-
ment beyond the GDR was not discussed with the Soviets during this 
period. As Mark Kramer concluded: “Gorbachev did receive numerous 
assurances during the ‘‘2+4’’ process that helped to sweeten the deal 
for him, but none of these had anything to do with the enlargement 
of NATO beyond Germany.” 7 Other analysts contend that U.S. and 
German officials did have discussions with the Soviets in early Feb-
ruary 1990 that could have been interpreted as eschewing expansion 
beyond the GDR. In particular, Baker told Gorbachev, “there would be 
no extension of NATO’s jurisdiction or NATO’s forces one inch to the 
east.”8 However, this statement was not further elaborated or codified 
in an agreement, and even Gorbachev admitted it was made in the con-
text of the early phases of negotiations on German unity.9 Moreover, 
there was no discussion of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern 
Europe in the Bush Administration at that time. The Soviets received 
financial assistance from Germany and the commitments on military 
deployments and force levels in the Treaty on the Final Settlement, in 
exchange for agreeing to a united Germany being a full-fledged mem-
ber of NATO, but there was no promise to freeze NATO’s borders.10 
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The Development of Liaison
During 1990, the Bush Administration’s European strategy discus-
sions focused on transformation of NATO and relations with the So-
viet Union and the post-Communist Central and Eastern European 
governments with the goal of promoting stability and mutual under-
standing. While there was a recognition that the Alliance would even-
tually need to address the interest of many Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean states to join NATO, taking a public stance on the issue was 
assessed to be premature and could risk trouble with Moscow, which 
still had several hundred thousand troops deployed in the region. 
A small interagency planning group began drafting a NATO summit 
declaration that included several dramatic initiatives including: declar-
ing nuclear weapons as truly “weapons of last resort,” eliminating nu-
clear artillery, proposing a new military strategy, seeking further force 
reductions in a CFE II, inviting former Warsaw Pact countries to es-
tablish missions to NATO, and strengthening CSCE.11 
At their July 1990 Summit in London, NATO Heads of State and 
Government endorsed these initiatives as a first step in NATO’s post-
Cold War transformation. NATO formally extended a “hand of friend-
ship” to the former Warsaw Pact countries, inviting them to form a 
new relationship with the alliance. The declassified verbatim record of 
the London Summit reflects that Allied leaders discussed the need to 
transform NATO for new missions, while retaining its collective de-
fense capabilities. President Bush argued that the most important step 
in engaging the Soviet Union and the new East European democracies 
was to invite them to establish permanent liaison missions to NATO. 
Liaison would facilitate an active dialogue and demonstrate that the Al-
liance had changed and was listening to Eastern security concerns. He 
noted that this would give the Central and Eastern European countries 
a channel to NATO and an alternative to a “reformed Warsaw Pact,” 
without alarming the Soviets. He also suggested inviting Gorbachev to 
a future NATO Summit to help overcome the Soviet image of NATO 
as an enemy. The leaders also explored how to develop cooperative 
political and military activities.12 
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Initial Stirrings: Moving Beyond Liaison
The first detailed discussions of NATO enlargement in the U.S. 
government unfolded during spring and summer of 1991. It was stim-
ulated by several factors. There was growing concern in Washington 
and Bonn that leaders and the wider public in Central and Eastern 
European countries were losing hope in the promise of integration in 
Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security institutions and that 
this disappointment might lead to backsliding on implementation of 
difficult reforms or even the emergence of extreme nationalist politi-
cal leaders, or the spread of the sectarian violence that was unfolding 
in Yugoslavia. In addition, the failed August 1991 Soviet coup raised 
fears of further instability and even revanchism in Moscow. While this 
abated somewhat in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, Central 
and Eastern European governments remained anxious to build closer 
ties with NATO and the EC. EC governments, however, were focused 
on development of the Union (Maastricht) treaty; Central and Eastern 
European leaders assessed the prospects of their integration were off in 
the distant future. The CSCE remained mainly a forum for dialogue 
on security, and other architectural constructs, such as President Mit-
terrand’s Atlantic to the Urals European Confederation, failed to gain 
much traction.13 
In February 1991, the Warsaw Pact’s military structure was dissolved 
by defense and foreign ministers and the last meeting of its Political 
Consultative Committee was held in Prague the following July, ending 
any notion that a reformed, or more political pact could provide for 
Central and Eastern European security.14 
In March 1991 Václav Havel, then President of the Czech and Slovak 
Federative Republic (CSFR), became the first East Central European 
leader to address the North Atlantic Council. However, some Allies 
were reluctant to issue a joint NATO/CSFR statement on basic prin-
ciples of relations, which appears to have led other Central and East-
ern European governments to decide not to push too hard on NATO’s 
door at that time. Allied reluctance also raised concerns in Central and 
Eastern European capitals that NATO governments were more inter-
ested in allaying Soviet concerns than in helping them emerge from the 
legacy of Communist rule. 
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The following month Polish President Lech Wałęsa, after a disap-
pointing meeting with the EC seeking economic assistance, lamented 
that “the Iron Curtain could be replaced by a silver curtain, separating 
a rich West from a poor East.”15 Still, some of the Central and Eastern 
European countries continued to ask the difficult question: if NATO 
is an alliance of democracies committed to promoting and protecting 
common values, how long would they have to be democracies before 
membership became an option? 
Allies were pursuing liaison in ways that would avoid any delay of 
Soviet force withdrawals from the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries or undercut Eastern reformers who were arguing for more coop-
erative security relations with the West. A number of NATO govern-
ments were initially reluctant to develop the liaison program beyond 
information exchanges and increased contacts to practical cooperation 
and to have any differentiation among countries in the conduct of liai-
son activities. I argued that this hesitation existed in large measure be-
cause Allies had yet to fully consider, or convey to liaison governments, 
what the long-term objectives and parameters this function should be. 
In a May 1991 policy planning paper, I presented a range of possibili-
ties from information exchange to limited partnership and even “can-
didate membership.”16  
By that time, leaders in Poland, Hungary, and the CSFR had already 
signaled NATO membership was a long-term goal.17 At the June 1991 
meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Copenhagen, Secretary Baker 
advanced several principles to clarify the objectives and guide the de-
velopment of the NATO liaison relationships. Baker noted that NATO 
liaison complemented the activities of other forums and formed a web 
of relations that would further integrate the Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries into with the West. Although liaison functions were not 
designed to extend a security guarantee, they did seek to foster greater 
security throughout Europe by building trust and reducing misunder-
standing. Baker called for: 
new mechanisms for the Eastern countries to interact with mem-
bers of the alliance so they would develop a better understanding 
of NATO’s nature and operations and to foster the security con-
cerns to all participating states; cooperation in areas where NATO 
had specialized technical expertise, such as civil emergency plan-
NATO From Liaison to Enlargement 101
ning, for coping with common problems; and flexible relationships 
responsive to evolving needs of these countries in transition on a 
differentiated basis that reflected their progress toward of democ-
ratization and demilitarization.18
Ministers issued a separate statement pledging to build “constructive 
partnerships with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe in order further to promote security and stability 
in a free and undivided Europe.” The statement identified several con-
crete initiatives including: meetings of officials and experts on security 
policy, military strategy and doctrine, arms control and defense con-
version; intensified contacts between senior NATO military authorities 
and their counterparts in the Central and Eastern European states, in-
cluding visits to military training facilities; participation of Central and 
Eastern European experts in certain Alliance activities, such as scien-
tific and environmental programs; exchange of views on subjects such 
as airspace management; expansion of NATO information programs 
in the region; and parliamentary exchanges.19 These principles were 
endorsed and expanded by the Rome Summit later that year that year 
and were further developed through the Partnership for Peace. 
The Rome Summit and the NACC
The Copenhagen Declaration was an important step in providing all 
Central and Eastern European states an initial roadmap for their inte-
gration into the Western security system. By the fall of 1991, however, 
the liaison program was at a critical juncture. There was a growing 
consensus in the Bush Administration that the Alliance had reached the 
limits of dealing with the Central and Eastern European states through 
diplomatic liaison and dialogue. There was agreement that these gov-
ernments would need concrete Western advice and assistance if they 
were to succeed in their reforms and become members of the Euro-At-
lantic community. 
The senior interagency European Strategy Steering Group (ESSG) 
identified the upcoming Rome Summit as an opportunity to actualize 
the Copenhagen pledge of partnership and to advance practical pro-
grams of cooperation. The group decided not to pursue discussion of 
NATO membership that time. In September, I was asked to draft a 
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memo for the ESSG that outlined a number of initiatives for Allied 
consultations, and was also authorized to “test market” these at a meet-
ing of the NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group in early October.20 
Washington’s assessment was shared by the German government, 
which led to the joint statement by Secretary of State Baker and Ger-
man Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on October 2, 1991. 
The two ministers proposed the establishment of a North Atlantic Co-
operation Council to institutionalize dialogue with liaison countries 
and several specific proposals for developing practical cooperation for 
consideration at the Rome Summit.21
The Baker-Genscher initiative was generally welcomed by Allies 
and most provisions were adopted at the Rome Summit in November 
1991, except for one to start planning with liaison countries for joint 
action on disaster relief and refugee problems,. In their Rome Decla-
ration, NATO heads of state and government announced the adoption 
of a new Allied Strategic Concept for a time of diminished threat but 
continuing instability, based on three mutually reinforcing elements: 
dialogue; cooperation; and the maintenance of a collective defense 
capability. The leaders avowed that Allied security was “inseparably 
linked to that of all other states in Europe,” and that “our common 
security can best be safeguarded through the further development of a 
network of interlocking institutions and relationships.”22 They agreed 
to expand the scope of the Alliance’s liaison program with the Sovi-
et Union and the five Central and Eastern European members of the 
former Warsaw Pact, and welcomed participation by Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania, which had recently regained independence. The new 
program included both deepened dialogue and practical cooperation. 
To help oversee and guide this effort, NATO foreign ministers invited 
their nine liaison counterparts to form a North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC). 
The first meeting of the NACC was held in Brussels at ministerial 
level on December 20, 1991. The foreign ministers of 24 countries 
(16 NATO, 8 Central/Eastern Europe)—and Soviet Ambassador Af-
anassievsky, who announced the formal end of the USSR and Yeltsin’s 
statement of Russia’s interest in NATO membership—agreed to devel-
op “a more institutional relationship of consultation and cooperation 
on political and security issues,” including:
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Annual ministerial-level and bimonthly meetings at the ambassa-
dorial level, as well as ad hoc gatherings, as circumstances war-
ranted; Regular meetings of the NATO Political, Economic, and 
Military Committees, the APAG, and the NATO military author-
ities with liaison states; Consultations on defense planning, arms 
control, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, civil-mil-
itary coordination of air traffic management, science and the en-
vironment, and the conversion of defense production to civilian 
purposes; New efforts to distribute information about NATO in 
Central and Eastern Europe through liaison channels and the 
embassies of member states.23
In his intervention, Secretary Baker proposed that the NACC devel-
op as the primary consultative body between NATO and liaison states 
on security issues; assume oversight of the liaison program; and play a 
role in helping to manage future crises in Europe.24
The second NACC ministerial in March 1992, which included all 
the states of the former Soviet Union except Georgia (which joined 
the following month), approved a NACC work plan, including intensi-
fied consultations and cooperative activities in the areas that had been 
agreed to at the initial meeting. A December 1992 ministerial also ad-
opted a work plan for 1993 with a provision for joint planning and 
training for peace-keeping, and the NACC later established an Ad Hoc 
Group on Cooperation in Peace-keeping, which included several non-
aligned countries with substantial experience in the field that were not 
members of NACC—Finland, Sweden, and Austria (which joined PfP 
after its formation in 1994 and the EU in 1995).25
The development of the NACC during this period did not abate the 
manifest interest of a number of Central and Eastern European states 
and former Soviet republics in even closer ties with NATO and eventu-
al membership. Indeed, leaders in Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest con-
tinued to press for a path to eventual membership. 
While the Bush Administration elected not to pursue a policy of 
formal Allied consideration of enlargement during the election year of 
1992, there was an internal debate over the rationale, modalities, and 
timing of eventual NATO enlargement. During the summer and fall of 
1992, I prepared several memos for senior State Department officials 
on various aspects of NATO enlargement, including one reviewing key 
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considerations in preparing the groundwork with Allies for a debate, 
another setting out criteria for enlargement, and one on how to treat 
Russia, including keeping the door open to its eventual membership. 
The European Bureau of the State Department and officials in the Eu-
ropean Directorate of the National Security Council (NSC) were also 
exploring the enlargement issue, which in my recollection was the sub-
ject of several ESSG meetings. 
In early 1992, I was also granted permission by the State Department 
to publish a paper in The Washington Quarterly that outlined some of 
our deliberations within the Bush Administration on the further devel-
opment of the NACC and enlargement, which I posed as a series of 
questions.26 On future enlargement, I argued that the first step Allies 
needed to take was a careful consideration of how the core functions, 
particularly collective defense, could be applied to a broader group of 
states. I asked since NATO now emphasized that it was an alliance of de-
mocracies with historical ties and common values, what was the basis for 
excluding other such countries in Europe that might apply for member-
ship? Could NATO develop a set of criteria for membership that would 
give transforming Central and Eastern European states the roadmap to 
fuller integration they were seeking? Beyond democratic and economic 
reforms, what other political, military, and geostrategic considerations 
should be articulated? I cited an op-ed that Hans Binnendijk, then Di-
rector of Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 
had written following a discussion we had about the issue in November 
1991, in which he set out an illustrative set of criteria that any new mem-
bers of the Alliance might be expected to meet.27 
Finally, I floated a proposal to address concerns within the U.S. and 
other Allied governments about how to manage the addition of the still 
transitioning Central and Eastern European states to NATO member-
ship in a way that would preserve the Alliance’s political cohesion and 
military capabilities. Perhaps bilateral “association agreements” could 
be developed as codicils to the North Atlantic Treaty through which 
Central and Eastern European states that met certain criteria would 
be invited to adhere to articles 1 through 4, but not the collective de-
fense obligations of articles 5 and 6 of the Treaty. Under this phased 
approach to enlargement, “associates” would thereby have the right 
to seek consultations with members states when threats to their secu-
rity and territorial integrity arose, but decision-making authority on 
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any action to be taken would remain vested in the full members of the 
North Atlantic Council. 
A quiet debate and growing consensus on enlargement continued 
through the end of the Bush Administration, however, senior leaders 
were contending with a number of more pressing issues, including 
the aftermath of the first Gulf War, the Madrid Peace Process, and 
the escalating war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Moreover, Secretary Baker 
and key members of his team had moved in late summer to the White 
House to work on the Bush reelection campaign. 
I was authorized to present a paper outlining some of the afore-
mentioned considerations concerning enlargement to counterpart 
policy planners and other officials at an October 1992 meeting of the 
NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group meeting in the Netherlands. It 
is noteworthy that in his final intervention at the North Atlantic Coun-
cil Ministerial meeting in December 1992, Acting Secretary of State 
Larry Eagleburger stated that the Allies could not keep kicking the 
enlargement issue down the road, saying that the deepening partner-
ship could “could contribute to transforming the composition of the 
Alliance itself.”28 
The Initial Clinton Debate
The debate on NATO enlargement resumed in early 1993 as the 
Clinton Administration undertook various policy reviews, including 
on overall European strategy and the crisis in the Balkans—which had 
greater urgency. This phase of the debate has been ably chronicled by 
former officials and scholars on both sides of the Atlantic and is subject 
to nuanced reassessments in several other chapters in this volume, par-
ticularly the two by Daniel S. Hamilton.29 I therefore focus here on a 
few pivotal developments and highlight several threads of continuity in 
the debates from the Bush to Clinton administrations. 
Under Clinton the initial focus on NATO’s relations with the East 
was to build upon and improve the NACC and other elements of en-
gagement with Russia. President Clinton called for a NATO summit 
in early 1994 to address these challenges. This set in motion intense 
and sometimes contentious interagency preparations of the agenda and 
deliverables. 
106 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
There were three main elements of the Summit approach. First, give 
NATO, through the NACC or other outreach arrangements, new ca-
pabilities for joint action with NACC partners on common security 
concerns, with a focus on peacekeeping. Second, make adjustments in 
the military and political structures that recognized the EU’s desire for 
more autonomy and U.S. interests in more equitable burden sharing. 
Third, adapt the Alliance’s military structures to address new challeng-
es within as well as outside of Europe. 
Some in the Clinton Administration wanted to continue to avoid 
taking a position on NATO enlargement, mainly out of concerns of 
damaging still fragile relations with Russia. Others, including Under 
Secretary of State Lynn Davis and I, contended that this would be a 
mistake. We argued that NATO needed to play a role in both provid-
ing all European countries a means to cooperate on common security 
concerns and serving as a hedge against failure of the democratic trans-
formation in the East. 
In a paper prepared for Secretary of State Warren Christopher in 
September 1993, we argued for an incremental approach that would 
transform the NACC into an operational organization that could de-
velop a partnership on peacekeeping and other security activities with 
the Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet repub-
lics. The second element of this approach would be a clear commit-
ment to open NATO to new members, along with the announcement 
of criteria or standards that aspirant countries would need to meet. 
These standards would be couched in a way that would not a priori be 
seen as excluding Russia, Ukraine, or other newly independent states in 
Eurasia. In addition, new arrangements with Russia and Ukraine could 
also be developed to counter perceptions that NATO’s enlargement 
was directed at them. Rather than offering all the NACC governments 
the right to consultations with NATO akin to article 4 of the North At-
lantic Treaty, as was the interagency proposal at the time, we suggested 
making that the first step in a phased approach to NATO membership 
that would proceed from an Article 4 to an Article 5 commitment based 
on the progress aspiring members had made on achieving the criteria 
and their readiness to contribute to collective defense. We postulated 
that this would result in the extension of full membership to sever-
al Central and Eastern European states by 1998 and others in later 
phases, including a peaceful, democratic Russia.30 Our memo was also 
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designed to allay concerns that the Clinton Administration might rush 
into a process of enlargement. 
Our phased approach was set aside by principals, who felt extending 
Article 4 commitments could create ambiguity about collective security 
guarantees. However, principals did agree to support NATO’s Open 
Door policy at the Summit. What many in the government didn’t ap-
preciate at the time was that President Clinton, National Security Ad-
visor Lake, and others were already convinced, including through dis-
cussions with Havel, Wałęsa, and other Central and Eastern European 
leaders in April 1993 at the dedication of the Holocaust Museum in 
Washington, that enlargement was the right thing to do, and could be 
achieved in a way that did not isolate Russia.
The other key achievement of the Brussels Summit in January 1994 
was the formal establishment of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). PfP 
was designed to strengthen practical cooperation between NATO and 
non-member countries of Europe and Eurasia through individual pro-
grams tailored to partners’ capabilities and needs, with implementation 
linked to progress on reforms. The Summit also sought to cast PfP 
as playing a key role in the “evolutionary process of the expansion of 
NATO.” 
A number of Central and Eastern European governments and their 
supporters in the United States expressed great disappointment that 
NATO did not make a more explicit commitment to NATO enlarge-
ment in Brussels. Some derided PfP as a “second class waiting room” 
that did not address their long-term security concerns. 
To counter this narrative, the Administration quickly dispatched 
U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Chairman General George Shalikashvili, and State Department Poli-
cy Planning Staff member Charles Gati to the Visegrád countries. Al-
bright and other officials presented PfP as the “the best path’” to NATO 
membership, and that message, reinforcing the linkage to membership, 
engendered active Central and Eastern European engagement in PfP. 
While the phased approach to enlargement was set aside, Paragraph 
8 of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document issued at the 
Brussels Summit granted PfP members who perceived a threat to their 
territorial integrity, political independence, or security a right, anal-
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ogous to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, to consultation with 
NATO.31
The Debate After 1994
The internal Clinton Administration debate on NATO enlargement 
in 1994-1995 featured vigorous exchanges between those who wanted 
to continue the development of PfP, to avoid loss of Russian cooper-
ation on nuclear and conventional arms control, and those who con-
tended that a failure to offer a more explicit roadmap to NATO mem-
bership risked the creation of an unstable security vacuum in Central 
and Eastern Europe and possible backsliding on democratic and mili-
tary reforms. Some in Washington and Allied governments were also 
greatly concerned that as NATO developed this new relationship with 
the East, it was essential to maintain the political cohesion and military 
effectiveness of the Alliance, and that adding more members too quick-
ly could erode these important aspects. This debate ultimately led to 
agreement to launch the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement, which 
clarified the purpose and established a clear set of principles. These 
principles guided the process that led to the accession of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland to the Alliance in 1999, and seven more 
Central and Eastern European countries in 2004.32 
Key Lessons and Implications for the Future
NATO enlargement played a central role in healing the Cold War 
division of Europe and providing the security environment that facili-
tated a peaceful and successful democratic transition of much of Central 
and Eastern Europe. It was vital to realizing President Bush’s vision of 
a Europe “whole and free.” It was by no means a foregone conclusion 
that this transformation of the Alliance or the region could be achieved 
so effectively in less than a decade. It required careful planning, skillful 
diplomacy, and a firm commitment to principles. 
The historical record reveals that the strategic rationale, political 
preconditions, and general military requirements of enlargement had 
been framed during the G.H.W. Bush Administration and brought to 
fruition during the Clinton Administration. This continuity reflected 
NATO From Liaison to Enlargement 109
the broad, bipartisan political support in the United States and in most 
other NATO countries during the 1990s for welcoming the Central 
and Eastern European states into the Euro-Atlantic community and 
that it would enhance both Alliance and overall European security.
Enlargement of NATO to Central and Eastern Europe was not an 
objective or in the political calculus of senior U.S. policymakers when 
the negotiations for German unification began. However, the 2+4 pro-
cess provided a diplomatic model that would could be emulated and 
adapted in the realization of the firsts post-Cold War round of NATO 
enlargement during the Clinton Administration. The United States 
and other Allies made clear that they supported the integration of a 
united Germany in the early 1990s and later the independent countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe into NATO. They cautioned Moscow 
that it had no veto over the sovereign decisions of these countries in ac-
cordance with principles of the Helsinki Final Act and later the Charter 
of Paris, but that the process would be undertaken through an inclusive 
dialogue and achieved in a way that did not threaten the security of 
the Soviet Union, Russia, or any other European state. This principled 
and transparent strategy, together with skillful diplomatic engagement, 
achieved the key goals of stabilization and reintegration of Central and 
Eastern Europe into the community of European democracies. 
Another key factor was strong but inclusive U.S. leadership, which 
featured close coordination among heads of state and government and 
senior officials in Washington and key European governments, includ-
ing Russia. While the Alliance has been unable to establish a durable 
and effective cooperation with Russia, this was not for lack of effort. As 
Alexander Vershbow outlines in his chapter in this volume, the United 
States and other Allies expended enormous effort to engage Russia as a 
partner, and to even hold out the prospect of NATO membership, and 
achieved real gains until the events of 2014. 
Twenty years ago, leaders in Central and Eastern Europe asked the 
question: if NATO is an alliance of democracies committed to promot-
ing and protecting common values, how long would they have to be 
democracies before membership became an option? Today with back-
sliding on reforms in Poland and Hungary and increasingly authoritar-
ian, nationalist rule in Turkey, it is increasingly clear that NATO can 
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no longer ignore this retreat from the principles without damage to the 
Alliance’s cohesion and standing in the world. 
With respect to hard security, the thirteen countries that have joined 
the Alliance since 1999 have for the most part demonstrated an endur-
ing and lately an increasing commitment to providing for their own 
defense and to contributing within their means to collective defense, 
crisis management, and cooperative security. Through their continu-
ing and varied contribution to the full range of NATO missions, these 
countries have more than met the relevant principles of the 1995 Study 
on Enlargement that their membership should contribute to Alliance 
and wider European and global security.
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Chapter 5
NATO Enlargement: Anchor in a Safe Harbor
Géza Jeszenszky
“It is not good for man to be alone,” says the Holy Bible. While it is 
a phrase usually quoted in marriage ceremonies, it is also true in poli-
tics. On November 16, 1997, when a binding referendum was held in 
Hungary on accession to NATO, 85.33 per cent of those who cared to 
vote understood that it was in the interest of the security, welfare and 
brighter future of the nation to join the political and military alliance 
that united most of the world’s economically and militarily strongest 
democracies.1 NATO enlargement was of great historical and political 
significance not only for Hungary but for all Central Europe, indeed 
for the whole world.
Overcoming Misfortune and Misjudgments
The vast area between the two largest European nations, the Ger-
mans and the Russians, home to at least twenty national groups, was 
traditionally the object of fights for influence and control by the two 
neighboring great powers, occasionally joined by the Ottoman Em-
pire and even Sweden. When the smaller countries (in what some have 
called Zwischeneuropa) were independent, they did their best to fight off 
invaders, but were often also involved in armed conflicts with neigh-
bors over territorial and/or dynastic issues. 
In the early modern age, at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, four em-
pires—the Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian and Prussian-German—ruled 
over Central and Southeastern Europe. The First World War lead to 
the break-up of those empires and to the independence of most of their 
subdued nationalities. Border disputes and the treatment of thirty mil-
lion people belonging to national minorities made the region easy prey 
for Hitler and Stalin. The United States and the West European de-
mocracies did very little to prevent World War II, which led to the hor-
rors carried out by the Nazis and later by the Bolsheviks. The spread of 
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Soviet communism to the West was blocked seventy years ago by the 
creation of NATO.
The basic principle of NATO, common defense, is not new in the 
heart of Europe. The idea to stand up jointly to aggression and to defend 
the land and the people against invaders is very old there. It is enough 
to refer to the common struggles against the Ottoman onslaught from 
the 14th to the 18th century, to the mutual sympathy and support by 
volunteers in the various uprisings and wars for national independence 
in Poland, Hungary and Italy in the 18th and 19th centuries, and above 
all to the solidarity shown in all the Central European countries for the 
efforts to get rid of the inhuman and irrational dictatorship imposed 
upon them by the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World 
War. Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland several 
times but particularly in 1980-81 underscored the strong attachment 
people in the eastern half of Europe felt towards freedom and democ-
racy, the cornerstones of Euro-Atlantic values and principles.
Ever since the adoption of Christianity more than a thousand years 
ago, the three nations that signed the Washington Treaty in 1999 have 
followed a Western political, cultural and religious alignment. They 
adopted the Latin (rather than the Cyrillic) alphabet, had feudal Diets, 
and also a Reformation. In Hungary (including today’s Slovakia) the 
final delivery from Turkish (Ottoman) rule in the late 17th century was 
the result of a huge international army liberating Buda and pushing on 
to Belgrade, then an Ottoman stronghold. 
Later, educated Central Europeans were deeply impressed by the 
Enlightenment, the American Revolution, and by the material progress 
the West achieved in the early 19th century. In 1848 Hungary attempt-
ed to introduce the liberal political principles that were beginning to 
guide countries on the two sides of the Atlantic, only to be suppressed 
by the joint military forces of the Habsburg and the Russian Emperors. 
Hungary’s leader, Lajos Kossuth (in exile) advocated the close associ-
ation of the United States and the liberal States of Europe, becoming 
one of the first Atlanticists, and also proposed a confederation of the 
smaller Danubian countries.
As a historian I have always seen two tendencies or symptoms which 
were responsible for the many tragedies that had befallen upon the 
peoples of what the British historian Hugh Seton-Watson called “the 
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sick heart of Europe.” One was what I call the “invasion and partition” 
syndrome: neighboring great powers threatening, invading, subduing 
the smaller nations and imposing upon them foreign domination and 
usually also a backward social and political system. The Tsarist (later 
Soviet) and the Ottoman Empires were the most obvious examples. 
This misfortune was clearly a running theme in the history of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe. Another sad feature was what might be called 
the “ganging up against your neighbor” phenomenon: quarrels over 
borders and the treatment of national minorities (due to overlapping 
national territories), and the effort to enlist the support of the great 
powers in the internecine conflicts. That was more the result of mis-
judgment than misfortune, because in the long run all the Central Eu-
ropeans were bound to pay a high price for being caught in the crossfire 
and becoming cannon-fodder in the wars of the giants. 
However, one can also see misjudgment in the policy pursued by 
the Great Powers towards Central Europe as well. The peace treaties 
ending the First World War produced “an apple of Eris” for Central 
Europe, giving rise to discord and territorial disputes among the peo-
ples of the region. Appeasement of Hitler and later of Stalin was a fatal 
and avoidable mistake. The lofty ideals expressed in the Atlantic Char-
ter and the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe were perceived as a 
pledge that Central Europe would not be given up to the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, mainly for military reasons, the United States did not 
prevent the Soviet Union from turning every country under the control 
of the Soviet Army into a satellite of the Soviet Union by 1949. 
All through the years of communism, the vast majority of Central 
Europeans looked at the West and NATO as the ultimate hope that 
one day freedom would be restored to them. It is a sad story to recall 
how the hopes of the Hungarians and others were dashed, how in 1956 
Soviet leaders turned down U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
promise not to seek new allies in Central Europe but in exchange to 
allow Hungary and its neighbors to become free. 1956, 1968 and 1971 
were all misfortunes for Central Europe, helped by the mistakes com-
mitted by the West.
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Potential Conflicts in the Post-Cold War Security Vacuum
It is evident (but seldom mentioned nowadays) that the existence and 
strength of NATO saved peace during the Cold War. The important 
role NATO played in the post-communist era in Central Europe, in 
the former Soviet satellites, is even less noticed. The aim to join NATO 
was a major incentive to consolidate democracy (as well as the market 
economy) and to overcome national antagonisms.
The collapse of communism was received with relief and joy in the 
West, but there was an understandable fear that old passions, prejudic-
es and grievances would be released from the deep-freezer of Com-
munism, and ethnic strife and national conflicts might re-emerge be-
tween peoples in the post-communist countries. Those premonitions 
proved right where it was least expected, in the former Yugoslavia, but 
such conflicts did not occur elsewhere in Central Europe, certainly 
not in a way threatening peace. Why? Because the foremost aim of all 
post-communist societies was prosperity (valued even more than inde-
pendence and democracy), and Euro-Atlantic integration was seen as 
the best way to achieve that. 
During the Cold War NATO was the official enemy of the Soviet 
Union and its satellites, who were rightly called “the captive nations.” 
Yet Americans were never and nowhere as popular as in those countries 
who found themselves on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Several 
attempts by Central Europeans to regain their freedom and indepen-
dence were foiled by the Soviet Union. Finally, in 1989 Central Euro-
pean countries were able to become free and independent, even though 
most were still members of that alliance of the unwilling, the Warsaw 
Pact, and Soviet forces were still stationed on their territories. 
The main foreign policy objectives of the reborn, democratic Hun-
gary were set forth in the government program, presented after the 
free elections held in Spring 1990: the development of a relationship of 
trust with the Western democracies, participation in European integra-
tion, good relations with all of its neighbors, and support for the rights 
of national minorities. 
The first task was the termination of the Warsaw Pact and the with-
drawal of the Soviet occupation forces, to reduce the danger of a re-
turn to Soviet Communism. The second was cordial relationships with 
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Hungary’s neighbors. We anti-communist leaders hoped that on the 
basis of the common suffering under the dictatorships, and the com-
mon acceptance of Western, Atlantic values, a new solidarity would 
emerge between the “new democracies,” and the former communist 
countries would follow the example of post-World War II Western Eu-
rope by putting aside all quarrels, and would concentrate on political, 
economic, environmental and cultural recovery. The third aim of Hun-
gary’s foreign policy was the protection of the Hungarian and other 
national minorities, who were victims of a kind of double oppression 
under communism. The Helsinki process, with its emphasis on human 
rights, was most promising in that respect.
The program was put into practice with a speed unexpected in 
over-cautious Western capitals. Hungary took the lead in dismantling 
the Warsaw Pact. In what turned out to be the last meeting of the lead-
ers of that body in Moscow on June 7, 1990 Hungarian Prime Minister 
Antall declared: 
Here I would like to emphasize that Hungary welcomes the new 
Soviet stance acknowledging the importance of American mili-
tary commitments in Europe. We believe the military presence 
of the United States to be a stabilizing factor that will continue 
to have a definitive positive influence even after German re-
unification. During the process of forging European unity, it is 
expedient to rely on stable Atlantic co-operation, which proved 
in the course of two world wars that Europe and North America 
are inseparable. We do not wish to exclude the peoples of the Sovi-
et Union from the unified Europe. We oppose merely shifting the 
line that divides Europe eastwards. The only credible alternative is 
the complete elimination of such divisions.2 
He proposed the radical revision of the Pact, called for the immedi-
ate liquidation of its military organization, and proposed talks “to re-
view the nature, the function and the activities of the Warsaw Treaty.” 
President Gorbachev still hoped that both military-political alliances 
could be dissolved, but Antall contradicted him: “During the process of 
forging European unity, it is expedient to rely on stable Atlantic coop-
eration.” He added that “the Soviet Union must be part of the process 
of European integration.”3 
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Gradually Hungary enlisted the agreement to that program all the 
former satellites, and the Warsaw Pact was formally dissolved on July 
1, 1991. By that date the last Soviet soldier had already left Hungary. 
In my role as Hungary’s Foreign Minister, I already visited NATO 
in Brussels on June 28-29, 1990. I found a sympathetic friend in Sec-
retary-General Manfred Wörner, whom we invited to visit Hungary. 
Prime Minister Antall then had most cordial talks with Wörner at 
NATO Headquarters on July 17-18, 1990. 
All the leaders of the new, non-communist governments wanted 
to guarantee that the great political and economic changes were ir-
reversible. The failed coup in Moscow on August 19-20, 1991 was an 
ominous warning. Although on August 21 the North Atlantic Council 
came out with a statement in support of democracy, reform and inde-
pendence in Central and Eastern Europe, and President Bush as well 
as Secretary-General Wörner placed encouraging phone calls to Antall 
and myself respectively, we knew that if the coup had succeeded and 
Moscow had sent back its troops, NATO would have found it difficult 
to do more than protest. 
The Visegrád Cooperation, established among Hungary, Czecho-
slovakia, and Poland upon the initiative of Antall on February 15, 1991, 
greatly facilitated the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Having achieved 
that with Gorbachev’s agreement, we were convinced that the funda-
mental political changes of 1989/90 could be guaranteed and made ir-
reversible only by entering the European Community and membership 
in NATO. The latter aim was not publicized, however, until the Prague 
Summit of the Visegrád 3 in May 1992. 
At that time NATO was still far from being ready to endorse the idea; 
instead it created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 
which brought together the members of NATO and of the dissolved 
Warsaw Pact. 
What was needed was a strong campaign, primarily in the United 
States, to convince its leaders and the public that it was in the interest 
of NATO to expand eastward, and that post-Soviet Russia’s likely op-
position to the idea should not prevent its realization. 
That aim was far from being shared by all in the West. John Matlock, 
U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1987-91, wrote a retrospective 
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opinion article in the Washington Post on March 16, 2014 deploring the 
fact that NATO had admitted members of the former Soviet bloc. By 
doing so, Matlock argued, NATO had violated “the understanding that 
the United States would not take advantage of the Soviet retreat from 
Eastern Europe.” 
Fortunately, eventually most American decision-makers, from Pres-
ident Clinton to Members the U.S. Senate, respected the desire and 
determination of the Central Europeans to join the foremost Western 
security organization. The late Ron Asmus (who left us painfully early), 
Steve Larrabee and others played a most important role in convincing 
leaders and public opinion in the United States about the wisdom of 
enlargement. The ongoing crisis in the Balkans acted as a catalyst for 
seeing enlargement as the best way to stabilize Central and Eastern 
Europe. (The present crisis in Ukraine has likewise reinforced the view 
of NATO as a force for stability.) According to Asmus, “the purpose 
of NATO enlargement was to help lock in a new peace order in Eu-
rope following communism’s collapse and the end of the Cold War. We 
wanted to promote a process of pan-European integration and recon-
ciliation that would make the prospect of armed conflict as inconceiv-
able in the eastern half of the continent as it had become in the western 
half. …it was also our hope that new allies from Central and Eastern 
Europe, having fought hard to regain their freedom and independence, 
would also bring fresh blood, ideas and enthusiasm to NATO and help 
us transform it for a new era.”4 
If a free Central Europe had been left in the no-man’s land between 
NATO and the Russian Federation, tensions over national minorities 
between Poland and Lithuania, Romania and Serbia, Bulgaria and 
Macedonia (and probably Turkey, too), not to mention Hungary and 
three of its neighbors, might have engulfed the whole area. 
Following the experts meeting of the CSCE in Geneva in July 1991, 
it became obvious that the recommendations of that body adopted in 
June 1990 in Copenhagen were not being carried out by the countries 
having large national minorities. Fortunately, the strict observation of 
human rights, including the rights of national minorities, was declared 
a prerequisite for NATO as well as for EU membership. 
The prospect of joining the two Euro-Atlantic institutions proved 
a strong incentive for proper behavior in the applicant countries. It 
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helped them reach important bilateral accords, like the treaties Poland, 
Hungary and Romania signed with their neighbors between 1991 and 
1996. (I find it most regrettable that later on NATO, like the EU, paid 
little attention to the strict observation of the rights of minorities, or 
honoring CSCE and Council of Europe commitments.)
First Steps: Coming Out of the Cold
All the members of the erstwhile Soviet bloc welcomed the new stra-
tegic concept of NATO, adopted in November 1991 in Rome, which 
expressed a willingness to cooperate with them. But this was still a far 
cry from membership in the cozy club. 
Prime Minister Antall addressed the Atlantic Council on October 
28, 1991 and expressed his gratitude for NATO: “We knew that if 
Western Europe could not remain stable, if the North American pres-
ence would cease in Europe, then there wouldn’t be any solid ground 
left for us to base our hopes upon.” He also emphasized that Central 
Europe represented a strategically very important space, a link towards 
the southern arm of the Alliance and an essential hinterland. Antall 
called for an active role in solving the crisis in Yugoslavia—which was 
only emerging then.5 
We were fortunate in having in Manfred Wörner a man as Secre-
tary-General who not only sympathized with the nations emerging 
from Soviet captivity but had an intimate knowledge of their concerns. 
Formerly the Minister of Defense in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Wörner made a great contribution to NATO rising to the challenges 
of the post-communist world. Central Europeans should preserve his 
memory most fondly. 
Hungary became a very active member of the NACC, which was 
set up on December 20, 1991. In my contributions to the meeting of 
the Foreign Ministers I proposed several measures to deepen the ties 
between the two halves of Europe, e.g. bilateral consultations especially 
in conflict managements, devoting special attention to the democrati-
zation of the newly independent states (former Soviet republics), and 
the “human conversion” of the large officer corps of the former War-
saw Pact.6 December 21, the last day of the NACC meeting was Stalin’s 
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birthday. It was also the day that the Soviet Union formally dissolved, 
as announced by the Soviet Ambassador during the NACC conference.
Together with its Visegrád partners Hungary decided to push for 
early membership in NATO – not as an alternative to the much hoped 
for membership in the European Community, but as a complement. 
This intention was announced publicly at the Prague summit of the 
Visegrád states on May 6, 1992. From that day until my last day in 
office, and after that as a member of the Opposition in Hungary’s Par-
liament, also as President of the Hungarian Atlantic Council (1995-
1998), I worked relentlessly for Hungary’s accession. Prime Minister 
Antall used his considerable international reputation and influence for 
the same aim until his early death in December 1993. 
During this time the two of us were careful not to appear as an-
ti-Russian. We shared the view, held primarily by the United States and 
Germany, that it was highly desirable to help the Russian Federation 
become a strong and prosperous democracy, and to bring it as close to 
NATO as possible. Therefore, we did not bang on the door at Brussels 
for immediate admission. 
In that spirit, at the second meeting of the NACC on March 10, 
1992, I welcomed all the independent successor states of the former 
Soviet Union. “Apart from the CSCE this body has become the sec-
ond institution to embrace the newly independent states and to offer 
them partnership, cooperation and a stabilizing fabric of international 
relations and interlocking institutions, they could hardly find elsewhere 
than in the Euro-Atlantic community of shared values and objectives.”7
The brutal war first in Croatia and then in Bosnia, the frequent 
violations of Hungarian airspace by Yugoslav planes, and the danger 
of ethnic cleansing spreading to the Hungarian communities of Vo-
jvodina, a formerly autonomous province of Yugoslavia (before 1919 
an integral part of Hungary), compelled Hungary to be very active in 
urging the international community to stop the bloodshed and to pre-
vent it from spreading further. With that purpose in mind, on October 
31, 1992 Hungary opened its airspace for NATO’s AWACS planes to 
monitor the military activities in the Balkans. It was followed by angry 
reactions from Belgrade. Milošević and his media continuously used 
threatening language towards Hungary and the large Hungarian mi-
nority in the Vojvodina, holding it as hostage. 
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We knew that even rump Yugoslavia was a formidable military power 
and was eager to draw Hungary into a military confrontation. NATO 
understood our predicament. In response to a letter by Prime Minister 
Antall, Wörner expressed what could be interpreted as a verbal guaran-
tee: in carrying out international obligations under the U.N. sanctions 
and in making airspace available for AWACS planes monitoring the 
observance of U.N. resolutions, Hungary could count on the support 
of the Alliance.8 
Germany was an early advocate of the recognition of Croatia’s and 
Slovenia’s independence. While Chancellor Kohl, grateful to Russia/
USSR for allowing and accepting German unification and membership 
in NATO, did not want to antagonize Russia in any way, his Minister 
of Defense, Volker Rühe, was eager to help the new democracies of the 
East by welcoming their inclusion in NATO. 
The French were at best lukewarm about the idea, as they did not 
like the idea of NATO becoming larger and stronger. They proposed 
other European models (excluding the United States), such as a “Eu-
ropean Confederation” or strengthening the West European Union. 
The United Kingdom, influenced mainly by military considerations, 
thought that the British were not ready to die for Warsaw. 
The ultimate decision, however, clearly rested with the United 
States. There the expansion (the term was soon changed to the more 
innocent sounding enlargement) of NATO was a subject of heated dis-
cussions under the new Clinton Administration. The details, meticu-
lously recounted by several authors, make exciting reading even today.9 
Many Americans, some of them fellow authors in this volume, played 
a most important role in convincing the leaders and public opinion in 
the United States about the wisdom of enlargement. On the Repub-
lican side they were given strong support by Senator Richard Lugar, 
Republican from Indiana, while the Secretary of State, Warren Chris-
topher (not exactly a sanguine person) was for long at best undecided. 
Other officials and experts (Steve Oxman, Strobe Talbott) appeared to 
be skeptical, fearing that Russia would be alienated by the Alliance ap-
proaching its borders. 
On the other hand, we, Polish, Czech and Hungarian politicians 
were increasingly vociferous in the counter-arguments. Clinton, im-
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pressed by the heroes of Central Europe’s anti-communist revolutions, 
was inclined to agree with us, but he did not want to go down in history 
as the President “who lost Russia,” alienating Yeltsin, the man who was 
instrumental in the break-up of the Soviet Union.
Although we were aware of the misgivings most NATO members 
had about diluting the Alliance and admitting officers who had been 
trained in the Soviet Union into their ranks, we thought that even a 
campaign for membership would increase our security, and we should 
persist in our efforts to convince the skeptics that an enlarged NATO 
would guarantee the peace and stability of Europe.
A very emphatic expression of our wish was the first NATO “polit-
ical-military workshop” held in a former Warsaw Pact country, in Bu-
dapest, on June 3, 1993. It was attended by many high-ranking NATO 
officers and officials, and offered an opportunity to articulate our argu-
ments in favor of enlargement. 
Prime Minister Antall opened the meeting in the impressive cham-
ber of the Upper House of Parliament with a forceful address. He put 
cooperation between Hungary and NATO in an historical perspective, 
highlighting the deep roots Atlantic ideals had in Hungarian politi-
cal thought, and recounting how Walter Lippmann and others had 
appeased Stalin. Hungary’s prime minister also assured his audience 
that “we are supporters of the renewal of Russia, supporters of Rus-
sian reformist endeavors.” With remarkable foresight Antall envisaged 
for NATO a new function in a volatile world, where “social and polit-
ical fundamentalism may in the North-South conflict manifest itself 
and assail the world as the Bolshevism of the 21st century.” Finally, the 
Prime Minister emphasized that in international politics, too, preven-
tion should replace reactive behavior.10 
In my own contribution I listed the many difficulties and dangers 
Central Europe was facing at the time, and pointed out that the pres-
ent security institutions (NATO, CSCE, West European Union) were 
incapable of handling the existing and potential conflicts and crises. 
My conclusion was that “the Western democracies must play their part 
in establishing the security of this region, far more seriously than they 
have done so far. The reason for this is not simply a moral obligation, 
but their self-interest.”11 
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The message was obvious: NATO must open its ranks. A week later 
I flew to Athens for the next NACC meeting, but it was preoccupied 
with Bosnia, and Christopher put enlargement on hold by preferring 
to plan a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) to deal with other unex-
pected crises. 
The conference was followed by a morning cruise on June 12. With 
Hungary’s Ambassador in Brussels, Granasztói, we managed to sit on 
the deck besides Wörner—to the exasperation of Romanian Foreign 
Minister Melescanu, who was keen only that Hungary should not be-
come a member of NATO before Romania. 
Despite his strong sympathy for Hungary, Wörner’s main concern 
was the survival of NATO per se, when many people predicted its ter-
mination as an old instrument of the Cold War. He listened carefully 
to our reasoning that the stability and success of the new democracies 
required the West to include them formally in its institutions, and that 
a consolidated NATO could largely take over the role of the CSCE and 
the rather inefficient U.N. Security Council. 
V3 Pressure, Washington’s Pondering, and Yeltsin 
Acquiescing
In Washington the debate in 1993 narrowed down between the 
Pentagon (Les Aspin) accepting enlargement only in the distant future 
(provided Russia agreed), and the State Department, which gradually 
endorsed the view that the West must rise to the unique opportunity 
and accept Central and Eastern Europe as its partner. 
On August 25, 1993 the world could hardly believe the news that 
on his visit to Warsaw, after a late evening discussion with President 
Wałęsa, President Yeltsin accepted that it was Poland’s sovereign deci-
sion to join NATO, and that it did not hurt Russia’s interests. “Yeltsin 
must have been drunk,” was and still is the general explanation, but 
Asmus shows rather convincingly that the Russian leader accepted 
Wałęsa’s arguments for a common Western orientation. In the com-
ing months he increasingly came to like the prospect that Russia, too, 
might join the Western Alliance. Although his advisors and—even 
more—most Russian politicians were opposed to this turnaround, for 
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Yeltsin it was enough if the Visegrád countries were not given prefer-
ence over Russia. 
Antall, the foremost advocate of Central Europe’s membership, 
was already seriously ill with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. While under 
special treatment in Cologne he continued to advance our drive for 
NATO membership. On October 4, 1993, in the wake of the dramatic 
collision between Yeltsin and the anti-reformist, anti-Western Russian 
politicians in the Russian Duma, Antall reminded President Clinton in 
a letter of Hungary’s standing in the Gulf War, throughout the Balkans 
and now the Russian crisis. That and the overall performance of Hun-
gary warranted speeding up its integration into NATO. 
On October 19 the Prime Minister turned again to the American 
President. Seven weeks before his death he pleaded in a letter for 
the upcoming NATO summit to make preparations for the Visegrád 
Group’s accession to NATO. “I remain convinced that this would also 
assist the reform forces in Russia, as I mentioned in my letter of Sep-
tember 14 to President Yeltsin.” The rest of the letter set forth why that 
was the time to act, arguments which have been proven true by subse-
quent events, including a reference that an enlarged NATO could help 
Turkey “as a counter-balance to pan-Islamic, fundamentalist (Shiite), 
and should occasion arise, Russian imperial endeavors.”12 
The answer was a long phone call placed by Secretary Christopher 
to Antall from the plane which took him on a visit to Budapest and 
Moscow. I gave a lunch in the Budapest Hilton in honor of the Sec-
retary of State; it was followed by a walk by the two of us on Fisher-
men’s Bastion. Having taken note of Hungary’s specific reasons for 
NATO membership, Christopher assured me that the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) would take all the new democracies much closer to NATO 
and would ensure their security. In a joint press conference, where 
PfP was formally announced, my guest told reporters: “I assure you 
we would never disregard or in any way underrate the significance of 
these countries.” One of his top aides told reporters that the Adminis-
tration wanted to “open the door” to the eventual expansion of NATO 
that could eventually include Russia and other countries of the former 
Soviet bloc.13 
I decided not to show any disappointment: “We welcome the U.S. 
proposal for a partnership in peace. It accepts the idea of expanding 
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NATO and it prepares participating countries for military collabora-
tion,” I told the correspondent of the Washington Post. The paper later 
explained that “For Hungary in particular, the threat from the south 
is more than hypothetical. At the start of the Balkan war in mid-1991, 
Serbian warplanes violated Hungarian airspace repeatedly and even 
dropped a cluster bomb on the border town of Barcs. Hungary had no 
way to respond, because Moscow took away Hungary’s air defense sys-
tem when its troops departed in 1991.” I was quoted that since mem-
bership in the European Community (by now the post-Maastricht Eu-
ropean Union) proved to be still far away, “NATO came forward as an 
alternative [. . .] as a shortcut to anchoring us into the Western world.” 
Asked whether a closer relationship with NATO did not involve sub-
stantial risks, I said Hungary’s experience has been just the opposite: 
after we agreed to allow NATO AWACS surveillance planes to monitor 
the traffic over Serbian-dominated Bosnia from Hungarian airspace, 
Serbia became less aggressive.14 
Unlike the Poles, who did not hide their disappointment, I really 
perceived PfP as an important step towards enlargement. On that basis 
the Hungarian government publicly welcomed the concept.
In the coming weeks and months, I used every possible opportunity, 
bilateral meetings, articles, interviews and speeches in NATO coun-
tries (France, Britain, five locations in Germany) to win over hesitant 
politicians and the public. The gist of my argument was that the West 
must “make hay while the sun is shining,” should admit the Visegrád 
Three before Russian opposition to it would harden. My motto was the 
Latin wisdom vincere scis, Hannibal, victoriam uti nescis: “you know how 
to win, Hannibal, you do not know how to use victory.” The West 
needed to use of its victory in the Cold War. 
I also expressed confidence in Yeltsin. He (unlike Milošević) “never 
said that all Russians must be kept within Russia, and by this a most ter-
rible war was averted.” I argued that the expansion of the area of stabil-
ity and security in what the Russians somewhat alarmingly liked to call 
the “near abroad” would not harm Russian interests; on the contrary, 
it would help to make the Western border zone of Russia safe. But 
Central Europe should not be required to wait for Russia to develop 
into a stable democracy – a very lengthy undertaking at best, a fraught, 
stillborn venture at worst. 
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I reiterated those arguments at a conference organized by the Hun-
garian-born financier George Soros in Budapest on November 12, add-
ing that in my opinion his idea of a “Grand Alliance” between NATO 
and Russia was only a distant possibility, and it should never be creat-
ed above the heads of the Central Europeans. My conclusion was that 
“Central Europe today is a no-man’s-land and there is a tendency for 
any vacuum to be filled. If the West does not fill it there will be others 
to put in a claim.”15 
The Decisive Meeting in Prague 
In preparation for the NATO summit to be held in Brussels in Janu-
ary 1994, I wrote a non-paper in October 1993 and sent it to all NATO 
foreign ministers. Its main message: 
We understand that the Alliance is now in the process of redefin-
ing its role and responsibilities so as to be able to meet the new 
challenges in Europe. This redefinition should take into consid-
eration the security needs of the whole continent. It means that 
NATO should find practical ways to gradually extend its sphere of 
influence as well as sphere of activity to the Central and Eastern 
parts of the continent. Hungary believes that this task cannot be 
accomplished without embracing the idea of extending the Alli-
ance to the democratically most mature states of these regions. We 
understand that such a decision could be realized only gradually, as 
a process, in which the first concrete steps should be already taken 
by the coming NATO Summit. We consider those principles very 
important, because in the process of the extension nobody should 
be allowed to feel to be left out, isolated or interpret it as a step 
directed against its security interest. Therefore, while extending 
the membership to the most advanced and stable countries of the 
region it is necessary to create cooperative mechanisms to satisfy 
the security needs of those countries which are not—yet—ma-
ture enough for more intensive cooperation. This means that the 
legitimate security interests of Russia, Ukraine and others must 
be taken into account and taken care of in the form of enhanced 
cooperation and coordination, in order to avoid that any—irra-
tional—feeling of isolation should prevail. Extension of NATO 
should be carried out in a way which strengthens the security of 
present members of the Alliance as well as its internal cohesion. 
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That is why we are in favor of gaining membership for the Viseg-
rád countries, since we are convinced that the membership of these 
countries would significantly contribute to NATO´s security by 
stabilizing & securing Central Europe. There is no danger of in-
troducing internal disputes in the Alliance. These countries have 
made significant progress in the transformation of their societies 
and economies and have no problems relating to their borders.
In order to calm down the opponents of enlargement I raised the 
possibility of a transitional status: 
We can envisage NATO to establish a new status, that of associa-
tion, which in the interim period would provide us a possibility to 
participate in the political mechanism of the Alliance, while grad-
ually preparing our military capabilities to obtain the necessary 
level of compatibility. During this period the ties of cooperation 
could grow constantly in every field, which would render mutual 
benefits, and the advantages of the extension could be seen more 
clearly for all sides. We strongly believe that NATO’s decision on 
the extension of the Alliance would be a very important step pro-
jecting stability in itself, stimulating countries in this part of our 
continent to strive even more decisively to stabilize the direction 
of their development based on the values of the present members 
of NATO.16
On November 18, 1993, I addressed the Strauss Symposium in Mu-
nich. I pointed out that now we had the opportunity to realize Franz 
Josef Strauss’ vision of a free and independent belt between Russia and 
Western Europe by NATO accession. I was confident that “Once the 
norms and attitudes that emerged in Western Europe after World War 
II come to prevail in Central and Eastern Europe, if they permeate 
the political elites, the young generations and the armed forces, exist-
ing tensions are likely to be significantly reduced.”17 Secretary General 
Wörner privately told me at the Symposium that he would gladly ac-
cept Hungary immediately in NATO; the problem was that there were 
eleven applicants, and obviously all of them could not be accepted at 
once or possible at all. 
At the NACC meeting in Brussels on December 3, in a partly im-
promptu speech, I gave a very positive interpretation of PfP. Having 
made a reference to the famous Cold War novel The Spy Who Came in 
from the Cold, I said that 
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We in Central and Eastern Europe have also come in from the 
cold, from the Cold War, from the wrong side. We were given a 
hero’s welcome, but later, when the party was over, the air started 
to cool. Now, after the announcement of Partnership for Peace 
and the many contributions heard today, and having read and 
studied carefully the speech made yesterday by the Secretary of 
State, Mr. Warren Christopher, all this has had a warming effect 
on us. His words show that our thoughts have indeed been given 
careful consideration. These statements serve to reassure Hun-
gary that the position which we already took when we were still 
in opposition at the end of 1989 has been a right one. We were 
calling for a continued strong American presence in Europe and 
for partnership for us in NATO. The Secretary of State’s speech 
recognized the existence of a security vacuum and the need to fill it 
with the concerted action of free nations. That readiness to expand 
the Alliance is something which has long been advocated by the 
Central Europeans. Hungary’s contribution in the military field 
will be both intellectual and in a modest way practical, consisting 
especially in providing support services for peacekeeping, as we 
are already doing through our help to the UNPROFOR mission 
in former Yugoslavia.
I assured my colleagues that 
The extension of the area of stability and security to Central Eu-
rope cannot do harm to Russian interests, let alone pose a threat 
to that country or to any other. On the contrary, it will make the 
Western border zone of Russia safer. A stable and eventually pros-
perous Central Europe will improve the economic chances of Rus-
sia and Ukraine, and encourage their democratic forces, because 
Central Europe has long been seen by them as a testing ground, 
as a model within their reach. The democracies and the democrats 
of Central and Eastern Europe are the friends and supporters of 
democracy in Russia. They can best support the latter by their own 
rapid success. But for that we need rapid accession to the Western 
institutions. 
[…] Partnership for Peace marks a good start. But its expansion, 
in my view, can only be gradual, and the countries that are more 
ready for membership should be given the green light first, for the 
time being by applying Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. I see 
no danger in this kind of differentiation, because it will encourage 
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others to follow the democratic model of the Central Europeans 
and increase the incentive to conform to the standards of smoothly 
functioning democracies. […] 
In conclusion, I would state that democracy, prosperity and stabil-
ity are interdependent, and like the European Union and NATO, 
they can only spread eastward gradually. It is like the old Western 
frontier in 19th century America. Once it started to move west-
ward, democracy, the rule of law, stability and prosperity spread, 
and eventually reached the shores of the Pacific. One day the new 
Eastern frontier will pass by Moscow, reach Siberia and end up in 
Vladivostok and the Western coast of the Pacific. Once we will 
have won the Wild East we will be able to deal seriously with glob-
al problems, like how to bridge the North-South divide, or the 
threat of fundamentalist intolerance. So Partnership for Peace is 
not an end, it’s only a means to prepare for the tasks of the coming 
years.18
After Brussels I flew to London, and had talks among others with 
Defense Secretary Malcom Rifkind. He listened politely to my words 
but I saw that he remained skeptical. 
I expanded on the subject more fully in my talk on December 6, 
1993 at the University of London’s School of Slavonic and East Eu-
ropean Studies, the institution where I spent much time in 1975 while 
doing research for my book on the British image of Hungary. I spoke 
about the lessons of appeasing Hitler in the 1930s and Stalin in the first 
half of the 1940s: Central Europe was then recognized by the Western 
democracies as of special interest first for Germany and then for the 
Soviet Union. By resolute and timely action both the Second World 
War and the Cold War could have been averted. At present I saw dan-
gerous tendencies, not in Yeltsin’s policies, but in those of his hardline 
opponents. My argument was that by admitting the Visegrád countries 
into NATO we could ensure that the no-man’s-land between Germany 
and Russia would no longer be an attractive and obtainable prize for 
the Russian red-brown nationalists.19 
Since Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd was not in London during 
my visit, I sent him a memo on NATO enlargement. My emphasis was 
on Russia, warning that the larger the space its nationalists see avail-
able, “the more likely it is that Russian imperialism will re-emerge.” I 
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asked the British Government to “pay more attention to accommodat-
ing the legitimate concerns of the Central European countries,” and to 
“send an encouraging signal” to them.20
I was aware that several NATO countries were less ready to offer 
security guarantees to former Soviet satellites than the United States, 
therefore I was eager to put forward my arguments in their media, 
too. In a long interview with Per Nyholm of Jyllands-Posten, the lead-
ing Danish newspaper, I explained why the Central Europeans were 
pressing for membership in NATO. We feared not Yeltsin’s Russia 
but the possibility of a new, neo-imperialist Russian Great Power (if 
Yeltsin failed), to whom Central Europe may be abandoned just as had 
happened under Hitler, and later under Stalin. I argued that as NATO 
got closer to Russia, stability and prosperity was going to spread to-
wards it.21 
In my interview to a French newspaper I repeated the above argu-
ment, adding that Hungary was let down in 1956, too, but at least the 
best intellectuals of France then showed their solidarity. While NATO 
was not an institution for solving national and ethnic conflicts, it was 
an excellent school for collaboration between armies and politicians 
coming from different nations.22 
Polish leaders did not hide their disappointment that despite Yeltsin’s 
go-ahead the United States offered only PfP instead of membership 
in NATO. President Clinton sent the Czech-born U.N. Ambassador 
Albright, the Polish-born General Shalikashvili and Hungarian-born 
State Department adviser Charles Gati to pacify the Poles and to enlist 
Hungarian support. 
On January 7, 1994 they had very hard talks in Warsaw. President 
Wałęsa told them that PfP only fed Russian imperialist designs, “in 
order to tame the bear it must be put in a cage and not allowed to roam 
in the woods.” Foreign Minister Olechowski said a full presidential li-
brary could be filled by Western promises. What Poland needed was a 
timetable with fixed dates.23 
The American team flew on to Budapest. My tactics differed from 
that of the Poles. I trusted in the force of our arguments and knew that 
in Washington a strong lobby of emigrants from Central Europe was 
also pressing the Administration. Albright and Gati assured me that the 
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arguments of our late Prime Minister had reached their target. Presi-
dent Clinton endorsed the idea of eventual enlargement, the question 
was only “when and how.” 
Those words enabled me to say at the press conference at the Atrium 
Hyatt Hotel on January 8 that “since the very moment Secretary Chris-
topher laid out the main principles of PfP to us in Budapest in Octo-
ber, the Hungarian Government has fully and articulately supported it. 
This program will, we trust, help prepare us for fulfilling the various 
responsibilities that arise from being a full member of NATO. […] I 
am convinced that one day, I hope soon, we will become full members 
of the organization. It is not a matter of if, but a matter of when. […] 
instead of regarding this [PfP] as something given instead of everything, 
we regard this as something given instead of nothing.”24 
The American guests welcomed Hungary’s position and they were 
the first to make the soon famous statement that NATO enlargement 
was no longer in doubt, “the only question is when and how.” 
All of this allowed me to be cautiously optimistic in another long 
interview, this time on January 10 for the Polish weekly paper Polytika. I 
said that a year earlier most NATO countries did not accept the idea of 
admitting new members, since then we had made substantial progress. 
In Prague we would be able to argue how important Central Europe 
was and that the U.S. should not focus only on Russia. I rejected that 
the present situation could be regarded as our having been let down, 
let alone betrayed. We were simply being left too long in a waiting 
room. A stable Central Europe would set a good example for the other 
transition countries by showing them it is worth their while to carry out 
political and economic measures similar to ours.25 
President Clinton was very forthcoming at the NATO Summit in 
Brussels on January 9-10. Speaking to the Allied leaders he referred to 
responsibility before history: he condemned U.S. isolationism; the time 
had come to incorporate the newcomers from the East. He promised 
that Partnership for Peace would start a process leading to the enlarge-
ment of NATO—but not in the immediate future. That would leave 
time for accommodating Russia. 
The final communiqué sounded encouraging: “We expect and would 
welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to 
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our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account politi-
cal and security developments in the whole of Europe.26 
Upon receiving the news in Budapest I called a press conference. 
I pointed out that the last few weeks demonstrated the fallacy of the 
view that Central and Eastern Europe had been written off by the 
West. Prime Minster Antall’s frequent warnings that the West was un-
prepared for the collapse of communism were at last beginning to be 
heeded; now, certainly from our perspective, the right answers were 
emerging. President Clinton declared that the security and the future 
of the area between NATO and Russia were regarded to fall within the 
interests of the United States. Sixteen NATO members accepted the 
principle of widening the Alliance. I was satisfied that the idea was not 
to push the Iron Curtain somewhat to the East, so that Hungary would 
become a frontier zone, perhaps a battlefield—but that Russia, too, was 
becoming a partner. That would be far more comforting than its raison 
d’etre as a revived rival superpower. Far from being a sell-out, PfP was a 
self-selecting process that rewarded those who took the lead, but it also 
encouraged those who lagged behind. The Brussels decisions were also 
good news for Ukraine, as they offered a perspective towards the West. 
We regarded PfP as a straight line leading towards NATO. Hungary 
was going to utilize all the possibilities for political, diplomatic, mili-
tary and logistical consultation and collaboration, so that within a few 
years we would meet all the requirements for NATO membership. We 
were ready to bear all the costs for our security.27 
I spoke in the same vein to the Hungarian program of the Voice 
of America. Answering the question about the difference between the 
Polish and the Hungarian reaction to PfP, I pointed out that Poland’s 
past, having been partitioned four times in history, and the role played 
in them by Russia, made Polish worries fully understandable. In that 
interview I expressed my gratitude to the Hungarian-American Coali-
tion and to those Hungarian-Americans who helped our case in Wash-
ington, coordinating with the Government of Hungary.28
The U.S. President and his entourage arrived in Prague on January 
11, 1994 to meet the leaders of the by now four Visegrád countries, 
following Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce in 1993. Meeting President 
Havel in the afternoon, Clinton made it clear that PfP left time both 
for NATO and the applicants to prepare, while not alienating Russia 
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and Ukraine. If a new threat from the East would emerge the answer 
would be immediate enlargement. Havel accepted the logic but asked 
for a public statement along it. 
In the late afternoon Strobe Talbott invited me to a discussion. I 
knew his stance, his concerns about keeping Russia a cooperating part-
ner. That was Hungary’s position, too, I told him. I set forth my views 
on where the real threats for Russia were coming from and that NATO 
enlargement in fact served the interests of Russia. I did not expect an 
immediate endorsement of my arguments, but Talbott clearly appreci-
ated that Hungary was keen not to push Russia in the direction of the 
hard-liner nationalists. 
The next day, the U.S.–V4 meeting was friendly, albeit a bit formal. 
There was no heated discussion on a date for admission into NATO. 
Hungary’s new prime minister, Boross, felt somewhat ill at ease among 
so many glamorous persons talking about issues which concerned him 
far less than Wałęsa and Havel – and myself. At the much-awaited press 
conference President Clinton reaffirmed that “while the Partnership is 
not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. […] 
It changes the entire NATO dialogue so that now the question is no 
longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” 
Havel was satisfied as far as saying that he hoped Prague would go down 
in history as the opposite of Yalta, as the symbol of the re-unification 
of Europe. Wałęsa agreed to participate in PfP, adding “We welcome 
American generals in Europe: General Motors, General Electric…”29 
Following upon the Prague meeting NATO’s Assistant Secretary 
General Gebhardt von Moltke held consultations in Budapest on Feb-
ruary 3-4, 1994 with Deputy State Secretaries Iván Bába and Zoltán 
Pecze on how to proceed with the Partnership. I signed the PfP Frame-
work Document in Brussels on February 8, while my deputy, State Sec-
retary János Martonyi, submitted the PfP Presentation Document to 
Deputy Secretary General Sergio Balanzino on June 6. 
How to Win the East: Pushing the Frontier Eastward
By this point all six political parties represented in the Hungarian 
Parliament, including the three in opposition, supported the drive for 
membership in NATO. Although in the Spring 1994 Hungarian elec-
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tion campaign both the opposition Free Democrats and the Socialists 
called for a referendum on NATO membership (while my Hungarian 
Democratic Forum thought the decision fell within the competence of 
the Government, subject to parliamentary ratification), the new coali-
tion government elected in May, led by Socialist Gyula Horn, contin-
ued close cooperation with NATO and was an active participant in the 
Partnership for Peace programs. 
The whole matter now depended on the United States—how the 
State Department, the National Security Council, the Department 
of Defense, and the President, together with his advisers, sorted out 
their differences and dealt with the issue of membership in NATO. As 
a member of Parliament now in the opposition, I continued to work for 
that very end, attended many international conferences, spoke at sever-
al American universities and at other fora on the importance of mem-
bership for Hungary and its Visegrád partners. My arguments were 
partly historical, referring to the tragic consequences of appeasement 
(of Hitler and later of Stalin) and to the success story of the American 
western frontier in the 19th century. Let me present part of a typical 
talk of mine.
Central Europe today is a no-man’s land and there is a tendency for 
any vacuum to be filled. With the gradual enlargement of NATO, 
a strategically most important space would be incorporated into 
the stable zone of Europe. The admission of the states of Central 
Europe would establish an important link between the separate 
areas of NATO. The value of the air space and the territory of the 
applicants were evident during the Gulf War and even more today 
with the peace mission in Bosnia. Central European membership 
is more than enlarging the defense perimeters of NATO; it is the 
most important step in conflict prevention, in projecting security, 
in consolidating the newly won frontiers of democracy.
NATO has proved to be an excellent educational institution in 
bringing together countries with a long tradition of mutual suspi-
cions and even conflicts. A similar role is badly needed in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Left alone those states, without guidance and 
help, might again end up not simply in petty quarrels, but being 
reincorporated in a new sphere of influence, even in a restored 
military bloc. Plans for such have obviously not died yet, and that 
must be the real explanation for the growing opposition shown by 
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Russia to its former satellites acceding to the Washington Trea-
ty. The former members of the Soviet bloc cannot help seeing 
that opposition as a most serious challenge to their sovereignty. 
It should not be answered by a policy which shows elements of 
appeasement.
The question is whether to provide unconditional support to Rus-
sia as long as there is at least a faint hope to see there a government 
basically friendly to the West, if necessary subordinating princi-
ples, the interests of the smaller nations that emerged from Soviet 
captivity, or to link help to more or less strict conditions, both 
in the field of economic and social policies, thus impressing upon 
Russia the advantages of continued cooperation with the West. Of 
course, everybody is aware of the importance of Russia, its nuclear 
arsenal, its pride and the danger of hurting it. It is difficult not 
to share the view that all efforts have to be made to avoid a new 
confrontation between Russia and the West. The question is how 
to support healthy forces and not offering a new chance for those 
who think that the best solution for the problems in Russia lies 
in the restoration of the Soviet Union, perhaps even the Soviet 
Empire. […] 
In my view in the case of Russia it is appeasement to accept any-
thing that smacks of a veto over expanding NATO eastward. Rus-
sian arguments about expansion being a threat to Russia or at least 
seen by its people as such is a rather flimsy pretext for dictating 
policy to others, this time utilizing not the strength but the relative 
weakness of Russia. This argument must be reversed: the expan-
sion of the area of stability and security to Central Europe does 
not harm Russian interests […] it will make the Western border 
zone of Russia stable and safe. That would enable Russia to deal 
with the real threats to its security, which appear to exist rather in 
the South and the East. A stable and eventually prosperous Central 
Europe will be also very advantageous for the countries east of it 
as it will improve their chances for following suit quickly. It will 
encourage the democratic forces of Russia and Ukraine because 
Central Europe has long been seen by them as a testing ground, as 
a model within reach. Today—as a recent survey shows—the ma-
jority of Russians do not consider themselves and their country as 
part of Europe. If the real Europe, the institutionalized one, moves 
closer to them, they are more likely to discover the advantages of 
partnership than while their isolation continues. Today there is a 
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de facto cordon sanitaire between Russia and the West. Is it in the 
interest of anyone that it would remain there?
Russia and Ukraine must indeed be offered special partnership by 
NATO, but not to the detriment of the Central Europeans, not as 
polite way of delaying their accession, slowing their integration. 
People in Central and Eastern Europe shudder if they hear any-
thing that reminds them of a deal over their heads. They remem-
ber when they were encouraged to seek ‘an organic relationship’ 
with the Soviet Union. It would be the biggest blunder of the still 
ongoing 20th century to repeat what failed miserably in the 1930’s 
and in the 1940’s. Reading some articles in the New York Times 
and quite a few British and American writers brings up memories 
of the London Times of the 1930’s and the other appeasers. The 
voice of aloofness, expressed by pragmatic realists, should remind 
us that appeasement was pursued not by die-hard conservatives, or 
so-called right-wing people, but by moderate, intelligent Realpoli-
tiker, by self-confident professional diplomats and by experienced 
journalists.
Once there was a westward-moving Frontier in America which 
greatly contributed to the consolidation and prosperity of a conti-
nent. Today there is a kind of eastward moving frontier in Europe, 
and that can help solving many of the problems of the present 
and the future. That new frontier must be helped to move quickly, 
not restrained. The process of enlarging western institutions could 
have, should have started long ago. By postponing or denying the 
admission of new members into NATO we are not helping the 
cause of democracy in Russia but rather the forces of reaction. If 
the western institutions do not fill the security vacuum in Central 
Europe there will be others to put in a claim. As a famous, shrewd 
aggressor once put it: ‘there is no space without a master’, and even 
if that notion professed by Hitler no longer holds true, NATO 
and/or WEU, by expanding eastward and consolidating Central 
Europe, will exclude any chance for others to try to influence that 
‘grey zone’ against the will of the inhabitants. The democracies 
and the democrats of Central and Eastern Europe are the friends 
and supporters of democracy in Russia. They can support the lat-
ter best by their own rapid success, but that requires adequate pol-
icies by the western world, a conscious break with attitudes which 
remind people of appeasement.
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My conclusion from this historical and political survey is that there 
is a very narrow edge between offering genuine friendship (if you 
like partnership) and inviting disaster by giving too much away 
without guarantees for proper behavior.
To sum up the lessons of the recent past: we have to be careful. 
There are dangers which can be avoided, but if the lessons of his-
tory are not taken to heart then we may well see our hopes dashed 
again. Winston Churchill ended his monumental account of The 
Second World War on a pessimistic note: ‘the Great Democracies 
triumphed and so were able to resume the follies which had so 
nearly cost them their life.’ Videant consules ... The leaders should 
be watchful.30
I continued to believe that Russia’s real concern should not be NATO 
enlargement. In the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Hungarian 
Parliament I told visiting Russian parliamentarians that enlargement 
would allow Russia to concentrate on the real threats to its security: 
Islamic fundamentalism in its South, potential rivalry in the Far East, 
particularly around Siberia and Central Asia, and internal dangers like 
lack of law and order, economic free fall, infrastructural backwardness, 
grey economy, corruption and poverty. They did not disagree.
With NATO’s decision to intervene in the war in Bosnia in order 
to bring it to an end, and with the establishment of IFOR to imple-
ment the decisions of the Dayton Peace Accords, the strategic impor-
tance of Hungary became manifest. The Government, supported by 
the opposition parties, offered the territory and air space of Hungary 
for the Bosnia peace mission. Soon Americans learned the name of the 
small Transdanubian village Taszár and its air base, which became one 
of the centers of the operation. An engineering corps unit of the Hun-
garian Army joined the troops in the field in Croatia and Bosnia, and 
they soon proved their value by building and reconstructing bridges 
and roads. The Hungarians, especially those who lived near the NATO 
base, soon directly experienced the difference between the uninvited 
Soviet Army and the invited U.S. Army. Those Hungarians who had 
genuine fears about Hungary’s involvement could also see the value and 
significance of Hungarian participation in that unselfish international 
venture and the advantages accruing for the Hungarian Army of close 
cooperation with NATO units in the field and in command. When the 
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Hungarian Parliament voted on participation in SFOR, the yes vote 
was unanimous.
Hungary’s Treaties With Its Neighbors 
In the American debates on NATO enlargement it was not self-ev-
ident that all the Visegrád countries would be invited to accede to the 
Washington Treaty. Poland was the strongest candidate due to its his-
tory (heroic resistance both to Nazism and communism) and size, also 
the large Polish-American community. The strongest argument for the 
Czechs was their geographical location. Slovakia’s case was rather weak 
because of the authoritarian policies of the Mečiar Government. Hun-
gary’s strong points were the 1956 uprising, the role in 1989 in the fall 
of the communist dominoes, and the strong Atlanticism of the Antall 
Government. 
There was one problem for Hungary, however: the fear of tensions 
and conflicts with its neighbors over Hungarian minorities. The exis-
tence of close to three million Hungarians (in speech and identity) in 
the region of the Carpathian Basin is a consequence of history. They 
are not immigrants or descendants of colonists; their ancestors lived in 
the Kingdom of Hungary for over a thousand years. They were cut off 
from the main body of the Hungarians by the Peace Treaty of Trianon, 
signed in 1920. Between 1938 and 1941 Hungary regained some of the 
territories lost in the peace treaty thanks to arbitration by Germany and 
Italy, only to lose them again in the 1947 Peace Treaty signed in Paris. 
Since 1945, reinforced by the democratically elected Hungarian gov-
ernments after 1990, Hungary sought a solution for ensuring the future 
of the Hungarian communities, not by changing the present borders 
but by changing their nature, by making them transparent and by advo-
cating measures and policies towards them recommended by the CSCE 
and the Council of Europe, in order to safeguard their future existence. 
Since the early 1990s the Hungarian governments sought to 
strengthen various international documents on minority rights and to 
include guarantees for their observation into bilateral agreements with 
their neighbors.31 By the end of 1992 Hungary concluded a whole net-
work of bilateral treaties and conventions with a number of European 
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countries: Italy, France, Germany, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Croatia 
and Slovenia; all contained clauses on the rights of national minorities. 
The Antall Government was also ready to sign treaties with Slovakia 
and Romania, which had the largest Hungarian minority population, 
only it insisted on clauses which would have improved their legal and 
actual status. Contrary to certain assumptions the obstacle was not the 
so-called territorial clause affirming recognition of the present borders. 
For fifty years Hungary had never questioned the validity of the peace 
treaty of 1947 and never voiced any territorial claim against any neigh-
bor. A special article renouncing territorial claims even for the future 
was included in the treaty between Hungary and Ukraine, concluded 
on December 6, 1991, immediately after Ukraine became an indepen-
dent state. 
The obstacle in the negotiations with Slovakia and Romania was 
not the inclusion of such a territorial clause but the intolerant policies 
shown in those countries towards the Hungarian minorities and the 
lack of any will to change that. The Antall Government was of the 
opinion that unless those two countries were ready to change some of 
their laws, and even more so their practice, it was useless to conclude 
empty treaties. 
The elections of 1994 changed the situation only in one respect: the 
new government of Gyula Horn was ready to accept considerably less 
in terms of improvements in the situation of the Hungarians in those 
two countries. While the international community paid very little at-
tention to the bilateral treaties Hungary signed between 1991 and 1994, 
there was almost universal acclamation when the socialist-led coalition 
government signed a so-called “basic treaty” (the term borrowed from 
the German Grundvertrag) with Slovakia on March 19, 1995 and with 
Romania on September 16, 1996. 
Without questioning the good intentions of the politicians and jour-
nalists who welcomed these treaties as clearing the last obstacles in the 
way of Hungary’s joining NATO and the European Union, a more de-
tailed analysis shows the flaws of these documents, notably that they do 
not go far enough in eliminating the real problems. Tensions exist not 
so much between Hungary and her two neighbors but rather between 
the majority nation and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and Roma-
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nia respectively. That is why all the controversy around these treaties 
centered on how the minority issue was being handled. 
The two countries had little reason to worry about their borders, but 
in the new treaties they received a new promise: the Contracting Par-
ties declared that they would respect the inviolability of their common 
state border and each other’s territorial integrity. They confirmed that 
they had no territorial claims on each other and would not raise such 
claims in the future (Article 3.1. and Article 4 respectively). According 
to the Hungarian-Slovak treaty, “The Contracting Parties confirm that 
their interests and endeavors are identical in relation to integration into 
the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the 
West European Union and in relation to the Council of Europe and 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and they 
declare they resolve to extend each other support in this respect.” The 
treaty between Hungary and Romania contained a similar clause. 
The Hungarian-Slovak treaty confirms that the protection of the 
national minorities falls within the scope of international cooperation 
and, therefore, is not an exclusively domestic affair of the states con-
cerned, but constitutes a legitimate concern of the international com-
munity (Article 15.1). The Romanian treaty contains no such phrase. 
Both treaties confirm that cooperation in the field of national mi-
norities constitutes an important contribution to their integration into 
the European Union, or (in the case of Romania) into Euro-Atlantic 
structures (Preamble). 
Both treaties contain an Article according to which the Contracting 
Parties shall strengthen (in the Slovak-Hungarian treaty) or promote 
(in the Hungarian-Romanian treaty) the climate of tolerance and un-
derstanding among their citizens of different ethnic, religious, cultural 
and linguistic origin (Article 14). 
The Hungarian-Romanian treaty condemns xenophobia and all 
kinds of manifestations based on racial, ethnic or religious hatred, dis-
crimination and prejudice, and declares that the parties will take effec-
tive measures in order to prevent any such manifestation (Article 14) 
According to the Romanian treaty, the persons belonging to national 
minorities shall have, individually or in community with other mem-
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bers of their group, the right to freely express, preserve, and develop 
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity (Article 15.2). 
Both treaties contain an Article according to which the Contracting 
Parties refrain from policies or practices aimed the assimilation of per-
sons belonging to national minorities against their will, shall protect 
these persons from any action aiming at such assimilation and shall 
refrain from measures that would alter the proportions of the popu-
lation in areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities 
(Article 15.2d in the Hungarian-Slovak treaty, Article 15.9 in the Hun-
garian-Romanian treaty). 
Each treaty was quickly ratified by the Hungarian Parliament. That 
should have dissipated any worry that the admission of Hungary into 
NATO would have imported tensions into the Alliance.
Nobel Peace Prize for NATO
My efforts and those of many other people came to fruition at the 
July 1997 NATO summit held in Madrid: the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Hungary were invited to accede to the Washington Treaty. The 
Socialist-Free Democrat coalition government of Hungary felt that 
membership should be endorsed by the people and called for a referen-
dum on the issue. An information campaign on NATO was launched, 
and non-governmental organizations such as the Hungarian Atlantic 
Council did their utmost to show the public the importance and value 
of NATO membership. The result—85 percent voting yes—exceeded 
even my hopes. 
That did not settle the issue, however. All NATO members had to 
agree, including the United States. The U.S. Senate had to confirm the 
decision with a two-thirds majority. In talks and by writing to news-
papers in the United States, I did my best to help convince the U.S. 
public and the decision-makers of the advantages of enlargement and 
Hungary’s inclusion. I argued that historically and culturally as well as 
geographically the three Central European countries were the closest 
to Western Europe. They were the pioneers of the changes in 1989/90; 
it would be most unfair to continue keeping them out in the cold. Eco-
nomically they were doing well; they were on their way to membership 
in the European Union. 
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I thought it had also become obvious that the Visegrád Three did 
not have “a long history of border, ethnic, nationalist, and religious 
disputes” among them, as was raised by a number of U.S. Senators in 
a letter they sent to President Clinton on June 25, 1997. But was there 
really a serious danger that in the future U.S. soldiers would be expect-
ed to give their lives for the protection of Warsaw, Prague or Budapest? 
During the Cold War no Americans died for those three countries, but 
many cried for them in 1956, 1968 and 1981, and indeed during all 
those terrible decades when they were subjected to Communist mis-
rule. 
I argued that after Central European countries joined NATO, 
Americans were as unlikely to have to die for them as they had to die for 
London and other NATO capitals. NATO had proved to be a credible 
deterrent and would remain so. It would be stronger, not weaker, when 
the Central Europeans, who had already proved their value among oth-
ers in the Gulf War and even more in the Bosnia peace mission, would 
become members as a result of the vote in the U.S. Senate .
It was far from easy to gather the necessary votes, but after thorough 
discussion the proposal was passed. On March 12, 1999 the Foreign 
Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland formally acced-
ed to the Washington Treaty at Independence, Missouri, the State of 
President Harry S. Truman, who initiated NATO. I had the privilege 
to attend the ceremony as Hungary’s Ambassador to the United States. 
Hungary’s then and present Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, wrote in his 
Preface to a volume published on that occasion: “We are proud of our 
NATO membership. We see it as a recognition of all the achievements 
that the Hungarians have made in the decade we are leaving behind. 
[…] We know that participation in one of the most successful alliances 
of modern history is our best guarantee against known and also yet 
unknown security threats.”32
NATO has indeed brought peace and stability to the eastern half of 
Europe, including the proverbial Balkan powder keg. That is why I am 
quite serious in suggesting that NATO deserves the Nobel Peace Prize 
for having prevented a third World War after 1949, having prevented 
local tensions and conflicts in Europe after the Cold War, and in gen-
eral for its contribution to a stable new Europe.
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Chapter 6
Hungary’s Motivations and Steps on its Path  
to Enter the Euro-Atlantic Community
László Kovács
Hungary has been part of Christian Europe for over one thousand 
years. Hungarian tribes, led by Árpád, arrived from Asia in 896 and set-
tled down along the Danube and the Tisza, the two rivers that continue 
to dominate Hungary today. Saint Stephen, who would be the first king 
of the country, appealed to Rome for the crown, and his requested was 
granted. The Bavarian princess he chose as his wife was escorted to 
Hungary by Bavarian knights.
For centuries, Hungarians proved successful in halting and driving 
out various forces attacking Europe from the east, including the Mon-
golian Tartars and, ultimately, the conquering Ottoman Turks, who 
ruled the country for 150 years. Subsequently, Hungary became and for 
a long time remained part of the Habsburg Empire, mounting a series 
of wars of independence against its masters over the centuries. The so-
called Compromise of 1867 led to the formation of the Austro-Hun-
garian Monarchy as part of the Habsburg Monarchy. This dual king-
dom, with the two countries sharing the same monarch, continued to 
rule other peoples in the region until World War I, which Hungary 
was instrumental in triggering on the side of Germany and Austria, and 
eventually lost. In the aftermath of the war, Hungary had to relinquish 
two-thirds of its territory and population, but remained part of Europe. 
Later, Hungary once again made a major contribution to the out-
break of World War II as a supporter of Nazi Germany and its ally, 
fascist Italy. Once again, the country emerged from the war as one of 
the losers, sustaining enormous damage in terms of material assets 
and human lives. After the German occupation in 1944, Soviet Russia 
moved in beginning in April 1945, effectively tearing Hungary from 
the western half of Europe and engulfing it in the Warsaw Pact and 
Comecon. It was along the Austro-Hungarian border that the infamous 
Iron Curtain was erected and fortified, laying a mine barrage between 
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what became two different political, social and economic systems, and 
thus two different cultures and ways of life.
The revolution and war of independence that broke out on October 
23, 1956, proved that the people of Hungary had not resigned them-
selves to their fate and refused to accept Soviet rule or the political, so-
cial, and economic arrangement imposed by the Soviet Union, includ-
ing the single-party scheme and the eradication of democracy, liberty, 
and the market economy. 
The revolution was crushed by the Red Army. Mátyás Rákosi, the de-
throned dictator, was granted asylum in the Soviet Union and replaced 
at the helm by János Kádár, the protégé of Moscow, who had served 
time in prison under the Rákosi régime. Kádár proceeded to rebadge 
the Communist Party and meted out death sentences and harsh prison 
terms to the revolutionaries in a wave of vengeance he called “consol-
idation.” Imre Nagy, the Prime Minister of the revolutionary govern-
ment who had returned to Hungary after spending decades in the Soviet 
Union, was executed along with several of his “accomplices.” With the 
work of retribution complete, and having learned the lessons of the rev-
olution, in the second half of the 1960s Kádár began to introduce cau-
tious economic reforms. From the early 1970s, he played an active role 
in assisting the détente between East and West, and participated in the 
wording and promulgation of the Helsinki Accords in 1975.
After 1975, János Kádár instructed the Foreign Department of the 
party headquarters to start building bridges between the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party (formed in 1957) and the Social Democratic 
parties of Western European countries. This marked a major turning 
point in East-West relations, given that the Soviet bloc had been ruled 
by communist hegemony, whereas many countries in Western Europe 
had been governed by Social Democrats, solo or in coalition with other 
parties. 
Starting in the early 1980s, a handful of senior officials of the Hun-
garian Socialist Workers’ Party, particularly of the Central Committee 
and the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Economic Policy, received 
the permission of János Kádár and assistance from Chancellor Helmut 
Schmidt to enter into a dialogue with the German member of the Eu-
ropean Commission (EC), Wilhelm Haferkamp, and his staff. The 
objective of the discussions was to phase out the quotas imposed on 
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Hungarian exports to Community member states, followed by paving 
the way toward industrial cooperation between Hungary and the EC.
The phasing out of quotas clearly improved Hungary’s market op-
portunities, while the initiative of industrial cooperation aided our abil-
ity to benefit from the relations forged with the most advanced Euro-
pean countries in other ways as well.
On the Hungarian side a select small group of six senior party and 
government officials, including First Secretary János Kádár and Prime 
Minister György Lázár (and me), were dealing with EC matters, as well 
as, obviously, the six senior staff members who actually conducted the 
negotiations with Brussels. 
To this day I do not know whether the highest echelons of the So-
viet leadership were ever briefed on these meetings. The matter was 
certainly never brought up by Soviet officials to their counterparts in 
Hungary. I find it highly likely, however, that the KGB was informed 
about the meetings taking place, although they probably never found 
out what had transpired at those meetings. Having first-hand experi-
ence with the inner workings of a single-party system, I can even imag-
ine that nobody wanted to “burden” the political leaders in the Kremlin 
with such “unsavory” information. It is important to remember in this 
regard that, by the fall of 1982, Brezhnev had been struggling with a 
terminal disease, and died at the end of the year. He was followed as 
party head and chief executive of the country by an equally ill Androp-
ov, who had served as Moscow’s ambassador to Budapest during the 
1956 Revolution, and later as KGB chief. He died a year and a half later 
himself. Chernenko, his successor as General Secretary, died in 1985. 
In all likelihood, the KGB simply refrained from “inconveniencing” 
the ailing leaders with such intelligence. 
In the spring of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected to lead the 
Soviet Union as Secretary General of the Communist Party. His arrival 
and moves towards economic reforms encouraged the Hungarian lead-
ership to disclose the fact and the purpose of the talks that had been 
taking place with the EC since the early 1980s, and to delegate the task 
of their continuation to competent government members instead of 
central party officials. In the fall of 1988, Deputy Prime Minister József 
Marjai, who also represented Hungary in the Comecon, and I (by then 
serving as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs) signed an agreement 
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that provided not only for industrial cooperation and the phasing out of 
export quotas but also for the establishment of embassy-level diplomat-
ic relations between Hungary and the EC. In those days, the Comecon, 
of which Hungary was a member, did not even recognize the existence 
of the Common Market.
An important, if delicate, moment in the process of opening up to 
the West had come in November 1982, shortly before Brezhnev died, 
when Hungary—subsequent to the decision of the party’s Central 
Committee—submitted its application to join the IMF and the World 
Bank. This move had previously been considered and rejected point-
blank by Brezhnev in various meetings with Kádár over the years. It 
was a vital step because gaining membership in both institutions in the 
summer 1982 enabled Hungary to access loans from international fi-
nancial markets on much more favorable terms. 
Even more spectacular was the step Hungary took toward opening 
foreign relations to the West when Soviet-American arms control ne-
gotiations over intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) ground to a 
halt in late 1983. NATO’s double-track decision of 1979 had entailed 
that, in the event that the Soviet Union failed to withdraw beyond the 
Ural Mountains (or even reduce) its SS-20 missile arsenal, then sta-
tioned in the western parts of the country (from where Great Britain 
and West Germany easily fell within range), then NATO would pro-
ceed to deploy Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in the United Kingdom, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 
to ensure striking capability on the European territory of the Soviet 
Union. Since the SS-20s were still in place at the end of 1982, NATO 
began preparations for its reciprocal deployments. 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko responded by announcing 
the cessation of the Geneva INF arms control talks, blaming NATO 
for making it impossible for the Soviet Union to remain at the ne-
gotiating table. A few days later, premiers Margaret Thatcher (UK), 
Bettino Craxi (Italy), Wilfred Martens (Belgium) and Helmut Kohl 
(Germany) unveiled plans to make a trip to Hungary – as a sign that 
they wanted to keep relations with Eastern Europe going, irrespective 
of a potential re-freeze of superpower relations. The tacitly obvious 
purpose was to ease tensions related to the INF issue, which threat-
ened to reignite the Cold War. Citing Gromyko’s statement, Hungary’s 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed that the visit be declined, while 
the foreign department of the party headquarters argued in favor of 
receiving the delegation.
Finally, on the recommendation of Kádár himself, the party’s Polit-
ical Committee decided to accept the visit, which duly took place with 
the participation of Thatcher, Craxi, Kohl, and Martens. The Soviet 
leadership essentially glossed over the Budapest meeting in silence. In 
subsequent years, senior NATO officials and the leaders of the afore-
mentioned countries repeatedly spoke in words of praise about Hunga-
ry’s openness to receive the four premiers, contrasting Hungary’s pos-
itive attitude with the aloofness of other countries in the Soviet bloc, 
which seemed to hark back to the days of the Cold War. 
This opening up of foreign relations—or rather Hungary’s new 
Westpolitik—on the eve of its domestic democratic turn, which ushered 
in a favorable change in the international perception of Hungary, was 
supplemented by visits Prime Minister Károly Grósz paid to various 
countries, including Austria, Greece, West Germany, the United States, 
and Canada, as well as from concurrent visits to Budapest by several 
dignitaries from NATO member states, such as the Presidents of West 
Germany and France, the Queen of the Netherlands, the Queen of 
Denmark, and the King of Spain. 
This series of visits culminated in the summer of 1989, when U.S. 
President George H.W. Bush came to Budapest. No other country in 
the Soviet bloc had ever managed to stage such a sequence of mutual 
visits, alone or together. The more positive opinion being formed in 
the West of Hungarian foreign policy further benefited from the res-
toration of diplomatic ties with the Vatican and Israel, which Hungary 
had formerly severed under Soviet orders, and from newly established 
diplomatic relations with South Korea and South Africa. 
A further highly symbolic and momentous episode, as part of the 
overall campaign to open the country to the world beyond the Iron 
Curtain, took place on September 10, 1989, when Hungary decided 
to open its western border with Austria, effectively allowing East Ger-
man refugees who had been staying for months in Hungary to leave for 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Just over a year later, Germany was 
unified. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl proclaimed that “Hungary 
knocked the first brick out of the Berlin Wall.”
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Without the democratic turn, the establishment of a multi-party 
system and the rule of law, the reinstatement of safeguards for basic 
liberties, and the first free elections, Hungary would not have been able 
to join Euro-Atlantic organizations. By the same token, it also must 
be said that had it not been for the decisions, measures, and initiatives 
taken in Budapest that I have outlined above, Hungary would never 
have received the amount of attention, recognition, and support the 
Euro-Atlantic Community provided to facilitate the country’s acces-
sion and smooth integration. 
During the brief days of the 1956 revolution and war of indepen-
dence, most Hungarians preferred a neutral future for Hungary. Later, 
too, arguments for neutrality resurfaced in the wake of the democrat-
ic transition. Proponents cited Austria as the model to emulate. I and 
others of the new Hungarian Socialist Party, founded by the reformists, 
pointed out that in the case of Austria, neutrality had never been a 
problem because it had never been questioned by Austrian public opin-
ion or the international community since the adoption of that coun-
try’s State Treaty in 1955. By contrast, Hungary had been a member of 
the Warsaw Pact, and therefore envisioning a neutral state in our case 
would have cast doubt over the seriousness of our efforts to join the 
Euro-Atlantic Community. On a more practical level, as we insisted 
on pointing out, the cost efficiency of national defense would be much 
greater if we became a member of NATO. We cited the examples of 
Sweden and Finland, two neutral countries spending far more on their 
own defense than Norway, a country of comparable size and condi-
tions but within the fold of NATO. The vast majority of the Hungarian 
public—in part persuaded by the Hungarian Atlantic Council, with its 
solid backing by intellectuals—concurred with this logic, and the issue 
of neutrality was taken off the agenda. Furthermore, neutrality seemed 
ill-advised in view of aggressive moves by Russia, including its former 
involvement in Afghanistan, its “near abroad” rhetoric and wrangling 
with the Baltics over border treaties. 
Hungary’s early decision to push for NATO membership now seems 
all the more justified in hindsight, given Russia’s 2008 military action 
against Georgia and its 2014 attack on Ukraine, particularly its annex-
ation of Crimea and its military backing of secession efforts mounted 
by Russians living in that country. 
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Hungary’s first democratic elections in 1990 produced a three-party 
coalition government led by József Antall and his Hungarian Dem-
ocratic Forum (MDF). From the start the new government and the 
three parties in opposition agreed that Hungarian foreign policy had to 
strive to achieve three interrelated goals. First, we had to join the Eu-
ro-Atlantic Community and its institutions, including NATO and the 
European Union. Second, we needed to finally establish good relations 
with neighboring countries, in part by putting behind us centuries of 
mutual wrongs and grievances. Third, we had to recognize the duty to 
protect the interests of Hungarian minorities living across the border 
and support them in their rightful pursuits and ambitions.
NATO and the European Union provided the additional incentive 
for Hungary and our neighbors to normalize relations by expressly and 
unambiguously stipulating this as a cardinal condition for the accession 
of former Soviet bloc countries. 
I became Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary’s second govern-
ment after the régime change. That government was a coalition be-
tween the Hungarian Socialist Party and the liberal Alliance of Free 
Democrats. In the spring of 1996, I received an unmistakable hint from 
a senior national security official in the United States that we stood a 
good chance of becoming one of three countries to participate in the 
first round of NATO enlargement, provided that we signed a Basic 
Treaty with Romania (akin to the one already signed between Hungary 
and Slovakia) prior to the NATO Council session scheduled for the 
summer of 1997. Since we managed to fulfill this condition, we were 
able to join in the first round. 
I remain convinced that we stayed on the right course thereafter 
when we chose to endorse, rather than to thwart, Romania’s own ambi-
tions of acceding to NATO. This had a beneficial influence on our ties 
with our neighbor. 
I believe that the reigning government of Hungary, led by Viktor 
Orbán, would be well-advised to follow a similar path. Gestures in the 
service of improving bilateral relations would accomplish more on be-
half of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine than obstructing Ukrainian 
advances to NATO. The Hungarian Socialist Party, now in the oppo-
sition, continues to urge the Orbán government to meet its obligations 
that come with NATO membership, including an annual 0.1 percent 
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increase of its defense budget and participation in NATO’s peace-build-
ing and peacekeeping missions. Finally, we affirm that NATO’s involve-
ment in the fight against international terrorism is essential. 
The failure and ultimate fall of the Soviet model, foisted upon Hun-
gary with its communist ideology, single-party rule, and insistence on a 
planned economy, did not come entirely as a surprise. The writing had 
been on the wall in Hungary for decades, perhaps from the start, or cer-
tainly since 1956. It was just a matter of time, especially after Hungary 
started to introduce the “goulash economy” in the late 1960s and to 
open up to the West. The democratic overhaul in the late 1980s—aided 
by the prevailing state of international relations—was accomplished by 
inside reformers who gradually turned against what had been a dead-
end street from the start, in unison with the popular will, which point-
blank rejected the single-party system – and by default the decade-long 
Soviet imposition of Communist ideology on the socio-economic and 
political order and the Red Army presence on Hungarian soil. 
Subsequently, two referenda supporting Hungarian membership in 
NATO and the European Union demonstrated, without the shadow 
of a doubt, that the overwhelming majority of Hungarian citizens pre-
ferred to become part of the Euro-Atlantic Community. Indeed, the 
process of our integration within both organizations was a seamless one. 
The 2010 domestic elections, however, brought an unfavorable shift 
in Hungary’s relations with its Western Allies: the relations between 
the new Orbán government—now in power for nearly a decade—and 
the central institutions of the two organizations, as well as the majori-
ty of the member states, have deteriorated. The verbal back-and-forth 
with the European Union has been escalating, and in recent months 
even Hungary’s ties with NATO have come under strain due to Orbán’s 
edging closer to a Russia bogged down in conflict with the Ukraine, 
even as the latter is eyeing NATO membership.
I personally and firmly believe that creating or maintaining tensions 
with the two organizations of the Euro-Atlantic Community, of which 
Hungary is a member, is blatantly antagonistic to our very real inter-
ests. This is an untenable situation, which Orbán’s government must 
remedy at the earliest opportunity. 
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Chapter 7 
NATO Enlargement: Like Free Solo Climbing
András Simonyi
For my generation, joining the NATO Alliance was a historic op-
portunity and potentially a dream come true. But at times it seemed 
like free solo climbing Yosemite’s “El Capitan” rockface: there were 
no ropes. One mistake and we could have plunged to our death. We 
were performing an acrobatic political act without a safety net. We did 
indeed break some bones. But then, looking back, that was part of the 
excitement, the thrill of doing something really great. Those of us who 
witnessed the process and the raising of the Hungarian flag at NATO 
Headquarters twenty years ago achieved something that cannot be re-
peated. We were among the first former members of the Warsaw Pact, 
the former adversaries, to join NATO.
It was never a given that NATO would open its door to Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic. After the fall of communism in Central 
Europe in 1989 and following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
“revolution” fatigue soon became apparent in many parts of the West. 
This was a clear case of complacency: the belief that the threats and 
challenges of the East-West conflict as we knew them were a thing of 
the past. The ghost haunting the captive nations of Eastern Europe for 
almost half a century was now thought to be gone. “What’s the rush?” 
Western leaders would ask. “What’s the urgency?” “Take it easy,” they 
would suggest, as we in turn pressed forward our desire to join. 
No doubt there was a constant element of wanting to appease the 
Russians, a silly feeling of guilt in some NATO circles for the demise of 
the Soviet empire, a quasi-apology for upsetting the “cozy” East-West 
relationship of detente. Apologizing for what? For keeping half of Eu-
rope hostage for fifty years? For causing lasting damage to the minds 
of generations? For suppressing democracy, freedom of thought and 
freedom of speech? I am forever grateful for the few supporters who 
initially backed our quest, who believed in us.
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Still, the most compelling reason for our drive, the sense of urgency 
to anchor ourselves in the community of democracies, was more than 
just the possibility of an external threat to our new-born democracies 
by a resurgent Russia. Our institutions of democracy were new. The 
democratic instincts of our elites were weak or idealistic or both. The 
damage caused by forty years of “socialist experimentation turned bad” 
was huge, and the forces of restoration were present, strong and lurking 
in the shadows. No one had imagined the enormity of the tasks ahead 
of us as we embarked on the process to overhaul the command econ-
omy and to establish the rule of law. There was no prior experience 
in turning around a complete society: simultaneously converting to a 
market economy and moving from dictatorship to democracy. Back-
sliding was the real worry.
I will not attempt a full exploration of Hungary’s road to NATO 
membership. I only want to give an account of a few important mo-
ments, perhaps my favorite ones in the process. Some of them were 
“historic and defining,” others simply funny. All of it was part of a pro-
cess of making history. And history is made of the actions of people. 
AWACS? What the H… is That?
It was October 1992. I had only been Deputy Chief of Mission 
(DCM) for NATO at the Hungarian Embassy for a few weeks when the 
phone rang in my make-shift office on Rue Mignot Delstanche in Brus-
sels. It was an unforgettable call from my colleague at the U.S. NATO 
Mission, DCM Minister Counsellor Alexander “Sandy” Vershbow. I 
barely knew my way around town and had only been to NATO Head-
quarters once. Still I was very aware that this was a U.S.-led institution, 
and a call from the second-in-command at the U.S. representation was 
not going to be a conversation about rock and roll music (As it turned 
out, it soon was about that as well!). This was going to be important.
We discussed the increasingly tense situation in Bosnia, the issue 
of enforcing the U.N. decision of a no-fly zone on Serbian president 
Milosevic’ forces, and NATO’s possible role in such an operation. San-
dy’s question was simple and straight forward: Would Budapest allow 
NATO AWACS planes to cross into Hungarian airspace to execute 
their mission? Would Hungary permit these Allied planes to land in 
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Hungary in case of an emergency? He explained that he had just come 
out of a meeting of the North Atlantic Council: this was an ask by all 
16 nations. 
It was unexpected. My immediate problem was that I didn’t un-
derstand the question at all. What in God’s name is he talking about? 
What’s this “avaks”? However, I understood the wider importance im-
mediately, and considered it a real opportunity for Hungary. Already 
during my very short first few weeks in Brussels, I knew that the process 
of edging towards NATO would be hard. Only Central Europeans saw 
NATO membership as a far-away, beyond-the-horizon prospect. We 
would have to look for “accelerators,” as I called our actions. We should 
seize every opportunity to prove our usefulness to NATO partners, to 
underscore that we would be net contributors to the Alliance, not just 
free riders. 
Sandy Vershbow’s call was one of those opportunities. But there 
were serious security considerations as well. A war raging just some 
hundred miles from the Hungarian border in former Yugoslavia posed 
a threat to our security.
I called a couple of friends in Budapest. By now well-educated and 
armed with the necessary expertise on “AWACS,” I called on Ambas-
sador György Granasztói, who passed Vershbow’s request on to Bu-
dapest. A day later, I —not the Ambassador — received a call: it was 
Foreign Minister Jeszenszky. 
“Prime Minister Antall wants to talk to you.” 
“Mister Minister, are you sure he wants to talk to me?” I asked.
“Yes, you. You talked to the Americans, right? So it’s you he wants.” 
He handed the phone to Antall.
I had met our Prime Minister a few times in the past, but would 
never have thought he would want to talk to me, the second secretary. 
Antall was straight-forward: “Tell me how this will impact our efforts 
to become members? Would the U.N. resolutions give us cover?” Even 
if I was uncertain, I gave him very confident, positive answers to both 
questions. 
“Yes, Mr. Prime Minister. I can confirm both!” I knew this was the 
answer he wanted to hear.
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“That’s all I need to know!” he responded. “Tell the Americans that 
we will need a decision by Parliament, but that I support their request.”
One small step for Hungary, one giant leap for NATO. This was our 
very first step on the long road to accession, which would be fraught 
with difficulties and sabotaged by opponents, inside and outside the 
country. But in the end, Hungary would be included in the first round 
of enlargement. Those who believed in Hungary’s rise and that the 
success of our transition lay in our full integration into the West had 
a great ally in Prime Minister József Antall. He was very clear about 
his ambition to bring the country into both NATO and the European 
Communities, as the EU was called at that time. He insisted we push as 
hard as we could, and move as fast as possible. He did not care in which 
of the two institutions we first crossed the finish line. 
Sandy Vershbow was pleasantly surprised at the quick and positive 
Hungarian response. This was history in the making in two ways. It 
would be NATO’s first out-of-area operation, and it would be conduct-
ed with the help of a former member of the Warsaw Pact. It required 
the proper level military cooperation and coordination. It was no doubt 
a major decision on both sides. It would also be the beginning of a 
lifelong friendship between me and Sandy Vershbow, who is not just a 
great diplomat but, as I soon found out, a great drummer as well. Soon 
we would be comparing notes about our common love for rock and roll 
and form the first garage band in the history of NATO. We called it the 
Combined Joint Task Force.
It would be hard to exaggerate the impact the opportunity to sup-
port the NATO operation had on us Hungarians, even if it was short 
of any guarantee that NATO would assist us if Milošević retaliated by 
attacking Hungary or the Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia. But Antall 
weighed the risks and the benefits, and took a bold decision. I thought, 
“We are now on our way into NATO.” 
Unfortunately, many in the NATO orbit saw it differently. This was 
made very clear to me by NATO’s Political Director at the time, the 
American John Krindler. At our first meeting, a courtesy call in early 
October 1992, we had a nice chat about the wonderful revolutions that 
had swept through Eastern Europe just three years before. Then I ex-
plained to him that I was the new diplomat at the Hungarian Embassy 
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and my job was to get Hungary into NATO. He got agitated and visibly 
angry he said: “Sir, you are going too far...!”
Dead End Street
Yes, at that time we did go too far. But that was the idea. Over the 
next few years, at every juncture, we Hungarians went too far. We did 
this on purpose. We were, in a way, driving the process. We felt a sense 
of urgency, even a fear, that this window of opportunity to enhance 
our security and stabilize our weak democracy (which in the ensuing 
decades has proven to be a lot weaker than I thought) would not last 
forever. It was also a crash course in understanding the inner workings 
of the Alliance, including the importance of formal and informal rela-
tionships. Nevertheless, as much as we tried, it was still very difficult to 
navigate the corridors of NATO. 
The first steps to involve us under the NATO framework came quick-
ly in the form of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), 
which first met in December 1991, and included all Central and East-
ern European countries and the USSR, though ironically the first gath-
ering took place on the very day the USSR was dissolved. This was fol-
lowed in January 1994 by announcement of the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) program. At the time PfP was a stark disappointment for those 
of us who were aiming for full membership. Elevated at first through 
participation in the AWACS mission and in our bilateral discussions, 
we soon became depressed; there was no sign that NATO was now 
ready to truly open its doors to new members. Instead, all of us in the 
post-Soviet sphere, including Russia, were offered “close cooperation.” 
We felt betrayed. This was clearly not what we had hoped for.
In NATO sometimes small things make a difference. Personal rela-
tionships for sure. Immediately after the PfP announcement, one of my 
most difficult and toughest conversations took place with Robert “Bob” 
Beecroft, Head of the Political Section of the U.S. mission to NATO 
(and later U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia 2001-2004). It was at the annual 
Knokke-Heist meeting of NATO—a kind of retreat, where issues of 
the day were discussed: obviously the Bosnia humanitarian crisis, which 
was getting to the top of the agenda, and of course, this new Partner-
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ship for Peace. Bob wanted to know my views, “how I felt about this 
great new program.” 
As always, the conversation was agreeable, Bob Beecroft being one 
of the friendliest and most emphatic persons I have met, an exception-
ally smart and shrewd U.S. diplomat. The discussion was between two 
devoted diplomats who understood what was at stake. I bluntly told 
him that if this exercise was meant to “appease” the eager Central Eu-
ropeans, it was the wrong idea. I am sure my message surprised him.
“This is a disappointment.” I said. “Not at all what we had expected. 
It’s a dead end street and we see this as a way to sidetrack our ambitions 
to become members.” And, I stressed, “I’d like you to convey home to 
Washington that some of America’s best friends in Central Europe feel 
let down.” Bob could have easily ended the conversation.
But he did not discard my criticism. On the contrary. He was gener-
ous in his response. He promised to convey my message, a promise he 
kept. He also told me that we, the ambitious Central Europeans - the 
Czechs, Poles, Hungarians—can and should turn this around (I wasn’t 
sure about that!). He also advised me to think of ways Hungary could 
be useful to the Alliance. Hungary should prove every step along the 
way that it would be an asset, not a burden. 
At the first session of the Partnership for Peace, Foreign Minister 
Géza Jeszenszky, with a flat face, endorsed the program.
Bumps on the Road
Unfortunately, by then, the clearly pro-Western Prime Minister An-
tall had passed away and our support for the AWACS operation was 
suddenly cast into doubt in Budapest. The new interim Prime Minster, 
an inexperienced former restaurant manager, Péter Boross, from the 
conservative MDF party, was clearly against Hungary’s NATO mem-
bership and thrust hurdles on the already slow track upon which we 
were moving. Our support for NATO’s AWACS campaign regarding 
Bosnia also nearly fell apart. This operation was so important to NATO 
that Secretary General Manfred Wörner summoned me to his office 
one day (again in the absence of Ambassador Ganasztói) and sent a very 
clear message to Budapest about “how this would be viewed by allies.” 
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We kept the line, but barely. I received unexpected help, support 
and guidance from Sergio Balanzino, NATO’s great Deputy Secretary 
General. And I would never find out why Gianni Jannuzzi, the Italian 
Permanent Representative, defied all rules and obligations to keep me 
informed about the debates and proceedings in the Council. He kept us 
in line and gave us tremendous encouragement. I became his adopted 
diplomatic son, and his Chief of Staff Stefano Pontecorvo (today Italy’s 
ambassador in Pakistan) my new Best Friend Forever.
In the spring of 1994, there were elections in Budapest, and the po-
litical left, led by Gyula Horn, won a landslide victory. I knew Horn 
from the past. He was a decent man with an honest Western inclina-
tion. He was a communist turned social democrat who had been for-
eign minister before the Berlin Wall fell. He knew the Russians better 
than any other on the political stage and for that reason he supported 
our NATO membership. Even before the changes in 1989, he had al-
luded to the possibility that Hungary one day should be a member of 
NATO. So I was now no longer worried about any volte face at Hun-
gary’s highest levels on the NATO question. Foreign Minister László 
Kovács was another stalwart. Both he and Horn had been architects of 
the historic day when Hungary gave refuge to East Germans, ultimate-
ly allowing them to leave via Austria to West Germany in late summer 
and early fall of 1989, triggering a series of events that culminated in 
the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
NATO, however, was worried. Would the rise of the left mean res-
toration of communism? Would it mean that the steps taken towards 
a market economy and democracy would now be halted? Would this 
mean that suddenly Hungarians would echo Russian “worries” about 
the dangers of NATO enlargement?
Horn and Hungary as a whole had to prove themselves. The first 
thing the government did, as a sign of its commitment, was to elevate 
the independent representative to the rank of Ambassador. I remember 
the Belgian colleagues freaking out: you have no status, you can’t be 
an ambassador. But, as I had understood by now: if the United States 
accepts me as an ambassador, then I will be the ambassador to NATO. 
And Robert Hunter, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO, liked the idea.
I thus became the very first non-member Ambassador to be “accred-
ited” to NATO. We also pushed hard for a presence at NATO Head-
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quarters. I soon moved into the compound. I still have a piece from 
the ribbon-cutting ceremony, signed by Minister Kovács and Secretary 
General Javier Solana.
In 1995, an informal defense ministerial was held where a Study on 
NATO Enlargement was discussed. It stated that nations aspiring to 
join the Alliance were expected to respect the values of the North At-
lantic Treaty, and to meet certain political, economic and military cri-
teria. It was as if the study had been tailor-made for Hungary (criteria 
mostly abandoned since!). These criteria included: a functioning dem-
ocratic political system based on a market economy and checks and bal-
ances; fair treatment of minority populations; a commitment to resolve 
conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military con-
tribution to NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civ-
il-military relations and institutions. I was ecstatic. This was the signal 
I had been waiting for. Our moment had arrived. I met my friend Hans 
Hækkerup, the Danish Defense Minister, in Copenhagen. He told me 
of the discussions around the first “batch” of possible new members. 
Then came the cold shower: Hungary is not in the first group, he said, 
only Poland and the Czechs.
That was devastating news. I immediately discussed this with For-
eign Minister Kovács. We agreed on the need to do whatever it took to 
be in the first round. Horn was totally behind us. Whatever we could 
come up with. He called me in person to discuss, and pressed hard for 
a plan. But for the moment there was no plan. 
The Opportunity
This is not the place to describe the horrors of the Bosnian geno-
cide, and in no way would I want to suggest that we were cynical about 
that terrible war and all its victims, and that our position was driven 
by sheer interest in getting to NATO membership. But we now knew, 
however, that there was considerable skepticism about Hungary in 
Washington and in most allied capitals. Nevertheless, I also knew that, 
given the opportunity, we would be able to prove ourselves. One way 
or another we would catch up with the Poles and the Czechs. It would 
just be a matter of time when that opportunity would present itself. 
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And such an opportunity came after the signing of the Dayton accords 
on November 21, 1995.
I had become friends with General Jeremy McKenzie, the Deputy 
SACEUR, a fine British soldier. We had been talking a lot and also 
discussed the role for NATO in implementing the Dayton accords. He 
had this idea, very early on, that Hungary could play a significant role 
once the peace agreement was signed, given its geographical location 
and the AWACS experience. He made it clear to me that if “we were 
ever asked to provide support” we should say yes. He said this would 
give Hungary that long-awaited special opportunity.
Jeremy was right. When U.S. Ambassador Robert Hunter invited 
me to his office to ask if Hungary would be ready and able to host U.S. 
troops as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia-Her-
zegovina, I did not blink. I asked him if a response the next day would 
be soon enough. I also told him that I would do my best to secure a 
positive response from Budapest. I was confident we would do so, since 
I had already discussed this possibility with Kovács, and he too was en-
thusiastic (I knew very little about the fight he had on the issue with our 
arch-conservative defense minister). I knew for sure this was going to 
be a game changer: U.S. troops stationed on Hungarian soil, American 
soldiers on the ground in the former Warsaw Pact. 
“Tell us how we can help, Mr. Ambassador,” I told Hunter a day lat-
er. He smiled and said “I knew Hungary would not disappoint!”
The next thing I knew I was on a plane to Hungary with Jeremy 
McKenzie. The Hungarian military, conservative by definition, was not 
ready. At the talks where the Chief of Staff politely explained at length 
the details of Hungary’s military reforms, McKenzie suddenly asked if 
there was a map of Hungary “somewhere” at the Ministry. The hosts 
were curious. Why would the DSACEUR want a map? They brought 
out the map. Jeremy pointed at the one base which would eventually 
become the site of the IFOR base: Taszár.
“This is the base I want to visit,” he exclaimed.
The Hungarian generals were furious. They did not want NATO 
to take over Taszár. They thought it was a set-up, orchestrated by me. 
Which was of course true. But they did not like civilians like me to 
interfere. At that time they still did not understand the concept of po-
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litical leadership and civilian control. But Jeremy’s insistence bore fruit. 
The next day we flew to Taszár.
Thus started one of the truly great military operations, a break-
through in the cooperation between NATO and aspiring non-member 
nations. It was a huge political, military and logistical challenge. It would 
be a success. We made history. The whole episode changed the chemis-
try between Hungary and NATO. Taszár turned out to be much more 
than just another element in our quest for membership. It was also a 
statement about the relationship between Americans and Hungarians. It 
was something of which we could be proud. NATO fulfilled its historic 
mission to stabilize Bosnia, and my country performed well with NATO. 
The people of Taszár proved to be fantastic hosts to U.S. troops.
Years later, as ambassador to the United States, I was on my way 
from Cleveland to speak at the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame. My driv-
er exceeded the speed limit and a morose trooper flagged him down. 
The trooper was angry. The driver explained that his passenger was the 
Hungarian ambassador. The officer walked over to my side of the car, 
asked me to pull down the window, saluted and said the following, smil-
ing: “Sir, a few years ago I served in the Army and I was posted to the 
town of Taszár. I want to thank you and your countrymen for your kind 
hospitality. Would you please ask your driver to drive safely!?” And he 
escorted us all the way to the Pennsylvania border. What are the odds?!
We made it to the first round of those to walk through NATO’s 
door. At the 1997 Madrid summit, the Poles, the Czechs and the Hun-
garians were invited to start accession talks. By that time, we had an-
other great ally in the U.S. administration: Madeleine Albright, who 
of all the allied foreign ministers best understood our difficulties and 
the importance—for us—of NATO enlargement. Sandy Vershbow was 
now Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic 
Council. It was an uplifting moment when President Clinton in a pri-
vate conversation thanked Hungary for its support to the U.S. troops 
in Bosnia. 
Rather than detailing the agenda items, and the nitty-gritty, of the 
two-year accession process, I want to recall a few more memorable mo-
ments. When we were asked to provide details of our armed forces 
and military spending and about the contributions we would make to 
the alliance, I was approached by the ambassador of one of the smaller 
NATO Enlargement: Like Free Solo Climbing 169
founding members. He told me that we needn’t worry too much about 
the numbers: he would show us how to “make them look bigger than 
they actually are.” What he really meant was that they did not car-
ry their fair share of the burden, but that they knew how to cook the 
books. I would remember this conversation in the future whenever the 
debate about burden-sharing heated up again and again over the next 
twenty years.
I also recall conversations about the importance of democratic cre-
dentials of member states. It was assumed that the new members would 
be firmly-rooted liberal democracies, with a guarantee for the rule of 
law, a clear separation of powers and a multiparty system. I was less 
optimistic. At a certain point I recall some talk about the introduction 
of safeguards in case there would ever be any backsliding in the demo-
cratic credentials in new member states. Even the idea of an “expulsion 
clause” was discussed, to have a mechanism in place should a new mem-
ber backslide on its commitments. Only a few of us took the position 
that perhaps that wasn’t such a bad idea. Unfortunately, the expulsion 
clause was deemed unnecessary. I was no prophet, but we knew our 
history.
Strawberry Fields Forever
In 1998 there were elections in Hungary. The leader of the Young 
Liberals, Viktor Orbán, won and became prime minister. We would 
soon celebrate our membership in NATO. We would also prepare for 
war. The situation south of the border was getting increasingly tense, 
and Europe once again was looking on helplessly as Serbian leader Slo-
bodan Milosevic was creating yet again a humanitarian crisis, this time 
in Kosovo. So even as we were rejoicing over the historic moment of 
membership, we had to prepare for the possibility of a hot war, now as 
members of NATO.
On March 19 1999, I stood by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán as the 
red, white and green Hungarian flag was raised at NATO Headquar-
ters. I have no reason to doubt his honesty when he spoke about the 
Alliance being the key to Hungary’s future. His eventual political volte-
face, his turning away from the principles and values enshrined in the 
Treaty, his appeasing approach towards Russia, was nowhere to be seen, 
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even in traces. For Horn and Kovács, who had done so much to get 
there, 1999 was a bittersweet moment: they were not invited to the cer-
emony. I felt bad about that. I believe in broad bipartisan cooperation 
across party lines on basic issues pertaining to the security and progress 
of our country. The achievement of membership simply fell into Or-
bán’s lap. He had done very little to get us there. 
On March 24, 1999, the bombardment of Yugoslavia began. I re-
member a short conversation on the secure NATO line with Orbán. I 
told him something that perhaps was a bit brash: “We will start bombing 
tomorrow. I hope your hand will not shake when you press the button” 
(meaning ordering the high alert of the Hungarian Armed Forces). 
He responded firmly: “It won’t.” Our baptism by fire began.
No one could have imagined that we would join an Alliance, created 
to avoid war, and that then essentially on day one we’d find ourselves as 
NATO members actually going to war. But that’s what it was. War. In 
a neighboring country. No other member state had to endure the risks 
that Hungary had in those days. To his credit Orbán stood firm, even 
in the face of Russian threats. The population, too, was remarkably 
solid in its support of the government. Even as novices, we did not take 
decisions lightly, at times fighting hard to push back unreasonable U.S. 
military demands. But we understood our obligation as new members 
to make sure we would not get in the way of a successful operation. We 
were not immune to the dangers to our citizens and in particular the 
Hungarian minority in Serbia. They could have become targets not of 
a NATO attack but of Serbian retaliation. We had to step into the role 
of a responsible member overnight. But we were ready—also to take a 
strong stance against Russian efforts to undermine NATO.
My favorite anecdote from those days is one I kept to myself for 
twenty years. As the operation was underway, I received a call from 
Foreign Minster János Martonyi.
“We’ve got a problem” he said.
“What is that János?” I inquired.
“It’s strawberry season. The Hungarians in Vojvodina are out pick-
ing strawberries. They cannot be hit. Tell NATO that we’ll send them 
the coordinates where the strawberry fields are.”
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I called DSACEUR General Dieter Stöckmann and presented the 
request.
“No big deal, Hungary has done enough. Send me the coordinates, 
András. Tell the Minister that his Hungarians will be fine. Send me 
some nice strawberries.”
Strawberry Fields Forever.
Warning Signs on the Road Ahead
When in 2000 Vladimir Putin emerged as the “compromise” suc-
cessor to Boris Yeltsin, we Hungarians, the Poles, and the Czechs were 
among the few who saw this as a writing on the wall that the cozy, even 
if somewhat chaotic, decade of transition in Eastern Europe was now 
over. I recall a conversation with NATO Secretary General George 
Robertson about my worries. I told him that Putin’s arrival meant “the 
old guard” was back. He told me that like all Hungarians I worried too 
much, and that I should not judge Putin on the basis of our experience 
with Russia in the past. I have enormous respect for George Robertson, 
he was a great Secretary General, but I did not agree with him.
 I proved to be right. Yeltsin’s successors, heirs to the Russian tradi-
tion of disruption, embodied an almost genetically-coded aversion to 
the West, and an anger (wrapped in a sense of humiliation) for losing 
the Cold War. Those feelings were all there. They were far from gone. 
We had felt the Russians breathing down our neck throughout the ac-
cession process. And we had also seen that some allies would go weak 
in their knees at the opposition expressed by the Kremlin to our mem-
bership. It was only a matter of time when Russia would flex its muscles 
again. Twenty years ago, Vladimir Putin might have seemed to some 
like a “nobody,” a weak outsider. But having a deep understanding of 
Russia, we were uncomfortable already then. 
When I left NATO in 2001, the Alliance was in great shape. I had 
no doubt that our accession was the best thing that ever happened to 
us, maybe in a thousand years. Regrettably, the developments some ten 
years later were less encouraging. But that story is for someone else to 
tell.
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Chapter 8
Václav Havel and NATO:  
Lessons of Leadership for the Atlantic Alliance
Jan Havránek & Jan Jireš
In 2019 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrates 
its seventieth anniversary and twenty years since its first post-Cold War 
enlargement. As both sides of the Atlantic commemorate these histor-
ical achievements, NATO faces challenges to its security, cohesion and 
credibility.
Since 2014, NATO has been confronted with a significantly deteri-
orated security environment, marked by Russia’s aggression in Ukraine 
and continued instability in Europe’s southern neighborhood. In re-
sponse, the Alliance has implemented the biggest reinforcement of its 
collective defense posture since 1989 and has recommitted to the fight 
against terrorism.
This adaptation has made NATO safer, but the world remains a 
dangerous place. Russia continues to disregard international law and 
treaties. It is testing NATO’s unity and resolve, employing hybrid tech-
niques against its neighbors and the Alliance itself. It is engaging in cy-
ber-attacks against allies and interfering in their democratic processes. 
Moscow has continued its military build-up and has explicitly called 
NATO an “enemy.”
In Europe’s southern neighborhood there is little prospect for stabil-
ity despite NATO’s efforts at counter-terrorism, capacity building and 
regional partnerships. China is emerging as a strategic competitor to 
the United States and Europe. Diplomacy, commerce, and innovation, 
but also conflict, are happening in cyber-space.
Internally, NATO’s credibility is under stress. Traditional gaps in 
threat perception persist among NATO allies. The transatlantic link, 
NATO’s bedrock, is pressured by (not so) latent anti-Europeanism and 
anti-Americanism and occasional heated rhetoric by political leaders. 
A growing capability and technology gap between the United States 
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and Europe, and a lack of sufficient defense spending on the part of 
most European allies (well below NATO’s agreed benchmark of 2% of 
GDP) are sources of friction and frustration. The renaissance of EU’s 
defense dimension brings a powerful element of misunderstanding and 
potential rifts to NATO. Meanwhile, the Alliance is struggling to clear-
ly articulate its role in the Middle East and North Africa and its ap-
proach to the partner countries in general. NATO continues to expand 
(with North Macedonia in line to become its 30th member soon) but 
there are no clear accession timelines for any other aspirant countries 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine).
These trends raise fundamental questions pertaining to NATO’s 
very existence: is NATO fit for purpose to address the challenges of 
today? Is it still the relevant venue for America and Europe to work 
together? What can be done to rectify these problems and ensure that 
NATO remains the glue of the West?
We believe the answer can be found in the analysis of NATO’s re-
invention after 1989. Since 2014, the new cycle of NATO adaptation 
has happened “on the go” without much historical reflection. It might, 
therefore, be useful to analyze the previous major transformative peri-
od, which took place mainly in the 1990s.
Specifically, we will examine the relevance of former Czech Pres-
ident Václav Havel’s policies and philosophy. Democratization and 
enlargement were central pieces of NATO’s transformation process, 
and Havel was their key proponent. He was not alone in this quest, 
of course. but he was one of the most eloquent, widely respected and 
convincing protagonists. Through his persistence, Havel managed to 
give NATO enlargement almost spiritual meaning. His endeavors cul-
minated in 2002 at NATO’s summit in Prague, where he facilitated the 
largest wave of enlargement in NATO’s history.
We acknowledge the visions put forward by other Western and 
Central European policy makers, including George H. W. Bush, Bill 
Clinton, Madeleine Albright, Volker Rühe, Lech Wałęsa and József 
Antall. The emergence of President Havel’s leadership in this debate is 
a particularly fascinating phenomenon, and one that has not been fully 
appreciated. After exploring Havel’s views on the transatlantic Alliance 
and the West, we shall present some ideas as to which lessons NATO 
can draw from these views today.
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* * *
With the end of the Cold War, NATO searched for a new purpose 
and identity within a changing European security order. This search 
for legitimacy emerged from the fog of geopolitical uncertainty be-
tween 1989 and 1992 and against the backdrop of two major geopolit-
ical changes: the re-establishment of German unity and the break-up 
of the Soviet Union. The debate on NATO’s future revolved around 
a number of scenarios, ranging from the dissolution of the Alliance 
(alongside the Warsaw Pact) to the conversion of the Alliance into a 
pan-European security organization, as Havel initially suggested, that 
could include Russia.1
Over the course of the year 1990, the countries of Central Eu-
rope joined their Western counterparts in their quest for maintaining 
NATO beyond the Cold War. In June 1990, NATO invited leaders of 
the post-Communist countries to visit and establish liaison offices at 
its headquarters, confirming the end of an era of confrontation. Václav 
Havel was the first head of state from Central and Eastern Europe to 
take up the call, visiting NATO HQ in March 1991 and voicing his 
support for Alliance’s preservation.2
For many leaders, including Havel, the Spring of Europe was at 
its height. Germany was now reunited and the Warsaw Pact had just 
agreed to dissolve itself. Soviet troops were withdrawing from the ter-
ritories of the former Soviet satellite states. The Helsinki Process had 
been revived through the Charter of Paris. 
By the summer of 1991, however, high hopes had been replaced by 
anxieties. Separatist and nationalistic tendencies around the former 
Eastern Bloc, the violent breakup of Yugoslavia, and the looming col-
lapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated that there would be no “end 
of history.”
The August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow was the final drop in Vá-
clav Havel’s contemplation on NATO’s relevance. It was utterly clear 
that Europe needed NATO as a stabilizing factor, and Havel was from 
then on determined to seek his country’s membership in the Alliance.3
Initially, it seemed like an impossible mission. The scepticism of 
opening NATO to new members carried over from the Bush to the 
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Clinton administration. As late as spring of 1993, nobody in the United 
States was seriously considering enlargement.4
Havel’s frequent public praise for the Alliance as a body contributing 
to the security of both its members and non-members, however, add-
ed a layer of legitimacy to the debate on NATO’s continued existence 
and its potential expansion. His international reputation, combined 
with his insistence that the Alliance was fundamentally beneficial to 
European security and, therefore, in the interest of everyone, even the 
countries outside of it, helped to buttress the case for adapting and 
reinventing it.5
In April 1993, when Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa and Árpád Göncz 
persuaded President Bill Clinton at the opening of the Holocaust Me-
morial Museum to start considering NATO expansion to Central Eu-
rope, the Alliance’s survival as a physical institution was no longer in 
question. However, there was a considerable and growing risk that, 
without an updated purpose responding to the new realities of and 
challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, it would gradually lapse into ir-
relevance and, as a consequence, lose support of both the American 
public and its elected representatives. A NATO that continued to exist 
formally but had been hollowed out would then be increasingly unable 
to provide the vital institutional framework for the West as a political 
community.6
This gloomy scenario was something that both President Clinton 
and his Central European counterparts wanted to prevent. For Havel 
in particular, seeking NATO membership was not primarily about the 
narrow national interest of his “rather insignificant country” but about 
contributing to the security, stability and general well-being of Europe 
and the West as a whole.7 In line with his lifelong devotion to the prin-
ciple of individual responsibility for the broader world, he believed it 
was his and the Czech Republic’s obligation to facilitate the establish-
ment of a new security order benefiting the entire continent and be-
yond. Everyone was to be a responsible stakeholder in the future of 
Europe, the West and the humanity: “As I have said many times, if the 
West does not stabilize the East, the East will destabilize the West.”8
Clinton’s solution for saving NATO’s relevance was to go “out of 
area”—both in the sense of enlarging the Alliance and moving to en-
gage in peace-enforcement and stabilization operations beyond its 
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territory. This formed the basis of the “new transatlantic bargain.”9 
President Havel embraced this approach as he believed in the necessity 
of both elements. His April 1993 conversations with Clinton in Wash-
ington were not just about pitching NATO membership but, in equal 
measure, about convincing the U.S. president to intervene in Bosnia to 
stop the ethnic violence.10
The inception of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the “anatomy 
of the decision” to enlarge are well documented in literature and in this 
volume.11 Václav Havel’s leadership on NATO continued after March 
1999. The same month that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
joined the Alliance, NATO launched a military operation without U.N. 
authorization against Slobodan Milošević’s rump Yugoslavia to prevent 
further violence in Kosovo.
For new members like the Czech Republic and its leadership, the 
Kosovo campaign was “baptism by fire.”12 Václav Havel was one of very 
few Czech politicians who supported the operation; others, including 
in the cabinet, were reluctant if not openly against. To Havel, however, 
the air campaign made sense. In addition to the principle of allied sol-
idarity, Havel emphasized the humanitarian aspect of the intervention: 
If it is possible to say about a war that it is ethical (…) it is true of 
this war. [The Alliance] is fighting in the name of human interest 
for the fate of other human beings. It is fighting because decent 
people cannot sit back and watch systematic, state directed massa-
cres of other people. (…) This war gives human rights precedence 
over the rights of states. (…) The Alliance has not acted out of 
licence, aggressiveness or disrespect for international law. On the 
contrary, it has acted out of respect for the law, for the law that 
ranks higher than the protection of the sovereignty of states. It 
has acted out of respect for the rights of humanity, as they are 
articulated by our conscience as well as by other instruments of 
international law.13 
His view of the Kosovo campaign was by no means utilitarian. Rath-
er, it was an expression of his principled opposition to appeasing evil.
Havel’s stellar moment came in 2002, when Prague hosted the first 
NATO summit behind the former Iron Curtain. The summit, short 
before the end of his tenure as president, was the culmination of his 
NATO efforts. Havel did not stop advocating for further NATO en-
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largement once his own country joined. Already in April 1999, when 
addressing the U.S. Congress, he named Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, 
Bulgaria and the three Baltic countries as potential new members.14 
In Prague in 2002, NATO invited these seven countries to become 
members in the largest wave of enlargement in its history. It was this 
decision that solidified NATO’s Open Door policy as we know it today.
But merely one year after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Prague 
was equally adamant about the need for NATO to transform to face 
new threats. Earlier that year, NATO and Russia had established the 
NATO-Russia Council, marking a new era of cooperation in Europe. 
For Václav Havel, the mission he set out in the early 1990s was accom-
plished.
* * *
Václav Havel was among the leaders who saw the historic oppor-
tunity to “do for Europe’s East what NATO had helped achieve for 
Europe’s West” after the Second World War, namely consolidate de-
mocracy, economic and political integration, de-nationalize defense, 
and make war unthinkable.15 Their aim was to safeguard NATO’s con-
tinued existence through transforming its mission, ultimately through 
extension of its membership.
Havel spent much time and effort thinking about NATO, its pur-
pose and its mission, as demonstrated in a number of his essays, speech-
es, interviews and newspaper articles. He never approached NATO as 
a utilitarian military alliance but always as something much bigger, 
broader and more important.
He identified several important roles of NATO that stay relevant 
today. First, NATO as an institutional embodiment of the West, and 
a political, and even spiritual, community based on shared values. Sec- 
ond, NATO representing a distinct “civilization” that must be aware of 
the geographical limits of its expansion. Third, the Alliance as an indis-
pensable vehicle for continued transatlantic cooperation and for Amer-
ican engagement in European affairs. Fourth, the West and NATO as 
promoters of international norms, particularly in the area of human 
rights. And finally, NATO as a community of friends based on mutual 
trust and a strong sense of responsible leadership.
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The West as a spiritual community based on shared values
Havel regarded NATO as something more than just a practical mil-
itary instrument to protect a piece of territory. For him, NATO was a 
tangible embodiment of the Western community of values.16 He and 
his Central European colleagues were not ashamed of praising the vir-
tues of Western values defined, in a rather conservative fashion, as an 
amalgamation of classical philosophy and law, Christian spiritual her-
itage and Enlightenment rationality. NATO membership was to be, 
among other things, a badge of honor confirming Central Europe’s 
“return” to Western values after a long period of forced separation.17
In Havel’s mind, the primary reason for Central Europe’s member-
ship in NATO was, therefore, not pragmatic geostrategy but the fact 
that the region now shared the allied countries’ values and aspired to 
establish democratic political systems. Not admitting them as members 
would not only be unjust and unfair, it would also be self-defeating: 
rejecting newly democratic countries eager to join would undermine 
NATO’s legitimacy as representative and protector of the Euro-Atlan-
tic community of democratic nations. As he remarked to Allied foreign 
ministers at the NATO Headquarters in March 1991:
We feel that an alliance of countries united by a commitment to 
the ideal of freedom and democracy should not remain perma-
nently closed to neighboring countries which are pursuing the 
same goals. History has taught us that certain values are indivisi-
ble; if they are threatened in one place, they are directly or indi-
rectly threatened everywhere.18
Havel believed the West was morally responsible for the fate of 
post-communist countries precisely because it had waged (and won) the 
Cold War: “From [Western support for democrats in the Soviet Bloc] 
arises a great responsibility for the West. It cannot be indifferent to 
what is happening in the countries which, constantly encouraged by the 
Western democracies, have finally shaken off the totalitarian system.”19
Three years later, at the time when Central Europeans were anxious 
about what they believed to be the sluggish progress of the NATO 
enlargement process, and when the Bosnian war was still raging, Havel 
wrote, rather angrily, that Western failure to create a new stable and 
durable order in Europe would “demonstrate that the democratic West 
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has lost its ability realistically to foster and cultivate the values it has 
always proclaimed and undertaken to safeguard and to which end it has 
built its arsenal of weapons. Such as state of affairs would be far more 
than just a crisis of the East; it would also be a crisis of the West, a crisis 
of democracy, a crisis of Euro-American civilization itself.”20
Havel was not ignorant of NATO’s and the West’s fair share of inter-
nal problems and challenges. After all, his lifelong oeuvre as playwright 
and essayist focused on the universal issues of the corruption of power, 
the dehumanizing impact of modern technology, the alienating nature 
of bureaucratic structures, and the resulting loss of human identity. His 
response to this modern human condition was an everyday quest for 
authenticity, responsibility and “living in truth.”21
A number of lessons for today’s NATO can be derived from these 
simple rules. First, reducing relationships among allies to mere trans-
actionalism is an anathema to how Havel saw the Alliance. Transaction-
alism does not provide sufficient basis for NATO’s long-term viability 
and relevance. What is needed is a clear sense of purpose, rooted in 
a set of values and principles that extend beyond today—and beyond 
bookkeeping.22
Second, NATO being a community of nations based on common 
Western values meant that it could play an important role in consoli-
dating Central Europe’s newly established democratic political systems. 
Havel regarded the conditionality required to achieve membership as 
one of key benefits of the enlargement process, to the point of actually 
wishing for a stricter enforcement of membership criteria.23
In the same vein, Havel expected that NATO and other multilateral 
Western institutions would keep playing an active role in further cul-
tivating new members’ democratic systems as well as their sense of re-
sponsibility. He would thus expect a stronger effort by both NATO and 
the EU to mitigate democratic backsliding in their member countries.
Unlike the EU, NATO does not have formal instruments to exert 
pressure on its members to change their policies. This stems from the 
fact that the Alliance is a strictly intergovernmental organization based 
on the principle of consensus, with each ally holding a veto power over 
every decision. Thus, the disciplinary power that works well before ac-
cession diminishes once membership is gained.
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On the other hand, NATO possesses informal mechanisms to dis-
cipline its members. First, there is peer pressure, exercised first and 
foremost by the United States as the chief contributor of military assets 
needed for Alliance’s deterrence and defense. Second, the very nature 
of NATO’s collective defense “guarantees” requires that allies behave 
themselves and demonstrate adherence to NATO’s core values. The 
language of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is deliberately vague 
and, for all intents and purposes, the execution of a collective defense 
operation depends on the political will of Allied governments at the 
given moment. This means that all NATO members must systemati-
cally work to maximize other allies’ motivation and goodwill to come 
to their assistance when subjected to an attack. Thus, it can be argued 
that allies grossly disrespecting Alliance values in times of peace invite 
a breach of allied solidarity in times of crisis and war.
From Havel’s perspective, there is just one way to make these cor-
rective mechanisms work: responsible leadership on the part of all Al-
lied countries that puts collective good over narrow political interests 
and stems from the urge to live an “authentic” life based on the identity 
of one’s moral impulses, words and deeds.
NATO as a distinct “civilization”
The polarization of Western societies that has become a norm 
over the past decade flattens Western political discourse to the point 
of meaninglessness and reduces policy options to an artificial binary 
choice between progressivist transnationalism and protectionist nativ-
ism. Our discursive landscape used to be much richer. Debates were 
less about two extremes and more about fifty shades of grey. Václav 
Havel’s thinking represented one such shade of nuance.
On the one hand, Havel’s persistent criticism of ethnic nationalism, 
his principled internationalism and his advocacy of humanitarian inter-
vention turned him into a hate figure for nativists in his own country 
and abroad. On the other hand, his philosophy included a number of 
rather conservative elements that would make some of his progressivist 
admirers blush.24
These two approaches mix nicely in Havel’s concept of “home” (do-
mov). He regarded the sense of belonging to be indispensable for the 
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true expression of one’s identity and authenticity. This applied to him 
personally, too. He never considered himself a cosmopolitan in the 
conventional sense and his identity as a Czech, shaped by his country’s 
history and intellectual traditions, was a crucial factor in developing his 
worldview and his policies. In other words, Havel was far from reject-
ing the notion of national identity or denying its importance.25
His idea of belonging to a “home,” however, was much more com-
plex and inclusive than that of conventional ethnic nationalists. For him, 
the individual was at the center of a structure consisting of concentric 
layers, each adding an element to one’s overall identity. Ultimately, all 
these layers were important to one’s fullness of being. They included 
family, profession, an immediate social circle, national community and 
language, Europe, Western civilization, and, eventually, humankind.26
National identity is thus important but not exclusive, since it always 
is, or should be, complemented by all those other layers, and should not 
be exerted in a hypertrophied way that suppresses them. At the same 
time, this approach means that Havel saw culturally and historically 
defined civilizations, broadly in the Huntingtonian sense, as important 
frameworks for respective national identities, providing them with co-
herent value systems.27
This is how he perceived the West and NATO. He gradually came 
to see the Alliance as an institutional expression of Western civilization. 
This meant that Russia could not become a member, due to obvious 
geostrategic reasons and, equally importantly, because of the funda-
mental incompatibility of Western and Russian values. This conviction 
of his only grew stronger as Russia’s democratization faltered and ul-
timately stalled, and as the country reverted to some of the traditional 
patterns of behavior inherited from its imperial and Soviet past.28 
This does not mean that Havel regarded Western civilization to be 
perfect. Rather the opposite was the case. From the very beginning 
of his intellectual endeavor, he had critically reflected upon Western 
modernity and the unintended (and sometimes intended) negative con-
sequences of some of its key features for both individuals and the en-
vironment, leading to the loss of authenticity in life and damage to the 
cherished idea of “home.”29 After all, he regarded the communist re-
gimes of Eastern Europe to be just more extreme, brutal and primitive 
versions of Western modernity, or simply its uglier siblings.30 In this, 
Václav Havel and NATO 183
Havel followed in the footsteps of such complex thinkers as Reinhold 
Niebuhr (whom he most probably never read) and, for that matter, 
George Orwell.
From the notion of civilization as an element of one’s “home” 
stemmed Havel’s clear idea of NATO as a political community of na-
tions bound by shared values and framed by a shared cultural outlook. 
This means NATO should not be regarded as an all-inclusive, universal 
organization. It was to remain a fundamentally Western body with a 
clear sense of where its borders should be. As he argued, 
Historical experience shows that vague, indistinct or disputed 
frontiers are one of the most frequent causes of wars. Every polit-
ical entity must know where its territory begins and where it ends. 
(…) Where is [NATO’s] frontier then? In my personal opinion, 
its starts with the border between Russia and the Baltic States and 
follows the Russo-Belarusian and Russo-Ukrainian border down 
to the Black Sea. This is absolutely obvious from the map, and it 
has more or less historical and cultural basis too.31
For Havel, civilization was a precious component of one’s identity, 
and NATO was to be an institutional framework of the Western civili-
zation, providing it with clear borders.32 At the same time, Havel’s view 
of civilization was clearly not as culturally deterministic as that of Hun-
tington. It was Russia’s political tradition hampering democratization 
and its imperial idea that were incompatible with NATO membership, 
not its orthodox religious affiliation per se.
Moreover, at no point in his life was Havel a Russophobe. As his bi-
ographer observes, he actually never developed a “concept of the ene-
my.” Not even Communist Czechoslovakia’s authorities who jailed him 
unjustly were “enemies” in his view. Rather, he tried to analyze their 
motivations and understand them.33 Likewise, he did not hate Russians 
and often pleaded for a cooperative relationship between the West and 
Russia.34
Indispensability of transatlantic cooperation
For Havel, the fact that NATO was a transatlantic institution (or 
rather the transatlantic institution) was by far its most appealing fea-
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ture. He wholeheartedly subscribed to the notion that the Alliance’s 
chief purpose was to “keep the Americans in.” The crucial challenge of 
the 1990s was how to secure this goal in the long run.
A part of the answer was to be, of course, the enlargement and the 
new sense of purpose it would generate for NATO. This was precisely 
the area where Central Europeans could contribute to the future rele-
vance if not survival of the Alliance: not primarily through their limited 
defence capacities but by playing a role of responsible stakeholders in 
Western security architecture and by providing the U.S. administration 
with the opportunity to transform the Alliance to make it relevant for 
the new era.35
Havel’s strong Atlanticism was obviously driven by a mix of moti-
vations, both practical and philosophical. As for the practical side, he 
understood perfectly well that the United States was the only relevant 
actor capable of and willing to invest in the stability and security of Eu-
rope through its continued leadership in NATO. As he put it, “In the 
20th century, it was not just Europe that paid the price for American 
isolationism: America itself paid a price. The less it committed itself 
at the beginning of European conflagrations, the greater the sacrifices 
it had to make at the end of such conflicts.”36 After all, as Ron Asmus 
and Alexandr Vondra noted, if there was one largely positive historical 
experience that Central Europe has in common, it has been with the 
United States.37
When it came to his philosophical motivations, the starting point is 
the fact that he was born and raised in a deeply Atlanticist cultural and 
political milieu, whose underlying tenets he retained throughout his 
life. The Havels were among the most prominent families in interwar 
Czechoslovakia, which, for all intents and purposes, was a creation of 
American Wilsonianism. Its democratic public philosophy, including 
some of its constitutional principles, was inspired by American Jefferso-
nianism. This came about, of course, mainly thanks to President TomáŠ 
Garrigue Masaryk, who adopted his American wife’s Unitarian faith 
and made an unashamedly Jeffersonian case for Czechoslovak indepen-
dence during the First World War.38
The Havel family was devoted to Masaryk and shared his public phi-
losophy, including his admiration for the United States and the Amer-
ican values of republican virtues and civic responsibility. In a sense, 
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Masaryk and the Havels were Atlanticists long before this concept was 
invented as a practical political doctrine in the 1940s.
Havel, though aware of great-power interests, identified a powerful 
streak of selflessness and idealism in American foreign policy, generally 
conducive to the well-being of smaller European nations. As in earlier 
periods, in the 1990s the United States could and would, through its 
deep political and military engagement in European affairs, contrib-
ute to the taming of European powers’ darker impulses, or so Havel 
believed. While Havel and other Central European Atlanticists fully 
trusted the United States, they were at least occasionally wary of their 
fellow Europeans.39
Havel’s approach to the transatlantic link was again heavily civiliza-
tional, informed by his understanding of Western culture and history. 
As he put it in 1991, 
Europe is deeply bound, through shared civilization, with North 
America, its younger brother. Three times throughout the twen-
tieth century, America saved Europe from tyranny; three times it 
helped liberty and democracy prevail in Europe. It cannot keep sav-
ing Europe forever (…), however, it is so essentially linked to it—
through its culture, values and interests—that not even Europe’s in-
tegration and certain emancipation should break this natural bond. 
To the contrary, the peaceful linkage of these two continents could 
be of the principal stabilizing factors in the global context.40
For all these reasons, the transatlantic bond was supremely precious 
to Havel. He regarded it as a value in itself and worth preserving at 
considerable cost, as exemplified by his support for the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, which tainted his reputation in the eyes of the war’s opponents 
in both the United States and Europe. He was aware, however, that a 
value-based and durable transatlantic bond was conditioned upon prac-
tically demonstrated responsibility of all allies and the unity of their 
words and their deeds.
The West as a promoter of international human rights norms
When it came to NATO’s preservation and transformation in the 
1990s, Havel never focused solely on the issue of enlargement. Above 
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all, he strongly believed that a crucial purpose of the Alliance was to be 
an international norm entrepreneur, particularly in the area of human 
rights. That is why he invested as much effort in convincing President 
Clinton to intervene in Bosnia as he did to put NATO enlargement on 
his policy agenda.
Havel’s motivation to embrace humanitarian interventionism was 
deeply rooted in both Czechoslovakia’s history and its intellectual tra-
ditions. “Munich” in particular provided a lesson in the sense of both 
moral unacceptability and practical foolishness of trying to appease 
evil. As he declared in March 1993, “We must accept our own share 
of responsibility for peace and justice in Europe. As people who once 
became the victims of a shameful concession to a bully in Munich, we 
must know even better than others that there must not be concessions 
made to evil.”41
Michael Žantovský argues that this is the core belief of the “Havel 
Doctrine” of humanitarian intervention understood as “shared respon-
sibility of people to stand up to evil (…) and the unacceptability of 
appeasement, inaction or indifference in the face of evil.”42
At the same time, Havel was acutely aware of humanitarian inter-
vention’s moral and practical difficulties. Contrary to his contemporary 
reputation in some circles as either naïve do-gooder or cynical facilita-
tor of American imperialism, he frequently spoke of the pitfalls of hu-
manitarian intervention: “One must constantly and carefully scrutinize 
such humanistic arguments to determine that it is not a pretty façade 
concealing far less respectable interests.”43 He did not shy away from 
juxtaposing the Czechoslovak experiences of 1938 and 1968. While 
“Munich” led him to the conclusion that evil must be resisted at the 
very beginning, the suppression of the “Prague Spring” alerted him 
to the need to consider thoroughly the declared motives for an inter-
vention and to “ask ourselves (…) whether it is not some version of the 
fraternal assistance.”44
Havel’s emphasis on NATO’s role (and, indeed, its indispensability) 
in preventing or ending gross violation of human rights again illustrates 
his ambitious view of the Alliance’s mission. He did not want the Czech 
Republic and other Central European countries to join a mere collec-
tive defence pact. Just as he expected responsibility for the world from 
individuals and from countries, he expected it from NATO as well.
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“Alliance” as a community based on trust and responsibility
As we have established, “responsibility” was a key element of Havel’s 
lifelong moral outlook, closely linked to the concepts of “identity” and 
“authenticity,” and a prerequisite for “living in truth” in the sense of 
unity of conscience, words and deeds.45
In his own case, this was exemplified not only by his principled 
opposition to Czechoslovak communist authorities in the 1970s and 
1980s to the point of sacrificing his health and even risking his life. In 
his presidential career he also showed remarkable courage and leader-
ship by becoming an early advocate of causes not entirely uncontro-
versial.46 Dissolving the Warsaw Pact and pressing NATO to open up 
to the East are obvious examples but there are many more: his early 
support for German reunification, meeting the Dalai Lama, pushing 
for U.S. military interventions in the Balkans, and promoting Russia’s 
democratization.
His emphasis on assuming responsibility led him to advocate for an 
active role of Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic in international 
security. To gain membership in the Alliance, his country was to be a 
shining example of mature, responsible behavior. In other words, Cen-
tral Europe was to be security provider and not just security consum-
er.47 An early example of this approach was Czechoslovakia’s military 
contribution to Operation Desert Storm and, later, the Czech Repub-
lic’s significant military deployments in peacekeeping missions in Cro-
atia and Bosnia.
In 1991, Havel explained this attitude explicitly: 
This is why we have a heightened sense of obligation to Europe. 
Our wish to become a NATO member, therefore, concerns more 
than international security guarantees, it grows out of a desire to 
shoulder some responsibility for the general state of affairs on our 
continent. We don’t want to take without giving. (…) Too often, 
we have had direct experience of where indifference to the fate 
of others can lead, and we are determined not to succumb to that 
kind of indifference ourselves.48
Needless to say, such a principled stance also bore practical fruits 
in helping the Clinton Administration make a more credible case for 
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NATO enlargement. By making practical contributions to internation-
al security and demonstrating their sense of responsibility, the Central 
Europeans could counter accusations that by seeking NATO member-
ship “all they wanted was a security umbrella for a rainy day with the 
Russians.”49
This emphasis on the need of his own country being responsible and 
mature stemmed from Havel’s firm belief that even the smallest coun-
tries have agency in international affairs, precisely because if they are 
courageous and authentic they can exert moral and thus also political 
influence. Again, this notion stemmed from Havel’s understanding of 
Czechoslovakia’s history and his refusal to see it as a mere victim of 
foreign powers but as an actor at least partially responsible for the bad 
things that happened to it.50
Havel’s thinking on the concept of responsibility, however, went fur-
ther. His ultimate ambition, at least in the early 1990s, was to turn his 
own country into a sort of “spiritual state” and a model to follow not 
only by fellow post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope but other parts of the worlds as well. Very much in the Masarykian 
tradition, he regarded Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic as a “project” 
rather than a mere piece of territory.51
Of course, such a view bears a close resemblance to the American 
self-image going back to the Pilgrim Fathers. This thinking was adopt-
ed and reshaped by Masaryk and his disciples as early as in the 1880s 
and later turned into an official doctrine of Czechoslovakia. In other 
words, the ultimate goal of the dominant tradition of Czech political 
thought stretching from Masaryk to Havel was finding “meaning” and 
“purpose,” defined in moral terms, of the very existence of Czechs and 
their country.
Their answer was that unless Czechs assume their share of responsi-
bility for the well-being of Europe and, even more ambitiously, unless 
they contribute to the cause of humanity as a whole, there is not much 
of a point in their existence as a distinct national community. This pe-
culiar intellectual tradition explains the strong emphasis Havel put on 
responsible behavior of individuals as well as countries.
Moreover, he stressed that executing responsibility requires ability 
to make sacrifices: “We came to understand (…) that the only genuine 
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values are those for which one is capable, if necessary, of sacrificing 
something.” Faced with what he perceived as Western wavering in its 
determination to expand NATO, he asked “Why has the West lost its 
ability to sacrifice?” He accused Western leaders of lacking imagination 
and courage and being overly fond of the status quo.52
Implications for today’s NATO are obvious. NATO’s future is in per-
il unless all allies start behaving responsibly, which means, among other 
things, demonstrating solidarity with and providing assistance to every 
member feeling threatened, delivering on their solemn commitments 
(including investing in defense and capability development), contribut-
ing their fair share to NATO’s operations, and refraining from rhetoric 
that may undermine the credibility of Alliance’s deterrence.
Conclusions 
Václav Havel’s contribution to the transformation of NATO in the 
1990s was fundamental. Through his leadership and talent, Havel was 
able to project his values and convictions into the largest effort to bring 
peace and stability in Europe after the Cold War: NATO enlargement. 
He managed to do so in a fluid period of history when old systems 
ceased to exist and new ones were being born. In such times of uncer-
tainty, Havel’s example demonstrates that value-based leadership has a 
stabilizing effect.
As we stressed, Václav Havel was not the sole contributor to NATO’s 
transformation and there is certainly not one single ideal type of lead-
ership for NATO. But he represented a type of leadership that would 
benefit the Alliance today. Here are five reasons why.
First, Václav Havel was the embodiment of political and moral cour-
age, stemming from his lifelong effort to “live in truth.” These personal 
qualities gained him respect long before he became the president of 
Czechoslovakia.  Havel also stuck to principles of morality while in 
office, regardless of consequences to his political standing and popu-
larity. For example, his staunch support for NATO’s intervention in 
Yugoslavia was contrary to the widespread popular beliefs at the time 
of the operation (and also to date). In the era of rising populism, virtues 
such as morality and courage are counter-intuitive and antagonistic to 
the mainstream, post-truth politics.
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Second, Havel skillfully blended morality and ideas into practical 
politics and decision-making. He believed that it was his “responsi-
bility to emphasize, again and again, the moral origin of all genuine 
politics, to stress the significance of moral values and standards in all 
spheres of social life.”53  His campaign to support the enlargement of 
NATO, a very practical project, had a strong moral component from 
the very beginning, but so too did his domestic endeavors. This con-
nection between morality and practical politics is mostly absent today. 
International politics is polarized: on the one hand, we see realpolitik 
downgraded to transactionalism or zero-sum games; on the other hand, 
fundamentalism and radicalism leave no space for practicality.
Third, Havel’s sense of strong responsibility for community shaped 
his attitude towards NATO and the West. Havel believed in a direct 
link between morality in politics and the mission to serve. Genuine pol-
itics, Havel wrote in 1992, is “simply a matter to serve those around us: 
serving the community.”54 In this spirit, he served throughout his life: 
in the theater, as a dissident, during the Velvet Revolution, as the Pres-
ident of the Czech Republic, and as the head of state of a NATO ally.
Fourth, Havel saw in NATO a tool for Europe’s transformation, in-
tegration and democratization, an institution allowing Europe to help 
itself and to contribute to international security beyond its borders. He 
saw NATO not just as an alliance of collective defense but also as an 
organization of collective security focused on stabilizing what is within 
its territory. This is in line with NATO’s current mission, including its 
effort to build a credible defense in Europe.
Fifth, Václav Havel sought a larger goal for NATO. Enlargement 
was a core element of his NATO policy, but only in the sense of being a 
vehicle to achieve a redefinition and transformation of the Alliance. In 
May 2002, prior to the Prague Summit, he outlined two objectives of 
NATO’s redefinition: first, identifying the Alliance’s approach not only 
to Russia but also to China, India, Africa, and other parts of the world; 
and second, opening NATO’s door, “while at the same time setting a 
definite limit on its possible future enlargement. Otherwise, no future 
enlargement will make sense.”55
All of this was to be undertaken in the context of an accelerated in-
ternal transformation. On the eve of the Prague Summit, Havel added: 
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If the Alliance is to be meaningful today it must be an organization 
equipped with a large quantity of information processed promptly 
and professionally; an organization capable of taking split-second 
decisions and, wherever this becomes necessary, of immediately 
engaging either its permanent rapid deployment forces, perfect-
ly trained and constantly ready, or specialized forces of various 
armies that will be capable of confronting modern dangers.56
Almost two decades later, these principles of NATO transformation 
still apply.
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Chapter 9
The 20th Anniversary of  
Poland’s Accession to NATO
Ryszard Zięba
Geostrategic Location and a Sense of Threat from Russia as 
the Background for Poland’s Bonds with the West
Poland is a middle-rank country located in the heart of Europe. The 
end of the Cold War and German reunification saw Poland revert to its 
old worries of being stuck between “two enemies,” Germany and Rus-
sia—the feeling of being caught in a grey security zone, or a so-called 
Zwischeneuropa, which might again become the focal point of power 
political rivalry between these two big neighbors. 
Since Poland had been part of the Eastern bloc, Polish political elites 
feared that Russia, the Soviet successor state, would seek to keep Po-
land in its sphere of influence. As early as September 1989, Poland 
decided to pursue the policy of a “return to Europe.” The shortest path 
would lead through Germany and continuing the reconciliation pro-
cesses would be at the core of engagement. Consequently, after the 
Soviet collapse Poland began to see Russia as its main threat. 
The process of settling historical differences with Russia only exac-
erbated these fears and brought further misunderstandings. The most 
important of these turned out to be the two countries’ distinct visions 
of European security. Having favored pan-European solutions based 
on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
for many years, Poland quickly opted for seeking accession to NATO. 
After all, the CSCE could only provide soft security, just like the EU—
whose Eastern enlargement appeared soon even more remote than 
NATO’s potential opening to the East. 
Meanwhile, Russia—though going on a charm offensive to NATO 
itself with Yeltsin speaking of partnership—reinforced its own efforts 
to build a pan-European security system based on an ever more institu-
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tionalized CSCE. Poland thus opted for group security with the West 
and collective defense provided by NATO, and Russia chose collective 
security—following the traditions of the USSR.
Changing Priorities: From Accession to the EU to 
Membership in NATO
Out of concern for its national security, post-communist Poland 
opted for hard security guarantees, i.e., obtaining the collective defense 
guarantees offered by the North Atlantic Alliance. There were sever-
al reasons, however, why Poland could not obtain those guarantees 
straight away. 
First, in 1989-1991 NATO underwent an identity crisis as a military 
alliance being gradually deprived of its opponent in the form of the 
USSR and the Eastern Bloc. 
Second, transitional arrangements remained in force due to the fact 
that forces of the former USSR temporarily remained on the territory 
of the eastern Länder of the united Germany and on the territory of 
Poland and elsewhere in former Warsaw Pact (and Baltic) states. 
Third, the United States and its Allies tried not to irritate Russia with 
an excessively rapid eastward expansion of their multilateral structures. 
Fourth, the ethnic conflicts that broke out in the former Yugoslavia 
and the former Soviet Union destabilized the international situation 
and called for cooperation between the West and Russia.
Fifth, Western elites were reluctant to perpetuate military blocs, as 
they believed in the concept of an era of democracy and peace, as put 
forward by liberal American political scientist Francis Fukuyama. 
In this situation, Poland’s political elites focused in the first instance 
on the other fundamental aims of their policy—the country’s devel-
opment. They introduced radical economic reforms (the Balcerowicz 
Plan) and established close ties with the European Community and the 
emerging European Union through an Association Agreement in 1991. 
The policy of “returning to the West,” pursued since 1989, also en-
tailed joining the Council of Europe (1991) and establishing contacts 
with the Western European Union (WEU). Collaboration with Ger-
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many and France within the framework of the Weimar Triangle (since 
1991) was another important aspect of this course. Poland bound itself 
to the “institutional West” in order to ensure a continued progression 
on its development and civilizational advancement free from the Soviet 
yoke, and to get closer to the West’s security structures, specifically 
NATO and WEU. 
For the political class that emerged out of the democratic opposi-
tion from the communist period, focusing on an increasingly institu-
tionalized CSCE was a temporary pan-European solution pending Po-
land’s accession to NATO. This was the viewpoint of Foreign Minister 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, and it was supported by Democratic Union 
politicians. The strong post-communist Left supported this security 
policy and saw Poland’s accession to the European Union as its most 
important international policy aim. This was met with understanding 
in the West, and American politicians and experts stated outright that 
Poland should first join the EU and establish itself as a democratic state 
capable of collaboration; this in turn could pave the way to one day 
gaining NATO membership.
In such circumstances, during the first years of the democratic trans-
formations, Polish foreign policy prioritized the aim of accession to 
the European Union. This viewpoint was not that of Jan Olszewski’s 
nationalist-right government, which was in power briefly (Dec. 1991-
June 1992) and took unsuccessful steps, especially in the United States, 
to obtain at least “partial” security guarantees from NATO. As we 
know, the North Atlantic Treaty does not provide for any form of asso-
ciation or partial membership. Moreover, the government proved un-
able to resolve any of the serious problems affecting Poland’s relations 
with Russia. If anything, it complicated them further by raising con-
tentious historical issues such the Katyń Massacres (1940). In addition, 
Polish President Lech Wałęsa was impatient with the West’s cautious 
stance with regard to the efforts of Central European countries to join 
NATO, and attempted to blackmail the West in the spring of 1992 with 
his idea of setting up a “NATO-bis” alliance.
Initially, there was no coherent position on Poland’s integration 
with Western structures among the Polish political class. Although the 
post-communist Left tended to favor Poland’s accession to the Euro-
pean Union during the first years of transformation, some voices on 
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the Left made allowance for Poland’s accession to NATO. One such 
example was President Wojciech Jaruzelski’s advisor, Colonel Wiesław 
Górnicki, who spoke of the need for Poland’s accession to NATO as 
early as 1990 in the daily Życie Warszawy. It was an isolated opinion, 
however, especially as at the time Poland was still a member of the 
Warsaw Pact. It should also be borne in mind that there were many 
outstanding security policy experts at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
under Krzysztof Skubiszewski, such as Andrzej Towpik, for whom Po-
land’s membership in NATO was a foreign policy aim. Along with the 
new officials—mostly from the Democratic Union—appointed by the 
post-Solidarity forces, they formed a competent team preparing Po-
land conceptually for the steps leading to NATO membership. 
The first important and successful initiative of the Polish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and the Chancellery of President Lech Wałęsa was 
the preparation, along with Czechoslovak and Hungarian diplomats, 
of a joint declaration by the three countries’ leaders. It was issued in 
Prague on May 6, 1992. The leaders of the Visegrád Triangle coun-
tries appealed for further qualitative development of relations between 
the three countries and the North Atlantic Alliance and stated that 
their “long-term objective remains their full-fledged membership in 
NATO.”1 
Two days later, on May 8, 1992, while announcing closer ties with 
NATO in the Polish parliament, Minister Skubiszewski for the first 
time explicitly declared that Warsaw’s aim was to gradually and effec-
tively integrate Poland with the Alliance’s security system, with NATO 
membership in due course.2 In his subsequent statements for the press 
in June 1992, Skubiszewski reiterated Poland’s intention to join NATO 
“step by step,”3 and from that moment on, this was the principal objec-
tive of Poland’s foreign and security policy. 
In July of that year, Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka said in her 
Sejm exposé that her government would strive to accelerate the pro-
cess leading to Poland’s membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. In 
October 1992, during an interview with the Secretary General of the 
Alliance and the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Suchocka stated 
clearly, and in the presence of Defense Minister Janusz Onyszkiewicz, 
that Poland’s aim was to become a NATO member. She did not receive 
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a positive reply, but was told that the Alliance would focus on coopera-
tion within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). 
NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, who was very friend-
ly towards Poland, mentioned during talks in a narrower circle that 
certain Allies were resisting the idea of enlargement, but noted that 
NATO was open to such an option in the future and gave assurances 
that Poland was part of the small number of candidates for member-
ship.4 
On 2 November 1992, President Wałęsa signed two program docu-
ments adopted by the National Defense Committee: “The Premises of 
Polish Foreign Policy” and “The Security Policy and Defense Strategy 
of the Republic of Poland,” in which Poland officially announced that 
its goal was to join NATO.5
Not long afterwards, one of the experts connected with the Demo-
cratic Left Alliance (SLD) voted in favor of a gradual rapprochement 
with NATO and indicated how this should be achieved. In early 1993, 
he wrote that “Poland intended to achieve membership in NATO grad-
ually. The way to do this was to establish the closest possible bilateral 
military cooperation with the members of the North Atlantic Alliance 
and multilateral cooperation within NATO, which also included in-
volvement in the NACC. The task during this initial period of rap-
prochement with NATO was for the Polish Armed Forces to gradually 
attain technical and functional compatibility with Western armies.”6 
Soon Poland’s efforts to join NATO were made easier, largely due 
to political changes at home and on the international stage. In Octo-
ber 1993 the center-left coalition government of the Democratic Left 
Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) was formed; one 
month earlier the withdrawal of Russian troops from Poland had been 
completed (and from former East German territory in mid-1994). 
The Democratic Left Alliance, which initially saw security in terms of 
pan-European regulations (CSCE), remained fixated on Polish acces-
sion to the EU. As they governed the country, Democratic Left Alliance 
politicians came to appreciate the difficulty of adapting Poland to EU 
standards, and as they shared government with President Wałęsa, they 
came to prefer Poland’s accession to NATO, not least because this was 
easier to attain. The center-liberal political circles of the opposition 
Freedom Union (former Democratic Union) had pronounced them-
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selves much earlier in favor of NATO membership. But they only pre-
sented their position fully in the Poland-NATO Report, which was pub-
lished in October 1995. Its main authors, Przemysław Grudziński and 
Henryk Szlajfer, joined by Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Andrzej Olechowski, 
Andrzej Ananicz and Krzysztof Skubiszewski, publicly called for Po-
land to first opt for NATO membership, as this was easier than meeting 
EU membership criteria.7
It can therefore be said that the years 1993-1995 saw the emergence 
of a consensus between Poland’s principal political forces, from right to 
left, about the country’s foreign policy priorities. The idea of joining 
NATO prior to gaining membership in the European Union carried 
the day. This led to a systematic and ongoing deterioration of Poland’s 
relations with Russia, which had been against NATO expansion to the 
East since the fall of 1993. Indeed, it produced a deepening impasse in 
Polish-Russian relations that no political force in Poland was able to 
overcome. Russia was not interested in overcoming this impasse either, 
and rejected the Partnership for Transformation concept put forward 
by Polish Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak and Foreign Minister An-
drzej Olechowski in 1994.
Polish Cooperation with NATO Prior to Accession
An issue of key importance in convincing Poland’s future allies, and 
especially the United States, to accept it as a NATO member, was the 
Polish-American cooperation established at a very early stage in the 
sphere of intelligence. The first significant Polish intelligence opera-
tion of this type took place in 1990, during the unfolding of the Persian 
Gulf crisis. It ended with the spectacular spiriting of CIA agents out of 
Iraq. This operation has always served to legitimize Poland in the eyes 
of its NATO allies. A similar motive guided the center-left SLD/PSL 
government’s dispatch of a 51-person contingent of commandos from 
the GROM unit to Haiti in October 1994, as support for the Multina-
tional Forces, to manage the situation following the overthrow of that 
country’s military junta. Another unequivocally positive role was played 
by Polish military intelligence services during the wars in former Yu-
goslavia. The Americans didn’t mind that professionally active Polish 
special services had a communist pedigree and had even conducted suc-
cessful operations against the United States.8 Unfortunately, the effec-
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tiveness of these services was hampered by some Polish governments 
(above all by those of Jan Olszewski and Law and Justice—PiS), guided 
by the obsession of vetting and eliminating proven, often outstanding, 
aces of the Polish intelligence services from communist times.9
Ever since Poland was interested in membership in the North Atlan-
tic Alliance, it feared that newly emerging institutions like the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) or the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) would be substitutes. The pronouncements of President Lech 
Wałęsa—who warned President Bill Clinton’s envoys Madeleine Al-
bright, General John Shalikashvili and Charles Gati in January 1994, 
prior to the Brussels NATO summit, that Poland would not even join 
PfP—were especially critical.10 However, during an official dinner of 
the heads of the Visegrád Group states with the U.S. president held in 
Prague on January 12, Wałęsa said of the PfP that it was “a step in the 
right direction, however too small. I hope that today’s talks will define 
the time horizon and that our progress on the way to NATO will be 
faster.”11 
Poland nevertheless joined the PfP in February 1994, and the fol-
lowing September the first NATO military maneuvers took place in 
Biedrusko near Poznań. Military cooperation within the PfP frame-
work served to adapt Poland to NATO standards and contributed to 
bringing Poland closer to membership in the Alliance. The Partnership 
for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP), thanks to which part-
ner countries were able to cooperate more closely with NATO forces 
in order to achieve interoperability objectives, was especially import-
ant. In practical terms, Polish military collaboration with NATO took 
the form of Poland’s participation in IFOR, which was implemented 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the Dayton peace agreements 
and which put an end to civil war in that country. In February 1996, a 
670-person strong Polish contingent joined IFOR and served as part 
of the Nordic-Polish Brigade. From December of that year, the Polish 
unit (which had been reduced to about 500 soldiers) was included in the 
next NATO mission—SFOR. 
In the fall of 1994, Poland, along with the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Slovakia, was included in the American military aid program (the 
so-called Brown amendment), and on December 1, 1994, the North 
Atlantic Council adopted the breakthrough decision to initiate internal 
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debate within the Alliance about the manner and principles of its en-
largement and the impact that this would have on European security. 
The option of NATO opening itself to new members was accepted by 
the Alliance’s 16 members.
Poland was impatient and sought, mainly in Washington, to accel-
erate NATO’s enlargement eastward. President Lech Wałęsa’s efforts 
were successfully continued by his successor from SLD, Aleksand-
er Kwaśniewski. However, the United States tried to secure Russia’s 
acquiescence to NATO’s historical admission of the former East Bloc 
countries. This was not made any easier by the pronouncements made 
in the fall of 1995 by President Wałęsa or Defense Minister Zbigniew 
Okoński (appointed by Wałęsa), who feared that Poland might become 
a second-class NATO member and who demanded that Washington 
deploy nuclear weapons on Polish territory. This led to nervous reac-
tions in Moscow.
A very positive role in the efforts leading to Poland’s admission to 
NATO was that of Jerzy Koźmiński, Poland’s ambassador in the Unit-
ed States in 1994-2000. I personally had the opportunity (as a fellow 
at George Washington University during the 1994-95 academic year), 
to see how persistent he was in his efforts to persuade political circles 
in Washington and the U.S. public to expand NATO. I remember that 
instead of complaining about Poland’s abysmal geopolitical situation 
and the threat from the East, he sought to convince the Americans of 
how good a deal they would be making by accepting Poland as a NATO 
member. 
Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, National Director of the Polish-American 
Congress at the time, also played an important role. This is evidenced 
by his extensive publicity work, published in Poland years later, upon 
which he embarked during this period.12 In general, the Polish-Amer-
ican community played a major role in the difficult process of persuad-
ing U.S. decision-making circles to expand the North Atlantic Alliance 
so as to include Poland. The very positive advisory role of Professor 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, associated with the Democratic Party, cannot be 
overestimated.
One issue hindering Poland’s diplomatic efforts to become a NATO 
member was the worryingly insufficient civilian control over the Polish 
armed forces. The problem was symbolized by the political activity of 
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General Tadeusz Wilecki, who was appointed Chief of General Staff 
of the Polish Army by President Lech Wałęsa in August 1992. This 
general openly criticized the Sejm and the government, and in autumn 
1994, with the support of other generals and President Wałęsa, forced 
the civilian minister of national defense (Admiral Piotr Kołodziejczyk, 
retired) to resign. General Wilecki was also a serious problem for the 
next president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski who, acting in response to 
Washington’s expectations, decided to dismiss this general in March 
1997.
Polish authorities faced another very sensitive problem on the way 
to NATO membership, and this was the issue of the investigation—re-
newed by Polish prosecutors—of Colonel Ryszard Kukliński. He was 
a former spy who had worked for the Americans, had informed them 
in 1981 of General Jaruzelski’s preparations for martial law, had fled 
Poland and had been sentenced in absentia to death for treason. The 
matter was not taken up by the governments with a Solidarity pedigree 
or by President Wałęsa, but by the SLD/PSL government, and the 
main politician who brought about the positive closure of this difficult 
matter in September 1997 was the SLD leader, Minister of the Interior 
Leszek Miller, one of the former secretaries of the communist party in 
Poland. This example shows how Poles, including those from the old 
system, wanted Poland to join NATO. The Polish authorities, in keep-
ing with regulations, carried out a controversial operation and resolved 
the last obstacle, which was the fact that Kukliński had until then been 
officially seen as a traitor in Poland and as a hero in the United States. 
Before the matter was formally closed, President Bill Clinton thanked 
the Polish government during his visit to Warsaw in July 1997.
The American political class found it difficult to come to terms with 
the fact that since 1993 the government in Poland had been formed by 
two parties who had originated in the communist system, the Demo-
cratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL), while 
in December 1995, the SLD’s chairman, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, was 
elected president of the country. However, they quickly came to terms 
with this by observing the concrete actions of the post-communists. Al-
though deep divisions persisted in internal politics, the political class at 
that time was guided by a raison d’état, which demanded that it continue 
its efforts to secure Poland’s accession to NATO and the EU. Even 
Lech Wałęsa—who had rendered great services for the country and was 
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bitterly disillusioned by his defeat in the 1995 presidential elections—
during his visit to the White House in March 1996, spoke telling and 
wise words to President Clinton: 
Mr. President, you need not fear for Poland. Poland is in good 
hands. Those that govern it, have nothing in common with Rus-
sian communists. I do not like them of course, this is natural and 
you most certainly understand this. But they are intelligent and 
educated—often in your country and at your cost—who know 
capitalism and understand it. They have even come to like democ-
racy, they are Westerners and pro-American. More than this, in 
a sense they have to be better than us, because everyone is now 
looking over their shoulder. We will win next time, but they won 
this time.13
Meanwhile, Poland was dissatisfied with the cooperation being es-
tablished at many levels between NATO and the Russian Federation. 
This so-called Yalta Syndrome (fear of the West coming to an under-
standing with Russia at Poland’s expense) appeared on many occasions, 
for example NATO’s proposal to include Russia to the PfP program, 
the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, 
and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation of May 27, 
1997 in Paris, the Rome Agreement of May 28, 2002, and the Lisbon 
Summit’s 2010 offer that Russia collaborate in building an anti-missile 
shield. 
This made the development of Poland’s relations with Russia difficult 
and appeared to confirm Poland’s alleged Russophobia in the eyes of 
some European allies. It has to be said that under the nationalist-right 
governments of the Law and Justice party (2005-2007 and since the fall 
of 2015), such allegations were not entirely groundless, even if Moscow 
was and remains uninterested in the normalization of relations with 
Warsaw. Russia treated Poland through the prism of its relations with 
the United States, and saw Poland as a U.S. client-state. In recent years 
Russian political science too has been criticizing Poland and Russia’s 
other Western neighbors increasingly often, and referring to them as 
“limotrophs” implementing America’s anti-Russian strategy.14
One of the most serious issues connected with Russia’s opposition 
to NATO enlargement was Poland’s fear of becoming a second-class 
member of the Alliance. As a concession to weaken Russia’s opposition, 
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the United States and NATO had pledged in 1990 that, just as with 
the eastern Länder following German reunification, NATO would not 
expand its infrastructure to the territory of new member states and that 
no substantial NATO combat troops would be permanently stationed 
there.15 This was formalized in May 1997 during the signing of the 
Founding Act in Paris.
Before the decision to invite new members to the Alliance was for-
mally announced at the NATO summit in Madrid on July 7, 1997, the 
Polish delegation was asked by Secretary General Javier Solana to sign 
the so-called “3 x NO declaration”: NO to substantial NATO armed 
forces on the territory of states joining the Alliance; NO to military 
installations and bases; and NO to nuclear warheads. A member of the 
Polish delegation described it years later: 
Silence fell. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski was quickest to re-
act: ‘Gentlemen, we wish to join NATO, but at the outset you wish 
to treat us as second-rank members.’ The NATO side expected 
this and replied ‘This will not be the case. Should anything bad 
take place in the East, we will change these provisions immediate-
ly.’ It was clear that precedence had been given to Russia and it is 
with its authorities that NATO had first negotiated. We quickly 
signed the document, and only then could negotiations begin.16 
Poland first ignored this forced political obligation, and went on to 
question it in the second decade of the 21st century as it advocated the 
building of the NATO anti-missile shield in Poland and to reinforce 
NATO’s eastern flank.
Polish Disputes with Russia about NATO Policy
Upon joining NATO in March 1999, Poland became an import-
ant member of the Alliance from a geostrategic point of view. It ob-
tained Allied guarantees in the event of aggression by a third country, 
an expression widely seen in Poland as synonymous with Russia. To the 
north, Poland borders on Russia’s Kaliningrad District, and to the east 
it shares a border with Belarus (bound to Russia by a military alliance 
since 1994), and with Ukraine—a state that was formally neutral and 
which was balancing between Russia and the West. Nearly half of Po-
land’s southern border is with Slovakia, a country which was outside 
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the Alliance until the spring of 2004. The fundamental concern of the 
Polish authorities was to secure the country militarily from any possible 
Russian aggression. For this reason, from the moment Poland joined 
the Alliance, it pushed for obtaining the same military status as that 
enjoyed by the “old” members, despite the above-mentioned NATO 
understandings with Russia. Polish politicians didn’t treat these pledges 
to Moscow, or the provisions of the Founding Act, as treaty obligations. 
It has to be said that this latter document was not a legally binding trea-
ty, but its binding force is de facto almost equally valid, similarly to the 
CSCE Final Act of 1975. The Western Allies have respected the origi-
nal political understanding with Russia as regards the additional perma-
nent stationing of substantial combat forces, and for as long as they saw 
no need to reinforce the Alliance’s eastern flank, there was no problem. 
Such a need arose toward the end of the first decade of the 21st century.
It was under the vigorous leadership of Vladimir Putin that Russia 
eventually embarked on a policy of balancing the influence of the West. 
This was foreshadowed by Putin’s famous speech at the Munich Con-
ference on Security Policy of February 2007. The following year Russia 
reacted with disproportionate force to Georgia’s attack on its troops, 
stationed as CIS peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Poland and other 
countries in the region felt an increased sense of threat, and feared the 
possibility of Russian armed aggression. In this situation, on August 
20, 2008 Poland signed an agreement with the United States to build 
elements of a U.S. anti-missile shield on Polish territory.
Poland then began to demand that NATO strengthen its collective 
defense function enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
and that it bring its contingency plans from 2001 up to date. This was 
Poland’s position prior to the Lisbon Summit of November 2010 and in 
subsequent years. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Poland 
further demanded a military reinforcement of the Alliance’s eastern 
flank. All these steps and demands led to protests from Russia, which 
invoked, among other things, the stipulations of the Founding Act.
Another problem in NATO-Russian relations turned out to be NA-
TO’s “Open Door” policy, which Poland strongly supported and which 
presupposed further expansion of the Alliance, especially to former So-
viet republics, that is, initially Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and, from 
2008, also Ukraine and Georgia. 
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Polish-Russian relations also deteriorated as a result of the two 
countries’ rivalry in the post-Soviet area. Poland took an active part 
in supporting U.S., NATO and EU policy which sought to promote 
democracy in Eastern Europe, included support of “color revolutions”, 
and the EU’s Eastern Partnership program. These Western initiatives 
were aimed at supporting democratization as well as a pro-Western 
orientation in the foreign policy of the former Soviet republics. Russia, 
on the other hand, saw this as interference in the internal affairs of the 
countries which lay in what it believed to be its sphere of influence, or 
what it called its “near abroad.” 
From the perspective of the theory of political realism, it has to be 
said that the motives officially put forward by Warsaw, Washington and 
Brussels, namely “supporting democracy,” were just a cover for ten-
sions already unfolding between the West and Russia over the future 
of the non-Russian post-Soviet states and their geopolitical orientation 
at stake. Side-by-side with the United States, Poland played a leading 
role in this contest.17 Such a policy was due to the concept Warsaw 
had adopted on the threshold of the post-Cold War period and which 
called for strengthening the independence of Poland’s immediate east-
ern neighbors as well as Georgia, in order to preclude Russia’s rever-
sion to an imperial policy.18
This was compounded by the strong anti-Russian sentiments, verg-
ing at times on outright Russophobia, of most Polish politicians, es-
pecially right-wingers. Poland showed its greatest commitment to 
supporting an anti-Russian political course with regard to Ukraine 
during the Orange Revolution at the turn of 2004/2005, and the so-
called Dignity Revolution which began in November 2013. In the lat-
ter case, Poland’s eagerness clearly overtook that of NATO and EU 
partners when it initiated economic sanctions against Russia, proposed 
that NATO sell weapons to Ukraine and, above all, when it sought 
to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank and have all NATO allies increase 
military spending. Poland’s determined course not only threatened the 
cohesion of the Alliance when it was accepted with some reservations 
by a number of European Allies but, above all, it eliminated Poland as 
one of the mediators in the Ukrainian crisis, a role that it could have 
played following the initially successful initiative of the Weimar Trian-
gle in February 2014.
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The Consequences of Poland’s Accession to NATO and of its 
Pro-American Attitude
Poland’s accession to NATO in 1999 had consequences not only for 
Poland’s security, but also for NATO as a whole. The following are ac-
cession’s most important consequences for the North Atlantic Alliance.
First, it strengthened Poland’s security and U.S. involvement in Eu-
ropean security issues by extending NATO security guarantees to two 
other Central European countries in the first instance and seven more 
in 2004.
Second, it enlarged the Atlanticist (and pro-American) wing within 
the Alliance. Proponents of an autonomous EU defense policy, France 
above all, began to refer Poland as an American “Trojan horse” in an 
integrating Europe, and following Poland’s intervention in Iraq, in the 
German press Poland was referred to as the “Trojan ass” in connection 
nature of this operation, which had not been legitimized by the United 
Nations.
Third, it launched the process of an asymmetrical shaping of Euro-
pean security, it strengthened the security of Central Europe but not 
that of Eastern Europe, as involving Russia on a large scale in this pro-
cess proved unsuccessful.
Fourth, Poland seeks to set the example in terms of contributing to 
NATO’s defense capabilities. In 2002, it undertook to spend no less 
than 1.95% of GDP on defense as compared to the previous year. In 
2018, it raised this figure to 2.0% of GDP, and on August 15, 2018 
President Andrzej Duda announced that he would increase it to 2.5% 
of GDP in 2024, that is to about $31 billion annually.19 This is an enor-
mous effort, and doubts were voiced loudly in Poland about whether 
the government in Warsaw could really afford it. U.S. President Don-
ald Trump praised Poland for this and singled it out as an example to 
follow by other allies, 23 of which did not attain the 2.0% of GDP fig-
ure recommended at the Newport NATO summit in September 2014. 
It is a pity that Poland’s steadily increasing military budget does not 
lead to increased security to a degree making it certain that Poland’s 
territory will be defended in the event of a possible war with Russia. On 
the other hand, the militarization of Polish and NATO security poli-
cy is not helping to strengthen international security, it weakens it by 
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spurring an arms race, as Russia is responding with its own increasingly 
modern armaments.
Fifth, the reinforcement of NATO’s eastern flank during the second 
decade of the 21st century has only ostensibly increased the security of 
the Allies, especially that of the Central European members. But it has 
strengthened Russia’s determination to counterbalance NATO expan-
sion. As a result, the militarization of security has begun, and the op-
portunities for multilateral pan-European negotiations (at the OSCE 
forum) and bilateral dialogue with Russia are not being used.
Sixth, continuing the process of NATO enlargement so as to in-
clude post-Soviet countries, especially when raised in 2008 regarding 
Ukraine and Georgia, entailed crossing a “red line” with regard to 
Russia.20 This triggered sharp Russian countermeasures in the form 
of the Georgian War in 2008 and the Ukraine crisis in 2014. By an-
nexing Crimea and militarily supporting the secession of the Eastern 
Ukraine’s Donbas area, Russia signaled emphatically that it would not 
hesitate to use force and violate international law in order to protect its 
great-power interests. All in all, this means that the states making up 
the Euro-Atlantic security system are potentially heading for a great 
war in which there would be no winners. Poland was one of the main 
supporters of politics from a position of force which led to a situation 
reminiscent of the Cold War during the Ukraine crisis.21
A few years after joining NATO, Poland moved toward a clear poli-
cy of “bandwagoning” with regard to the United States. The most im-
portant signs where Poland’s participation in America’s invasion of Iraq 
in March 2003, its subsequent administration of one of the stabilization 
zones in that country, followed by new arms purchases from the United 
States once in April 2003 an agreement was signed for the purchase of 
F-16 multi-purpose planes. In September 2004, U.S. Deputy Secre-
tary of State Richard Armitage and Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Adam Daniel Rotfeld inaugurated a strategic dialogue between 
Poland and the United States. It was a low-level dialogue, although 
bilateral visits took place at the highest level. The bandwagoning policy 
in the following years, especially during the Law and Justice govern-
ment, reduced Poland to the role of a U.S. client state and satellite.
The militarization of security policy as pursued by the United States 
and Poland neither strengthens the North Atlantic Alliance’s security, 
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nor increases Poland’s national security. What’s more, it hinders NA-
TO’s internal cohesion, since the leading Western European allies, 
Germany and France, are in favor of a cautious Eastern NATO policy 
and pragmatic cooperation with Russia, not least in security matters. 
On the other hand, Poland considers its security interests as identical 
with those of the United States and, therefore, unquestionably supports 
unilateral U.S. actions (such as the suspension of the INF treaty) and 
even encourages them, like the proposal to build “Fort Trump” on its 
territory. The danger is that this course may lead to Poland’s strategic 
isolation, because Trump’s America is no longer fully predictable.
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Chapter 10
Opening NATO’s Door
Volker Rühe
Making the Case
On March 26, 1993 I was the first ministerial-level official to argue 
that NATO should open its door to aspiring candidates in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
In my Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture at the International In-
stitute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, I placed the issue of 
NATO’s opening in the broader context of the changes that had un-
folded since the end of the Cold War.1 It was time to create a new 
architecture for Europe that transcended the old divides of Versailles, 
Yalta, and the Cold War. 
For the first time in European history we had the opportunity to 
build cooperation across all of Europe on the basis of democracy and 
market economies. Institutions designed for half of Europe had to be 
prepared to open their doors to new democratic members. This was as 
true for the European Union as it was for NATO. 
The deepening and the widening of the European Union had to 
proceed in tandem. Without opening to the East, EU member states 
would never be able to advance their own cooperation. “Without our 
neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe,” I argued, “strategic unity in 
Europe would remain an illusion.”
This applied also to NATO. “We must not exclude our neighbors in 
the East from Euro-Atlantic security structures,” I insisted. “Eastern 
Europe must not become a conceptual no-man’s-land…and the Atlan-
tic Alliance must not become a ‘closed shop’.” Opening Western insti-
tutions was not only important, I argued, it was urgent. 
At the time, in my lecture and in other writings, I argued that “the 
success of the reforms in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
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is the greatest strategic challenge of the Euro-Atlantic community…if 
the West does not stabilize the East, then the East will destabilize the 
West.” I warned that if Central Europe were to be left in a strategic 
vacuum, a turbulent and insecure in-between Europe (Zwischeneuropa) 
would emerge, and “sooner or later Russia and the European Union, 
or even Russia and Germany would come into conflict regarding their 
respective influence” in the region.2 Such a situation could be in the 
interest of no country, including Russia. 
What we needed was the right balance between cooperation and in-
tegration. It was important to sustain the momentum for cooperation 
with Russia and translate that into practical steps so that Russia would 
be recognized as a strategic partner for NATO, and would itself feel to 
be such a partner, while simultaneously ensuring that the special nature 
of such a partnership did not hinder or suppress the process of integra-
tion of other partner countries into Western institutions.3 
Managing the German Debate 
I didn’t consult my Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, on the content of my 
speech. If I had, I could not have given the lecture. 
As Chancellor of a coalition government, Helmut Kohl could not 
be as forward-leaning as I was. That was clear. But if governing is just 
about compromising, you don’t succeed. I was neither shy nor inse-
cure on that point. Internally, I pressed Kohl quite hard on NATO’s 
opening. He was still reticent for various political and tactical reasons. 
He never threatened to fire me if I went public with my views, but he 
and my colleague Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany’s Foreign Minis-
ter and a member of our coalition partner, the Free Democratic Party 
(FDP), tried to slow me down. Genscher was against opening NATO 
to new members. Genscher never said we could not achieve such a goal, 
he simply didn’t want to do it.
I disagreed and decided to go public. I was concerned that Alliance 
discussions on the issue had become desultory. Some weeks earlier, am-
bassadors to the North Atlantic Council had discussed informally in 
off-the-record session the possibility of NATO membership for Cen-
tral and East European countries. The debate was inconclusive. I was 
convinced that this was an inadequate response to the desire of these 
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countries to join the Alliance. There was a danger of drift. It was time 
to put the topic on the international agenda. 
I deliberately chose the IISS because it is a special place to give an 
important speech, and because of my close friendship with Helmut 
Schmidt. I did not consult Schmidt beforehand, but I wanted my speech 
to have a historic background. I recalled Schmidt’s own ground-break-
ing speech at the IISS in 1977, when he warned that the Soviet Union 
was deploying a new generation of mobile intermediate-range missiles 
with multiple warheads that could decouple European from U.S. secu-
rity unless NATO matched the new Soviet threat. Schmidt’s speech led 
to NATO’s dual-track decision to deploy intermediate-range missiles 
and also to negotiate with the Soviet Union the removal of this entire 
class of weapons from Europe, a strategy that ultimately proved to be 
successful. 
When I gave the speech, my views were in opposition to my own 
government’s official position. But I had had a history of not asking 
Helmut Kohl before making important speeches. 
In 1985 I gave a speech in the Bundestag on German-Polish re-
lations and on the Warsaw Treaty, which had been signed by West 
German Chancellor Willy Brandt and Polish Prime Minister Józef 
Cyrankiewicz in December 1970. 
In the treaty, both parties accepted the existing border, the Od-
er-Neisse line, which the Allied powers imposed on Germany at the 
1945 Potsdam Conference. The German Bundestag ratified the War-
saw Treaty in May 1972. Nevertheless, the Treaty’s Article IV stated 
that it did not supersede earlier treaties such as the Potsdam Agree-
ment, so the provisions of Warsaw Treaty could be changed by a fi-
nal peace treaty between Germany and the wartime Allies, as provided 
for in the Potsdam Agreement. Some conservatives interpreted this to 
mean that the German-Polish border had not been ultimately settled. 
This was of great concern to the Poles. 
In my 1985 speech I said clearly that if Germany would again be 
united, its eastern border would be the Oder-Neisse line. I considered 
the Warsaw Treaty as politically binding for a united Germany. Po-
land and Germany had common strategic interests. Poland wanted a 
democratic neighbor in the West. The only precondition was that the 
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border question had to be resolved. It was incumbent upon Germany 
to reassure the Poles on this point. 
Kohl understood my rationale, but the speech made him angry be-
cause once again he had other political and tactical considerations in 
mind. For Kohl, my speech was another political headache. Franz Jo-
sef Strauß, the Bavarian leader of the Christian Social Union (CSU), 
the sister party of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to which 
Helmut Kohl and I belonged, demanded that Kohl throw me out of the 
party. Kohl refused. But he was not happy. 
Formative Experiences
My Polish experiences were formative when it came to shaping my 
views of opening NATO’s door. In the 1980s I was Deputy Leader of 
the Parliamentary Group of the CDU/CSU responsible for Foreign 
Policy, Defense and German-German relations. In the early part of 
that decade I was already in Poland meeting Solidarnosc people living 
in the underground, for instance Janusz Onyszkiewicz, at the time Soli-
darnosc’s press spokesman and later my close friend as Defense Minister. 
After the declaration of martial law in December 1981, Onyszkiewicz 
had been arrested. He was later released, but he was still banned, living 
in illegality. In 1984 I met him nonetheless. I’m sure many spies were 
surveilling us, but I knew that the Polish authorities couldn’t do any-
thing. In fact, I invited him to a reception at the German embassy in 
Warsaw with all the official Polish authorities. I didn’t ask the German 
Ambassador. He would have said no. I just brought him. I wanted Ja-
nusz Onyszkiewicz to be my guest. The Poles were just stunned by this.
My intensive political contacts with Polish interlocutors during that 
time made me realize that the Polish opposition was more in favor of 
German unity than most in Germany and in my own party. Those 
fighting their own regime in Poland believed they had a vital interest in 
having a democratic, unified Germany as a neighbor. After unification 
in 1990 I felt politically and morally obliged to stand up for the unity 
of Europe, to ensure that those countries that had enabled us all to 
overcome the division of Europe and the division of Germany enjoyed 
the same sense of security that we did, and to help prepare the path for 
them to be integrated into Western structures. 
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My second main motivation for opening NATO’s door emerged in 
the context of German unification. During that process, I was Secre-
tary General of the CDU. As the unification unfolded, it became clear 
to me that as Germany and Europe emerged from the Cold War, it 
would be wrong and dangerous for the eastern border of NATO and 
the European Union to coincide with Germany’s eastern border, be-
cause then the border between stability and instability would be identi-
cal with Germany’s eastern border. It was incumbent upon us to extend 
the Western space of stability eastward.4 
After I became Germany’s Defense Minister in 1992, my contacts 
with Central and East European policymakers were renewed. It was 
very clear that with the breakdown of the division of Europe, the Poles, 
the Czechs, the Hungarians and the Baltic states wanted to be members 
of the European Union and of NATO.
My Polish friends approached me and they said: We want the same 
security as Germany. And we can only get that in NATO. I shared their 
opinion that they deserved the same security as Germany. 
Full Steam Ahead
I never liked the expression NATO expansion. I prefer the term 
opening of NATO. At a very early stage, I decided to develop a concept 
for the opening of NATO, very much with the help of Admiral Ulrich 
Weisser, who led my policy planning staff. Without Weisser, I could 
not have done it.
Weisser and I alone produced the IISS speech; he wrote the final 
draft. We had not informed anyone of the content. 
After the speech, the German generals with us on the flight back to 
Germany were both surprised and depressed. They said that this was a 
blow to NATO that we would feel for many years. The domestic reac-
tion was also skeptical. 
I didn’t care about domestic criticism; my approach was strategic. 
The Central and East European countries did more for Germany’s uni-
fication than anybody else. How can you have a European Union where 
some countries feel safe and others do not? I was undeterred and deter-
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mined to press ahead. But I had to win over my government, the Amer-
icans, other NATO allies, and to thread the needle with the Russians.
In Germany, I had a good relationship with Chancellor Kohl. He 
never threatened to fire me. But I remember at least one instance—and 
I think there were more—when Kohl took me aside after a Cabinet 
meeting telling me that he and Yeltsin were in the sauna and Yeltsin 
had complained about me, arguing that he had to get his Defense Min-
ister under control. And then Kohl told me to stay out of debates over 
NATO’s opening. I didn’t, of course. I knew that he was not going to 
fire me.
People in the Chancellery, for instance Kohl’s National Security Ad-
viser Joachim Bitterlich, said, “Don’t listen to Rühe.” They argued that 
I did not represent the German position and the Chancellor’s view. 
They were very much against our approach. In some instances, the 
Chancellery did not inform me about its talks with U.S. interlocutors. 
But the Americans informed me about their talks with the Chancellery, 
which is very unusual.
In my own ministry, the German generals were also against NATO’s 
opening. One general stated in an interview that Polish tanks were not 
good enough for NATO. I told him: “If you say this again, I will fire 
you. We will give the Polish our tanks for one Deutschmark,” which we 
later did. It shows you: the military were not thinking in geostrategic 
terms. Many of them were totally against it.
Klaus Kinkel, my colleague as Germany’s Foreign Minister, was not 
a strategic thinker. He was totally undecided on this issue. I really took 
the leading role, but made sure that the German Foreign Office was not 
totally pushed to the side. Wolfgang Ischinger, the director of Kinkel’s 
policy planning staff and later the Political Director of the Foreign Of-
fice, was more open, and he and Admiral Weisser cooperated closely. 
It was easier to open NATO without Genscher. Kinkel was not as 
strong. But Genscher was kind of a one-man ancien régime. He still 
had a lot of influence with Kinkel. We often had difficulties with the 
Foreign Office. Weisser approached me regularly asking for permission 
to go to the Foreign Office to talk things over with Ischinger to keep 
him informed. Weisser also always informed the Chancellery. At some 
point, we needed the whole government behind us. 
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I did not have many discussions with Social Democrats about 
NATO’s opening. Karsten Voigt, the foreign policy spokesman for the 
SPD, was quite open to it. But I had enough challenges in my own gov-
ernment and in the U.S. Administration. The Social Democrats and 
the other parties could not help me with that.
Moving the Americans—and the Alliance 
When I first talked to the Americans in 1993 about opening NA-
TO’s door, they were against it. Their position only changed after the 
mid-term elections in 1994. Bill Clinton and Strobe Talbott had both 
been Rhodes Scholars in Oxford, and they were both so-called “Russia- 
firsters.” You can also see this when you look at the documents and the 
talks between Clinton and Yeltsin. That was also true for my American 
counterparts Les Aspin and Bill Perry.
After Strobe Talbott became Deputy Secretary of State, I had a con-
versation with him on opening NATO. I said, “Strobe, listen to me. 
The Poles want to be a member of the European Union. And they de-
serve the same security as Germany and France, don’t you think so?” I 
added that “If we don’t give them the same security, this will be the end 
of NATO. Why? Because they will then form something in between 
Russia and NATO, some security organization.” I asked him, “do you 
think that this is in the interest of America?” I think he understood 
that if we didn’t open NATO to them, there was a danger that NATO 
would break up. There was a beginning of a change of mind in 1994.
Meanwhile, I had to move things forward within the Alliance. The 
NATO bureaucracy did not want to expand. In one ludicrous memo 
they expressed concerns that a bigger NATO would mean there would 
not be enough parking spots at NATO Headquarters. 
NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner, in contrast, supported 
my efforts. In a speech on September 10, 1993, he said that NATO 
was not a closed shop, that the option of membership remained open, 
and that it was time to give a concrete perspective to those countries of 
Central Europe that sought membership and that the Alliance consid-
ered to be viable candidates for membership.
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Wörner and I worked together to organize the NATO Defense 
Ministers’ Meeting in Travemünde, Germany on October 20-21, 1993. 
This was my first big NATO conference as Defense Minister. I had 
been in office just for a year and a half.
While preparing for the conference, I learned from my people that 
the United States intended to float a proposal for something called a 
Partnership for Peace. We were concerned that it was a means to avoid 
NATO’s opening. I sent Weisser to Washington on October 12 and 
13, 1993 to find out where the U.S. Administration stood on the issue. 
Weisser returned believing that our position could be aligned with that 
of the Clinton Administration. He reported that the German and U.S. 
sides agreed that NATO had to undergo an internal adaptation that 
equipped it to deal with new missions, and that Western security struc-
tures had to be opened to new members. He added, however, that the 
U.S. interagency discussions were still not uniformly aligned. These 
differences were encapsulated in the idea of the Partnership for Peace.5 
It was imperative for us to use the Travemünde meeting to build 
a consensus on NATO’s opening. In remarks to the press before the 
event began, I made it clear that the Central and East Europeans had to 
be offered a clear membership perspective. The question was no longer 
“whether,” but rather “when” and “how.”6
As expected, discussions at the meeting centered on the nature of the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP), which U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin 
proposed and which had been developed by U.S. General John Sha-
likashvili, who intended PfP to be an alternative to NATO member-
ship. I disagreed.
The Americans knew I was their friend even when I was fighting 
with them. I was not and am not anti-American. I was and remain very 
pro-American and always approach things with a transatlantic perspec-
tive. I visited the United States for the first time in 1963 and since en-
tering the Bundestag in 1976 I had cultivated close relations with many 
American colleagues in the Congress, in the government, and in the 
think tank world. The Americans knew me and took my position very 
seriously. They listened to my argument that we would destroy NATO 
if we did not open it.
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Manfred Wörner played an important role in Travemünde. He very 
much agreed with me. He had cancer, but he had lots of fighting spirit 
to support me. Without him, I would not have been able to turn around 
the Travemünde meeting. In his role as NATO’s Secretary General, he 
could not confront the Americans as sharply as I could. But he played 
his role consummately as Secretary General by summarizing that there 
appeared to be consensus on two points. First, there was support for 
NATO enlargement, and that a process to this effect should be initiated 
at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. Second, there was support for 
the U.S. concept of a “Partnership for Peace” as a useful step in this 
process, but not as an alternative.7
In the end, Wörner and I crafted the language reporting on the con-
clusions of the meeting so that PfP could also be understood as offer-
ing a path to eventual NATO membership. The nuanced language was 
underestimated at the time. It was finalized despite U.S. concerns. My 
good friend Hans Haekkerup, the Danish Defense Minister, as well as 
the Dutch and the Canadians, were instrumental in securing the final 
language that opened NATO’s door.
Hans Haekkerup was my closest ally in Europe. He was totally in 
favor of opening NATO’s door. He was from a small country, but he 
was a strategic thinker. Together, we conceived the idea to establish 
a joint Danish-Polish-German corps, consisting of three divisions, in 
Szczecin. We started this process in 1994, three years before the 1997 
Madrid Summit, where the first invitations were extended. This initia-
tive could not have been done by Germany and Poland alone. Denmark 
played a very big role. In the old NATO, before 1990, there was a joint 
Danish-German command in Rendsburg. So, Hans suggested that we 
had to do something new to foster the process of opening NATO up. 
I suggested Szczecin. It has developed very well. In the meantime U.S. 
forces are also now there. 
The effort to change U.S. and Allied opinion took time. If one looks 
back, it is astonishing: people did not understand the kind of problems 
that we would have had if we had not opened up NATO. I think that 
without NATO’s opening, the European Union would not have sur-
vived as an institution.
The Clinton Administration did not fully turn in our direction until 
after the U.S. mid-term elections in November 1994. Even in Septem-
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ber 1994, at a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Seville, Spain, 
my U.S. counterpart Bill Perry warned me about moving too fast. Per-
ry is a friend of mine and I hold him in high esteem. At the time he told 
me that President Clinton did not like what I was doing. His advice was 
“Don’t push too much. You will run into big problems.” 
Richard Holbrooke played an important role in this process. In 1993, 
he came to Germany as the U.S. Ambassador. Weisser and I managed 
to convince him that NATO’s opening was a good thing. When he 
went back to Washington in 1994, he changed the attitude of the Clin-
ton Administration.
The RAND Story 
I had the political strategy in mind to open NATO. But I needed 
help to implement it. That’s why I hired RAND. I needed them to put 
some flesh on my ideas and to outline the next steps. There were so 
many things to do. 
Weisser and I had long been familiar with RAND. They were open, 
and they were in favor of our approach. RAND helped us to develop a 
step-by-step effort. Every three to six months RAND analyst Ronald 
Asmus would come over to report on what they had been working on. 
We then decided on the next studies. Asmus and I knew each other very 
well. Weisser was the go-between. 
Essentially I paid RAND to help me do something that was against 
the foreign policy position of the United States. RAND was very cou-
rageous to work with me. U.S. government representatives warned 
them against it. But I was very unconventional. 
No German think tank supported me. They were all against it. The 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) would have been the only think 
tank in Germany that could have really helped me to develop the steps 
toward NATO membership for the Central and East European coun-
tries. I asked them. Michael Stürmer, the head of SWP, was totally 
against it. 
There are multiple ironies to the RAND story. At one point I shared 
the RAND studies with the Clinton Administration and with my Pol-
ish colleagues. I told them the studies were free. I had already paid for 
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them. I said, “If it will influence you, that’s enough for me.” The studies 
were indeed influential. In 1997, in fact, Asmus even joined the Clinton 
Administration to implement the strategy.
Bosnia and German Responsibility
Between 1994 and 1997 we continued to work through the details 
of opening NATO’s door. The conflict in Bosnia weighed heavily on 
our efforts. Without an end to the Bosnia crisis it seemed unlikely that 
there would be a consensus behind opening NATO to new members. 
Here again Richard Holbrooke played a major role by securing the 
Dayton Peace Accords. 
When it came to implementing the Dayton agreement, Germany’s 
role as an Alliance member was scrutinized. Through the Cold War 
Germany security and defense policy was focused on challenges in cen-
tral Europe. There was little domestic support for German participa-
tion in foreign military missions. But in the post-Cold War period it 
was clear that Germany would be called on to join such efforts. 
From the outset of my tenure as Defense Minister I argued that 
Germany had to take on the same responsibilities as its Alliance part-
ners with regard to the use of military power.8In the summer of 1992 
one of my first calls as German Defense Minister was to U.S. Defense 
Secretary Richard Cheney. He was clear that Washington expected 
greater German contributions to foreign military missions. I decided I 
would not come back to Washington until I had changed the German 
position. A major theme in my March 1993 IISS speech was Germany’s 
responsibility to be a more proactive member and leader of the inter-
national community. 
It was unbelievable to me that Germany did not contribute to U.N. 
military operations. One of my first acts as German Defense Minister, 
in May 1992, was to send German non-combat troops to participate 
in the U.N. mission in Kampuchea. Later in 1992 we send an navy air 
patrol as part of a NATO mission in the Adriatic. In 1993, we sent Ger-
man non-combat forces to participate in the blue-helmet U.N. mission 
in Somalia. The deployments were controversial at home. Only in July 
1994 did the Federal Constitutional Court rule that Germany’s 1949 
Constitution did not prohibit participation in multilateral peacekeep-
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ing or combat operations, and that German troops were permitted to 
join military missions abroad if the parliament approved.
Nonetheless, German participation in implementing the Bosnian 
peace posed a real challenge. Helmut Kohl was quite reluctant to de-
ploy German forces for historical reasons. He referred to the role of the 
Wehrmacht and the Croatian Ustaše during World War II. I thought 
that our participation in the mission would be worth it if we could save 
many lives. I was determined that something like Srebrenica should 
never happen again. I was encouraged by the attitude of the Ameri-
cans, who expected a united Germany to be part of these new roles of 
NATO. Manfred Wörner was also supportive. He believed that either 
we “go out of area” or “we go out of mission.” Others didn’t. It was 
quite a fight in Germany. Our coalition partner, the FDP, was against 
the deployment of German forces to Bosnia. Some Social Democrats, 
such as Karsten Voigt and Norbert Gansel, supported me. The Greens 
were totally opposed (later on, they agreed with my approach when we 
participated in the mission in Kosovo in 1999). In the end we managed 
to get a majority, and we joined the Bosnian implementation force. 
Holbrooke gave us a call one morning to say that while watching 
television he had seen the Iron Cross on the surface of a Tornado jet in 
the sky over Sarajevo. He emphasized that this was a signal that Ger-
many was a full member of the new missions of NATO.
If we were to succeed in adapting NATO to new missions and new 
members, Germany had to show that it was a reliable ally. Bosnia was a 
watershed for these efforts. Shortly after the end of the war, I met with 
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. He believed that Europe ended 
right after the town of Banja Luka. For him, Bosnia was Turkish and a 
part of the former Ottoman-occupied territory, whereas my intention 
was not just to fulfill Germany’s role in NATO but also to work for the 
integration of what I call secular European Muslims. I am still con-
vinced that if we had not intervened, al-Qaeda’s headquarters would 
not be in Afghanistan, but in Sarajevo. There was already money com-
ing in from Saudi Arabia. We had to show that we were willing to fight 
for the human rights of Muslims in Europe. That was our mission: 
to play a full role in NATO’s new missions. And the other part of our 
mission was to fight for the rights of European Muslims, also later in 
Kosovo.
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Deciding the “Who”
With the Bosnian peace being implemented and Alliance efforts at 
adaptation underway, and following the U.S. and Russian elections in 
1996, the stage was set for the debate on who would be the first coun-
tries to walk through NATO’s door. That decision was to be taken at 
the 1997 Madrid NATO Summit. 
From the beginning I agreed with the American approach, which 
Strobe Talbott summarized as “small is beautiful.” If we brought in too 
many countries in the first round, it would appear as if this would be 
the end, and others would not be able to join later. But we envisaged 
NATO’s opening as a process, not an event. If we wanted to bring in 
the Baltic states and others in later, it was just the right thing to bring 
three in first. 
I was the first German political leader to name publicly the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland as Germany’s preferred candidates 
to walk through NATO’s door.9 As usual, I was ahead of my govern-
ment—and the Alliance. 
Kinkel again was undecided. The French, the Italians, the British, 
who had initially been against NATO’s opening, were unclear about 
their preferences. The French position was rather ironic. When they 
first saw that they could no longer stop NATO’s opening, they argued 
that it should proceed along the lines of the French version of NATO 
membership, i.e. without military integration. I told the Poles this, to 
which they replied, “They are fools.” 
Initially, the French rejected NATO’s expansion. The French then 
reversed course and favored bringing in five countries in the first round, 
including Romania. Chirac’s argument was that they had much better 
tanks than the Poles. That was a very superficial view. My response was: 
I am not interested in the quality of their tanks. I am interested in their 
mindset.
Kohl was very slow to change his mind on opening NATO. He ar-
gued that it was very important to influence Yeltsin. The idea was not 
just to open NATO, but to develop a strategic relationship with Russia. 
While he had voiced support for enlargement earlier, he only decided 
on three new members a few months before Madrid. He was still angry 
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with me for pushing too hard. He didn’t invite me to join the Summit. 
I didn’t care. I was just happy. NATO was about to open its doors. 
Shortly before Madrid, a German-French meeting was held be-
tween Kohl and Chirac. Chirac asked our delegation whether we were 
in favor of three, four or five new member states. Kinkel first said we 
are for three, four and five. That was typical for him. Then I said we are 
for three. Kohl did not say anything. But Kohl supported the American 
position.
A related challenge was what to tell aspirant countries who would 
not be among those asked to join NATO in Madrid. By 1995 it was 
apparent that we would not take in a large group of aspiring members. 
I visited the Baltic states August 21-23, 1995 to break the news.10 Es-
tonian Prime Minister Lennart Meri attacked me in private when I 
told him we would likely start with three new NATO members. He 
was concerned that the process would end with three. He said: This is 
another Munich 1938.
I said you don’t talk to us like this. This is not another Munich, this 
is Brussels. I am the one who started the process to open NATO at all. 
And now you criticize me because we don’t bring in the Baltic states in 
the first phase. I was very outspoken. Later on, he understood that this 
was the right process: small is beautiful. His views had historic roots. 
Back in 1941, Meri’s family was deported to Siberia. In the 1990s, he 
feared that Estonia and the Baltic states might be left out again. That 
was never my intention. But I understood his anxiety.
Managing Relations with Russia 
As the process of integration proceeded, it was important to estab-
lish new patterns of cooperation with Russia. Only a few short weeks 
after my IISS speech, I conducted talks with the Russian leadership in 
Moscow on April 13-17, 1993. As I reported to the Chancellor upon 
my return, I came away with a number of observations. Russian For-
eign Minister Andrey Kozyrev made it clear that Russia was guided by 
the geopolitical and geostrategic national interests of a normal country, 
and that a threat from the West no longer played any role in such con-
siderations. My counterpart, Defense Minister Pavel Gratchev, added 
that Russia now considered the real threats to emanate primarily from 
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the south. Russian leaders emphasized that they sought a closer bilat-
eral relationship with Germany, also in military-security issues; during 
my visit we signed a agreement on military cooperation. It struck me 
that NATO-Russia cooperation was opening a perspective for Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries to draw closer to NATO and EU 
structures, and simultaneously for a new more intensive partnership 
between Russia and NATO to develop. 
I continued to have regular meetings with the Russians, both in Ger-
many and in Russia. In 1994, I went to St. Petersburg. I met Mayor 
Anatoli Sobchak and spent two days there. His deputy sat to his left: it 
was Vladimir Putin. 
I met very often with Boris Nemtsov, Yevgeny Primakov, and Dmit-
ry Rogosin, a member of the Duma who later became Russia’s Ambas-
sador to NATO. I met with Vyacheslav Trubnikov, who ran Russia’s 
Foreign Intelligence Service, and Anatoly Chubais, who was Deputy 
Prime Minister and then chief of the Russian Presidential Administra-
tion. I also had many contacts with the community of strategic thinkers 
in Moscow. One of my most important contacts was Sergey Karaganov, 
who is still there and who had already been there during Soviet times. 
Another important contact was Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin.
In our conversations, my Russian interlocutors did not try to change 
my strategic position. But we did try to work out things and to develop 
a strategic relationship. I explained my position that NATO was open-
ing, not expanding. I told them that it was my conviction that Russia 
also deserved the same security and that one day we also might be open 
for Russia.11 
The relationship between NATO and Russia had always been dif-
ficult. The Allies only met as a group with the Russians after we had 
found a 100 per cent consensus in NATO. We missed some opportu-
nities. In some instances, it would have been possible to discuss some 
issues with the Russians beforehand, for instance topics relating to the 
Middle East. I was also ready to have some Russian thinkers relegated 
to NATO’s international staff. It goes without saying that you have to 
discuss crucial things only among the NATO member states. But there 
were many other issues which we could have invited the Russians to 
discuss, to give them the feeling and the reality that they could join the 
debate when it was still open.
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My discussions with the Russians were not always pleasant. We had 
particularly difficult interactions related to the war in Chechnya. On 
New Year’s Eve in 1995, the Russian army sent in 500 young, recent-
ly-drafted and half-drunk soldiers into Grozny. Most of them were 
killed. What I learned later on and what really angered me was that 
their only training with hand grenades had been throwing snowballs in 
St. Petersburg. I promptly disinvited Grachev from the Munich Secu-
rity Conference. Kohl said: What are you doing? Yeltsin complained 
as well.
Nonetheless, I tried to develop a strategic relationship with Russia. 
One example was my proposal, which I developed in 1997 and 1998, 
to develop a military transport plane as a joint venture between Airbus 
and the Russian aircraft company Antonov. We talked to the Ukraini-
ans about it. Their President was very much in favor, and the Russians 
also. Even the French President sent me a letter saying that France 
agreed that this could be studied. Politically and strategically, it would 
have been a clear signal that we were engaged in common projects, and 
that we lived in a new world, not just with treaties and words, but in a 
very practical way. We would have been able to show that it was not the 
old NATO expanding, but a new NATO opening together with a new 
relationship towards Russia. Unfortunately, the Schröder government 
did not follow up on this initiative. They gave in to the interests of 
Airbus and to West European industry.
I was strongly in favor of modernizing Russia. In the 1990s I did not 
fear a Russian backlash. Yeltsin was trying to reform Russia. It was cha-
os. Putin tried to bring back order and hierarchy. Unfortunately, we did 
not find the appropriate response to Putin’s pleas for a common zone of 
trade and economic interdependence. 
Opening NATO’s Door 233
Notes
1. An edited version of the speech may be found at Volker Rühe, “Shaping Eu-
ro-Atlantic Policies: A Grand Strategy for a New Era,” Survival, 35:2, pp. 129-137, 
DOI: 10.1080/00396339308442689.
2. Volker Rühe, Deutschlands Verantwortung: Perspektiven für das neue Europa 
(Berlin: Ullstein, 1994), pp. 21, 59.
3. Ibid., p. 120.
4. For further exploration, see Ulrich Weisser, Sicherheit für ganz Europa: Die 
Atlantische Allianz in der Bewährung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), 
pp. 23-59.
5. Weisser, op. cit., pp. 45-47.
6. Ibid, p 49.
7. Ibid, p. 51. 
8. Volker Rühe, “Sinn und Auftrag der Bundeswehr im vereinten Deutschland,” 
speech of April 2, 1992, Bulletin, No 37, April 7, 1992, p. 346. 
9. See “Bewertung der künftigen Rolle Moskaus,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung, May 12, 1995. 
10. See “Rühe fordert von Lettland und Litauen Geduld bei der Annӓherung 
an EU und NATO,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 23, 1995; “Letten wollen die 
Zusicherung der NATO: Rühe brenst Hoffnungen auf einen schnellen Beitritt,” 
Handelsblatt, August 23, 1995; Kristina Spohr Readman, Germany and the Baltic 
Problem After the Cold War: The Development of a New Ostpolitik 1989-2000 (London: 
Routledge, 2004), pp. 182-184.
11. In 2010 I published a piece in Der Spiegel with Admiral Weisser, Frank Elbe 
and General Naumann arguing in favor of Russian membership in NATO. We 
explained that it was not our intention to expand the old NATO. Our article was 
much welcomed by President Medvedev and also by his advisers and the think 
tank people in Moscow. See Volker Rühe, Klaus Naumann, Frank Elbe and Ulrich 
Weisser, “Open Letter: It’s Time to Invite Russia to Join NATO,” Der Spiegel, 
March 8, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/open-letter-it-s-time-
to-invite-russia-to-join-nato-a-682287.html. 

NATO Enlargement: Perspective of a German Politician 235
Chapter 11
NATO Enlargement:  
Perspective of a German Politician 
Karsten D. Voigt
In April 1994, at the height of the debate about an eastward en-
largement of NATO, the Trilateral Commission met in Vancouver. I 
was asked to open the debate. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger and former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzez-
inski were asked to comment. Kissinger remarked that this was a his-
toric day. Not only did he agree with me—which happened seldom 
enough—he also agreed with Brzezinski: all three of us were advocat-
ing for an eastward enlargement of NATO. Our motives, however, 
were different. 
My motives reflected predominantly political goals that could not 
have been achieved in the course of the reunification of Germany, or 
the need to address challenges that had became clearer in subsequent 
years.
First, the goal of the reunification of Germany was achieved in Oc-
tober 1990, but the goal of overcoming the division of Europe and re-
alizing a lasting European peace order had not yet been accomplished.
On November 21, 1990, the member states of the former Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) had agreed, with 
the Charter of Paris, on the basic normative principles of a future, fair, 
democratic, and constitutional peace. The reality, however, was that 
those standards were not upheld consistently across the vast space from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok. This was especially true in the area of secu-
rity policy.
Until the fall of the Berlin Wall, for most German politicians the 
CSCE process and arms control policy agreements between East and 
West, in particular the INF Treaty and the SALT I and SALT II trea-
ties, were the most important instruments for overcoming tensions and 
divisions in Europe. In the first few months after the fall of the Berlin 
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Wall, I would not have thought it realistic to strive for membership of 
a united Germany in NATO. Only after my talks in January 1990 in 
Washington and then in Moscow did I change my opinion and advo-
cate first internally within my Social Democratic Party (SPD) and then 
publicly for NATO membership of a unified Germany.
On January 27, 1990, Robert Blackwill and Steve Hadley on the 
U.S. National Security Council informed me confidentially about the 
concept of the “Two Plus Four” talks to facilitate the unification of 
Germany.1 I agreed with Blackwill that the Soviet Union could agree 
to NATO membership of unified Germany—if we were careful to en-
sure that the Soviet side understood the talks were truly “Two Plus 
Four” and not “Five Against One,” the “One” being the Soviet Union. 
Only a few days later, on February 2, 1990, German Foreign Minister 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher held talks in Washington about the concept 
of “Two Plus Four” talks. Subsequently, on February 8, 1990, Secretary 
of State Baker also spoke in Moscow about this concept.
On February 6, 1990, I spoke for the first time in a session with SPD 
foreign policymakers about the possibility of membership of unified 
Germany in NATO. At that time, the majority of SPD members were 
still advocating for overcoming the security-political division of Ger-
many within the framework of a reformed and strengthened pan-Eu-
ropean CSCE. Thus, this was still in the draft for my speech for the 
“Wehrkunde” Munich Security Conference of February 2–4, 1990. 
On February 12, 1990, there was another session of the foreign af-
fairs working group of the SPD. Here, Egon Bahr, supported by the 
leading representatives of the newly-established party of the GDR, 
including Markus Meckel, Hans Misselwitz, and Walter Romberg, ar-
gued that a unified Germany should belong neither to NATO nor the 
Warsaw Pact, but rather to a pan-European security system. I objected 
and argued that the SPD must at least support an effort to sound out 
the possibility of membership of a unified Germany in NATO. 
On February 27 and 28, 1990, Bahr and I flew to Moscow.2 When 
the SPD party caucus (Fraktion) asked me to accompany Bahr, I was 
well aware that he and I represented different opinions. We spoke in 
Moscow with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Politburo Member Ya-
kovlev, and Marshall Akhromeyev. Valentin Falin also participated in 
the talks with Yakovlev. Bahr explained his concept of a reformed and 
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strengthened OSCE. At this point I interrupted him and explained that 
it was necessary to at least consider the possibility of NATO member-
ship. Our Soviet interlocutors did not contradict Bahr. His ideas did 
not seem unsympathetic to them. But only Falin actively supported 
Bahr. Otherwise, our Soviet partners seemed to be much more inter-
ested in economic questions and good relations with the United States. 
After our return from Moscow, I was convinced that there was an 
opportunity to maintain the NATO membership of a unified Germany. 
After that, I advocated first within the party and then also publicly for 
this.
Even though such an outcome would be favorable for Germany and 
Germany’s neighbors, it was important that such a decision not deepen 
the division of Europe. The CSCE Charter of Paris was one response. 
But it alone would have been an unsatisfactory solution to the German 
(security) question. It would have guaranteed no effective multilater-
al integration of the German military, even though all of Germany’s 
neighbors wanted this. In addition, due to the veto possibility of each 
individual CSCE member state, it would not have been in a position 
to protect CSCE members against the threat of military force in times 
of crisis.
The SPD was a very early advocate for the inclusion of Eastern Euro-
pean democracies in the Council of Europe and in the European Com-
munities/European Union. Eastward enlargement was of great signif-
icance for the consolidation of the rule of law and respect for human 
rights. Yet neither the Council of Europe nor the larger, post-Maas-
tricht EU carried any significance for military security policy. 
The enlargement of the Council of Europe was completed relative-
ly quickly in the mid-1990s. The enlargement of the EU, in contrast, 
was conditioned on significant economic and social transformations by 
the former Soviet satellite states. Therefore, contrary to our original 
conceptions, EU enlargement was realized only much later than the 
enlargement of the Council of Europe and NATO. In 1995, only Fin-
land, Sweden, and Austria (all firm democracies and successful econo-
mies) became EU members and thus stepped out of the shadow of the 
Cold War. 
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At the beginning of 1990, individuals active in peace research and on 
the left of the SPD discussed the possibility of contractual agreements 
between NATO and a reformed Warsaw Pact and between the EU 
and a reformed COMECON. In my opinion, however, the dictatorial 
internationalism in the Warsaw Pact and in COMECON could not be 
transformed into a voluntary internationalism -- and in fact, both orga-
nizations soon fell apart. Added to this was that Poland, Czechoslova-
kia and Hungary were pushing for a withdrawal of Soviet and Russian 
troops from their countries and as close a connection to the EU and 
NATO as possible. 
The membership of post-Soviet Russia in NATO received some 
support both in Germany and in the United States in the first half of 
1990. I never approved of this. In my opinion, a NATO of which Rus-
sia was a member would be transformed from a system for collective 
defense into a system of collective security. In case of larger conflicts in 
Europe, such a transformed NATO would probably frequently not be 
able to act, because, due to the principle of consensus, it would always 
require the agreement of all members, that is, also of Russia. 
Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, 
Russia regarded itself as a world power and large European power. 
This self-image made it unlikely that it would come to terms with the 
dominant role of the United States in NATO. Russia’s membership 
in NATO would diminish some problems, but create many new ones. 
Furthermore, from the very beginning, countries such as Poland saw 
the United States and NATO as an instrument of protection against 
Russia. For these reasons, I contradicted Deputy U.S. Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott when, during a discussion at the American Acade-
my in Berlin on March 20, 1998, he pleaded for the inclusion of Russia 
in NATO. It was important, I said, to bind Russia closer to Europe, but 
not to bring it into NATO.3
At the end of 1991 and in early 1992, I began to advocate for the 
eastward enlargement of NATO. Two ideas were decisive for me here. 
First was the multilateral embedding of Germany in the East accord-
ing to the example of relations with our Western European neighbors 
in NATO and the EU. Second, at the same time, the enlargement of 
NATO needed to reinforce the trajectory then underway toward great-
er security cooperation throughout all of Europe. Therefore, in my 
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opinion, the step of integration into NATO should be tied to the step 
of closer cooperation/collaboration with those countries, especially 
Russia, who were not able or willing to join NATO. In addition, I was 
convinced that the political and military strategy of NATO and its de-
fense-political deployment would have to be changed so that it would 
be clear that Russia could be perceived as a partner rather than an op-
ponent of NATO.
Today, NATO regards itself reinforced again as a system of collec-
tive defense, especially against risks that originate in Russia. This shift 
of accent had been required by the Baltic states and Poland since the 
beginning of their membership. In Germany, this shift of accent was 
first shared by the vast majority of members of the Bundestag as a con-
sequence of Russian behavior in the 2008 Georgian conflict, and the 
2014 annexation of Crimea and Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine.
A second complex of problems arose in connection with the unifi-
cation of Germany. European politicians such as British Prime Min-
ister Margaret Thatcher, French President François Mitterrand and 
others sought to reanimate concepts of the “balance of power” and the 
“concert of powers.” For centuries, these concepts were the cause of 
conflicts and wars in Europe. German policy regarded it as a European 
interest to replace these concepts with multilateral systems of cooper-
ation and integration, as had been practiced successfully in the preced-
ing decades in Western Europe, also now in Eastern Europe.
At the 2+4 talks, the four former victorious powers, that is, the large 
powers at the end of World War II, were in agreement that the de-
fense policy of a unified Germany had to be integrated multilaterally. 
Because the Soviet Union presented no viable alternatives to this, in 
the end, the Western concept of the integration of unified Germany 
into NATO prevailed. Thus, with the agreement of the Soviet Union, 
the first eastward enlargement of NATO was agreed upon, namely the 
enlargement of NATO territory to include the territory of the former 
German Democratic Republic (GDR). At that time, this was not called 
the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO, but in fact it was the 
first, and a precursor to the subsequent enlargements.
In order to make this first NATO eastward enlargement (I did not 
yet speak of an initial enlargement in 1990, but only later in the con-
text of the enlargement of NATO to include Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
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and Hungary) acceptable to the Soviet Union, some special arrange-
ments were agreed: no permanent stationing of foreign troops would 
be allowed on the territory of the former GDR. Because Germany was 
forbidden to possess atomic weapons, this meant factually a nuclear 
weapon-free status for the territory of the former GDR. These agree-
ments about the military status of the former GDR territory later also 
became the example for similar agreements for the further eastward 
enlargements of NATO. 
The former victorious powers were not the only countries worried 
about the future foreign and defense policy behavior of a unified Ger-
many. Other neighbors of Germany, e.g. Poland and Denmark, shared 
these concerns. From their point of view, the integration of a unified 
Germany into NATO and the stationing of U.S. troops in Germany 
guaranteed that unified Germany could also not pursue any aggressive 
or revisionist policies in the future. Because Germany did not have such 
policies in mind, these arrangements in the interest of “enlightened 
self-containment” were also in Germany’s own interest. In this manner 
it was guaranteed that Germany could not do what Germany also did 
not intend to do. Locking Germany into multilateral structures was a 
good basis for good relations with all of its neighbors, including those 
in the East.
A third set of issues arose because at the same time the Eastern Bloc 
was disintegrating, national conflicts within and between countries in-
creased in Southeastern Europe and Yugoslavia. These conflicts were 
frequently conducted with force. The 1994 Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
was an instrument for moderating the effects of these conflicts. In that 
the settlement of such conflicts became a precondition for acceptance 
in NATO or in the EU, it was possible to solve or at least contain such 
conflicts. The SPD supported the Partnership for Peace. 
On the basis of the treaties concluded in 1990, over the next few 
years Germany and many of its European partners concluded numer-
ous bilateral agreements. It became the declared goal of German policy 
to strive for just as good a relationship with its eastern neighbors as with 
its western neighbors. With an eye on this goal, those advocating for 
closer cooperation between the EU and the Eastern European states 
grew in number and influence. Full integration into the EU, however, 
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assumed such extensive economic and social changes that even with the 
best intentions it could only be achieved after quite a few years. 
In this context, Russia only came into question as a cooperation part-
ner for the EU and not as a full member. Its self-image as a sovereign 
nuclear global power and large European power could not be recon-
ciled with the restrictions on sovereignty associated with full member-
ship in the EU. 
When I began to advocate for the concept of an eastward enlarge-
ment of NATO at the end of 1991/beginning of 1992, I assumed that 
Russia would be against former members of the Warsaw Pact joining 
NATO. There was almost no chance to change Moscow’s mind. How-
ever, Russia also had very limited possibilities to prevent it. 
As Chair first of the German-Soviet and later the German-Russian 
parliamentary group in the Bundestag, I was always in favor of close 
partnerships and relationships with this country, which is so important 
for Europe. Particularly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, I 
believed it was important in the interest of lasting stability in Europe 
to design the eastward enlargement of NATO politically and militarily 
so that it would at least be palatable to Russia. Despite all differences of 
opinion, conflicts, and conflicting interests, today I am still in favor of 
continuing to attempt to find cooperative solutions with Russia.
The idea of an eastward enlargement of NATO did not emerge on 
one day in 1990, but rather as the result of a lengthy process. Today, 
Volker Rühe and I each believe that we were the first to advocate for 
this concept. I no longer remember when we discussed this goal for 
the first time. However, when we spoke about it initially, we were both 
aware that we were a minority within our respective parties. It was clear 
to us that in the beginning there was also no majority in the Unit-
ed States for an eastward enlargement of NATO. Without active U.S. 
support for an eastward enlargement of NATO, a German commit-
ment would have been futile. And so, both of us, each according to his 
abilities, sought support in Washington. Leading U.S. foreign affairs 
policymakers such as Strobe Talbott and Richard Holbrooke, who were 
reluctant in the early 1990s, later became engaged proponents. 
Richard Holbrooke became a proponent during his time as Ambas-
sador in Germany in the year 1993. In talks with him at this time, I 
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emphasized especially that without an eastward enlargement of NATO 
and later of the EU that it would also be more difficult for Germany 
to incorporate our legitimate striving for good relations to Russia into 
multilateral frameworks. As a matter of course, that would only exac-
erbate the anxieties with which our Eastern neighbors approached a 
unified Germany. Locking Germany into multilateral structures would 
serve German and European interests equally. It would also solve many 
geostrategic problems from past centuries. 
While others saw the Partnership for Peace as an alternative to 
NATO enlargement, Volker Rühe and I regarded it as a precursor. In 
these years, I spoke about this several times with Admiral Ulrich Weiss-
er, the head of the planning staff at the Ministry of Defense. As leader 
of the study group for security of the German Council on Foreign Re-
lations, I regularly invited him to sessions of the study group. I remem-
ber that we both explained the concept of an eastward enlargement 
of NATO in the study group. Over the next years we continued our 
discussions. In Volker Rühe’s chapter in this volume, he emphasizes the 
important role Admiral Weisser played. 
Volker Rühe advocated among the Christian Democrats and as 
Defense Minister for the eastward enlargement of NATO. I did this 
as foreign policy speaker for the SPD in the Bundestag, through my 
intensive contacts with diplomats in other European countries and in 
the United States, through discussions in think tanks and calculated 
publicity work.
Throughout this period, I actively sought to shape public and parlia-
mentary opinion to win support for enlargement of the Alliance within 
a broader frame of cooperative security across the European continent. 
In the following, based on my notes and my shuttle diplomacy of that 
time, I offer impressions of this process, which in the end contributed 
to gaining strong majorities for the eastward enlargement of NATO in 
the German Bundestag, in other European states, and in the United 
States. 
From January 15-20, 1992, I flew to Jamaica to attend a seminar 
of the Congressional Program of the Aspen Institute. The topic was 
relations with the post-Soviet region. Eleven U.S. Senators and five 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives attended, as did several 
U.S. specialists, such as Robert Legvold and Robert Blackwill. I was 
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invited in order to familiarize the U.S. representatives with a German 
point of view. The presence of Janusz Onyszkiewicz from Poland and 
Andrey Kortunov and Vladimir Lukin from Russia served the same 
purpose. Russians, e.g. Vyacheslav Nikonov and Alexei Arbatov, also 
participated in later seminars in Vienna, Istanbul, St. Petersburg, War-
saw, and Berlin. Onyskiewicz and I took the opportunity to present our 
arguments for a NATO eastward enlargement; the Russian participants 
confronted the representatives with their counter-arguments. In this 
respect, the seminar fulfilled its purpose. 
In all of the following years, up to ratification of the NATO enlarge-
ment, I continued to participate in these Aspen seminars in different 
places. The American participants changed. But over the years, prom-
inent Senators and Congressmen such as Lindsey Graham, William 
Roth, Mitch McConnell, Joe Liebermann, Nancy Pelosi, Jon Kyle, 
Sam Nunn, and Richard Lugar participated. Professor Michael Man-
delbaum was responsible for preparing the content of these seminars. It 
spoke in favor of his democratic discussion culture that he kept inviting 
me even though he himself was against an eastward enlargement of 
NATO.
When it came to working with Members of the U.S. Congress, both 
through the Aspen sessions and in my work within the North Atlan-
tic Assembly, my cooperation was especially close with the Republican 
Senator William Roth and his advisor Ian Brzezinski.
In February 1992 I called for a “security partnership agreement” that 
would include Eastern European democracies in a reformed NATO 
if they would heed the rights of national minorities and abandon any 
mutual territorial claims against one another. I believed that there was 
an opportunity to connect transatlantic ties and pan-European tasks 
with one another conceptually and practically better than ever before. 
Since the creation of new security structures in Europe was exceedingly 
urgent, I argued that it was realistic to utilize existing structures as the 
basis for the new architecture. Even former opponents of NATO, I 
argued, now considered the Alliance as a factor for stability in Europe. 
This was a qualitatively new moment, especially since NATO itself had 
offered the Eastern Europeans and the former USSR its partnership 
and friendship. However, I added, NATO would have to transform it-
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self from an alliance based on military deterrence into a comprehensive 
security alliance.
I called for an amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty in which 
NATO would state that it was an institution in the service of the CSCE 
and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. NATO should deploy its 
capabilities in the interest of the CSCE to mitigate crises, prevent con-
flict, and avoid the re-nationalization of defense. A changed NATO, 
I said, should be open to all CSCE states and members of the Coop-
eration Council. I realized that the inclusion of new members and an 
amendment to the North Atlantic Treaty with the goal of stabilizing 
pan-European security would require unanimity and the formulation 
of an overall concept by NATO. But this should not stop NATO from 
already declaring its readiness to include stable Eastern European de-
mocracies as full members in the future. The prerequisite would be that 
the countries in question could not make any mutual territorial claims 
and they would have to guarantee the rights of national minorities. At 
the same time, I rejected the idea of security guarantees provided by 
the alliance of member states of the CIS (Community of Independent 
States). The Social Democratic Press Service commented on my pro-
posal with the words: “It honors the SPD that its foreign policy speaker 
Voigt is the first to present a comprehensive concept for the creation of 
a security partnership between the Western states and those of Eastern 
Europe.”4 
Before going public with my views, I had discussed this concept with 
the foreign policy and security policy representatives of the SPD. Some 
embraced it; others opposed it.5
Soon thereafter, József Czukor, the Hungarian envoy and later Hun-
garian Ambassador to Germany, visited me to discuss my approach. I 
explained my concept of NATO enlargement and requested that Hun-
gary make an application for admission to NATO. As he told me years 
later, he then wrote a report to his government. They were very aston-
ished and would have liked him to ask whether I really meant what I 
said, and how I imagined such a request could be realized. 
I continued my efforts in March 1992 by contributing an article to 
the “Entscheidung,” the newspaper of the Christian Democratic youth 
organization, about the “Westernization of Eastern Europe as a Mis-
sion.” Each country in Eastern Europe had its own traditions, I wrote. 
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But it would be foolish to believe that these traditions would lead to 
better democracies, better adherence to the rule of law or better eco-
nomic reforms than had already been realized in the West. Therefore, 
the “Westernization of the East” was a progressive concept.
For me, part of this concept of the “Westernization of Eastern Eu-
rope” also involved, where possible, leading previously communist par-
ties to the political culture of Western European social democracy. In 
these years, I was the representative of the SPD to the “Socialist Inter-
national” and what was called at the time the “Alliance of Social Demo-
cratic Parties” in the European Community (today called the “Party of 
European Socialists”). Here, I advocated for the cooperation with and 
later membership of these parties. In coming years, many of these for-
mer communist parties voted in their respective parliaments for their 
countries to join NATO.
On March 3-4, 1992, I participated in the first seminar organized 
by the North Atlantic Assembly (today the NATO Parliamentary As-
sembly) in Kyiv. In my speech to the seminar participants, I advocated 
for close cooperation of Ukraine with NATO, however consciously did 
not speak about membership of Ukraine in NATO. A Russian-speak-
ing German whom I was paying was working at the time—with his 
cooperation—for a Ukrainian representative in the Verkhovna Rada, 
the Ukrainian parliament. She organized appointments for me with the 
foreign minister and the most important party groups in the parliament. 
At these meetings, we discussed the future relationship of Ukraine to 
NATO and the EU.
In early April 1992, Polish President Lech Wałęsa visited Bonn. In 
the course of his visit, he held talks with members of the foreign af-
fairs committee of the Bundestag. In the process, he advocated for the 
membership of Poland in NATO, at the same time, however, set forth 
confused ideas about NATO and Poland’s future security-political role. 
On May 22, 1992, I flew to Copenhagen at the invitation of the su-
preme commander of the Danish forces. In my lecture to the Danish 
Academy for Defense, I explained not just my ideas about an enlarge-
ment of NATO. I also advocated for having NATO be available in the 
future for peacekeeping deployments of the UN and the OSCE. I also 
made this request because it would make it easier to gain support for 
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the eastward enlargement of NATO in countries such as Denmark and 
within the SPD. 
On October 1, 1992, I flew to Bucharest as Chair of the Defense 
Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly. There I held talks with 
President Iliescu, Foreign Minister Nastase, Defense Minister Spirou, 
and the chairs of the most important committees. I also visited Roma-
nian military units. In Romania, agreement on the eastward enlarge-
ment of NATO was unanimous. However, my partners in the talks 
absolutely wanted to be present at the first enlargement round. They 
feared that there would not be additional rounds.
A letter from Berndt von Staden, our former Ambassador in Wash-
ington, had already presented me with similar worries. He came from 
the Baltic region, and he too that there would not be additional enlarge-
ment rounds. If that would be the case, then the political and security 
position of the Baltic states could be more exposed than without any 
enlargement. I tried to dispel these worries with a note about additional 
enlargement rounds. But naturally I was not certain about this either. 
At the SPD’s national party convention in November 1992, I advo-
cated for the eastern opening of institutions previously limited to the 
West. I said that NATO would remain a system of collective defense 
and would not be transformed into a system of collective security. But 
in future, NATO could increasingly perform functions of collective se-
curity and thus perform pan-European functions. I did not mention the 
goal of an eastward enlargement of NATO in this speech.
In the following months and years, I continued this exceptionally 
large number of talks with German, European, and American politi-
cians, diplomats, and specialists. In the process, I used my function in 
the Bundestag, in German and international social democracy, to think 
tanks and transatlantic networks, in order to promote the concept of 
the eastward enlargement. Because there were countless appointments, 
in the following I will mention only a few talks and meetings.
From June 8-10, 1993, I flew to Slovenia. There, among other 
things, I met President Kucan. In my talks, there was also discussion 
of the eastward enlargement of NATO. However, the primary concern 
was the violent conflicts in Yugoslavia and the possible escalation of 
these conflicts. Only after Slovenia was recognized internationally as 
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an independent state did the question of NATO membership become 
an important goal for this country.
Shortly after my visit to Slovenia, I met RAND analyst Ron As-
mus on June 14, 1993. to discuss the eastward enlargement of NATO. 
We and other American proponents met repeatedly in the following 
months and years to compare notes and our impressions. 
As the Brussels NATO Summit slated for January 10, 1994 ap-
proached, it became apparent that NATO governments were ready to 
adopt the U.S.-inspired Partnership for Peace, but were not yet pre-
pared to offer aspiring countries any real perspective for membership. 
I felt this was wrong. On December 21, 1993, I issued a statement on 
behalf of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group about the upcoming 
summit:
The proposals for a Partnership for Peace previously discussed at 
NATO fall short in two ways. On the one hand, they are lacking 
sufficiently concrete and binding proposals that could truly help 
Russia on its imperiled path to democratic and economic reforms. 
On the other hand, the perspective of membership in NATO and 
the European Union is missing, for which the Central European 
reform states are rightly urging.
As close a partner-like cooperation with a hopefully further de-
mocratizing Russia and the integration of those Central Euro-
pean democracies that want this and that are already capable of 
this should create a stable network of NATO and the European 
Union with our Eastern neighbors.
At the same time, NATO and the European Union should urge 
all Central European states to seek good neighborly relations 
with Russia and one another. However, at the same time, there 
may be no doubt that none of our Eastern neighbors has a veto 
right with respect to the membership of another state in the 
European Union or NATO.6
I reinforced the message the next day in an article for the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, in which I criticized NATO and EU gov-
ernments for failing to offer Eastern European states any membership 
perspective.7 Partnership for Peace was not enough. 
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On January 17, 1994, a representative of the German Federal For-
eign Office, Wilfried Gruber, reported to the “International Rela-
tions” study group of the German Council on Foreign Relations on 
the NATO Summit conclusions with regard to the enlargement issue. 
In advance of this summit, the Alliance had been confronted with a 
dilemma. On the one side were the Poles and other Visegrád states, 
who pushed hard. On the other were the Russians, who rejected a geo-
graphic enlargement of NATO. The Summit result was a double-track 
decision. On the one hand, Allies affirmed the principle that NATO’s 
door was open to new members. On the other hand, this would be an 
evolutionary process—hence the Partnership for Peace.8
Not only was I disappointed with the Brussels Summit outcome 
on membership, I felt it did not go far enough in demonstrating that 
NATO, too, had to change, and that a new relationship with Russia had 
to be forged. On February 6, 1994, I wrote another article in the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung. I reiterated my support for NATO 
enlargement, but underscored that it had to be proceed together with a 
change in NATO strategy and deeper cooperation with Russia.9
I increasingly used my function as Chair of the German-Russian par-
liamentary group in the Bundestag to speak with Russian politicians, 
specialists, and diplomats about the concept of NATO and EU enlarge-
ment. For instance I was in Moscow from February 9-14, 1994 and 
spoke there with the chairs of all party groups of all parties except for 
communist party leader Zyuganov and the right-radical Zhirinovsky. 
In many talks with Eastern European politicians, the mixture of do-
mestic policy, party political, and foreign policy arguments was strik-
ing. The President of the Romanian parliament visited me on April 
28, 1994. He requested a private meeting. There, he asked me about 
the chances for his Social Democratic Party to be included in the “So-
cialist International.” More important to him, however, was inclusion 
in the “Party of European Socialists,” because he hoped, not without 
good reason, that this could facilitate his country’s prospects to join the 
European Union. In particular, he urged that Romania be included the 
next round of NATO enlargement.
From July 16-20, 1994, I flew to RAND in Santa Monica. There, I 
discussed with Ron Asmus, Robert Blackwill, and Steve Larrabee and 
others conceptual details of a NATO enlargement and the respective 
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debates about this, especially in the United States and in Germany, but 
also in other countries. I also explained my ideas about the role of the 
North Atlantic Assembly (today’s NATO Parliamentary Assembly) in 
the further process. 
In Washington in November 1994, I was elected President of the 
North Atlantic Assembly. In my inaugural address, I emphasized that 
while the Assembly had no power, it could exert influence. I made the 
case that it should use this influence to build support for an eastward 
enlargement of NATO and incorporation of Eastern European parlia-
mentarians into the customs and culture of transatlantic relations. This 
way, the Assembly could also contribute to overcoming the division of 
Europe.10 
In the Assembly there was still no consensus about the eastward en-
largement of NATO. However, over two years the Assembly working 
group on this topic had made a significant contribution by clarifying 
questions to be considered. Shortly before the Washington meeting, 
the working group’s “Report on NATO Enlargement” was published. 
Co-Chairs of this working group were Republican U.S. Senator Wil-
liam Roth from Delaware and Democratic U.S. Congressman Charlie 
Rose from North Carolina. 
As Rapporteur, it was my task to prepare this report. As part of this 
process, I had sent a letter to all leaders of the associate delegations of 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. In this letter, I 
asked them to write to the working group whether they were—beyond 
the Partnership for Peace concept—interested in NATO membership. 
If so, I asked them in which type of membership they were interested:
• participation in integrated command structure (not France; spe-
cial Spanish status);
• deployment of non-indigenous ground and air forces in peace-
time (e.g. Germany, UK, Netherlands);
• only deployment of non-indigenous air forces in peacetime (e.g. 
Turkey);
• no deployment of non-indigenous forces in peacetime (e.g. 
Norway);
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• total integration of all indigenous forces in NATO command 
structure already in peacetime (Germany only);
• no nuclear weapons deployment in peacetime (e.g. Norway/
Denmark).
Each delegation was clear: they wanted to be fully integrated mem-
bers of the Alliance. In the 10-page report (plus appendix), the working 
group described and analyzed practically all arguments for and against 
enlargement and all relevant questions in the context of this debate.11 
I later sent these same questions to those from Belarus and Russia who 
represented their parliaments at the Assembly. They answered me in 
February 1995.
The Belarus delegation emphasized the significance of the decision 
to join the Partnership for Peace. Belarus wanted to be a territory free 
of nuclear weapons. For the foreseeable future, however, Belarus did 
not want to join NATO. Many people in the population, they said, 
would be concerned if NATO came closer to the borders of Belarus. 
This would be especially true if troops or, in particular, nuclear weap-
ons were stationed in the vicinity of Belarus.12
The Russian delegation emphasized in its 5-page letter of February 
2, 1995, “We regard NATO today not as an enemy or as a threat of any 
nature against the new, democratic Russia. We have the right to rely on 
a similar approach of the North Atlantic block with regard to Russia...
Russia is attempting to set up a broad-based and deep cooperation with 
NATO based on the principles of mutual respect, mutual benefit, and 
friendship.” The Russian parliamentarians went on to call for a com-
prehensive pan-European security model. “A transformation of NATO 
in the interest of European unity is of vital importance,” they contin-
ued. “NATO’s December agreements form a stark contrast against this 
backdrop...there are numerous other, international organizations such 
as the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the West European 
Union, in which membership would be a much more persuasive con-
firmation of belonging to Europe than would participation in NATO, 
which represents a transatlantic organization...it’s time to reject the 
chronic complex with respect to the role of Russia in Europe.”13
On January 24, 1995, I invited all members of the SPD Bunde-
stag parliamentary group to a discussion of the topic “NATO enlarge-
NATO Enlargement: Perspective of a German Politician 251
ment.” Over previous months it had become clear that a clear major-
ity of foreign affairs policymakers of the SPD Fraktion supported this 
concept. Our task now was to gain stable majority support in the entire 
party group. 
Meanwhile, I continued discussions on NATO enlargement with 
members of the “International Security” study group of the German 
Council on Foreign Relations that I was leading. On February 13, 
1995, I invited its members to a discussion on the topic “New per-
spectives on NATO enlargement.” The discussion was introduced by 
one representative from the Foreign Office, the Defense Ministry, and 
the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). 
Uwe Nerlich of the SWP pleaded for a careful rather than overly hasty 
NATO enlargement. The representative of the Foreign Office was not 
specific with respect to the endorsement of an enlargement, however he 
pleaded against haste—also with regard to Russia. The representative 
of the Defense Ministry expressed himself somewhat more positively 
about NATO enlargement, however then concentrated more on the 
individual questions that would have to be considered in the context of 
a possible enlargement. 
In the discussion, the vast majority of the participants assumed that 
there would be an enlargement of NATO. In their remarks, they con-
centrated on the different positions of the individual Central European 
states, on the interests of the Baltic States, on specific German points 
of view and interests, and the relationship to Russia.14
Soon after that, from March 15-17,1995, I flew to Moscow as Pres-
ident of the North Atlantic Assembly. I met with Russian Foreign 
Minister Kosyrev, Deputy Minister of Defense Kokoshin, various par-
liamentarians, including the Vice-President of the Duma and counsel 
of the Federation, members of the commission of foreign affairs and 
defense, and many political analysts. All of my interlocutors, without 
exception, declared themselves opposed to an enlargement of NATO, 
with Kozyrev being the most inflexible among them. 
The meeting with Kozyrev was more a monologue than an exchange 
of views. Immediately after Kozyrev entered into the room he began to 
object, even before he sat down. The 20-page protocol of the secretary’s 
office of the Assembly notes that “The Minister of Affairs described his 
position using a very simple formula: no to enlargement, yes to partner-
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ship.” He argued that an enlargement of the Alliance would undermine 
cooperation between NATO and Russia and be incompatible with part-
nership. NATO enlargement would reduce the NATO-Russia partner-
ship to nothingness. It would put an end to the democratic experience 
in Russia, and Russian public opinion could not comprehend the expan-
sion of this military alliance. The NATO Enlargement Study under-
way at that time would in itself undermine cooperation with Russia; the 
publication of criteria would mark a new stage. Russian opinion would 
interpret this as an overture to negotiations, like the trigger of an irre-
versible process (which he qualified as an “avalanche of enlargement”).
I responded by saying that I was personally in favor of enlarge-
ment, but did not think that NATO would reach a firm decision about 
the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ before the Russian elections. I reviewed with 
Kozyrev the main conclusions of the Assembly’s deliberations, which 
encouraged the integration of new members into the Alliance in paral-
lel with pursuit of cooperation with Russia.15
On May 24, 1995, the spring meeting of the North Atlantic Assem-
bly began in Budapest. It was the first time that such a meeting was held 
in a former member state of the Warsaw Pact (a meeting was later held 
in Bucharest from October 9-12, 1997). Public interest was accordingly 
great. As main speakers, I had invited Volker Rühe and Richard Hol-
brooke, two committed proponents of enlargement. Both fulfilled my 
expectations. The speech was very important to Holbrooke, as Daniel 
Hamilton recounts in Chapter 1 of this volume. He used it not only to 
argue for enlargement, but to send the East Europeans a “tough love” 
message that NATO was unlikely to open its door to new members un-
less and until they resolved their own historical disputes and made real 
progress on political, economic and security reforms. 
Among the Assembly parliamentarians, in addition to the Germans, 
the Scandinavians professed themselves very early as supporters of an 
enlargement. The British and French delayed for a long time—if for 
different reasons.
On June 13-14, 1995, I flew to Sofia as Assembly President. In Bulgar-
ia, the discussion about a possible NATO enlargement had developed 
completely differently than in Romania. The parliament was deeply 
divided with respect to this question. A minority of the parliamentari-
ans—the so-called “Euro left” and the conservative opposition—want-
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ed to be in the first enlargement round if possible. The socialists who 
then reigned—a party that arose from the former communist party—
was at that point still largely skeptical to dismissive. The proponents of 
membership in the EU were more numerous. The socialists advocated 
for close relations with Russia, but due to a possible EU membership 
wanted at the same time to become members of the “Confederation of 
Socialist Parties,” the later “Party of European Socialists.” 
I had meetings with the President of the National Assembly, Sen-
dov, with Deputy Foreign Minister Alexandrov, Defense Minister Pav-
lov, with Prime Minister Videnov, with the President of the Republic, 
Zhelev, and representatives of all political parties.16 In my talks, I con-
stantly emphasized that Germany as member of NATO would simulta-
neously maintain good, close relations with Russia and that our NATO 
membership would not harm our relations with Russia. No pressure 
would be exerted on Bulgaria to join NATO. Bulgaria would first have 
to decide whether it wanted to become a NATO member. Important 
also would be that Bulgaria seek good relations with its neighbors, and 
especially not let familiar border problems from Bulgaria’s earlier histo-
ry erupt again. But even then, there would be no automatic acceptance 
of Bulgarian membership to NATO. It was easy to join the Warsaw 
Pact, but difficult to leave it again. In NATO, the situation was reversed.
The Bulgarians made me the honorable offer of addressing their 
parliament. In this speech, I once again summarized the arguments 
from the foregoing talks into an overall concept.
I had been in Romania as Chair of the Defense Committee of the 
North Atlantic Assembly in October 1992. Now I flew to Bucharest 
from September 12-15, 1995 as Assembly President.17 I had meetings 
with President Iliescu, Prime Minister Văcăroiu, the foreign and de-
fense ministers, the leader of the Romanian delegation to the Assem-
bly, the President of the House of Deputies, and all political parties. 
The Romanian interest in joining NATO as early as possible was even 
more perceptible than during my visit in 1992. All interlocutors wanted 
Romania to be considered in the next round of enlargement. They em-
phasized that they were striving for a similarly long-term reconciliation 
with Hungary as the one between Germany and France. They would 
make efforts to maintain good relations with all neighbors and would 
also respect the rights of national minorities.
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From October 17-19, 1995, I flew to Warsaw as Assembly Presi-
dent.18 Part of the program was a wreath-laying at the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier. This event was a very special and emotional element 
for a German politician. My interlocutors were President Wałęsa, the 
Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the Marshall of the Sejm, the 
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Marshall of the Sen-
ate, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Chair of the 
Defense Committee, the First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and 
representatives of all political parties.
All my interlocutors wanted to become members of NATO as ear-
ly as possible. They were concerned about the slowing down of this 
process. I remarked that this was “regrettable, but to be expected.” 
There were four different sources for this caution: those worried about 
guarantees—the “Article Fivers;” those concerned about Alliance co-
hesion—the “NATO protectionists;” those worried about Russia—the 
“Russia-firsters”; and those who saw the strengthening of OSCE as a 
solution—the “pan-Europeans.” I raised the issue of civilian control of 
the armed forces several times. This problem was not always taken as 
seriously as one would have wanted. 
History played a direct or indirect role in all discussions. In my 
meeting with the Marshall of the Senate, my Polish interlocutor men-
tioned the Russian desire for a sphere of influence. I answered “that if 
NATO enlargement was seen in terms of spheres of influence, it be-
came a zero-sum game; it should be seen as stabilizing by providing 
reassurances and confidence. If the Poles and Czechs were alone, they 
would become nervous if the United States or Germany were to coop-
erate with Russia. Membership in NATO would give these countries 
the confidence to cooperate with Russia. Remaining ´outside´ meant 
that each offer of cooperation would be seen as a competing influence; 
the old game in this region would start again.”
My meeting with Wałęsa was dramatic. He was obviously very frus-
trated with what he considered to be the slow pace of enlargement. 
He told me he had already obtained a written agreement from Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin that Russia had no objections to Polish aspira-
tions to join NATO and the EU. When I responded that Yeltsin ap-
peared to have changed his mind, Wałęsa agreed this appeared to be so, 
but retorted that NATO should have taken a “man’s decision.” NATO 
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was a military alliance; he had done his military service and knew what 
it was to take decisive decisions. What he had realized two years earlier 
would now take three years to materialize. 
It was a question of whether or not the West would take a coura-
geous decision, he said. It was essential not to talk of confrontation or 
of individual countries but of Europe. There was one continent and 
one civilization, not individual categories. The later enlargement was 
implemented the higher would be the price. Now was the opportunity 
to overcome the division of Europe. 
In concluding the meeting, Wałęsa appealed for an acceleration of 
the process. Time would not wait, he said. Life would be safer and col-
lective capabilities greater. “We join you to defend you,” he told me, as 
we said goodbye. 
I continued my campaign to win majority support in my party for 
NATO enlargement. On November 6, 1995 I sent to all members of 
the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group “10 theses about the eastward 
enlargement of NATO. I later used the 10 theses as the basis for a Feb-
ruary 1996 article in the NATO Review.19 
10 theses about the eastward enlargement of NATO
1. So that the principles of Europe—human and minority rights, dem-
ocratic pluralism, rule of law, and freedom from violence—become 
the reality of a unifying Europe, beyond the strengthening of the 
OSCE, the European Union, the WEU, and NATO must exercise 
pan-European functions in that they open themselves up to the East 
for cooperation and integration.
2. The eastward enlargement of NATO relies, like that of the Euro-
pean Union, on the principle of the parallelism of integration and 
cooperation. The integration of new members and the deepening of 
cooperation with those who are not or not yet in a position or not 
willing to join.
3. The eastward enlargement of NATO should contribute to stability 
through integration. It is not provoked by an acute military threat. 
Therefore, in the new member states, there do not need to be any 
nuclear weapons or any foreign troops stationed there.
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4. The eastward enlargement of NATO and the European Union 
should complete the already completed multilateral integration of 
Germany into the West. This obligates Germany in the interest of 
stability in Europe to consider the interests of its neighbors when 
pursuing its own values and interests. The eastward expansion shall 
prevent a bilateralism in German politics toward the East that is 
problematic for Germany’s neighbors in the East and West.
5. NATO is interested in good, close partner-like relations with Russia 
and Ukraine. The process for accepting new members into NATO 
must accompany parallels mechanisms of cooperation. A security 
partnership to be secured contractually between Russia and NATO 
should allow for Russia’s singular status as nuclear power and as per-
manent member of the Security Council. Russia should be informed 
immediately about decisions within NATO and be consulted on 
questions of collective security in Europe. In addition, the OSCE 
should be strengthened. Parallel to agreements with Russia, a secu-
rity partnership with Ukraine should be striven for.
6. Above all, the eastward expansion of NATO is a political decision 
about whether states that want to join can support the values and 
principles of the alliance. The minimum conditions that must be 
fulfilled: democracy and a free-market economy must be anchored; 
the new member state must be in a position to promote the princi-
ples of the Washington Treaty and contribute to the security of the 
North Atlantic territory; its membership must bring a security gain 
for both sides, which means unresolved conflicts such as territorial 
and minority problems may not be brought into the alliance, it must 
be in a position to bear appropriately the costs of membership, each 
new member must have the agreement of all 16 NATO members in 
the ratification process, and its inclusion may not prevent the inclu-
sion of other candidates.
7. Adherence to these minimum conditions is required in order to 
maintain democratic credibility and NATO’s ability to act. This also 
means that not all states that want to join will join at one time. Ac-
cession negotiations should begin in the second half of 1996. This 
also means that Russia’s fear that NATO will rush into an eastward 
enlargement is unfounded.
8. It is anticipated that some of the young European democracies will 
be able to join NATO earlier than the European Union. No con-
scious obstacles should be placed in the way of their integration 
efforts. Therefore, there is a conceptual relationship between the 
NATO Enlargement: Perspective of a German Politician 257
enlargement of NATO and the European Union, but no necessary 
temporal parallel.
9. The dynamic of the enlargement process should be maintained 
despite current objections. The enlargement study passed by the 
NATO council at the start of October [1995] represents an import-
ant step even if the study does not make any clear statements about 
some important questions, for example, with respect to the begin-
ning of the accession negotiations and about partnership relations 
with Russia and Ukraine.
10. The decision about the enlargement of NATO will be made solely 
by the 16 member states and the candidate countries; there is no 
veto right from a third party. The eastward enlargement is not di-
rected at anyone. It prevents the re-nationalization of the security 
policy of the Eastern European states and thus serves stability and 
security in Europe overall. A nationally organized security policy of 
the Eastern European states can become a motive for the arming of 
these states. Furthermore, an integration of these states into NATO 
can be used for increased disarmament efforts. For this, first and 
foremost, additions to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
(CFE) should result in lower upper limits.
On December 4, 1995 at the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, I used the 
10 theses to discuss NATO enlargement with German peace research-
ers, who still harbored great reservations about the issue. I placed the 
debate in the context of German domestic politics. “With the end of 
the power and system-political bipolarity between East and West,” I 
argued, “the basis has been removed for the previous bipolarity be-
tween CDU and SPD in the discussion of foreign affairs and security 
policy in Germany.” I also framed the debate on NATO in the con-
text of broader changes to the architecture of European security. “The 
OSCE should not just be maintained, but also strengthened,” I said. 
“However, anyone who proclaims the strengthening of the OSCE not 
as an additional measure but rather as a substitute for the eastward en-
largement of NATO and WEU is really talking about the sacrifice of a 
deeper integration with and between states that are ready and in a po-
sition for a deeper multilateral integration of their foreign and security 
policy.... An enlarged NATO bound to Russia and Ukraine by a treaty 
is still not a system of collective security. It is still a system of collective 
defense, but it fulfills functions of collective security.”20
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That same day I led another session of the “International Security” 
study group at the German Council of Foreign Relations on “How do 
we continue with the NATO eastward enlargement?” I asked NATO 
Assistant Secretary General for Political Questions, Ambassador 
Gebhardt von Moltke and Russian Ambassador Terechov to provide 
opening statements. Based on the explanation of the official position 
of NATO and the Russian Federation, subsequently all aspects of the 
NATO enlargement were discussed.21
From May 25–June 2, 1996, I visited Poland again as President of the 
Assembly. In addition to talks with most of the leading politicians and 
in the relevant ministries, I was given the honor of addressing the Sejm, 
the Polish parliament. In the process, I emphasized that I would speak 
not just as President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, but also as 
a German politician. From my point of view, the enlargement of NATO 
was a historical setting in which centuries-old dilemmas in relations be-
tween Russia and Poland could be overcome. We Germans could work 
closely with Russia without having Poland feel threatened on account 
of this. And Poland, as a member of a multilateral transatlantic alliance, 
could develop close, constructive relations with unified Germany and in 
the end also with Russia without requiring reinsurance through bilateral 
treaties with Western partners. This bilateral reinsurance of Poland in 
the West would never have proven reliable in the past.
From June 15-17, 1996, I flew to Bratislava, Slovakia as President of 
the Assembly. The talks with the President, the Foreign Minister, the 
Defense Minister, and the various parties and committees in the parlia-
ment were very constructive. My interlocutors urged that Slovakia be 
considered for the next round of the NATO enlargement. My indica-
tion that this also depended on the development of democracy and the 
rule of law in Slovakia met with resistance. Some partners in the talks 
even asserted that there was a secret agreement with the Russian lead-
ership to the detriment of Slovakian membership. My talk with Prime 
Minister Vladimír Mečiar were contentious. He did not accept my ar-
gument that the decision about inclusion in NATO would not be made 
based on geostrategic considerations, but also assumed as a prerequisite 
Slovakia’s adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law.22
From September 14-17, 1996, I flew to Kyiv as President of the 
NATO PA. I held talks with President Kuchma, Prime Minister Laza-
NATO Enlargement: Perspective of a German Politician 259
renko, the Defense Minister, the President of the Parliament, and the 
relevant committees and party groups of the parliament. In my talks, 
I remained true to my earlier position. I favored cooperation between 
Ukraine and NATO, but not membership. With the Foreign Minister, 
I went through point by point a list I had made of European treaties 
and organizations of which Ukraine could be a member without being 
a member of the EU. I did not talk about the question of future mem-
bership of Ukraine in the EU. However, this topic was addressed by 
several Ukrainian interlocutors. Several participants in the talks advo-
cated for a NATO membership of Ukraine. Some of those who desired 
this believed it was unrealistic. Others advocated for non-alignment, 
linked to a close cooperation with NATO. Regardless of which position 
the Ukrainian politicians represented, each discussion was overshad-
owed by the question about the relationship of Ukraine to Russia.23
From October 21-23, 1996, I visited Estonia, where I met with the 
President, the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, the President of 
the Parliament, and the most important committees and party groups 
in the parliament. In Tallinn, all of my interlocutors wanted Estonia 
to join NATO. The dominant reason for this was the fear of Russian 
revisionism. I could understand this fear, but I did not share it at that 
point. I supported the Baltic states’ desire to join NATO, but only in 
a second enlargement round. Before that point it would be possible to 
reinforce cooperation with NATO and naturally also with the EU on 
many levels. President Meri expressed the fear that if Poland entered 
NATO and the Baltic states did not, this could cause problems with 
respect to Kaliningrad. In an address to the Estonian parliament, I had 
the opportunity to give reasons for the overall concept of the policy of 
NATO enlargement.24
I completed the series of my visits to future NATO member states 
with a visit in Prague from October 29-31, 1996. There, I met all the 
politicians important for the question of joining NATO. Czech Presi-
dent Havel especially impressed me. 
From January 23-26, 1997, I flew to Moscow for a conference of the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. After the talks there, I stated again that the 
members of NATO should not wait for the agreement of Russia for 
NATO enlargement. At best, Russia would tolerate such an enlarge-
ment, but would not explicitly agree to it. I represented the same con-
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viction in speeches to the Bundestag on February 28 and June 26, 1997. 
By the time I delivered these speeches, a clear majority of the leader-
ship of the SPD now advocated for NATO enlargement. At that time, 
the SPD would also have been in favor of including a larger number of 
states, e.g. also Romania and Slovenia, in the first enlargement round.
On March 21, 1997, I flew to Tokyo for the meeting of the Trilateral 
Commission. In connection with this meeting, the Tokyo office of the 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung organized appointments for me with parlia-
mentarians and at the foreign and defense ministries. One of the topics 
was the possible consequences of an eastward enlargement of NATO 
on the security situation in East Asia. In September 1998, I flew to 
Asia again, this time to Beijing and Tokyo. At the talks in both capitals, 
there was concern about the possible consequences of the eastward en-
largement of NATO for East Asia. The greater concern, however, was 
the future foreign policy of Germany in case of a government coalition 
between the SPD and the Greens. 
To round out the picture: On May 12, 1997, Joschka Fischer and I 
went to our old favorite pub from the times of the 1968 student move-
ment, the “Club Voltaire” in Frankfurt. There, with moderate success, 
I defended the concept of an eastward enlargement of NATO. The vast 
majority of the Greens were still against it at that time. But it became 
clear: after the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy front lines be-
tween the parties in Germany had begun to change.
On July 8-9, 1997 at the Madrid NATO Summit, Alliance leaders 
invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the Alliance. 
On March 26, 1998, 554 of the 621 members in the Bundestag—in-
cluding almost all members of the CDU, FDP and SPD as well as a 
minority of the Greens—agreed to the entry of the three countries into 
NATO. Only 37 members voted against, and 30 abstained. By the time 
the three new members took their seats at NATO’s 50th anniversary 
summit in 1999, Germany’s new Chancellor, Social Democrat Gerhard 
Schröder, and Germany’s Green Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, 
welcomed them into the Alliance.  
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Chapter 12
Enlarging NATO: The Initial Clinton Years
Jenonne Walker
The end of the Cold War presented the West with obvious oppor-
tunities but also with a tangle of challenges and trade-offs that policy 
makers knew they could only imperfectly understand. Trying to deal 
sensibly with the dizzying pace of change sometimes seemed like paint-
ing a moving train. Top American diplomat Larry Eagleburger cap-
tured the times when he answered a question about whether he was 
guilty of nostalgia for the Cold War: “Hell, I’m nostalgic for last week.”
Western governments wanted to do all they could to help stabilize 
the independence of Central and East European states—former Soviet 
satellites and republics alike—and aid their transition to democracy and 
market economy. At the same time, they wanted to support democratic 
forces within Russia and build a constructive relationship between it 
and the West. Most Washington career officials, civilian and military, 
saw a possible conflict between these goals, but President Clinton never 
seemed to waver from his belief that he could do both. Western leaders 
also had to deal with question of NATO’s own role and relevance once 
the military threat to its members was believed to have disappeared, 
especially in light of its unwillingness to resist Serbian aggression in 
Bosnia. These issues, in turn, were related to the political and security 
role of the European Union, now presumably less in need of American 
military protection and apparently eager to take more responsibility 
for its own security—and what its evolution might mean for NATO, 
for good or ill.
All the former Soviet satellites, and several of its former republics, 
felt an urgent need to be firmly linked in some Western structure. Most 
looked first to the European Union, with its tight political links and the 
economic benefits of membership. As realization grew that EU mem-
bership would face tough conditions and take a long time, attention 
turned to NATO.
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Like good bureaucrats almost always almost everywhere when faced 
with hard issues, the first instinct in the West was delay. There were 
various reasons, some better than others. Much as we wished the coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe well, the old system had been com-
fortable for the West. Decades of planning and training and playing 
together had formed close bonds among civilian and military security 
officials across the Atlantic which were unlikely to be replicated, and 
could well be diluted, by the addition of those whose backgrounds and 
perspectives inevitably would be different. One senior American diplo-
mat bemoaned, “nothing will ever be the same” if NATO enlarged. As 
former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told a Washington con-
ference, “governments tend to go on doing what they know how to do 
well; that’s how they get into trouble.” But it also was clear that none of 
the Central or Eastern European states was yet ready for NATO or EU 
membership and that continuing changes in all of them made it hard to 
know which would be ready to become members, or when.
In addition to skillfully managing the unification of Germany with-
in NATO (a united Germany, untethered from multilateral structures, 
would have alarmed its neighbors to the west as well as east), the George 
H.W. Bush administration focused almost exclusively on supporting the 
transition to market economies—a key issue given the importance to 
democracy of economic health and a strong middle class. The Clinton 
administration continued those efforts and added more direct support 
to the underpinnings of democracy—non-governmental organizations, 
journalists, judicial and police reform, local governments. 
On NATO membership, senior working level officials in the Clin-
ton administration at first adopted the mantra of the Bush administra-
tion: it was “a question for the future, not now.” From the beginning, 
however, any paper sent to the President with those words would be 
returned with his left-handed scrawl in the margins: “why not now?” 
American support for Central and Eastern European integration into 
NATO and other Western structures, as broadly as possible and as soon 
as possible, was consistently driven from the top. 
The question was what “as possible” reasonably could mean. As 
Washington saw the NATO issue, it was not only which countries 
might join and when, but also how to help them prepare for member-
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ship and how to strengthen Western ties with those who could only 
join later, or maybe never.
The Defense Department was most wary, understandably so about 
taking on new commitments to defend countries in the midst of rapid 
change and unable at that time to contribute much or anything to their 
own defense or even to support NATO forces if necessary. However 
unlikely a military threat then seemed, military planners are paid to 
prepare for worst cases. Money also mattered. The cost of assimilating 
new NATO members could be substantial; whatever new funds Con-
gress might provide, some diversion of Defense Department resources 
was likely. Opinions within both the State Department and the NSC 
staff varied, and those of individuals changed along the way.
At the June 1993 NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Greece, Al-
lies agreed to a Washington proposal for a Summit in December 1993 
(later slipped to January 1994). I was then Senior Director for Europe 
on the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) staff and thus chaired se-
nior Interagency Groups for crises (Bosnia) and issues of equal concern 
to two or more Departments (NATO). As soon as we returned home 
from Greece, I convened an Interagency Group to prepare for the 
Summit. Other key members were the State Department’s Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Alexander Vershbow 
(later U.S. Ambassador at NATO and then to Russia); Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (soon to be Under Secretary) Walter 
Slocombe; and Chief of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Barry McCaffrey. Each of these was backed by an im-
pressive group of experts who contributed significantly. All participants 
also were deeply engaged in Bosnia, which in fact absorbed most of our 
time and attention. The same was true for the Principals Committee 
to which we reported: National Security Advisor Tony Lake; his Dep-
uty Sandy Berger; Secretary of State Warren Christopher; Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell; 
Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright; and Director of Central 
Intelligence James Woolsey.
All members of the Interagency Group agreed from the outset that 
the Summit Communique should take concrete new steps, not just 
affirm Allies’ devotion to NATO—and that Washington should have 
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proposals to that end when European allies returned in September 
from summer holiday.
NATO’s relations with its neighbors to the east topped the agenda. 
There already was a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), es-
tablished in 1991 during the George H. W. Bush Presidency, to which 
all European states—including Russia—sent representatives for con-
sultations with NATO’s North Atlantic Council on a range of issues. 
The State Department had a list of ideas for upgrading NACC, ranging 
from the mildly substantive to assigning its non-NATO members free 
parking places at Alliance headquarters. The NSC staff felt strongly 
that something more was needed—a recognizably significant departure 
rather than a grab-bag of small improvements to existing arrangements. 
At the Group’s initial meeting I laid out the bones of what became 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP), an idea that was elaborated by all. In-
deed it became apparent that American officials at NATO had been 
thinking along similar lines and their ideas were fed into the Washing-
ton process. NATO would invite all European states, again including 
Russia, to join the PfP and send permanent staffs not only to NATO 
headquarters outside Brussels but also to its military command at Mons, 
Belgium. Non-NATO PfP members would plan and exercise with 
NATO members for possible operations. There were to be no criteria 
for joining the PfP, but non-NATO members would share with NATO 
their plans for military and political reforms. (When I asked Sweden’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister how they would feel about the requirement 
to share Sweden’s plans to become a democracy, he smilingly said they 
understood its purpose and would be happy to comply.)
Washington knew that NATO had an “out of area” problem: to 
remain relevant after the Cold War it had to do more than continue 
preparing to repel a highly unlikely Russian attack on Western Eu-
rope. “Out of area or out of business,” the saying went. To address 
this problem John Shalikashvili, the American General who was then 
Supreme Commander of NATO’s military forces and soon to become 
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed creation of Com-
bined Joint Task Forces (CJTF): multinational, multi-service head-
quarters units which would plan and train to direct military operations 
beyond NATO’s geographic area. Non-NATO members of the PfP 
could participate. 
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Shalikashvili also proposed that the European Union—then acting 
as the Western European Union or however it chose to organize its 
security and defense cooperation—could use a CJTF or other NATO 
assets for operations in which NATO chose not to participate. NATO, 
including the United States, would have to approve the use of NATO 
assets, but after that the operation would be under EU/WEU control. 
(NATO of course does not “own” combat forces, which are under na-
tional control until and unless assigned to a specific NATO mission. 
NATO’s own assets at that time included, for example, an Airborne 
Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) and some logistics capabili-
ties such as a pipeline.)
This was an American proposal for the Summit, not a concession to 
the French or others as some have suggested. It was a dramatic depar-
ture for Washington, which for years had seen NATO as the key instru-
ment of its influence in Europe and viewed any other form of security 
cooperation as potentially a mortal rival. It was understandably contro-
versial. One senior American diplomat then posted in Europe sent a fax 
to his Washington peers saying all that remained was to “rename the 
Alliance OTAN” (the French acronym for NATO). 
I suspected that some in Washington hoped that making Europe-
an-only military operations dependent on NATO assets, and thus sub-
ject to U.S. veto, would curb European efforts to build truly separate 
arrangements; capabilities would be “separable but not separate.” But 
Bosnia had made Clinton Administration leaders, very much including 
Shalikashvili at NATO and Colin Powell speaking for the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, keenly aware that there could be situations calling for Western 
military engagement in which the United States would not want to 
participate—and that NATO would not act without significant U.S. 
involvement. Also, at that time of enthusiasm for European integration 
among West European governments and people, it was believed that 
acting to “build Europe” might gain more popular support for defense 
efforts than contributing to an American-led enterprise, thus strength-
ening NATO’s own “European pillar.” 
All this—creating the PfP and CJTFs, making NATO assets avail-
able for European Union missions—was agreed relatively easily at the 
senior working level. Two things slowed formal approval. One was the 
name. The working title had been Peacekeeping Partnership, until 
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the killing of 18 American soldiers in Somalia in October 1993 made 
“peacekeeping” a dirty word in Washington. There was a longish pause 
until a Pentagon official came up with “Partnership for Peace.” The 
other was more substantive. A newly-arrived senior political appointee 
in the Defense Department wanted to upend things and require each 
non-NATO country to apply for Partnership membership and its fit-
ness be judged by NATO. His bosses didn’t support him but thought 
he should be given a hearing by the Principals Committee. Both these 
issues should have been resolved quickly, but the Principals were meet-
ing almost daily on the Bosnian morass and it took time to get their 
attention. The delay added to suspicions, in Central Europe and else-
where, that Washington was stalling.
We saw the PfP and CJTFs as related to the question of NATO 
enlargement. Participating in them would help Central and Eastern 
European states learn to operate with NATO and could prepare at least 
some of them for membership. They could be in at the beginning of 
the CJTFs, rather than just signing on to longstanding NATO activity. 
Decision
With regard to NATO enlargement itself, all understood the strong 
commitment of the President, his National Security Advisor, and the 
Secretary of State. Some key political-level officials, notably Secretary 
of State Christopher and U.N. Ambassador Albright, initially wanted 
the NATO Summit at least to designate some Central and East Euro-
pean states associate members, or candidate members, or set a timeta-
ble for admitting new members—something more than just promising 
pie in a distant sky. All members of the Interagency Group were more 
cautious. While few if any voiced outright opposition to NATO en-
largement, some clearly wanted to delay it as long as possible. And even 
those more supportive (or at least resigned) believed that part of their 
job was ensuring that their political masters understood the possible 
pitfalls both of enlargement and of its careless handling.
The arguments for enlargement were understood by everyone. 
Whether or not Central and East European states faced a military 
threat, the confidence and therefore stability provided by NATO mem-
bership could underpin economic and political reforms, much as had 
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been done for West European countries in the Alliance’s early days. 
Membership could ingrain patterns of cooperation among peoples and 
governments previously wary of each other. It could promote key el-
ements of democracy like civilian control of the military and trans-
parency of military budgets. Finally, it would have been very hard for 
Western leaders to say that Luxembourg might need NATO’s military 
protection, but Poland never would.
A less admirable reason for some to push NATO enlargement was to 
distract attention from Washington’s unwillingness to oppose Serbian 
aggression in Bosnia. Enlargement was to make NATO seem vigor-
ous, on the move, despite its absence from Europe’s worst conflict in 
the Alliance’s history. The shadow of that war loomed over everything. 
One senior political-level official in the State Department even drafted 
a speech arguing explicitly the need to “enlarge NATO to save it,” but 
was dissuaded from being so blunt in public.
At the same time the Clinton Administration, from the President 
on down, was doing all it could, in big ways and small, to build a con-
structive relationship with a Russia which at that time seemed open to 
one. No one expected Moscow to like the idea that its former enemy 
would move closer to its borders and absorb some of its former satel-
lites and possibly even, in time, republics. No one could be sure how 
much NATO enlargement might damage Russia’s relations with the 
West or democratic forces within Russia. But all on the Interagency 
Group took the problem seriously. 
Some East Europeans also urged caution. The Ukrainian Foreign 
Minister told us that he knew his country would not be among the first 
new NATO members, but urged that it be given five years or so to 
entrench its independence before NATO took in other former com-
munist states.
We also had concerns about whether early NATO membership 
would necessarily be an unmitigated good for potential new members. 
Would it lead them to divert resources from building strong economies 
to unnecessary defense spending? While defense contractors did urge 
aspiring countries to do just that, NATO’s military leaders, including 
top American generals like Shalikashvili, toured the region telling them 
that big ticket items like supersonic fighter jets were not necessary and 
that less expensive things like NATO-compatible communications gear 
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were far more important. As one member of the U.S. delegation to 
NATO put it: “we care less whether they have their own supersonic 
jets than whether their airfields can refuel ours.” Another concern was 
whether, given the importance of democracy in NATO’s criteria for 
new members (see below), countries doing well, and so less in need of 
the stabilizing benefits of membership, would be admitted while those 
still struggling might be seen by their publics as having been rebuffed. 
(To their credit, countries not in the first batch of new members redou-
bled their efforts, with public understanding and support.)
If NATO were to designate associate or candidate members, how 
could it be sure which they should be? At the time of NATO’s January 
1994 Summit, Slovakia probably would have been included, but under 
Prime Minister Mečiar it soon experienced a period of political back-
sliding that kept it from being among the first new members.  
These and other considerations, such as the cost of assimilating new 
members, formed the bulk of a Pros/Cons paper the Interagency Group 
submitted to the Principals. The paper did not turn any of them against 
NATO enlargement. But it did persuade all that the January 1994 Sum-
mit should be only the beginning of a slower process than some, in 
Washington as well as in the Central and Eastern European countries 
themselves, had hoped. President Clinton’s Deputy National Security 
Advisor Berger remarked on the paper, “this shows that it (NATO en-
largement) is a lot more complicated than we thought.” Another mem-
ber of the Principals Committee noted, after reading the paper, that “it 
looks like this (a general commitment to NATO enlargement, without 
further details) is all we can do for now” (at the January 1994 Summit). 
With one exception, there was no disagreement among members 
of the Interagency Committee on what the pros and cons were and 
how to describe them, even though some struck different balances and 
so reached different conclusions. It was a remarkably congenial and 
cooperative effort. The exception was a newly appointed political ap-
pointee in the Pentagon who pressed me forcibly on the telephone to 
eliminate key “pros” for NATO enlargement. I refused and he dropped 
the matter.
On the issue of criteria for membership, there was easy agreement 
that democracy, market economies, respect for human rights and the 
sovereignty of others should come first and military factors put farther 
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down the list. Among the latter, civilian control and defense budget 
transparency were listed ahead of military capability and interopera-
bility with NATO. The Clinton Administration understood that the 
chief incentive for political and economic reform in the former com-
munist east would be the lure of European Union membership, but 
wanted NATO to contribute what it could. Its Summit proposals were 
designed to that end.
Washington bungled the rollout of its package. Final details of the 
PfP (its name, whether there would be conditionality) were decided 
just before a previously scheduled NATO Defense Ministers meet-
ing in December 1993. Secretary of State Christopher first briefed his 
opposite numbers by telephone, and then Secretary of Defense Aspin 
elaborated the proposal to his fellow Defense Ministers. Press accounts 
of the latter meeting gave the impression that PfP was a substitute for 
NATO membership rather a step toward it at least for some.
That suited most West European Allies just fine. While none object-
ed publicly to NATO enlargement in principle, few wanted to move as 
rapidly as President Clinton. Many in the public thought Germany was 
an exception, especially when its Defense Minister Rühe published an 
op-ed in a major American newspaper supporting rapid enlargement. 
But at the same time Chancellor Kohl was urging President Clinton to 
slow down lest he damage relations with Russia.
In the end, the January 1994 NATO Summit communique declared 
that the Alliance “expects and would welcome” expansion to “demo-
cratic states of the east” in an “evolutionary manner.” Allied briefings 
stressed that this could include Russia. While we were still in Brussels, 
I shared a television interview with Kenneth Adelman, a prominent Re-
publican security expert. When asked if I really believed Russia might 
ever join NATO, Adelman, luckily for me, jumped in with the perfect 
answer: “I don’t ever expect to see Russia in NATO, but I didn’t expect 
to see the Berlin Wall come down or the Soviet Union to disintegrate.” 
The Summit language meant different things to different people. 
To many it seemed a reiteration of the old “question for the future but 
not now” attitude. West Europeans allies went home comfortable that 
the issue had been settled for the foreseeable future. Russian security 
officials may have had a similar reaction; they voiced no objections to 
the Summit outcome when I joined Under Secretary of Defense Frank 
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Wisner in briefing them on the margins of President Clinton’s sub-
sequent meetings with President Yeltsin in Moscow. Strobe Talbott’s 
chapter in this book relates the far more important Clinton-Yeltsin dis-
cussions then taking place. Central and Eastern European states were 
understandably disappointed. But Madeleine Albright and General 
Shalikashvili had previewed our positions in pre-Summit visits, which 
helped soften the blow. More important was President Clinton’s affir-
mation, when he met Central European leaders in Prague immediately 
after the Summit, that enlargement was a question of when, not if. 
To dispel impressions that the NATO Summit language on enlarge-
ment had been just a place-holding temporizer, National Security Advi-
sor Lake directed that a study be launched on the when and how of en-
largement. He wanted to keep the issue out of America’s 1994 mid-term 
elections, but in the meantime to use the study to show commitment 
and momentum. Some West European allies felt they’d been misled.  
The View From Prague 
I was still on the NSC staff when Lake asked for the study, but I left 
in the summer of 1994 to prepare for a new post as U.S. Ambassador to 
the Czech Republic. From that vantage point I saw how one candidate 
country was preparing for NATO membership, and the role of the U.S. 
Embassy there.
On the whole the Czech course was quite smooth. NATO and EU 
membership were each enthusiastically supported by Czech leaders 
across the political spectrum and by the populace. The beginning of 
serious NATO air action in Bosnia on August 31, 1995 strengthened 
this feeling; the Czech Foreign Minister and other key figures told me 
excitedly “this shows that NATO still is relevant.” One exception was 
Prime Minister Klaus, who told me privately that NATO membership 
would be a waste of money, but acknowledged that he could not say so 
publicly or try to make opposition the position of his party or the Czech 
government.
The U.S. Embassy’s Defense Attaché arranged for Czech military 
and civilian defense officials to participate in a wide array of training 
programs on how to work with NATO, while both it and the Politi-
cal Section discussed parliamentary oversight with Czech legislators. 
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Washington wanted its ambassadors in Central Europe to promote 
NATO membership, but that was scarcely necessary in Prague. A small 
minority did see NATO as only a war-fighting body and claimed Wash-
ington should focus instead on conflict prevention. I spent quite a lot 
of time trying to ensure that Czechs understood what NATO was and 
was not, including the conflict-prevention importance of deterrence, 
and explaining the Clinton Administration’s support for the security 
roles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
Council of Europe, and especially the European Union. I also tried, 
with very limited success, to remind Czechs that they needed to pay 
attention to the West European parliaments that would have to ratify 
their NATO membership.
There were bumps in the road. A senior American general based in 
Europe came to town and told the press that the Czechs were failing in 
membership preparations, specifically because their defense budget was 
half that of Hungary and growing at half the pace. The opposite was 
true; he had his countries confused. I worried that his factual mistakes 
would have enabled Prime Minister Klaus to say we didn’t know what 
we were talking about when we urged the improvements the Czechs 
did need to make. At the other extreme, the other NATO ambassadors 
in Prague and I were concerned when General Shalikashvili visited and 
said publicly that the Czechs were “ready now” to join, or when Made-
leine Albright, by now Secretary of State, came to town and told them 
“welcome home.”
None of these incidents, however, seemed to affect Czech prepara-
tions. They had decided early to concentrate first on building one Rap-
id Response Brigade and on English language training. The head of the 
Czech Army told me proudly that he would be the last in his job who 
was not fluent in English. In late 1995 they eagerly joined enforcement 
of the Dayton accords in Bosnia, welcoming the chance to show that 
their military could operate with NATO.
More troublesome for the Embassy was the competition between 
two major American defense contractors, each trying to persuade the 
Czechs that U.S. Senate ratification of their NATO membership de-
pended on their buying its supersonic fighter airplane. Individuals in 
each company were eager to find evidence that the Embassy was favor-
ing the other. This became so extreme that when former U.S. Senator 
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Bob Dole came to town, I felt I could not join his meetings because one 
of his law partners represented one of the companies, and the other 
likely would have accused me of helping him sell its rival’s plane. Dole 
did not mention airplanes to the Czechs. Already a strong supporter 
of enlargement, he told me that he was visiting the candidate states so 
he could tell his former Senate colleagues that he had seen their fitness 
with his own eyes. Savvy about Washington, he understood and was 
gracious about my predicament. 
The Clinton Administration’s efforts to secure Senate ratification 
of NATO enlargement is covered in Jeremy Rosner’s chapter of this 
book. U.S. Embassy Prague’s participation was minimal. We arranged 
meetings for the steady stream (sometimes flood) of U.S. executive 
and legislative branch visitors to Prague (then the flavor of the month 
for Westerners). Czechs were less good at selling themselves (whether 
their military abilities, export goods, or cultural attractions) than Poles 
or Hungarians, but had solid progress to show and did so effectively to 
official American visitors. In February 1998, U.S. Ambassadors in the 
three candidate countries accompanied “our” Foreign Ministers when 
they traveled to Washington to make their case on Capitol Hill. In 
April of that year, the U.S. Senate ratified accession of the three to 
NATO.
Concluding Reflections 
Other chapters in this book and talks with some of the authors show 
how the NATO enlargement story illustrates two recurring aspects of 
U.S.—and probably other—foreign policy making.
The first is that even those who participate in the same discussions 
can come away with different understandings of the decisions, depend-
ing at least in part on what outcome they wanted. While those of us 
working in the White House understood that deciding the “how and 
when” of enlargement might be tough going, we believed the basic de-
cision to enlarge had been taken with the Summit language expecting 
and welcoming it. We saw that as the Summit’s prime accomplishment. 
In sharp contrast, senior American diplomats who had been key partici-
pants in pre-Summit deliberations thought the Summit decided on PfP 
as a substitute for enlargement.
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The second point is how little presidential decisions sometimes set-
tle. The U.S. Defense Department’s continued opposition to enlarge-
ment is well known, but it was not alone. It took a long time even to 
get the Enlargement Study underway. Implementation of other policies 
also was rocky. The ink was scarcely dry on the Summit decision that 
the EU could borrow and command a CJTF before NATO’s top mili-
tary commander (a U.S. general) began trying to ensure any operation 
using one would be under his ultimate command. Later, a new Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Europe began cautioning European diplo-
mats that EU security cooperation risked damaging transatlantic ties, 
although President Clinton had made no decision to change American 
support for it.
There is nothing new in this. Except on long-running, major crises 
requiring continued presidential/prime ministerial involvement in the 
details, heads of government in most countries, their foreign ministers 
and national security advisors, do their best thinking on an issue, make 
a decision, then necessarily move on to the next problem, unable to 
monitor implementation of what they think they have mandated. Har-
ry Truman was exaggerating but had a point when he said, as Eisen-
hower was about to assume the presidency: “Poor Ike. He’ll sit at this 
desk and say “do this, do that” and nothing will happen.” 
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Chapter 13
Redrawing the Maps:  
Rethinking Atlantic Security in the 1990s
John C. Kornblum
How best to focus Western security institutions has been a never-end-
ing task for Alliance nations since 1949. The Atlantic community in its 
present form emerged from widespread concern about the Soviet threat. 
Its reach expanded during the 1950s when NATO provided a founda-
tion for the first steps towards European integration. With this new 
task added, NATO emerged as the most important transatlantic link, 
whose importance surpassed the original focus on the Soviet Union. 
These mutually supporting goals defined the Atlantic community for 
forty years. This evolution was much on the mind of many European 
and American officials as the post-Cold War era began to unfold.
Ironically, NATO was originally a European project to keep the 
Americans engaged on the continent, while European unity was origi-
nally an American effort to disengage itself from a permanent presence 
on the continent. After the project for a European Defense Force failed 
in 1954, however, NATO assumed a more central role and the Ameri-
can umbrella became more permanent. 
NATO’s guarantee of European stability and democracy played a 
central role in support of the first steps towards European unity. Failing 
a common European defense structure, NATO was needed as a means 
of reassuring Europeans that Germany would not reassert its power 
against them. Embedding a rearmed Federal Republic within NATO 
was the best solution. Germany entered the Alliance in 1955.
Throughout this era, NATO also served increasingly as a bulwark 
against the reemergence of isolationist tendencies in the United States, 
such as the efforts by Montana Senator Mike Mansfield to pull Ameri-
can troops from Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. Continued Congres-
sional recommitment to NATO in the face of Donald Trump’s iso-
lationism is an important demonstration of how central the Alliance 
remains to maintaining Atlantic unity
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The Core of the Post-Cold War Debate
In short, the security debate in the 1990s was about much more than 
strategies for dealing with post-Soviet Russia. As a result of the dramat-
ic changes of the past thirty years, NATO’s post-Cold War role has in 
fact become even more complex. Defense against Russia has evolved 
into efforts to maintain both dialogue and deterrence in Russia and in 
the countries it borders, especially those in Central Europe who ulti-
mately have joined NATO. Germany is now a central member of the 
Atlantic community, but its firm anchor within NATO ensures that it 
will not be unsettled by instability emanating from Russia or elsewhere. 
And, as the current U.S. Administration demonstrates, isolationist ten-
dencies remain strong in America. Without NATO and the military se-
curity link, it is unlikely that the American commitment to an Atlantic 
partnership would continue.
Add to this NATO’s key role in “out of area” crisis such as the Bal-
kans and Afghanistan, and the fundamental strategic importance of 
NATO to both sides of the Atlantic becomes clear. 
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke focused the 
American position on these basics in a much-commented article in For-
eign Affairs in the Spring of 1995, in which he declared that as a conse-
quence of its Cold War engagement, American had become a European 
power. But even today, neither Americans nor Europeans have fully com-
prehended NATO’s role as a geopolitical fulcrum for the Atlantic world.
Since 1990 Europeans seem to have forgotten the fact that NATO 
is essential to progress in European integration. Especially after the 
debacle in the Balkans, EU leaders seriously misread their strategic sit-
uation. Rather than understanding the importance of maintaining the 
strategic link with Washington, they were convinced that European 
defense should be sought primarily through stronger European institu-
tions outside the Alliance. In so doing, they effectively removed NATO 
from their vision for a European future.
The low point occurred at the Berlin NATO Ministerial meeting in 
June, 1996, when French President Jacques Chirac, mostly for domes-
tic political reasons, torpedoed a plan to join the conventional capabili-
ties of Europe and the United States into an integrated structure within 
NATO. From that point on, Europe and America travelled in opposite 
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strategic directions. One result is that the American public, whether 
Democrat or Republican, is returning to more traditional American 
nativism and is becoming restive over what is seen as an inadequate 
European contribution to the common defense.
This growing transatlantic gap represents the most important threat 
to NATO’s future and thus to the security of the Atlantic Community. 
American demands for higher defense contributions, or more econom-
ic access or political support in third countries, were once tempered 
by the sense of mutual support embodied in Atlantic ties. No longer. 
Younger elites from both parties no longer have a sense of the strate-
gic dilemmas for American interests presented by the complexities of 
Europe. Now America decides on whatever goals seem to be attractive 
at the moment. This tendency towards “transactional diplomacy” was 
as active during the Obama administration as it is now under Trump. 
The Road to NATO Enlargement
The roots of the negative American reaction to European strategic 
reluctance could already been seen in the debate over NATO enlarge-
ment after 1990. In the United States, differences arose between those 
who might be called the geostrategic lobby, who argued that Europeans 
could take care of themselves, and that eliminating the danger of nucle-
ar war, if necessary over the heads of the European allies, was America’s 
main goal in a post-Cold War world.
This group focused more on military-security considerations than 
on NATO’s importance to solidifying civil society in Europe and the 
Atlantic world. They believed urgent defense needs required the West 
to focus primarily on building new sorts of security cooperation with 
our former foe, Russia, and above all not “threatening” Russia with an 
expansion of Western security structures. This group believed Ameri-
ca’s sole task in Europe had been to hold back or defeat Russia—noth-
ing more. 
Such thinking in fact harkened back to President Truman, who put it 
most directly as he signed the NATO treaty in 1949. The United States 
had no intention to remain a protecting power for Europe. We ex-
pected rapid moves towards unity and to the formation of a European 
Defense Force which would be an equal partner of the United States.
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Numerous well-known security experts, analysts of Russian behavior 
and those who wished to limit American foreign commitments argued 
strongly against any changes, including NATO enlargement, which 
could stoke new sorts of conflict with Russia.
Those who focused on civil society, on the other hand, argued that 
to flourish, the West should expand its vision beyond traditional mili-
tary security strategies and focus also on building a unified, democratic 
community of those who wished to be part of it, including of course 
Russia. They did not reject efforts at a new security dialogue with Rus-
sia, but argued that failure to build civil society in the newly liberated 
countries of the Warsaw Pact could undermine any progress made on 
military-security issues.
Countries just emerging from Communism needed protection that 
only membership in NATO (and the EU) could afford them. History 
would reassert itself and the road to unity would be difficult. The At-
lantic community had evolved into a partnership of democratic coun-
tries. An equally important Western goal should be to steady this part-
nership and help the countries of Eastern and Central Europe join the 
family of democratic nations.
This group argued that a strategy focused primarily building a 
new security arrangement with Russia, even if it had newly become 
non-Communist, would have been a bet against history. Democracy 
was our strongest suit. Modernizing and expanding our own institu-
tions was the only logical way of supporting democracy in Russia as 
well.
Practical political arguments also played a role. Large numbers of 
Americans traced their origins to Eastern and Central Europe. The 
West had not always stood up for the freedom of these countries during 
the Cold War. Both Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush felt a 
moral responsibility for these interests as well.
Thirty years later, these debates have been reignited by the many 
new challenges presented by aggressive Russian behavior. The debates 
have evolved into an even more fundamental rethinking of the goals 
and identity which should be defined for the West in a new age of glob-
al digital integration.
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Focus on building stability for the newly democratic nations has 
proven to be correct. But many new challenges such as technology, 
refugees, and above all national identity have overwhelmed many exist-
ing assumptions. New forms of conflict, such as cyber warfare, outside 
challenges such as terrorism and refuges and a general drop in aware-
ness of the importance of the Atlantic community require new impuls-
es, in particular where Russia is concerned.
The complexities are endless and right now we haven’t yet even de-
veloped a vocabulary to help us define what needs to be done. But we 
can be sure of one thing—modern civil society has been strengthened 
by extension of Western institutions into Central and Eastern Europe. 
This democratic foundation will remain the West’s most important ad-
vantage in dealing with competitive visions for the digital future from 
Russia and elsewhere.
How Enlargement Came About
Many persons and institutions played a role in defining a new strat-
egy in the 1990s. This is an account from the viewpoint of one whose 
professional role during the 1990s, as described below, touched on all 
of the issues involved. My task at the State Department, beginning in 
1994, was to implement what the President and others had decided—
which was the enlargement of NATO.
The critical phase which led to the decision to enlarge NATO in 
1997 was guided primarily from the Bureau of European Affairs in the 
State Department, where I was senior deputy and then Assistant Sec-
retary of State. The key State Department personality was Assistant 
Secretary Richard Holbrooke, who had a mandate from the President 
to make enlargement a reality. He often worked independently of other 
agencies, including the National Security Council.
Defining a Strategy
The foundation of the Holbrooke strategy was to fit NATO into a 
longer-term vision of the Atlantic, which included a permanent Ameri-
can presence, and in fact defined the United States as a European pow-
er. This was the philosophy which Holbrooke and we on his team had 
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grown up with, but as the following years would show, it was counter-
intuitive for much of the American political establishment.
We were aware, however, that regardless of the fundamental changes 
already imposed on the strategic map of Europe, much more was to 
come. Our goal was not to draw up a perfect strategy for the 1990s. 
Rather, we hoped that by strengthening and modifying existing insti-
tutions, we could provide a firm foundation for protecting Western in-
terests during the many upheavals ahead of us.
Nothing has turned out perfectly. Russia remains a disruptive force 
in Europe and the world. Western Europeans have essentially aban-
doned military security as a central task of their governments. But 
when we see the way in which Europe has unified into a democrat-
ic community, when we note the progress toward freedom in several 
former Soviet dependent states, we can be proud to register that the 
West’s ability to reorient and expand its goals and institutions nearly 
three decades ago represents one of the most successful diplomatic and 
political achievements of our era.
Background for the Debate
As the Soviet Union entered its final days, Western leaders were 
faced with several fundamental questions:
•	 How should we maintain military and political security? What 
changes were necessary and how far should they go? How should 
the role of institutions, especially NATO, be defined? I took part 
in many discussions of this issue at NATO headquarters after 1989 
and helped formulate the program set forth in the London Com-
munique in 1990, parts of which are quoted below. 
•	 What was the role of post-Soviet Russia? Which tools would best 
suit our needs in dealing with it? How could we best integrate this 
new Russia into the modern post-Cold War world? 
•	 And above all: How could our community of democratic Atlantic 
nations ensure that former Warsaw Pact countries, which had suf-
fered for decades under authoritarian rule, would not again threat-
en Western security by drifting into dictatorship and decay? This 
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point was stressed repeatedly by European Allies and by the nations 
of Central Europe themselves. 
The Question of Russia
Since much of postwar Atlantic and European cooperation was 
aimed at reducing a perceived threat from the Soviet Union Russia, 
decisions of how to deal with the post-Soviet Russian rump state were 
central to the process. Many of them remain controversial, and the 
current situation is in no way satisfactory. After an initial period of co-
operation in the very early 1990s, Russia has soon began to revert to a 
self-centered, hostile approach to its immediate neighbors and to the 
West. In response, the West has responded by reducing the level of 
cooperation and moved to sanctioning Russian behavior.
In particular, most recently Russia has even invaded neighboring 
countries and threatened to expand both conventional and nuclear ca-
pacity. Hence, much of the framework for future cooperation worked 
out with Russia in parallel with NATO enlargement has stopped func-
tioning, although many of the institutions are still intact.
Some blame Western behavior in the 1990s for today’s situation in 
Russia—some twenty years on. To me, that contention is ludicrous. 
Not building a security foundation for democracy in Europe would 
have been a concession which probably would have emboldened Russia 
to mix in the affairs of its weak neighbors. 
Not to have built this democratic community would have risked our 
security much more than any event in Russia could have done. Choos-
ing Russia over Europe would have been an historic blunder of epic 
proportions.
We need only imagine a situation in which Poland or Hungary were 
struggling to maintain a democratic system—something we are wit-
nessing in fact right now in 2019—while Russia taunted them from the 
sidelines. We need only ask if Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would have 
remained attack-free and independent without joining NATO and the 
EU. We need only to observe remind ourselves of Russia’s earliest pres-
sures on Georgia and Armenia, which much predated NATO enlarge-
ment, or its invasion of Ukraine virtually without pretext.
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And to be totally honest, we need only to recall the strong words of 
then German Defense Minister Volker Rühe in 1993 warning of the 
consequences of allowing Germany to sit alone on NATO’s eastern 
border.
Over the past fifteen years, new threats from Russia, such as cyber 
warfare and aggressive use of natural resources, have complicated the 
debate. None of them are related to NATO. Other new elements are 
is the growing strength and ambition of China (including its dealings 
with Russia as regards the Arctic Sea route and raw materials mining/
exploration) and its consequences for the global balance of power, ma-
jor instability in South Asia and the Middle East, and the security chal-
lenges created by massive movements of refugees into both Europe and 
the United States.
As a result, the original security equation for Russia and the inde-
pendent nations of the former Soviet Union has expanded significantly 
beyond its 1990s definition. Thirty years later, we are again at a major 
point of redefinition. Russia is now only one of many complex new 
challenges—albeit a significant factor of course.
As in the past, Russia’s power to disrupt is greater than its ability (or 
desire) to cooperate. As a participant in the 1990s exercise, I believe 
that we can be grateful that our institutions successfully met the chal-
lenge to change. But it is also clear that both the United States and Eu-
rope are now in the midst of a new era of fundamental upheavals which 
go far beyond question of military security in Europe.
New technologies are likely to change both the practice of diploma-
cy and the definition of security in fundamental ways. As in the past, 
the West is the leader of this new era, but success is far from certain. 
The transatlantic format of NATO, the EU and the OSCE, which we 
established in the 1990s, is more important than ever.
Western democracy continues to offer the best operating system for 
the new digital world. Initial arguments about expansion of Western 
institutions have in many ways been overtaken by events. Our focus on 
Russia must now be built into a much broader strategy which includes 
China, India and several other important/ pivotal regions of the world.
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Back to the Roots
My judgments on these issues were based to considerable extent on 
my good fortune of having taken part in the structural reordering from 
five vantage points:
•	 As U.S. Minister and Deputy Commandant of Forces in divided 
Berlin in the 1980s, I was able to watch the steady decline of East 
Germany and absorb the political consequences of what was hap-
pening. When German Defense Minister Volker Rühe warned that 
Germany could not be left on NATO’s eastern border, I recalled 
that President Reagan’s famous Brandenburg Gate speech had 
been aimed not at Gorbachev, but at Bonn. The goal was to stifle 
growing tendencies in the Federal Republic to favor a deal with 
Gorbachev, which would have cemented the division of Europe.
•	 I was Deputy U.S. Representative to NATO from 1987–1991. As 
such I directed the American role in negotiation of several import-
ant NATO positions, including the Conventional Forces in Europe 
negotiations, the CSCE Charter of Paris and the two declarations 
issued at meetings of NATO Foreign Ministers and at the Summit 
in 1990.
•	 I was Ambassador and head of the American delegation to the 
CSCE from 1991–1994. In this role, I chaired the American dele-
gation to the Helsinki review conference in 1992 and opened the 
first U.S. Mission to the CSCE in Vienna in that same year. I also 
played a major role in redefining the CSCE in Helsinki and in 
transforming it into the OSCE at the Budapest summit in 1994. 
My experience with what became the OSCE in 1994 went back to 
the drafting of the Helsinki Final Act in the mid-1970s. Over the 
years, I became a strong believer that more active use of the tools 
of civil society could play an important role in building security in 
Europe.
The Helsinki preparatory conference in 1992 was fascinating for an-
other reason. This gathering of senior officials (from all over Europe, 
America, Canada, including Russia and the other post-Soviet republics 
as well as Yugoslavia’s successor states) was the only existing relevant 
forum for discussion of the Balkan wars as they unfolded in 1992.We 
spent many dozens of hours discussing events and recommending pol-
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icy options for the international community. We notably welcomed 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Albania as new CSCE par-
ticipating states. In July of 1992, we suspended Serbia’s seat in reaction 
to its aggression in Bosnia.
•	 From 1994–1997 I was Principal Deputy and then Assistant Secre-
tary for European Affairs in the Department of State. In this role, 
my task was to implement strategies defined by the President and 
others. This included American strategy on important aspects of 
NATO enlargement and other institutional changes taking place 
during the 1990s. I personally negotiated several of the arrange-
ments, including the NATO-Russian Founding Act. In addition, I 
was deputy head of delegation to the Dayton Balkan negotiations 
and later American special envoy to the Balkans. I also authored 
much of NATO’s Berlin decision in 1996 which created a frame-
work for closer NATO-EU military cooperation.
•	 Finally, from 1997–2001 I was American Ambassador to Germany, 
in both Bonn and Berlin. In this function, I worked closely with 
the German government on Balkan issues, including refugees from 
Kosovo and NATO’s bombing of Serbia in 1999, and conducted a 
continuing dialogue with the new SPD/Green government (from 
1998). 
Having the advantage of viewing the world from these much differ-
ing perspectives led me to become a strong supporter of an integrated 
approach to security. This was the approach I adopted when I arrived 
in Washington in 1994. 
Eventful Years
NATO’s first official reaction to demise of the Warsaw Pact came at 
the Summit meeting held in London, July 5-6, 1990. Secretary General 
Manfred Wörner set the tone in his opening remarks: “The Cold War 
belongs to history. Our Alliance is moving from confrontation to coop-
eration. […] Never before has Europe had such a tangible opportunity 
to overcome the cycle of war and peace that has so bedeviled its past.”
The Summit Communique continued in the same spirit: 
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Our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help 
build the structures of a more united continent, supporting securi-
ty and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, 
the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Significantly, the London Communique did not foresee enlargement 
of the Alliance. It went only as far to extend a “hand of friendship” 
across the old East-West divide and proposed a new cooperative rela-
tionship with all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But the 
London Declaration and other statements of that era left no doubt that 
most Allies believed that NATO should evolve beyond its defensive 
role and put more stress on building a more far-reaching structure of 
peace. Despite the ensuing debate among various experts in Washing-
ton, by 1990 the die had already been cast. Article 2, the passage of the 
NATO Treaty which provided for consultation and support of freedom 
along all allies, was to many, the future of the Alliance. 
NATO sought to give substance to this concept with establishment 
of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) on December 20, 
1991. The NACC was explicitly created as a forum for dialogue and 
cooperation with NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries—not as a 
stepping stone for enlargement.
It was an irony of history that as the final communiqué of the in-
augural NACC meeting was being agreed, the Soviet ambassador an-
nounced that the Soviet Union had dissolved during the meeting and 
that he now only represented the Russian Federation. Multilateral po-
litical consultation and cooperation helped build confidence and paved 
the way for the launch of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, 
which established concrete programs of cooperation with non-NATO 
members, primarily in the East.
Interesting was the fact that at that January 1994 PfP summit, U.S. 
President Bill Clinton characterized the Partnership for Peace as a 
“track that will lead to NATO membership” and that “does not draw 
another line dividing Europe a few hundred miles to the east.”
While the issue of enlargement had not yet been addressed, these 
first reactions and NATO’s 1991 revised strategic concept began a re-
statement of NATO’s goals from that of a defense Alliance to an insti-
tution for dialogue and change.
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The 1991 document gave prominence to economic, social and en-
vironmental issues as a means of promoting stability and security in 
the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole. Dialogue and cooperation would be 
essential to managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance.
Parallel to the NATO transformation was a joint East-West effort 
to add new commitments to the Helsinki Process and to transform the 
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe into a more for-
mal organization.
The Charter of Paris, signed at a Summit of CSCE participating 
States in November, 1990 followed NATO’s example by reaffirming 
and deepening the original principles of the CSCE, establishing new 
mechanisms for consultation and cooperation and agreeing to work 
further in conjunction with a CSCE Summit scheduled to be held in 
Helsinki in 1992. 
I should stress that this was a thorough reordering of broader Eu-
ropean security cooperation. As head of the American delegation to 
this meeting, I spent six months in Helsinki preparing the program 
approved at the summit.
Our goal was to establish the CSCE as a functioning pan-European 
framework for day-to-day work on areas of possible tension. Both mil-
itary confrontations and human rights violations were areas the CSCE 
should tackle and were thereby included in our final report.
During the preparatory phase, we agreed a comprehensive reorga-
nization of the CSCE process and added substance to commitments 
made in Paris. The Document compiled in Helsinki remains the op-
erating manual for the OSCE. While recent confrontations, especially 
with Russia, have hindered some OSCE operations, it remains a key 
institution for human rights, civil society and conflict prevention in 
Europe. By 1992 it had evolved into a pan-Eurasian format that would 
ultimately include over fifty members.
Equally important was the debate surrounding the extension of Eu-
ropean Union membership to the countries of the former Warsaw Pact 
(especially after the Cold War neutrals Finland, Sweden and Austria 
had joined in 1995; and the GDR, as a special case, had effectively been 
absorbed into the West German state structures through unification in 
1990 and thereby automatically become part of the EC/EU).
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A consensus grew in support of using EU membership as a tool 
to push democratic development in these countries. With a current 
membership of 28, there is a wide feeling in the EU, that the promise 
of membership is still one of Europe’s most important foreign policy 
tools. EU enlargement was also an important element of our (Ameri-
can) comprehensive security strategy. NATO could provide the protec-
tion but not the political and economic foundation for a wider commu-
nity of democratic states.
Parallel to these events, the United States, both in official and private 
capacities, worked hard to promote establishment of the free market 
economies in the former Comecon countries, including Russia. Former 
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage played an important 
role during the George H.W. Bush Administration in supplying hu-
manitarian aid (and financial assistance, mostly via the IMF) to Russia.
But EU membership would be long-term goal, as the criteria of the 
acquis communautaire post-Maastricht posed significant hurdles for the 
transforming states that were undergoing serious electoral revolutions 
and economic shock therapy. Seeking stability and security Eastern Eu-
ropeans increasingly looked to NATO and the United States.
Movement Towards Enlargement
By early 1994 arguments in favor of NATO enlargement were grow-
ing in both Europe and the United States. Central European countries 
were especially vocal in their call for NATO membership. German De-
fense Minister Volker Rühe was an early supporter of an “open door 
policy,” noting that in a reunified Europe, Germany should not be left 
alone on NATO’s eastern border. But the United States government 
was far from unified on the strategy to be followed. 
The arrival of Richard Holbrooke as Assistant Secretary for Europe-
an Affairs in 1994 and the establishment of a separate Bureau for Russia 
and CIS affairs under Strobe Talbott in 1993 were important events. 
While the existence of two Bureaus did not survive beyond the Clinton 
Administration, it was useful at this critical point to have an indepen-
dent focus on Russia. I arrived in the European Bureau as principal 
deputy in early June of 1994, coming directly from the CSCE Mission 
in Vienna. 
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By this time, the outlines of a broader, integrated approach to Eu-
ropean security were becoming more evident. The fact was that events 
following the fall of the Soviet Union were so complicated and un-
manageable, that any policy had to be one both of planning and of 
improvisation.
As a first step, we quickly adopted this three-pronged approach 
based on the key institutions of NATO, the EU, and the CSCE/OSCE 
as our basic framework for defining a sense of direction for Atlantic and 
European security cooperation.
Hopes for a democratic belt around Russia and the idea that the 
West would work first on that were unrealistic. But working closely 
with Russia to help define and meet its needs was an important part of 
our strategy. President Clinton’s decisions to build close ties to Yeltsin 
have been criticized in various quarters. I strongly doubt, however, that 
without Clinton’s strong bond with Yeltsin that Russian acceptance of 
enlargement would have been possible at all.
Also important were the views of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Rühe’s argument that Germany should not be left isolated in the East 
was of considerable influence, as were the strong desires of the Viseg-
rád countries to find a home in the West. Germany was also crucial in 
sweetening the pill for Russia and for Yeltsin by financial means—and 
just like Bill cultivated his bond with Boris, Helmut Kohl worked his 
sauna friendship with the Russian also.
We should also not forget that the Balkan war was a major focus 
during all of this period. Our success in maintaining cooperation with 
Russia during the Balkan war and in using NATO as the foundation 
for the IFOR peacekeeping force added considerable credibility to a 
broader future role for NATO.
A final, important consideration was an assumption about the future, 
on which Richard Holbrooke and I agreed. Developments in Europe 
and with Russia would be unpredictable. A strong American role would 
be essential. But as events since 2000 have also demonstrated, isolation-
ism was a deeply held emotion in the United States and we could not be 
certain that a continued strong American engagement in Europe could 
take taken for granted.
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To us this meant that while the three existing security arrange-
ments—NATO, EU and the newly upgraded OSCE—should be 
strengthened, the real bastion would in American eyes be NATO. It 
has a deeply rooted credibility in the United States, not possessed by 
anyone or anything else. Observing the many U.S. Senators and Con-
gress members who demonstrably supported NATO at the 2019 Mu-
nich Security Conference more than proves the point.
We could at that time not foresee NATO’s important role in Af-
ghanistan or its stabilizing role in Central Europe, but generally these 
were the types of considerations we had in mind. If a new strategy were 
based on NATO, it would have a better chance of surviving, for exam-
ple, than one built on cooperating with Russia. Again, recent events, 
including a more isolationist American administration, have demon-
strated how important it will always be to keep American NATO mem-
bership functioning and up to date. 
The Foreign Affairs Article 
By the fall of 1994, Holbrooke had been given the task getting Amer-
ican preparations for enlargement going and to jump start the process 
in NATO. He turned in his usual superb performance. As a first step, 
the European Bureau prepared for Holbrooke’s signature an article lat-
er published in the Spring 1995 edition of Foreign Affairs, which set 
forth the overall concept for the first time in a public document. In the 
article, Holbrooke argued that forty years of postwar engagement had 
cemented America’s role as a European power. Neither the Europeans 
nor the United States could prosper if this American link were broken. 
The article set forth a building block approach to post-Cold War secu-
rity, based on NATO, the EU and the OSCE.
Holbrooke welcomed an expanded role for NATO, including new 
members, but suggested that “NATO, the European Union (EU), 
and the other major institutions of the West are not clubs that one 
joins simply by filling out membership applications. Over time, each 
has evolved values and obligations that must be accepted by each new 
member.” 
This sentence was carefully chosen. It was meant to pave the wave 
for organizing the American and NATO bureaucracies into a step-by-
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step NATO enlargement process, which could be managed and de-
fended with each forward step. First there would be consultations on 
the requirements of membership, then a judgment as to whether one or 
the other country was eligible and only then membership. And this is 
exactly the process which was followed. One country, Slovakia, actually 
did not meet the requirements and therefore did not join in the first 
group.
Getting the process started within the U.S. government was a differ-
ent story. As noted above, entrenched communities such as arms con-
trol, Soviet specialists etc. continued to be vocal in their rejection of 
any enlargement of NATO. They either argued that any lasting peace 
in Europe must include a Russian role, or that adding new members 
would stretch Alliance resource too thin. Much of the Pentagon, and 
especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were also known to be against en-
largement. Letters with many signatures were being sent to the news-
papers and the Administration rejecting enlargement.
Despite this opposition, President Clinton himself was already mak-
ing positive noises, including an important statement in Warsaw in July 
1994. NSC chief Tony Lake was strongly in favor. But the all-import-
ant inter-agency consensus among all relevant players in the U.S. gov-
ernment had not yet been constructed. That was our job. 
Gore Speech in Berlin 
As a first step, we came up with a high level, direct means of getting 
the process moving. On September 9, 1994 Allied and Russian troops 
were completing their departure from Berlin. Vice President Gore was 
scheduled to deliver a speech on the occasion. A torn knee prevented 
him from going to Berlin, but he delivered the speech by satellite.
The text, which I had drafted, contained many positive sentiments 
and also announced the founding of an American Academy in Berlin, 
which would substitute cultural exchange for American military pres-
ence.
Gore was a strong advocate of enlargement and reacted with humor 
when I suggested that the Defense Department might come beating at 
his door if he included the language on NATO. In the speech, the Vice 
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President talked about the need for NATO and other organizations to 
adapt adjust to the new situation in Europe or they would stagnate. He 
added: “Everyone knows that the economic and political organizations 
tailored for a divided continent must now adapt to new circumstanc-
es—including acceptance of new members—or be exposed as mere 
bastions of privilege…Beyond Partnership for Peace, and the NACC, 
several countries have already expressed a desire to become members of 
the Alliance. We shall begin our discussion on this important question 
this fall.”
This simple sentence, “We shall begin our discussion on this im-
portant question this fall,” masked considerable debate in Washing-
ton and in the Administration. The Pentagon, including Secretary of 
Defense Bill Perry, was especially skeptical. Armed with a Vice Presi-
dential statement signifying that a decision had been taken, Holbrooke 
skillfully pushed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take the lead in the “process 
of examination.” There was some pushback from the Defense Depart-
ment, but the White House backed up Holbrooke’s procedure. He was 
able to move the process forward. By December NATO Allies were 
also ready to move ahead. The Ministerial communique recorded the 
following agreement: 
We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement that would 
reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary 
process, taking into account political and security developments in 
the whole of Europe. Enlargement, when it comes, would be part 
of a broad European security architecture based on true coopera-
tion throughout the whole of Europe….
Accordingly, we have decided to initiate a process of examination 
inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the prin-
ciples to guide this process and the implications of membership. 
To that end, we have directed the Council in Permanent Session, 
with the advice of the Military Authorities, to begin an extensive 
study. This will include an examination of how the Partnership for 
Peace can contribute concretely to this process.
This examination was a serious one. Candidate countries were pre-
sented with catalogues of requirements and a list of individual imple-
menting agreements (STANAGs) they would be expected to fulfill. In-
side the U.S. Government, the State Department guided a complicated 
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process which consumed months of meetings. It would be more than 
two years before enlargement was settled. But after the Ministerial in 
December, 1994, there was little doubt that it would occur.
The other key was Russia. While perhaps not set down formally, it 
was generally accepted that the Alliance could not enlarge if Russia was 
opposed. President Clinton had been working on Yeltsin assiduously, 
but the Russians kept turning hot and cold. A very cold moment came 
in December 1994 at the OSCE Summit in Budapest when Yeltsin 
warned that NATO enlargement could lead to a “cold peace.” But 
Clinton agreed to attend Yeltsin’s celebration of the end of World War 
II in 1995 and held several other discussions which moved him forward.
Jim Collins, Strobe Talbott’s senior deputy, and I were given the task 
of designing agreements that would convince the Russians we were tak-
ing them seriously. The result was the NATO-Russia Founding Act 
and the NATO—Russia Partnership Council. We also agreed similar 
arrangements with Ukraine.
I took part in the closing negotiations in May, 1997 led by Secretary 
of State Madeline Albright. The details focused mostly on Russia’s de-
sire to ensure that NATO did not expand militarily up to its border. 
After several near break downs of the discussions, language was found 
and Russia agreed.
I had great hopes for these agreements, but they turned out to be 
less successful than expected. One reason in my view was that NATO 
Headquarters itself did not implement them, especially the Partnership 
Council, sufficiently. Many Russian complaints about Western behav-
ior after NATO enlargement are in my view not accurate, but this one 
is: Both the NATO staff and the member nations dropped the ball.
Our original idea had been that Russia would be treated as an hon-
ored partner. As has been reported elsewhere, both President Clinton 
and others offered the Russians the prospect of future membership in 
NATO. Yeltsin never took us up on the offer, and the Europeans reject-
ed it anyway. But the spirit was a positive one.
Unfortunately, the Russians were soon complaining, rightly in my 
view, that they sat almost as if they were in Court, being grilled by 
the allies. I myself took the opportunity a few years later to complain 
to then NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer about the lack of 
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respect offered the Russians in Brussels. After scowling at me for a few 
minutes, Scheffer said I was right.
Of course, other major events intervened. A year after NATO en-
largement was agreed, Russia suffered a near economic meltdown. 
Yeltsin was on the ropes, both politically and health wise and a new era 
was waiting in the wings. He chose Putin to make sure that his personal 
legacy would be honored. 
Whatever the intervening events, few would argue that the basic 
goal of the 1990s had been achieved: to strengthen and update existing 
institutions as a means of maintaining security and democracy in Eu-
rope.
Since then, the nations of Europe have evolved beyond all expec-
tations. Democracy is beginning to take hold in important parts of 
the former Soviet Union such as Georgia and Ukraine. The NATO 
of 2019 is a much different animal than the Alliance I knew in the late 
1980s. So are the European Union and the Organization on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Many are knocking on our door, asking 
for entry. No one is crying to join Russia.
We can now be proud of a democratic community of nations, num-
bering nearly 1 billion inhabitants, which stretches from the Finnish 
and Estonian borders in the Northeast to the tip of Alaska in the far 
West. This complex community is not totally unified and not perfect. 
But all of its members are guided by the democratic principles of mod-
ern civic society.
This to me in the most important result of our efforts nearly thirty 
years ago. In my mind, there is no doubt that without enlargement of 
NATO and the EU, this community would today not exist, and sev-
eral states in proximity to Russia would be hanging tenuously to their 
independence.  
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Chapter 14 
Toward NATO Enlargement:  
The Role of USNATO
Robert E. Hunter
The story of how NATO took in new members from Central Eu-
rope following the end of the Cold War has been told from many per-
spectives. This chapter looks at what happened from the perspective 
of the United States Mission to NATO (USNATO), which played a 
crucial role both in creating the architecture of the “new NATO” and 
in negotiating many of its elements, at times not only for the United 
States but also for NATO as a whole. This chapter is in part a personal 
account, relating to my own service at NATO as the U.S. Permanent 
Representative from July 11, 1993, to January 1, 1998—the most sig-
nificant period of NATO’s transformation in the post-Cold War era, 
building on what had already been done in the George H. W. Bush 
administration. 
This chapter will focus on those developments most relevant to 
NATO enlargement. That of necessity brings in many more factors. 
These include NATO’s role in ending the war in Bosnia, but this chap-
ter will only deal with Bosnia as it impacted on the Alliance’s overall 
transformation and the enlargement issue. 
By the time the first NATO enlargement was formally decided in 
July 1997, the work of transforming the Alliance to deal effectively with 
post-Cold War security challenges in Europe was essentially complet-
ed. The basic design of that era continues to be preeminent in today’s 
functioning of NATO. Since then, NATO has continued to adapt and 
to meet new demands, especially those which followed Russia’s seizure 
of Crimea in February 2014. Unfortunately, in my judgment, some 
decisions taken since 1997 affecting NATO have had adverse effects, 
not so much on NATO as an institution but on its ability effectively 
to meet European and transatlantic security requirements. Most im-
portant were ill-thought-out excessive further enlargements of NATO 
until it now numbers 30 Allies and, related to that, miscues in Western, 
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especially U.S., policies and actions toward the Russian Federation. 
Complemented by Russian actions, these essentially ruined the chanc-
es for creating a European security structure that might have avoided 
repetition of some of the historic errors that plagued Europe and inter-
national society in the past.
Creating a Grand Strategy for Europe
As a nation, Americans have almost never articulated a grand strat-
egy for the United States in the outside world and then taken steps to 
implement it—except occasionally at time of war. Usually grand strate-
gy comes into being the other way around: as a summary of individual 
goals, strategies, and actions which are seen in retrospect as coherent 
and comprehensive.
One major exception to this general rule was the peacetime ef-
fort to restructure European security following the end of the Cold 
War. The effort began not as a summary of individual elements but 
as a central proposition for the United States that was contained in a 
few short words: “to create a Europe whole and free”—to which a few 
more words, “and at peace,” were later added. They were contained in 
a speech by President George H. W. Bush in Mainz, Germany,1 five 
months before the Berlin Wall opened; but they provided the frame-
work for what followed, certainly in U.S. policy toward Europe and 
also for most European countries (plus Canada), at least west of Russia 
and Belarus. 
Thus, none of the steps to implement the Bush grand strategy, both 
during his administration and during much of Bill Clinton’s adminis-
traion, took place in a vacuum or reflected just experimentation. While 
the character of each individual policy and action was not predeter-
mined, each did evolve within the broader context of the Bush grand 
strategy and was judged, at least in the West, in terms of how it contrib-
uted to pursuit of that grand strategy, undertaken primarily by NATO 
and the European Union.2
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The Core Elements of the Grand Strategy 
As efforts to implement the Bush grand strategy moved forward, the 
key elements, in virtually all of which US mission at NATO played a 
central role, were as follows:
•	 Ratifying the United States’ engagement as a European power;
•	 Preserving key elements of NATO, including the integrated mili-
tary command structure;
•	 Confirming the end of the “German problem,” which had begun 
even before formation of the German Reich in 1871;
•	 Taking the Central European countries “off the geopolitical chess-
board,”3 and including them in Western and NATO institutions, as 
independent, democratic nations (NATO efforts were conducted 
in parallel with those of the European Union);
•	 Reaching out to Russia, seeking to involve it in wider European 
security and other institutions and practices without posing threats 
to its neighbors;
•	 Ensuring a special place for Ukraine as an independent country;
•	 Breaking down barriers between NATO and the European Union 
(including the Western European Union [WEU]);
•	 Acting, both on its own and with other institutions, to end conflict 
in Europe (Bosnia and later Kosovo) and to help keep the peace 
afterwards; and
•	 Undertaking ancillary efforts (in addition to ongoing NATO co-
operative practices), including shifting the primary orientation of 
post-reduction NATO militaries in Europe (especially those of the 
United States) from an easterly to a south-easterly direction and 
moving most USAF assets from north to south of the Alps; creating 
the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept as a key element 
of NATO peacekeeping; expanding NATO cooperation with the 
Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE/OSCE); and beginning the process of reinte-
grating France fully into NATO defense and military structures.
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Taken together, these steps were designed to follow the theory and 
practice of the creation of European security, writ large, in the late 
1940s, plus development of transatlantic relations: a combination of 
political, economic, strategic, and military relations, which also includ-
ed important roles for the private sector and what came to be known as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). In effect, these are organic, 
mutually supportive institutions and practices, within a core set of po-
litical commitments. They were designed precisely to play these roles. 
Before President Bill Clinton came to office, there had been prelim-
inary steps, including a U.S. decision to remain deeply committed to 
NATO, plus collective allied decisions to continue honoring the Treaty 
of Washington of April 4, 1949, as well as to preserve the Alliance’s 
institutions, notably the North Atlantic Council—where Allied deci-
sions are taken—and the integrated military command structure. The 
latter remains historically unique and is a basic element in the Alli-
ance’s being and, if need be, its ability to implement the Treaty’s Article 
5: the “Three Musketeers” provision of an all-for-one and one-for-all 
response to external aggression. The Alliance had also taken other pre-
liminary steps toward preserving, reforming, and restructuring the Al-
liance, for example creation of a North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) in December 1991 (the first meeting of which coincided with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union), “as a forum for dialogue and co-
operation with NATO’s former Warsaw Pact adversaries.”4 
NATO 1993: Still a Backwater 
In general, however, the NATO Alliance was essentially marking 
time in a new world without a major enemy (the Soviet Union) and 
thus without a central organizing principle. While the Alliance and its 
subordinate institutions were still ticking over, it was essentially in a 
holding pattern; there were even voices on both sides of the Atlantic 
(some of which still persist) calling for NATO to be abolished as out of 
date and no longer necessary or, at least, having no serious purpose to 
justify keeping it in being, except perhaps as a passive insurance policy 
in the event that Russia, in particular, would at some point in the future 
pose an active threat to the alliance or any of its members.
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That NATO as an institution was seen at senior levels in Wash-
ington as essentially a backwater was marked by the decision of the 
U.S. Permanent Representative (ambassador), Reginald Bartholomew, 
to leave that position in March 1993, after only 10 months, to become 
the lead U.S. negotiator on the Bosnia war, which, as the worst conflict 
in Europe since the Second World War, was on the radar.5 This led 
to my being offered NATO, as opposed to being U.S. ambassador to 
the European Communities, an appointment that was already in the 
works. NATO ambassador was certainly not seen as the plum job it 
later became.6 
My first step was to phone NATO Secretary-General Manfred 
Wörner, a friend from my days on the NSC staff in the Carter admin-
istration. “What can I do for you?” I asked. “Get me a summit,” he 
replied. So I worked to get that done. My second step was to ask to see 
the draft intervention to be given by Secretary of State Warren Chris-
topher at the forthcoming June NATO foreign ministers meeting in 
Athens, although I was not yet in the government. I believed this was 
particularly important because of Christopher’s first trip around Eu-
rope in February, when he asked the Allies what should be done about 
Bosnia rather than presenting Clinton Administration ideas. There was 
no sense of American leadership. This reminded me of Vice President 
Walter Mondale’s first trip to Europe soon after the 1977 inauguration: 
the same lack of U.S. leadership; the same failure of advisers to pro-
vide substance; the same failure with the Allies and thus their wonder-
ing about the strength of a new U.S. administration’s commitment to 
NATO and European security—as well as its competence.7 
The Athens ministerial draft, prepared by the State Department Of-
fice of European Affairs, in my judgment showed virtually no awareness 
of the massive changes taking place and the challenges that lay ahead. 
I wrote a totally new draft, laying out key themes, outlining some spe-
cific proposals, and demonstrating U.S. leadership. I took it directly to 
Stephen Oxman, the newly-installed Assistant Secretary for European 
and Canadian Affairs, who accepted it as the basis of what Christopher 
would say at Athens. Most of it survived the State Department bureau-
cracy. It helped to restore Christopher’s reputation with his colleagues. 
It laid out, within the overall grand strategy of a “Europe whole and 
free,” much of the basic framework for detailed U.S. initiatives during 
that crucial year in creating a new architecture for NATO and Europe-
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an security overall. It also began the process of demonstrating Ameri-
can leadership, a sine qua non throughout NATO’s history for Alliance 
success. Notably, however, it did not occur to me to include one idea 
that became important: that NATO should take in new members! But 
Christopher did raise the subject: in his intervention at the foreign min-
isters’ meeting, he said that “…at an appropriate time we may choose 
to enlarge NATO membership. But that is not now on the agenda.”8
Starting Out in Brussels
This was background to my arrival in Brussels on Sunday, July 11, 
1993 and a meeting of the North Atlantic Council the following day to 
begin planning for the summit, “penciled in” for the following January 
in Brussels, for which I had gained agreement in Washington. I met 
with my able mission team that afternoon to game out our approach 
for Monday’s meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the “NAC,” to 
start summit planning and for which I had written most of my formal 
Washington instructions.
What follows is an account of what was done to meet the needs of 
European security, writ large, and of transatlantic relations, from the 
perspective of efforts at NATO and with a special focus on USNATO. 
To begin with, it will focus in detail on the period through the Janu-
ary 1994 Brussels summit, by which time most of the elements of the 
new architecture for European security—as I called it from that time 
forward—had been formulated, though many details and implemen-
tation took considerable time and efforts in Washington, other allied 
capitals, and at NATO to get done. As I noted later, the fact that it took 
nearly six years from the start of the NATO restructuring process until 
the first three Central European countries were welcomed as alliance 
members testified to all the other things that had to be done to increase 
the chances that enlargement would strengthen rather than weaken 
NATO and keep open possibilities for accommodation with Russia on 
European security matters.
As these efforts and roles developed, I believe it represented a vir-
tually-unique engagement by U.S. officials based abroad in the Wash-
ington interagency process. Beyond doubt is that, while direct contacts 
between Washington and foreign capitals were important, as well as 
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ministerial and summit meetings, most of the practical negotiations re-
garding NATO’s future were conducted in Brussels. Simple math will 
indicate that this would be difficult to carry out on an iterative basis 
from Washington—how to get each of the United States’ 14 European 
allies plus Canada to reach agreement on a round robin basis. 
Many times, of course, only a handful of Allies would count—most 
often the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—
with the others trusting their decisions, but at the extreme when all had 
to be involved, as often happens around the negotiating table at either 
the ambassadorial (NAC) or subordinate level, the number of iterations 
from a distance would be staggering. Great complexity was involved 
even when ambassadors came instructed, if they were to have to com-
promise to get agreement (consensus) in the NAC.9 With the necessary 
give and take, often a compromise would be reached that then got sent 
back to capitals ad referendum, on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Most often 
each capital, including Washington, would “take it.” With the leader-
ship of USNATO at Alliance headquarters on most issues and being, 
as the United States, the “800-pound gorilla,” U.S. positions regularly 
(but not always!) prevailed.10
For my fifteen colleagues on the Council, plus the Secretary General 
and other NATO officials, the important thing was not that “Hunter” 
had arrived, but that the United States would again be represented by 
an ambassador after a gap of four months (despite the abilities of the 
chargé, Alexander Vershbow, who later succeeded me as ambassador in 
January 1998). Having the United States represented at the level of am-
bassador was a touchstone for the allies of U.S. commitment and pur-
pose. It was also useful for this individual to be a political appointee, as 
had prevailed with only a few exceptions until Foreign Service Officer 
Reginald Bartholomew, as opposed to being a member of the Foreign 
Service. The notion was that a political appointee would more read-
ily have access if need be to the U.S. president than someone whose 
onward career would be determined within the State Department. It 
also didn’t hurt that I had been working on NATO issues for 30 years. 
Further, I had in the past worked closely with the new Secretary of De-
fense, Les Aspin, a matter of consequence at NATO, given the nature 
of the work and the fact that NATO is the only post where the U.S. 
ambassador has unfettered access to the Secretary of Defense (who also 
has his own representative in Europe, under the ambassador’s authori-
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ty) as well as the Secretary of State.11 That relationship, which ensures 
that the NATO ambassador will in effect be part of the interagency 
process back in Washington, proved invaluable, as did my working re-
lationship with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), 
Gen. John Shalikashvili, who soon became chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff.12 Indeed, in this early period, many of the ideas for NATO’s 
future were worked out primarily between my mission and the Defense 
Department, then accepted within the interagency process.13
Throughout my first two years at NATO, Bosnia was a major is-
sue for NATO, although it tended to be dealt with only episodically, 
generally when the Bosnian Serbs had attacked one of the cities that 
had been designated as “safe areas,” from which heavy weapons were 
excluded and which were supposed to be places where civilians could be 
safe from the conflict. But since Bosnia did not figure prominently in 
the restructuring of NATO until mid-1995, this account will not delve 
deeply into that subject.
Partnership for Peace
While the persistent challenge of the Bosnia war was always in the 
background at NATO-Brussels, far greater attention was paid to prepa-
rations for the forthcoming NATO summit and the accompanying 
demonstration of renewed U.S. leadership, which had fallen from its 
high-water mark of the remarkable diplomacy that had been so critical 
in the soft landing of the Cold War, the opening of possibilities with 
Russia in the wake of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and the unification 
of Germany. These Bush administration achievements (many by the 
president himself) made possible what we in the Clinton Administra-
tion were then able to do. Indeed, the continuity involved highlights 
one of the most critical aspects of U.S. engagement in NATO since the 
early days after its creation: U.S. domestic political and public support 
has always been bipartisan. There have often been disagreements on 
the details, but never on the basic U.S. commitment to NATO. For 
U.S. ambassadors to NATO, this has always been a godsend; I found 
that particularly so during my tenure when the U.S. Senate was con-
trolled for the first year-and-a-half by the Democrats and the last three 
years by the Republicans.
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A key moment came in early September, when the Internation-
al Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) held its annual conference in 
Brussels. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was invited to speak and he 
planned to arrive with a full Defense Department team. Key was the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy, Joe Kru-
zel, a remarkable public servant who tragically died on Mt. Igman in 
Bosnia in August 1995. He and I planned the visit by Aspin to Brussels 
and I offered to convene a seminar at my ambassadorial residence, Tru-
man Hall. Joe and I organized it around a morning session that would 
include a number of the leading strategic thinkers from the ranks of the 
IISS conference attendees, following by a lunch with Secretary Gener-
al Wörner, and then an afternoon just with U.S. government officials, 
who, in addition to key members of my staff, were primarily from the 
civilian and military sides of the Defense Department, plus key U.S. 
commanders in Europe. 
As we planned the agenda, Kruzel and I, working closely with Gen. 
Shalikashvili and also with the State Department and NSC staff,14 fo-
cused on what became a central factor both in architecture for post-
Cold War European security and for the forthcoming NATO summit. 
We devised an approach that would embrace within NATO’s purview 
those Central European and other countries that had emerged from 
the wreckage of the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union, and then also the 
Former Yugoslavia. But at the same time this would be without NATO 
inviting any of them to join the Alliance, with the critical Article 5 
guarantees and membership in allied military commands and command 
structure. We sought to thread several needles: in particular to give 
these countries, which had just emerged from communist governments 
and Soviet control, a sense of engagement in the West and especially 
with NATO, but at the same time without weakening NATO’s military 
capabilities (notably Allied Command Europe) and sense of common 
commitment (Article 5 of the Washington Treaty). Indeed, the Penta-
gon’s Joint Staff and SHAPE were strongly opposed to the enlargement 
of NATO. Concern about weakening NATO militarily was in addition 
to the added burdens of having potentially to defend more countries, 
especially when they would not have the requisite national military ca-
pacities and infrastructure to make such defense feasible. 
Around the table that afternoon on September 11th came agreement 
among the key U.S. government security officials to finalize a concept 
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based mostly on the Kruzel-Shalikashvili-Hunter initiative, which 
came to be called Partnership for Peace (PfP).15 It would not include 
roles for non-NATO countries in the “high end” of military activi-
ties, with full integration in NATO commands and military activities, 
but rather at the “low end” of peacekeeping. The most important tool 
in implementing this concept would be for military personnel from 
NATO allies to work with the militaries of what came to be known as 
“partner” countries. These could include all countries that were mem-
bers of CSCE, then 52 in number, stretching all the way through to 
Central Asia.16 
As we at USNATO then took the lead (with SHAPE) in elaborating 
PfP, it developed several principal aspects. Working with Kruzel and 
his colleagues at the Defense Department, along with the State Depart-
ment and the NSC staff, PfP was embedded in the NACC and then, at 
the 1997 Madrid summit, in a successor organization which came to be 
called the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council (EAPC): essential differ-
ences being that the latter also permitted the inclusion of the European 
neutral and non-aligned countries, plus enhanced involvement for all 
members in NATO activities. As I told key officials of the Swedish and 
Finnish governments when they joined PfP, with their capabilities they 
would be on the “teaching rather than the student staff” for other part-
ner countries.17 
PfP focused on the military institutions of the countries that joined, 
with the understanding that, with their existing structures, they 
could in most cases play a significant role in the democratization of 
these countries, while at the same time being reformed, trained, and 
equipped to play roles in peacekeeping, in league with NATO allied 
peacekeeping elements, as well as for potential use by the United Na-
tions.18 While the United States played the leading role in sending 
uniformed personnel to work with national militaries, many of the 
other allies also took part.19
As Kruzel, General Shalikashvili’s people, and my team and I devel-
oped the PfP concept, along with SHAPE/EUCOM20 and some input 
from State and the NSC, we decided on three functions for it to per-
form, in addition to being a lead element in democratization and confi-
dence-building to underpin economic development:21
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•	 It helped to prepare partner militaries to undertake peacekeeping 
missions, while also giving them access to NATO standards and 
command practices (plus use of English, the NATO military lan-
guage) that are essential for the militaries of different countries to 
work together;
•	 It helped prepare partner countries to become ready for NATO 
membership; and
•	 For those countries that would not join NATO—either by their 
own choice or because NATO would not invite them to join—it 
would give them an enduring form of security just by having this 
engagement with NATO. I termed this kind of arrangement their 
being within the penumbra of NATO security, even without the Ar-
ticle 5 commitment. My reasoning was simple: that if a non-mem-
ber of NATO were subjected to external aggression, the alliance 
might anyway decide to respond militarily (or in other ways) even 
without Article 5, as happened with U.S. responses against North 
Korean aggression (1950) and Iraqi aggression (1990). This then 
might have a quasi-deterrent effect or at least would reduce the 
chances of miscalculation by a potential aggressor.22
In retrospect, PfP has proved to be one of NATO’s most successful 
ventures and an essential precursor to enlargement.
NATO, the European Union, and France
Long before being appointed U.S. ambassador to NATO, I had been 
concerned about virtually non-existent relations between NATO and 
what became the European Union. Indeed, I regularly said that these 
were “two institutions living in the same city (Brussels) on different 
planets!” That practice of institutional pride and division—which also, 
of course, represented the differences in membership and of structure 
and purpose—seemed to me to violate the principle that security had 
to be a combination of political, economic, strategic, and military ac-
tivities. This was especially so following the end of the Cold War, when 
it was necessary to create new bases for European security and the po-
litical and economic development of countries that had emerged from 
communism and, in fact, in some cases had become truly independent 
for the first time in decades. 
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From the U.S. perspective, however, shared in particular by Britain, 
with its sense of special relationship with Washington and ambivalence 
toward “Europe,” there was also worry that the Western European 
Union could compete with NATO and lead to a weakening of alliance 
capabilities, political as well as military. The State Department in the 
Bush administration had been assiduous in trying to limit the writ and 
activities of WEU.
I judged otherwise even before I went to Brussels. During the Cold 
War, the United States did not want WEU (or any other institution 
or arrangement) to get in the way of NATO and of U.S. strategic 
leadership because of the need for central direction of confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, that argument 
fell to the ground. I saw virtue in the EU having both a more effective 
foreign policy and defense component. I argued that if an effective 
WEU would lead European members to spend more on defense and 
to build more useful capabilities than they would do just for NATO, 
that was a net plus. In any event, as I argued and has proved true, if 
there is ever a disagreement between NATO and WEU as to which 
would have primacy, NATO, the “big kid on the block,” would always 
prevail; further, if European security were at risk from external ag-
gression—i.e., a resurgent Russia—only the United States could be 
effective: that means NATO. My reasoning did not convince some 
State Department people who continued to fret, wrongly, that WEU 
(and its successors) would steal NATO’s thunder and U.S. primacy in 
the transatlantic relationship.
I had also long been interested to see whether France could be rein-
tegrated in NATO’s military command structure. Again, with the Cold 
War over and thus any incentive in Paris to gain flexibility in dealing 
with Moscow,23 that incentive had gone away. Further, during Opera-
tion Desert Storm (Kuwait/Iraq) in 1991, the French military realized 
that being outside of NATO military institutions for so long had led 
it to miss much military modernization. Thus, it had to put its forces 
under U.S. command. I saw an opportunity for NATO here.
When the French ambassador to NATO, Jacques Blot, invited me 
to lunch early in my tenure, I suggested that he and I explore a possi-
ble deal: that I would work to get the U.S. government to back off on 
its opposition to a strong WEU if Blot would work to move France 
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in the direction of rejoining NATO’s integrated command structure. 
We agreed and sold the basic concept to our respective governments. 
This led in 1995-96 to complex negotiations between NATO and the 
WEU24 that created a useful and viable relationship between the two 
institutions.25 Fortunately, I was able to prevail with Washington that 
U.S. relations with the WEU would be run out of USNATO rather 
than out of the U.S. mission to the European Union. On my initiative 
and with Washington’s approval, I also organized France’s return to the 
NATO Military Committee and International Military Staff, necessary 
first steps toward its full reintegration in NATO’s military structures 
in 2009. 
Resolving this issue also helped with enlargement, as it increased the 
chances of cooperation/coordination between NATO and the Euro-
pean Union, both as they extended informal mechanisms into Central 
Europe (PfP and its EU analogues), and parallel processes of taking in 
new members.26
Travemünde
As the Alliance was preparing for the January 1994 Brussels summit, 
key was a set of U.S. proposals in October, part deriving from initiatives 
at the USNATO mission and part originating in Washington, more at 
the Defense Department and the NSC than at the State Department. 
Following interagency agreement, they were deployed with Allies by 
both Christopher and Aspin. The former presented the ideas in a ca-
ble to U.S. ambassadors for Allied leaders; much more attention-get-
ting was a unique event at NATO to that point, an informal meeting 
of defense ministers, without all the ceremony and circumstance that 
tended to circumscribe the semi-annual regular meetings. German De-
fense Minister Volker Rühe offered to host, and the meeting was held 
in Travemünde, not coincidentally in Rühe’s part of the country.27 With 
all the allies to be gathered in one room at ministerial level, attention 
naturally focused on Travemünde and Secretary Aspin, rather than on 
Secretary Christopher’s cable.28
This was clearly foreseen as the moment when the United States 
would need to show that it would be both able and willing to lead at 
NATO, especially for the transformation that the alliance would have 
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to undergo in order to remain relevant. Already, there were widespread 
calls for its dissolution, including on Capitol Hill, and questioning 
whether it could have relevance in the absence of a central organizing 
principle, as the Soviet Union had been. I argued that NATO’s prin-
cipal objective was to create confidence in stability—a relatively low-cost 
but certainly high-value insurance policy. If a major measure of this 
stability could be achieved—with its heavy dose of psychology—that 
would enable people to get on with their lives, which I have long ar-
gued should be the end of international politics.
Because of the importance of the forthcoming meeting, Manfred 
Wörner agreed to visit Washington and discuss the key issues with 
President Clinton. This would also help to lock in the political signif-
icance of other developments for NATO and gain U.S. blessing at the 
highest level.29 Clinton’s main message was that despite talk about the 
possibility of NATO soon taking in new members, the United States 
could not at this time support that course. He deployed some of the 
arguments advanced by the Pentagon, such as had led to the compro-
mise in creating Partnership for Peace. Notably, however, it had been 
decided in the interagency process that at some point enlargement 
would happen.30
On the day of the Travemünde meeting, I sat with Aspin on the 
helicopter from Hamburg Airport and went through his final briefing 
book.31 The talking points included an announcement that the United 
States was abandoning its commitment to use airpower in Bosnia, thus 
also no longer supporting a NATO role in stopping the war. I told 
Aspin that, if he made that statement, he might as well forget the other 
U.S. proposals: any hope for U.S. leadership and a positive response by 
Allies would be dead. Aspin read the talking points, then said: “You’re 
right. I won’t do that.” 
At the start of the defense ministers’ meeting there was a forest of 
glum faces, until Aspin laid out the U.S. proposals, from the small 
(Combined Joint Task Forces—CJTF, as a means for making NATO 
peacekeeping effective) to the large (NATO peacekeeping itself, Part-
nership for Peace, and support for the WEU in the form of a European 
Security and Defense Identity).32 The mood shifted instantly: here was 
proof positive that the United States was taking NATO seriously and 
was reasserting its traditional and indispensable role as leader. There 
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was rapid agreement on the entire U.S. agenda for the Brussels summit. 
Enthusiasm was so great that one additional idea that Aspin had only 
laid down in passing—that NATO should at some point involve itself 
in limiting proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic 
missiles—was seized upon by his colleagues and added to the summit 
agenda. All these proposals and the sense that the United States “was 
back” offset concerns that the defense ministers had little to say about 
the war in Bosnia. Indeed, Travemünde was probably the most import-
ant moment for NATO, at least in the Clinton Administration, except 
for 1) decisions that led directly to the NATO airstrike campaign in 
Bosnia in August-September 1995 that ended the war; and 2) decisions 
taken in 1997 regarding NATO enlargement and relations with Russia 
and Ukraine.
The 1994 Brussels Summit 
Still, the Brussels summit on January 10-11, 1994, was not an an-
ticlimax. But the fact that Travemünde (and Secretary Christopher’s 
parallel presentation of the U.S. proposals to his European and Cana-
dian colleagues) had done so much to show American leadership and 
set forth a coherent approach to the future of European security meant 
that the summit itself did not require as much heavy lifting at the level 
of heads of state and government that is often true at NATO. 
In his remarks at the summit meeting, Clinton moved the ball for-
ward on the possibility of NATO enlargement, in line with a public 
speech he had made the day before in Brussels,33 when he said about 
Partnership for Peace: “…[it] will advance a process of evolution for 
NATO’s formal enlargement. It looks to the day when NATO will take 
on new members who assume the Alliance’s full responsibilities.” Also, 
the summit declaration did “reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to 
the membership of other European countries”—though at that point 
that did not connote any decision or haste to arrive at one. However, 
Clinton advanced U.S. thinking in almost-decisive fashion in Prague 
immediately afterwards. In a press conference with Visegrád leaders,34 
he said: “While the Partnership is not NATO membership, neither is 
it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire NATO dialog so 
that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new 
members but when and how.”35 Notably, however, many subsequent 
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statements by different officials of the US government, some recently 
declassified, indicate that the U.S. position on enlargement was not al-
ways consistent and was often open to different interpretations.36 This 
was to cause considerable difficulties down the road and, in some ways 
it still does.37
After Brussels: The Role of USNATO—Major Themes
Following the Brussels summit, work began in earnest to build 
on basic architecture for the future of European security. USNATO, 
which had played a major role in creating that architecture, was in the 
thick of things. We focused not just on dealing with other parties in 
Brussels, SHAPE, and the other NATO commands,38 which collective-
ly make up the NATO organism and are a major source of its strength. 
We also had to play a role with Washington, which included reporting 
what was going on in Brussels, making recommendations, and receiv-
ing instructions on what to do; we also often played an informal role in 
the Washington interagency process, even though 3800 miles and six 
time-zones distant.39
The last-named was possible in part because represented at the mis-
sion were elements from the Departments of State and Defense (civil-
ian and military), acting on a fully-integrated basis, and because of the 
many differences of view and priorities within the Washington bureau-
cracy. I realized we had to balance a series of differing U.S. perspec-
tives, or trade-offs, and if we didn’t do it at USNATO, often nobody 
else could. In addition to NATO-WEU relations, the most significant 
of these issues were: 
•	 Preserving the effectiveness of NATO military operations (and de-
cision-making) versus deeper involvement of partner countries;
•	 Keeping NATO small or expanding it, with the attendant issues of 
decision-making (consensus principle) and taking on added bur-
dens, including potentially under Article 5; and
•	 Giving priority to aspirations of Central European countries 
(membership) or trying to avoid excluding Russia and, by so doing, 
potentially leading to a new Cold War.40
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I saw my special responsibility to keep the strength of the Alliance, 
Central Europe, and Russia all in view and, regarding Washington bu-
reaucratic struggles, to help prevent overemphasis on any one perspec-
tive to the detriment of the others, thus to damage U.S. and Western 
interests.41
In the process, I always shared with all the key people at USNATO 
everything that I knew, especially when I returned from trips to Wash-
ington—something of a rarity in the “knowledge-is-power” part of the 
U.S. government,42 at least on the civilian side. Two benefits result-
ed: first, after thoroughly discussing issues with senior members of my 
team, State and Defense, civilian and military, and my making a deci-
sion, people in the Washington bureaucracy who had lost the battle of 
our recommendations would phone their counterparts at the mission, 
only to be told that they had had a fair shot and would honor my deci-
sion. Second, we never had a leak from the mission. That comes from 
showing trust and confidence in one’s colleagues.
Partners’ Adaptation
The first of the three central problems—preserving NATO’s mili-
tary effectiveness—was easiest to deal with, at least in helping the mil-
itaries of non-NATO PfP members adapt to NATO methodology and 
create military capabilities able to function with NATO. But how could 
they play a role in taking decisions on peacekeeping operations, given 
that they would be putting their troops at risk? The solution was to 
invite non-ally troop-contributing nations to join in decision-making 
meetings, but not to give them a veto on decisions (they could always 
elect not to take part). The Pentagon and Allied militaries were par-
ticularly sensitive on this point, especially in cases where a NATO ally 
wanted to include in a peacekeeping operation a neighbor from Central 
Europe that was not up to speed.
It was also widely recognized that NATO could only do part of the 
job: the European Union also had a major role to play in the adaptation 
and modernization of Central European countries, with as much inte-
gration with NATO’s efforts as possible; and at USNATO we supported 
the relevant EU political and economic programs. In my judgment and 
that of some of my team, what the Central Europeans really needed, 
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in addition to PfP, was not NATO membership (at the time there was 
no palpable threat) but close association with the EU and other pro-
grams for economic development. Universally, the Central European 
governments did not see it that way, and they had a major point. With 
their histories in the Second World War and the Cold War, strategic 
guarantees were uppermost. Indeed, given a choice between having a 
U.S. security guarantee without NATO and membership in a NATO 
where the United States did not give a guarantee, they would all choose 
the former. This was understandable because of the psychological value 
of a security guarantee for getting on with economic and other devel-
opments; whereas the opposite, membership in the EU, might not pro-
duce a serious security guarantee and uncertainties would continue.43
Enlargement
The second problem, relating to NATO enlargement, was far more 
difficult. Soon after the Brussels summit, when the full import of de-
cisions had become evident—that is, PfP now, membership later and 
perhaps not at all—almost all Central European states expressed deep 
reservations about PfP, especially fearing that “later” would indeed 
mean “never.” There were also people in the Washington bureaucracy 
who were more anxious to take in new members than to see them be 
effective allies, militarily or otherwise. For some, that included a be-
lief that, the Soviet Union/Russia not posing a threat, NATO could be 
converted into a form of CSCE, indeed “NATO-lite.” That view was 
stoutly resisted by U.S. and Allied militaries and by us at USNATO.
Even for Central European states which understood they had to be 
able to pull their weight before becoming NATO allies, there was re-
luctance to put great effort into PfP without a guarantee that mem-
bership would follow. I set myself the task of working closely with 
representatives of these states at NATO and impressing on them the 
need to develop capabilities that would make them ready to be allies. 
I held regular meetings with them at Truman Hall, the ambassador’s 
residence. On the first such occasion, I made the following statement: 
“Pay close attention. Anyone here representing a country that would 
like at some point to join NATO, you need to take PfP very seriously: 
repeat, very seriously.” The message was not particularly welcome but 
it was understood. The same was true of a more graphic way I put it: 
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“NATO will only take in new members who are producers and not 
just consumers of security.” The message began to get across. Thus, a 
year later the Latvian foreign minister told me that his country would 
not want to join NATO if thereby the Alliance would become weak-
er.44 Several countries did indeed work hard at PfP, including in NATO 
peacekeeping exercises, the first of which, with partner militaries, was 
held at Poznan, Poland.45
I also delivered another clear message: that NATO membership 
would be closed to any country that chose to pursue ambitions or his-
torical grievances against another state or ethnic group in Europe. The 
dead past had to bury its dead.46 Given the number of grievances that 
had festered for so many years and in some cases decades or even cen-
turies, this was a critical injunction. It was in general swallowed as the 
price of getting into NATO. 
At the same time, Central European aspirants were worried that 
NATO and in particular the United States might give Russia a chance 
to block their entry, given the desire not to drive it away from the West. 
Thus, we made clear that no outside power—meaning Russia without 
naming it—would have any influence on NATO enlargement. I sum-
marized that as NATO’s allowing Russia (or any other outside country) 
“a voice but not a veto” on developments within the alliance.
I further advanced the ideas, though in retrospect this might have 
been a vain hope (this may be debated forever), that the overall ar-
chitecture of European security and efforts to implement it—with a 
respected role for Russia—might be able to move European security 
beyond centuries’ old concepts: the balance of power and spheres of in-
fluence. This ambition was consistent with George H. W. Bush’s con-
cept of a Europe whole and free. Obviously, it didn’t work; but I remain 
unconvinced that it was given “the old college try”—by either side!
As the various processes developed, NATO also created Member-
ship Acton Plans47 for each aspirant country, to underscore the need 
for preparation to undertake full allied responsibilities. At the end of 
1994, NATO also decided to conduct an Enlargement Study, related to 
preparing countries to join. As I wrote in NATO Review:
Allied agreement to take in new members is a fact; debate now 
centres solely on the means. This year, the 16 Allies are delving 
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into questions of the how and the why of formal NATO expansion. 
They know they must answer these critical questions before they 
can either logically or beneficially proceed to the next level of de-
cision: the who and the when of taking in new members. 
The NATO enlargement study has two major, declared purposes. 
One is for the Allies to gain a clear knowledge of how NATO will 
function once it expands its membership—put simply, what they 
must do to ensure that a larger NATO will be the same strong 
defensive military alliance it is today. The other major purpose is 
to show prospective members precisely what they can expect as 
Allies—both their rights and their duties within the Alliance. 
The study also has an unspoken purpose—to build confidence 
among the 16 Allies that, when they do decide on the who and the 
when of expanded membership, each of their several parliaments 
will give a strong and positive assent—and will mean it.48
However, despite the efforts underway to get aspirants ready to be 
allies in terms of military and other capabilities, and despite all the 
talk about criteria for membership, none of that really mattered, even 
though a country that was progressing in terms of capabilities would be 
easier to defend and would be demonstrating seriousness of purpose. In 
fact, there was and is only one criterion for NATO membership: that 
all of the existing NATO Allies are prepared to honor Article 5 of the 
Washington Treaty if the new entrant suffers external aggression. If so, 
membership is possible; if not, membership would be folly. Full stop.49 
Russia
The third major problem of perspective and trade-offs led to the 
most intense disagreements in Washington: how to balance extension 
of NATO’s formal writ into Central Europe with the desire not to drive 
Russia away or give it cause to believe that it was being taken advan-
tage in its weak condition or was being “disrespected.” There were two 
camps in Washington, each with strong views. The camp that was more 
concerned with bringing Central European countries into NATO had 
the advantage of President Clinton’s support which I judged, rightly or 
wrongly, had a lot to do with domestic politics. Indeed, it always ap-
peared to me that he was more concerned with domestic than foreign 
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policy issues—a choice that a number of presidents make. For instance, 
on a visit to the Oval Office with Secretary General Willy Claes, Clin-
ton did an excellent job in discussing NATO issues. After 15 minutes, 
the White House Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta, tapped on his clipboard 
to bring the meeting to an end. I signaled to Claes, who started to 
get up but then asked Clinton: “How is the economy, Mr. President?” 
Clinton promptly sat back down. It was as though he had received a 
huge injection of adrenalin. For the next half hour, he expatiated vig-
orously on the U.S. economy: at that moment, I understood where his 
heart really lay. 
Notably, the only foreign policy speech Clinton gave in his 1996 
reelection campaign was in Detroit on October 22, following a cam-
paign stop in Hamtramck, a town surrounded by Detroit and heavily 
populated by people of Central European nativity or ancestry. Clinton 
said that “By 1999, NATO’s 50th anniversary and 10 years after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, the first group of countries we invite to join should 
be full fledged members of NATO.”50
He also tried to thread a needle by reaching out to Russia: “NATO 
will promote greater stability in Europe and Russia will be among the 
beneficiaries. Indeed, Russia has the best chance in history to help to 
build that peaceful and undivided Europe, and to be an equal and re-
spected and successful partner in that sort of future.” It was an im-
portant effort and, even today, it is not possible to judge whether it 
might have worked or was doomed to fail: whether reemergence of 
great-power politics, based on competition if not also confrontation, 
was inevitable or not.
Even as the United States and key Allies were attempting to turn an 
historical page with Russia and the conduct of international relations, 
Russian leaders remained skeptical. This included Boris Yeltsin, who 
was president throughout the key period. 
It was obvious to us at USNATO that the two camps in Washing-
ton—Central Europe-heavy and Russia-heavy—would have a difficult 
time in pursuing both objectives; indeed, discussions, even in the White 
House Situation Room, sometimes became acrimonious.51 
In Brussels, meanwhile, my team and I detected early-on that the 
Russian leadership was skeptical even of PfP: they could read as well 
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as anyone else that one theme for PfP was as a precursor for NATO 
enlargement. But who would be included and how fast it would hap-
pen was obviously as opaque in Moscow as it was in Washington and 
elsewhere in the Alliance. There was also some skepticism about PfP 
in the U.S. government, including the U.S. ambassador in Moscow. As 
a result, I got the NAC to propose a mission to Moscow at the begin-
ning of March 1994 to explain what PfP was and what it wasn’t, both 
to try convincing the Russians that it was in their interest to join (thus, 
of course, giving them a hearing and respect by NATO), and to get 
the U.S. ambassador on board!52 The sheer fact of the visit was a plus: 
while we were not paying court to Russia, we were showing that it was 
not just being shunted aside in what (PfP) was to that point the leading 
edge of NATO reform. 
After a good deal of nurturing, Russia did indeed join PfP in June 
1994, when Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev visited NATO. Moscow 
also sent officers to take part in a military Partnership Coordination 
Cell (PCC) at SHAPE.53 The alternative, of course, was that it would 
be self-isolating and, among other things, would have no influence at 
all on the NATO enlargement process. 
I worked in particular with Vitaly Churkin,54 in 1994 Russia’s new 
ambassador to Belgium, who, after PfP accession, also represented it 
at NATO, to explore possibilities for NATO cooperation with Rus-
sia. When he arrived, he was “full of beans,” but soon realized that he 
would have to mind his manners to be taken seriously: the days of the 
Soviet Union were over, and he had to be civil even to representatives 
at NATO from the three Baltic states, carefully-chosen individuals who 
knew how to take care of themselves and their nations’ interests. As 
part of my relationship with Churkin, designed to show that Russia 
could have a productive role with NATO, I was able to get a positive 
response from Washington to Churkin’s request that Russia be allowed 
to bid on equipment contracts for Soviet-era aircraft (e. g., MiG-29s) 
that still dominated air forces of former Warsaw Pact states.
The person in the U.S. government who led the “Russia-firsters” 
and worked hardest to forge a productive relationship with Russia was 
Strobe Talbott, senior State Department person on Russian matters 
and from 1994 onward Deputy Secretary of State. Despite his seniority 
in the government, however, plus a close personal relationship with 
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Clinton, he faced intense opposition from the “Central Europe-first-
ers.” One of my jobs, even though on the other side of the Atlantic, was 
to try to find common ground, as well as to help reconcile the military 
side of the Pentagon to NATO expansion, through emphasis on aspi-
rants’ undertaking needed reforms.
The NATO-Russian relationship even progressed to the point that 
Moscow was prepared to conclude an Individual Partnership Pro-
gramme (within PfP), as well as a paper on “NATO-Russia Relations 
Beyond PfP.” This was to be done at the Alliance’s foreign ministerial 
meetings on December 1, 1994. But in the interim, the enlargement 
camp in Washington had been reinforced by a new Assistant Secretary 
of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Richard Holbrooke, who 
was deeply committed to bringing in new members as fast as possible, 
come what may and without concern for other matters then in play. 
His efforts on enlargement at times were well out in front of the tol-
erance of a number of Allies, as I heard from them in Brussels; they 
also went beyond what the Pentagon and some allied military leaders 
believed was the time needed to develop the partners’ capabilities to 
the point of adding to allied security rather than detracting from it, 
i.e. becoming producers and not just consumers of security. The bu-
reaucratic balance in Washington among different NATO goals was 
thus upset. Further, in mid-November Holbrooke was quoted publicly 
as saying that NATO would soon take in new members. Allies were 
disconcerted. His comments also struck a nerve with Yeltsin, who had 
already developed concerns about what he thought he saw developing 
with enlargement and that, I later learned, he had expressed directly to 
President Clinton.55 
Thus, when Foreign Minister Kozyrev arrived at the NATO minis-
terial, he was—he told us—pulled back by an angry Yeltsin and instruct-
ed to deliver in closed ministerial session a strongly-worded rejection 
of the Individual Partnership Programme, plus blistering comments 
about enlargement. Afterwards, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kin-
kel publicly rebuked Holbrooke. “Satisfied, Dick?” he asked.
The Russian reaction happened despite NATO’s carefully nuanced 
ministerial statement on enlargement, which could hardly have been 
less specific or forward-leaning, out of deference not directly to Russia 
but to some skittish allies:
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We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement that would 
reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary 
process, taking into account political and security developments in 
the whole of Europe. Enlargement, when it comes, would be part 
of a broad European security architecture based on true cooper-
ation throughout the whole of Europe. It would threaten no one 
and would enhance stability and security for all of Europe. The 
enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the 
European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, con-
tributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new 
democracies in the East.56
In the NATO drafting sessions, every word had been haggled over 
and every one counted. The first sentence of 34 words, buttressed by 
the next two, was the most carefully-crafted and heavily-compromised 
NATO statement of any during my four-and-a-half years as ambassa-
dor. Given the U.S. desire to get the alliance fully on record for en-
largement and to create a basis for launching the Enlargement Study, 
while also not going beyond the tolerances of several NATO allies 
(wary either of new security responsibilities or of driving Russia away), 
my team and I earned our keep in this drafting exercise. Nevertheless, 
President Yeltsin was not mollified.57
There was even worse to come in striking a balance between Russia 
and Central Europe: a week later at a Budapest summit meeting of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (at that meeting it 
was renamed as an Organization rather than a Conference, i.e. OSCE), 
Yeltsin laid into President Clinton:58 “Why are you sowing the seeds of 
mistrust?...Europe is in danger of plunging into a cold peace…History 
demonstrates that it is a dangerous illusion to suppose that the destinies 
of continents and of the world community in general can somehow be 
managed from one single capital.”59
It took considerable time and effort, with Talbott in the lead in deal-
ing directly with the Russians, aided by individual NATO allies, to put 
this particular genie as much as possible back in the bottle. That never 
totally succeeded.
A big moment to test possibilities in NATO-Russian relations came 
at the time of NATO’s air campaign in August-September 1995, when 
the Alliance finally received approval to conduct a sustained air cam-
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paign, which ended the war in 18 days. This was pursuant to a U.N. 
Security Council resolution which, for reasons of its own, Russia did 
not veto (neither did China), despite historic Russian ties to Serbia and 
their common Orthodox Christianity.60 
Following the Dayton Accords, when NATO created an Implemen-
tation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia, the Russian military indicated a desire 
to be part of it: not to be left out of this most important venture in the 
center of Europe. To the Pentagon and us at USNATO, that seemed an 
ideal opportunity to work directly with the Russians within the frame-
work of a NATO-led peacekeeping operation. But how to achieve it? 
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry invited the Russian defense minister, 
General Pavel Grachev, to meet in Brussels. In a session in my office 
at USNATO, the deal was struck, but there was a problem: Russia was 
not willing to put its troops under the command of NATO, the former 
enemy, while, from NATO’s perspective, there could be no troops in 
IFOR that were not under a common command. 
SACEUR, Gen. George Joulwan, came to the rescue. He recalled 
that U.S. and Soviet forces had met on the Elbe River at the end of 
World War II, and that this was the first time since then that Russian 
and American forces had had a chance to work together. He accepted 
that the Russians could not be under NATO command, but how about 
U.S. command? That would show that Russia was being treated more-
or-less on the same plane as the United States. Grachev immediately 
accepted the idea, even though representatives of the Russian foreign 
ministry in the room tried to stop him.61 
Arrows on charts Joulwan displayed thus showed the proposed  chain 
of command. Russian troops would report to the U.S. European Com-
mand (EUCOM) rather than to NATO. The key element: SACEUR, 
the NATO commander, was the same person—General Joulwan—as 
the commander of U.S. Forces in Europe! Respect would be shown by 
the superpower, the Russians would have a  major role, and they would 
not be under NATO. The Russians then sent highly-qualified troops 
to Bosnia, and Russians and Americans worked closely together, on dif-
ferent occasions rescuing one another from misbehaving Bosnian Serb 
soldiers. This was a high-water mark in Russia-NATO relations, even 
though achieved through a transparent sleight-of-hand.
322 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
Bosnia
Throughout the months in which NATO was being reorganized to 
deal with the key issues of European security—implementing the ar-
chitecture, as I had dubbed it—Bosnia came in and out of prominence 
at NATO Headquarters, almost never “in” except when the Bosnia 
Serbs committed a military outrage, especially against one of the safe 
areas. But each time (a total of 8 decisions in the NAC), the alliance 
advanced its commitments, but to no overall effect until the very last 
set of decisions, following the horrific Bosnian Serb slaughter of more 
than 7,000 Muslim civilians at Srebrenica in July 1995.
However, much more than Srebrenica was involved in the change of 
views by some key Allies62 on the use of NATO airpower. Since Trave-
münde in October 1993, NATO had been significantly transformed to 
meet post-Cold War challenges. By the summer of 1995, almost all the 
pieces were moving into place, including the prospect of enlargement. 
Only one key element—Russia—was still not clearly on track. There 
was widespread satisfaction at NATO Headquarters about its major 
achievements as a job well done. I also discovered that, when other 
ambassadors at NATO talked about its new architecture and practical 
steps, all said more-or-less the same thing as was in my script. I had 
made sure that all of them could claim a share in bringing about the 
new NATO: it was a corporate achievement. 
Bosnia, however, stood in the way of unalloyed celebration. The 
challenge was clear. As RAND’s Steve Larrabee put it, “How can you 
be so proud of what you have done when you can’t even stop the war in 
Bosnia?”63 This crystallized the issue: along with the triggering event 
at Srebrenica, there was realization that little of what NATO was doing 
for European security with its transformation could have political vali-
dation unless NATO (finally) acted in Bosnia.
Foreign ministers of key Allies met in London on July 21 and is-
sued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs.64 The baton then passed to us 
at USNATO to codify with the NAC what became the last of the air 
strike decisions. The special NAC on July 25 that authorized bombing 
if triggered by impermissible Bosnian Serb military actions was one of 
the longest on record and stretched far into the night. It was successful 
in issuing a warning to the Bosnia Serbs, who ignored it and conducted 
further military actions against safe areas.65
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The NATO bombing campaign, Operation Deliberate Force, start-
ed on August 30.66 At NATO headquarters, there was a major shift of 
mood: finally, the Alliance was acting. There was an almost universal 
sense of accomplishment, even on the part of people from countries 
that had been most reluctant for NATO to act. 
The mood was short-lived, however. Late that night, I was phoned 
by the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. Ambassador Hol-
brooke, by then chief Bosnia negotiator, was demanding a bombing 
pause so he could go to Belgrade and get Slobodan Milošević to end 
Bosnian Serb military action. I couldn’t believe it; the chances of its 
working so soon after the bombing had started were absurd. And, once 
stopped, could we get the bombing started again?67 
I woke up Secretary General Claes and relayed the request from 
Washington. He, too, was furious. Further, Holbrooke had asked that 
the call for a pause come not from him but from Claes! A good soldier, 
Claes agreed to do so. 
In the morning, the Allies soberly absorbed the news but had to 
comply. Thus, Holbrooke went to Belgrade and, as we had predicted, 
came away empty-handed. Then there was a problem: how to get the 
bombing restarted. I proposed a method to Claes that, as Secretary 
General, he would declare that the original NATO decision was still 
in force and that the technical pause could be automatically ended. In 
other words, a new NAC decision would have to be taken to turn off 
the renewed bombing, and that would be subject to a veto (mine!). The 
NAC met and there was no objection.
Sixteen more days of air attacks and the war was over. Left was the 
wrapping-up in the Dayton Accords, which many of us at NATO saw 
as having the virtue of bringing the conflict to a formal conclusion, but 
also allowing Milošević to gain at the bargaining table much of what he 
and his Bosnia Serb proxies had lost in battle.
1997: On to the End Game
The rebuilding of NATO in all dimensions then continued apace 
into 1997, to be crowned by a summit. To accommodate the Secretary 
General, Javier Solana,68 it was agreed to hold it in Madrid. Only one 
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key element was missing: a way to include Russia in some way and 
not exclude it, keeping the door open to cooperation but not letting 
Moscow affect NATO decisions, especially enlargement. This led to 
proposals for a NATO agreement with Russia, setting out principles 
and specific areas for cooperation, while also steering clear of any hint 
that this would give Moscow a way to side-track other NATO efforts.
Unique among the steps toward remaking NATO, diplomacy with 
Russia was developed and orchestrated from Washington, led by Strobe 
Talbott, with little input from NATO-Brussels, other than formally. 
The fiction of full Allied involvement was preserved but the reality was 
Washington-Russia, although with a role for Solana as front man and 
me as the Alliance conduit with Washington. Thus, when the NAC 
had considered all the issues in the proposed NATO-Russia agreement, 
Solana said he would take all the ideas, ponder them over the weekend, 
and propose his own draft for the NAC on Monday. Over the weekend, 
the State Department produced its own consolidated draft for negoti-
ations with Russia and cabled it to me. What Solana then tabled with 
the NAC was therefore, in fact, “made in Washington” and, with his 
imprimatur, was approved unchanged by the Council.69 
Solana then took the lead in formal negotiations with the Russians 
on behalf of NATO. But, to be sure he kept on track, the United States 
quietly held his hand.70 The result was agreement on a NATO-Rus-
sia Founding Act, a remarkable document in terms of possibilities for 
cooperation.71 In addition to general principles to govern the rela-
tionship, the Founding Act listed 19 areas for practical cooperation. It 
also sought to resolve some difficulties the Russians had with NATO’s 
potential military involvement in Central Europe. It was clearly un-
acceptable, both to the United States and to allies, for Russia to have 
a role in determining NATO policies. Yet the need was recognized 
to relieve some legitimate Russian security concerns about NATO’s 
moving eastward.
As a result, at U.S. prompting, the NAC unilaterally agreed on two 
self-abnegating provisions, which were then imported into the Found-
ing Act, untouched by Russian hands. In brief, these were:
• The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no inten-
tion, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the 
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territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of 
NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not foresee 
any future need to do so….72
• NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security 
environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence 
and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, 
integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by ad-
ditional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.73
As ever, there was some caviling in the NAC over the final agree-
ment. Most came from the French. I suggested a work-around: that 
NATO propose that the summit-level signing of the Founding Act take 
place in Paris (at the Élysée Palace). All French objections instantly dis-
appeared, and President Jacques Chirac hosted this prestigious event.
We still had a problem regarding architecture. Ukraine was in an 
anomalous position. It was clear to everyone (including the Ukrainians 
at that time) that it could not aspire to join NATO, certainly under 
prevailing conditions and perhaps never. Also, opinion in Ukraine was 
deeply divided. It was also necessary to reassure Russia that NATO 
membership would not extend that far but without at the same time 
leaving Ukraine in limbo.
The answer was to negotiate a special arrangement for Ukraine with 
NATO. The Secretary General delegated the task to us at USNATO 
and, working with Washington, my team negotiated with the Ukraini-
ans. Final provisions were worked out between me and the Ukrainian 
representative to NATO, Ambassador Borys Tarasyuk, who later be-
came Ukraine’s foreign minister. The result, signed on July 9 at the 
Madrid NATO Summit, was a Charter on a Distinctive Partnership 
between NATO and Ukraine.74 Like the NATO-Russia Founding Act, 
it included general principles designed to reassure Ukraine and a list of 
areas for practical cooperation. It also provided for “NATO-Ukraine 
meetings at the level of the North Atlantic Council at intervals to be 
mutually agreed…” a Ukrainian military mission at NATO, and NAC 
meetings “with Ukraine as the NATO-Ukraine Commission, as a rule 
not less than twice a year.”75 The Commission was thus created at the 
Madrid summit.76
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Whom to Invite to Join NATO
The final significant matter was which countries to invite to join 
NATO. This was done at a foreign ministers’ conference in Sintra, 
Portugal, on May 29-30, 1997.77 At USNATO, we provided Washing-
ton with our best assessment of the thinking of key allies, notably Ger-
many, the UK, and France. From the beginning of the process, Germa-
ny had been concerned to surround itself with NATO, as well as with 
the European Union. That meant Poland and the Czech Republic as 
the minimum and could also include Hungary and Slovakia, the other 
two from the so-called Visegrad Group, named for the Hungarian city 
where leaders of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungry came together 
in February 1991.78 Slovakia, however, had been scratched from the list 
because its prime minister, Vladimír Mečiar, was judged to be less than 
committed to democracy.
Britain’s objective, we at USNATO determined, was to have as little 
enlargement as possible, in order primarily to keep from weakening 
NATO, both militarily and in its ability to take decisions. Its list, there-
fore, included all four Visegrad countries plus Slovenia, but then with 
a “hard stop:” an end to further NATO enlargement. For its part, we 
learned, France wanted Poland and the Czech Republic (the “surround 
Germany” factor), plus Romania.79 
Thus, only five Central European aspirants were in play: the Viseg-
rad three, Slovenia, and Romania. Obviously, the decision whether to 
admit a country was the United States to make, since its strategic com-
mitment to new allies was most critical. Secretary of State Albright’s 
comment was simple: “We believe in a small number; that number is 
three; so, we support Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.”80 So 
that was it. Part of the U.S. reasoning had to do with gaining U.S. Sen-
ate ratification: it would be easier to gain approval—the strategic com-
mitment of the United States to more allies—if there were only a few.
All this was ratified at the Madrid NATO summit, July 8-9, 1997, 
which also included the first meetings of the simultaneously-created 
NATO-Ukraine Commission and of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (the latter having been created at the Sintra ministerial).81 
President Yeltsin declined to attend, however: enlargement was on the 
agenda. Nevertheless, I believed that, especially with the NATO-Rus-
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sia Founding Act, Moscow had become reconciled to the first round 
of three countries to join NATO. That its complaints were muted had 
a lot to do, I concluded, with the basic policy that Russia had adopted 
toward Germany, beginning with its unification at the end of the Cold 
War and the entry of united Germany into NATO. This was consis-
tent with a judgment I made about Germany’s surrounding itself with 
NATO and the EU. In my words: “This generation of Germans wants 
to make it impossible for its children and grandchildren to do what its 
parents and grandparents did.” 
I also arranged for Senator Bill Roth (R-Del) of Delaware, the head 
of the U.S. Senate NATO Observer Group, which I had helped to cre-
ate, to speak at the summit, and I also gained NAC approval for defense 
ministers of Allied states to attend, in order to increase the chances 
of integrating the different aspects of security and to increase support 
for NATO with the U.S. Congress and European parliaments. I also 
arranged for some other members of Congress to be present and en-
couraged Allies to do likewise.
The only major business done at the summit that had not already 
been completed or at least decided (e.g., Ukraine and the EAPC), re-
lated to the future of enlargement beyond the first three countries.82 
Most important was a debate that took place just among foreign min-
isters, about the eligibility of the three Baltic states at some point to 
join NATO. In order to avoid provoking Russia regarding states that 
had been part of the Soviet Union (and with two of them contiguous to 
Russia), Deputy Secretary Talbott opposed any mention of these states 
in the summit communiqué, but the Danish foreign minister said that 
there would be no NATO communiqué and no NATO enlargement if 
they were not mentioned. His views were thus included, as innocuous 
as they sound:
We will review the process [of enlargement] at our next meeting 
in 1999…The Alliance recognises the need to build greater stabil-
ity, security and regional cooperation in the countries of southeast 
Europe, and in promoting their increasing integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, we recognise the progress 
achieved towards greater stability and cooperation by the states in the 
Baltic region which are also aspiring members [emphasis added]. As 
we look to the future of the Alliance, progress towards these ob-
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jectives will be important for our overall goal of a free, prosperous 
and undivided Europe at peace.83
Responsibility for implementing the decisions of the Madrid sum-
mit was given to the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, 
which included us at USNATO. In the period ahead, many more de-
cisions were taken that deeply affected the future of NATO and of 
European security overall. Most consequential for the near term were 
more decisions on further enlargement with their impact on NATO’s 
relations with Russia. European security is still being affected by the 
consequences. Also, during the ratification process in the U.S. Senate, 
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Tx) proposed to me (I was then out 
of government) the creation of a mechanism at NATO to deal with 
any new Allies that might backslide in terms of their responsibilities, 
including falling short on democracy. The person heading enlargement 
on Capitol Hill for the State Department instantly rejected this sugges-
tion when I proposed it to him. In view of recent developments in Hun-
gary and to a lesser extent in Poland, this was a most short-sighted view.
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Notes
1. See A Europe Whole and Free: Remarks to the Citizens in Mainz. Presi-
dent George Bush. Rheingoldhalle. Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 
1989, at https://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/ga6-890531.htm.
2. The Treaty on European Union was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 
1992, and the European Union formally superseded the European Communities 
on November 1, 1993. For treaty text, see https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/
europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf.
3. A phrase I invented.
4. See North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (Archived), at: HTTPS://
WWW.NATO.INT/CPS/EN/NATOLIVE/TOPICS_69344.HTM? 
5. Like some other observers, I had publicly taken a strong public position on 
the need for the United States to be actively engaged in trying to end the Bosnia 
War. 
6. Nevertheless, the appointment process went rapidly, and I arrived at post on 
July 11, only the second Clinton Administration ambassador to do so, after Pamela 
Harriman to Paris, who proved to be an outstanding representative of our country.
7. This is a constant concern of European Allies with a new U.S. administration, 
even today so many years after the end of the Cold War. It betokens the critical role 
of the United States in European security. Beginning with my time on the NSC 
staff in 1977, I noted that the Allies always complained if the United States did too 
little; and they often complained if we did too much. I prefer that we be criticized 
for doing too much.
8. Quoted in Mart Laar, The Power of Freedom—Central and Eastern Europe after 
1945 (Tallinn: Unitas Foundation, 2010), p. 217.
9. No votes are ever taken in the North Atlantic Council or its subordinate 
bodies. Any ally can object to any proposal and it then fails. This is an important 
provision for building political cohesion and ensuring that, after a decision is taken, 
allies will not fail to carry out assigned military tasks. No ally ever has. 
10. I was, of course, careful that we never made a formal proposal at the NAC or 
in subordinate committees for which we did not have written instructions by cable 
from Washington, other than in the midst of hot and heavy negotiations—e.g., on 
Bosnia air-strike decisions—where oral instructions from the State Department 
had to suffice. It was the State Department’s task to get interagency clearance for 
the oral instructions.
11. This was established by DOD Directive 5105.20 of 1952, which is periodi-
cally updated. See https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/
dodd/510520p.pdf.
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12. Even at SHAPE, adaptation to new circumstances was slow. Soon after ar-
riving in Belgium, I visited General Shalikashvili at his headquarters at Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and received a command briefing. 
It included the projection that Russia could field at least 99 army divisions by the 
year 2000. I was uncomplimentary (!) and Shalikashvili was embarrassed for this 
idiocy by his staff briefer. Following that, we forged a good relationship that paid 
dividends throughout our mutual terms of service.
13. USNATO is also the only fully-integrated U.S. foreign mission/embassy. It 
includes State and Defense personnel (military and civilian) plus some other small-
er elements (in those days the later-abolished United States Information Service). 
It was a single team, under the ambassador’s authority, without the stove piping 
that so often occurs in embassies with representatives of a multitude of Washington 
agencies. The United States, like the other allies, was also represented by a military 
delegation that reported to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (in common 
NATO parlance the Chief of Defense or “CHOD”) and formed the NATO Mili-
tary Committee. See Structure of NATO, at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Struc-
ture_of_NATO. 
14. Key NSC staff were Alexander (Sandy) Vershbow and Jennone Walker.
15. There were different names at different times. One was Peacekeeping Part-
nership; a second, based on Partnership for Peace, was P4P. The finally agreed 
acronym was PfP.
16. The CSCE standard was later used to denote those countries that the Unit-
ed States, at least, would see as potentially eligible to join NATO. 
17. I was even able to stimulate Irish interest in joining PfP. After lengthy con-
sideration, it finally did so in 1999, after I had left Brussels. This was a remarkable 
departure for Irish foreign policy, where in 1949 it had rejected a U.S. offer of 
membership in NATO, unless Britain were excluded (!). The Truman administra-
tion opted for the UK. 
18. An essential objective was also the massive reduction of Cold War-era mil-
itary formations and equipment, as both irrelevant to peacekeeping tasks and as 
burdens on national economies, an essential element both of democratization and 
development of these societies: functions of security, writ large.
19. In 1995, the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) told me 
that the “pers-tempo” of all the people in his command—that is, how were they 
spending their time—was more than 50% at any time engaged in PfP activities 
with partner militaries. 
20. EUCOM is the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, also commanded by 
SACEUR in his solely U.S. “hat.” In parallel with PfP, SACEUR (U.S. General 
George Joulwan) developed what he called the U.S. European Command State 
Partnership Program, which fostered cooperation between the National Guards 
Toward NATO Enlargement: The Role of USNATO 331
of individual American states and the militaries of PfP countries. Thus, the Illinois 
National Guard partnered with Poland, the Maryland National Guard with Es-
tonia, etc. These efforts were an effective supplement to PfP and are continuing. 
21. This was not, however, a matter of creating civilian control of the partner 
militaries but rather the democratization of the broader societies. Indeed, in the 
Cold War, all of the Warsaw Pact militaries were under civilian control with the 
political commissar system.
22. This obviously did not work with regard to Ukraine and Crimea in deterring 
Russian aggression in 2014. That begs the question, however, whether what the 
United States was doing in Kyiv contributed to the Russian decision to invade. The 
crisis also took place against the background of the unthought-out 2008 Bucharest 
NATO summit’s declaration that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members of 
NATO,” thus clearly crossing a red line for Moscow.
23. I had always believed this to have been a central motive for President De-
Gaulle’s expelling Allied Command Europe and NATO troops from French soil 
in 1966-67.
24. The key Washington official on this issue was Frank Kramer, Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
25. I was also invited to lunch by the British ambassador, Sir John Weston, 
whom I had known well when he had been posted to the British Embassy in Wash-
ington. His single message: stifle WEU. Ironically, British opposition to significant 
elements of European integration was still alive and well in the 2016-19 British 
folly over Brexit!
26. Unfortunately, after I left NATO in 1998, opponents of a strong EU (and 
its successors) at the Departments of State and Defense undercut some of the key 
NATO-WEU provisions. The debate, which was settled in the mid-1990s, has also 
been (uselessly) revived during the Trump administration. See Robert E. Hunt-
er, The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion — or Competitor?, 
RAND Corporation, 2001, free download at https://www.rand.org/pubs/mono-
graph_reports/MR1463.html.
27. See Press Statement Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers Travemünde 
20th-21st October 1993, at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/sid-f8a07a2a-aff13dba/
natolive/news_24026.htm.
28. See Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. to Offer Plan on a Role in NATO for Ex-So-
viet Bloc,” The New York Times, October 21, 1993, at https://www.nytimes.
com/1993/10/21/world/us-to-offer-plan-on-a-role-in-nato-for-ex-soviet-
bloc.html.
29. Ahead of Wörner’s visit, I went to Washington and learned the White House 
was not prepared to provide a scheduled time for Wörner to meet with Clinton or 
332 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
even to guarantee that one would take place. He could meet with National Security 
Advisor Tony Lake, and the president might “drop by.” Wörner threatened to can-
cel his trip. I talked him out of it, made clear to Lake the political damage at NATO 
if there weren’t an Oval Office meeting, and it did take place.
30. Sciolino, op. cit.: “The United States has decided to support an expansion 
of NATO that could eventually include Russia, the countries of Eastern Europe 
and other former members of the Warsaw Pact, a senior aide to Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher said today.”
31. Usually, the secretaries of state and defense got their first look at the 
staff-prepared briefing books for ministerial meetings on the plane on the way to 
the conference site.
32. See Press Statement Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers Travemünde 
20th-21st October 1993, at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-F8A07A2A-
AFF13DBA/natolive/news_24026.htm. 
33. Remarks to Multinational Audience of Future Leaders of Europe, President 
Bill Clinton, Brussels, Belgium, January 9, 1994, at: https://usa.usembassy.de/
etexts/ga6-940109.htm.
34. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
35. See The President’s News Conference With Visegrad Leaders in Prague 
January 12, 1994, at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1994-01-
17/pdf/WCPD-1994-01-17-Pg41.pdf.
36. In a press conference with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on 
January 14, Clinton emphasized Partnership for Peace, which Yeltsin looked at 
somewhat favorably, though he hedged his position: “…the idea may prove just one 
of the scenarios for building a new Europe.” Clinton apparently misheard that as 
“Russia’s intention to be a full and active participant in the Partnership for Peace.” 
Clinton did add that PfP included that “NATO plainly contemplated an expan-
sion.” The President’s News Conference With President Boris Yeltsin of Russia in 
Moscow, January 14, 1994, at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-
1994-01-24/pdf/WCPD-1994-01-24.pdf.
37. See “NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,” National Security Archive, 
March 16, 2018, at: https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-pro-
grams/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard. This account contains 
some documents that were not shared with USNATO at the time and thus did not 
directly affect our dealings with the issue.
38. These include at NATO Headquarters the U.S. Delegation to the Military 
Committee, which worked for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other 
15 national delegations, delegations from PfP countries, the Secretary General and 
his Private Office, the Deputy and Assistant Secretaries General, and the seemingly 
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myriad other NATO bodies (notably the civilian International Staff and the mili-
tary International Military Staff).
39. At NATO Headquarters, we also received on average 7,000 official govern-
ment visitors each year for meetings of the alliance’s various bodies.
40. In 1994, less than three years had passed since the USSR dissolved; its forces 
had not that long before departed from Central Europe; and it could not be said for 
sure that military confrontation, which had ended, would stay ended.
41. I worked particularly closely with Joe Kruzel, until his death on Mt. Igman, 
and Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, one of the most effective holders of that office 
and a strong supporter of NATO and of what we were trying to achieve at NATO 
Headquarters. Both had clear-sighted perspectives on what needed to be done.
42. I found this to be mostly on the civilian than the military side (with some no-
table exceptions) of the U.S. foreign policy/national security bureaucracy. Regard-
ing the latter, I was struck with how open U.S. officers were with one another and 
with their Allied counterparts, until I realized that, if there is not a full exchange of 
information, in combat people may die.
43. Many Central European states have argued that joining NATO would help 
them gain foreign investment. This has been a factor in what I believe to have been 
excessive NATO enlargement, but there is no evidence to support the proposition. 
44. I asked him if he had ever heard of Groucho Marx.
45. Notably, at that exercise, which I attended to show the American flag, peace-
keeping troops from Ukraine performed particularly well.
46. One notable example was Hungarian claims on Transylvania, which had 
been incorporated into Romania in 1918. Hungary was told it had to give up this 
claim in order to join NATO and it did so.
47. See Membership Action Plan (Map), NATO, at https://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/topics_37356.htm.
48. Robert E. Hunter, “Enlargement: Part of A Strategy for Projecting Stability 
into Central Europe,” NATO Review, May 1995, at: https://www.nato.int/docu/
review/1995/9503-1.htm. 
49. This was a major reason why the NATO summit at Bucharest in 2008 was 
grossly irresponsible in declaring that “Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO.” It 
was clear that not a single ally was prepared to fight for Georgia—and, when the 
short conflict began with Russia, none did; and that judgment also likely applies 
to Ukraine, as well. The upshot of that decision was to give credence to Vladimir 
Putin’s domestic propaganda claim that NATO was seeking to “surround” Russia, 
but with no security benefit for Georgia, Ukraine, or the alliance. See Bucharest 
Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating 
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in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, at: 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm. 
50. Transcript of the Remarks by President W. J. Clinton To People Of Detroit, 
USIA, 22 Oct. 1996, at https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.htm. 
51. I saw this first hand during a trip to Washington that included a meeting 
of senior officials in the White House Situation Room, when members of the two 
camps personally insulted one another.
52. Although I had proposed the mission, it was properly led by the dean of the 
NAC, Spain’s Ambassador Carlos Miranda. This was actually an advantage since it 
showed that PfP was not just a U.S. venture. 
53. Ironically, the PCC occupied a small building that had been used for Opera-
tion Live Oak, Cold War-era coordination by the three Western occupying powers 
in Germany—the U.S., UK, and France—plus the Federal Republic of Germa-
ny, regarding possible Soviet/East German threats or military action against West 
Berlin. When we took officers from the PCC nations to tour the building and to 
choose offices, the Russian delegation took the best for themselves.
54. See Robert E. Hunter, “Vitaly Churkin: The Consummate Professional,” 
Lobelog, February 21, 2107, at https://lobelog.com/vitaly-churkin-the-consum-
mate-professional/.
55. There is also still debate, including U.S. diplomats who were present, about 
whether the United States had promised Yeltsin at the time of German unification 
that NATO would not expand into Central Europe. When we were first consider-
ing NATO enlargement, I formally asked the State Department whether any such 
pledges had ever been made. I was assured that that had not happened.
56. Final Communique Issued at the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlan-
tic Council, 1 December 1994, at: https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/
c941201a.htm.
57. See Leonid Velekhov, “Russia-NATO Betrothal Didn’t Happen,” Sevodnya, 
December 3, 1994, translated in CDPSP 46(48). In a late December letter to Clin-
ton, Yeltsin explained the Russian reaction: “I proceeded from the assumption that 
we had agreed in Washington [in September 1994] not to act hastily, but rather 
to achieve, in the first place, agreement between us on Russia’s full-scale partner-
ship with NATO, and only after that to start tackling the issues of enlargement.” 
Kozyrev later wrote that “[p]rior to the meeting, as a result of arduous and pro-
tracted negotiations, representatives of the 16 NATO member-states worked out a 
compromise communiqué. The Russian delegation had the text of the paper only 
a few hours before the official inauguration of the cooperation program between 
Russia and NATO. We did not even have time to translate the document into 
Russian, much less to analyze it in order to report to the president of Russia. How-
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ever, the communiqué recorded positions on issues of direct concern to Russia. It 
described the future evolution of the alliance, including its eventual expansion east-
ward, with the emphasis on the expansion rather than on partnership with Russia. 
This created a new situation for Russia, which we needed at least to examine. Thus, 
it was decided to postpone signing the partnership instrument.”
58. See “NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,” op. cit. 
59. See Sciolino, op. cit.
60. At least one reason Russia opposed he 1999 air campaign over Kosovo was 
that there was no U.N. resolution. Whether it would have vetoed such a resolution 
if the Western powers had proposed one is not clear.
61. Russian diplomat Yuli Vorontsov said in Russian that this must not be done. 
Grachev told him, in Russian, to shut up.
62. Britain worked hardest to prevent any use of NATO airpower to protect safe 
areas, to begin with at NATO and, if it was cornered there, at the U.N. through the 
Secretary-General or, if even that failed, on at least one occasion by instructing its 
military commander in the field not to act.
63. At a conference attended by senior NATO leaders organized by the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs in Ebenhausen, Bavaria.
64. See John Darnton, “Conflict In The Balkans: The Strategy; Ambiguous Ul-
timatum: Allies Show Differences,” The New York Times, July 24, 1995, at https://
www.nytimes.com/1995/07/24/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-the-strate-
gy-ambiguous-ultimatum-allies-show-differences.html.
65. See Press Statement by the Secretary General Following North Atlantic 
Council Meeting on 25 July 1995, at https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/
s950725a.htm.
66. See Operation Deliberate Force, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oper-
ation_Deliberate_Force.
67. As is any ambassador’s right, I asked for formal instructions by cable, which 
arrived a few hours later.
68. See Javier Solana, at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Javier_Solana. Hav-
ing been Spanish foreign minister and with ambitions for the future in Spanish 
politics—never realized—this was a logical proposal.
69. The British ambassador, Sir John Goulden, took me aside after the NAC 
meeting and said: “Robert, when your people in Washington produce a draft and 
pass it off as Solana’s, you could at least change American spellings to the British 
spellings we use here at NATO!”
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70. Talbott sent Sandy Vershbow to Moscow to make sure that Solana got 
things right.
71. Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between 
NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, at: 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm. The Founding 
Act was revised somewhat at a 2002 NATO-Russia Council meeting in Rome, at: 
https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/rome-eng.pdf. 
72. Key elements of the wording of this paragraph were literally written on the 
back of a napkin at the NATO Headquarters restaurant at a U.S.-officials-only 
lunch, including me and key members of my team, plus Sandy Vershbow of the 
NSC staff. Vershbow was the chief draftsman.
73. The qualifiers “current and foreseeable security environment” became an 
escape clause for NATO following the Russian seizure of Crimea and military ac-
tivities elsewhere in Ukraine, beginning in 2014. They permitted NATO to do 
military things in Central Europe while arguing that it has not violated the Found-
ing Act.
74. See Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between the North Atlantic Trea-
ty Organization and Ukraine, at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_25457.htm. 
75. Regarding a name for the agreement, I told Tarasyuk we had proposed call-
ing the NATO-Russia agreement a “charter,” but Moscow had rejected it. “We’ll 
take it,” he said.
76. There was nearly a snag. I was back in Washington to go over final details 
for Madrid and mentioned to Strobe Talbott that NATO would meet with Ukraine 
at the summit in the context of the new Commission. Worried about the impact on 
the Russians, he disagreed vigorously. But he was overruled by Secretary of State 
Albright.
77. See Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Sintra, Portugal, at: https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970529/
home.htm. Notably, he communique also said: We also recommend to our Heads 
of State and Government to make explicit our commitment that the Alliance re-
mains open to the accession of any other European state able and willing to further 
the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to our common security.
78. See History of the Visegrád Group, at http://www.visegradgroup.eu/his-
tory/history-of-the-visegrad. Slovakia acceded to the group as an independent 
country, as did the Czech Republic, following the velvet divorce of December 31, 
1992.
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79. At USNATO, we believed French inclusion of Romania was calculated 
more to “get the U.S. goat” as anything else, since the Romance language connec-
tion was not serious.
80. Hungary’s inclusion by the United States in the first enlargement was af-
fected by its contribution to U.S. military efforts to keep the peace in Bosnia with 
the post-Dayton Implementation Force (IFOR). I was tasked to ask the Hungari-
an ambassador to Belgium, who represented his country to PfP, whether the U.S. 
First Armored Division could use the Hungarian military base at Taszár for transit 
to Bosnia. When I approached him with this request, the Hungarian ambassador, 
András Simonyi, asked: “Would tomorrow morning be too late for us to agree?” 
From that moment, Hungary was on the U.S. short-list to join NATO. President 
Bill Clinton visited the base in December 1995.
81. For documents, see NATO Summit, Madrid, Spain, 8-9 July 1997, at: 
https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1997/970708/home.htm. 
82. At the end of the summit, President Bill Clinton had a private meeting 
with leaders all of the Central European aspirant countries. It concluded with a 
“family photo” of all of them. Just before that, Madeleine Albright deliberately but-
ton-holed Prime Minister Mečiar of Slovakia, the “anti-Democrat,” and proceeded 
to lecture him at length in Czech. As a result, he missed the family photo and saved 
Clinton the embarrassment. 
83. Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation Issued by 
the Heads of State and Government, at: https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/
p97-081e.htm. 
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Chapter 15 
New Members, New Missions:  
NATO and Euro-Atlantic Architecture in the 
Second Clinton Administration
Daniel S. Hamilton
With the advent of President Clinton’s second term, the evolving 
security architecture entered a new phase. The essential premise of 
U.S. strategy—that the United States, as a “European power,” needed 
to help engineer a new interlocking architecture that could anchor a 
Europe that was whole, free and at peace—had become foundational to 
operational policies as well as public statements by the President and 
senior officials. 
Progress had been made on each element of the emerging architec-
ture during the Administration’s first term. The prospect of walking 
through the doors of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions had ac-
celerated aspirants’ efforts to strengthen democratic institutions; make 
sure soldiers served civilians, not the other way around; and resolve 
lingering ethnic and border disputes.1 With little fanfare, some small 
steps toward integration had been taken; 17 European countries had 
joined the Council of Europe, and the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland had acceded to the OECD. 
Nonetheless, there was no room for complacency. From Bosnia to 
Chechnya, more Europeans had died violently in the past five years 
than in the previous forty-five. Russia’s trajectory remained uncertain. 
The EU enlargement process seemed stalled. There was very real pros-
pect of renewed bloodshed in the Western Balkans. 
President Clinton’s new Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, im-
mediately underscored the urgency of the task. Europe’s democratic 
revolution was not complete, she said. Much still needed to be done. 
Right after assuming office she asked me and Tom Malinowski to help 
her with an Economist piece in her name to set the stage for her inaugu-
ral visits to European Allies as Secretary of State, and for decisions the 
Alliance would have to make over the next six months.2
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In the first term, the “how” and “why” of NATO enlargement had 
been determined. Now the “who” and “when” had to be answered, 
after which the ratification struggle had to begin. At the same time, the 
Administration’s promise of a “new NATO” required the Alliance to 
complete its own internal transformation by streamlining commands, 
promoting European capabilities and welcoming Spain and potentially 
France into the integrated military command. The proposal for an At-
lantic Partnership Council had to be implemented. Initiatives to inte-
grate Russia, through a more robust NATO-Russia partnership and full 
participation in the G-8, had to move forward. A special relationship 
with Ukraine was still necessary.
It was also clear that NATO could open its door to some, but not 
yet to all, of the many aspirants seeking to join the Alliance. Already in 
the Clinton Administration’s first term U.S. officials had been clear that 
enlargement must naturally begin with the strongest candidates, but 
that NATO’s next new members would not be its last.3 My long-time 
friend and colleague Ron Asmus, who had been working informally 
with Administration officials while outside the Administration at the 
RAND Corporation, now joined the State Department as Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for European Affairs, with responsibility for NATO 
and European regional political-military affairs. He argued successful-
ly that the Administration’s strategy should be “small is beautiful plus 
robust Open Door.” This meant that only the strongest candidates 
should be invited for membership to ensure the principle of contin-
ued enlargement would be successfully established. That would pave 
the way for accession by others after that. This required a proactive 
strategy to reassure those not in the first wave that the door did indeed 
remain open to them, and to work together to create the conditions 
that would let them walk through that door. 
President Clinton and his foreign policy team were now ready to 
advance the strategy. Significant decisions were made in a remarkable 
44-day period between the May 27,1997 meeting of NATO heads of 
state and government at the Élysée Palace with Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin and the July 9,1997 NATO summit in Madrid, when leaders 
formally invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to join the 
Alliance. As U.S. Ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter noted, the de-
cisions all reinforced each other: “each was indispensable to the success 
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of the others and to the overall creation of a transatlantic security ar-
chitecture that can succeed.”4 
First, the Alliance chose the first new members because they were 
judged to be the most likely to gain the support of the legislatures in 
the 16 NATO member states. Administration officials echoed Richard 
Holbrooke’s mantra: NATO was not a club, it was a military alliance 
with high standards. Madeleine Albright drove home the point: “the 
enlargement of NATO must begin with the strongest candidates; oth-
erwise it would not begin at all. But when we say that the first new 
members will not be the last, we mean it. And we expect the new mem-
bers to export stability eastward, rather than viewing enlargement as a 
race to escape westward at the expense of their neighbors.” 5
Second, the Alliance affirmed that its door remained open to addi-
tional European countries ready and willing to shoulder the respon-
sibilities of NATO membership. President Clinton stressed that NA-
TO’s next invitations would not be the last. Secretary Perry’s fall 1996 
comment set the tone: the answer to those not among the first three 
was not “no,” it was “not yet.” The Alliance engaged in a new phase of 
individual dialogues to help aspirants understand the implications of 
Article 5 responsibilities, work through obstacles to eventual member-
ship, and maintain positive momentum. 
Third, the Alliance decided to strengthen the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), which then embraced 27 countries, including countries that 
weren’t even part of the Warsaw Pact, including Austria, Finland, Swe-
den and Switzerland. Allies agreed to the U.S. proposal for an Atlantic 
Partnership Council, which they renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partner-
ship Council (EAPC), to replace the defunct NACC and become the 
political voice of the Partnership for Peace: a forum for intensified po-
litical and security consultations and decision-making among Allies and 
partners on common activities. 
Fourth, the Allies negotiated a NATO-Ukraine Charter and its op-
erating arm, the NATO-Ukraine Commission, recognizing tacitly that 
the future of Ukraine could well be the key to many other Alliance 
strategic plans and objectives. 
Fifth, NATO and Russia signed their Founding Act creating a Per-
manent Joint Council as the mechanism for Russia-NATO cooperation 
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on a range of issues, from peacekeeping and theatre missile defense to 
nuclear safety, terrorism and disaster relief, all as part of a comprehen-
sive and cooperative security architecture.6 NATO reiterated that it 
had “no intention, no plan, and no reason” in the foreseeable future to 
station nuclear weapons on new members’ soil, but that it may do so 
should the need arise. NATO further stated that military infrastruc-
ture “adequate” to assure new members’ security under Article 5 of 
the North Atlantic Treaty would be maintained on their territory. The 
Alliance pledged not to place “substantial combat forces” in the “cur-
rent and foreseeable security environment” on new members’ territory, 
but underscored an intention to increase interoperability, integration, 
and reinforcement capabilities with the new states. In Paris, President 
Clinton declared that the quest for security in Europe “is not a zero 
sum game, where NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss and Russia’s strength is 
an Alliance weakness. That is old thinking, these are new times.”7
Sixth, NATO continued its internal adaptation by creating the means 
to build the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the 
Alliance, rather than separate from it, slimming down NATO’s military 
command structure, reducing the number of headquarters from 65 to 
20, preparing forces for operations under the command and control of 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) headquarters and comparable ar-
rangements—one of which was represented by SFOR in Bosnia—and 
to improve its ability to conduct operations with nonmembers.8 These 
and related reforms enabled the full integration of Spain into NATO’s 
military command. France inched closer, although Chirac in the end 
was not prepared to agree to full reintegration.9
Five months after the Madrid Summit, NATO foreign ministers 
joined their counterparts from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary and signed the protocols of accession. In that same week, the Eu-
ropean Council agreed to begin accession negotiations with the same 
three countries, as well as Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. 
The “Litmus Test”
Major pieces of the architecture were now in place, but Secretary 
Albright pushed on the Baltic issue, which she called a “litmus test” of 
our overall strategy of integration. She said that there was perhaps no 
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part of Europe which suffered more from the old politics of the Cold 
War and the zero-sum philosophy of the Cold War than did the Baltic 
republics. That was why there could be no better example of our suc-
cess and the benefits of win-win cooperation than this region—if we 
got it right. She looked at Ron Asmus at the time and said, “Where 
is the strategy?” A team of us were put together to develop one. The 
result was essentially the Baltic Action Plan on steroids. It consisted of 
two elements: a Northern European Initiative and a U.S-Baltic Char-
ter, anchored by a joint Commission.
During this time John Kornblum had moved on to become U.S. 
Ambassador to Germany. His successor as Assistant Secretary was 
Marc Grossman, who had been U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. As one of 
his first acts Grossman flew to the region in September 1997 to present 
the Northern European Initiative (NEI). The key goal of the NEI was 
to encourage stronger cooperation with and among the countries of the 
region, creating the conditions in which the question of integration, 
while controversial at the time, could be posed more positively in the 
future. The NEI was an effort to build closer ties to Nordic countries 
while embedding our engagement with the Baltic states in a broader 
framework that sought to create stronger regional cooperation (includ-
ing the northwestern region of Russia) and cross-border relations in 
terms of business promotion, law enforcement, civil society, environ-
ment, energy, and public health. In each of these areas we established 
a number of concrete projects and activities. We knew that the United 
States wouldn’t be the major player in these areas, but we thought we 
could play a modest and, in some niche areas, a crucial role. We were 
prepared to be a junior partner or a bigger partner depending upon the 
issue and depending upon what we could bring to the table.
Like the Baltic Action Plan, the NEI consisted of three tracks. The 
first was to help Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania help themselves to be-
come the strongest possible candidates for Western integration. Polit-
ical goals included managing expectations regarding NATO, establish-
ing Partnership commissions, facilitating border treaties, supporting 
recommendations of the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National 
Minorities regarding inter-ethnic issues, starting EAPC regional dis-
cussions on security issues, and promoting inter-Baltic cooperation. 
Economic initiatives included facilitating Baltic entry into the WTO, 
promoting an open investment climate, and prodding Baltic-Russian 
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commercial cooperation. Military goals included support for NATO 
activities, exploring eventual CFE accession, supporting the decom-
missioning of the Skrunda radar facility in Latvia in 1999, and increas-
ing Baltic receptivity to Russian participation in regional PfP activities. 
We also sought to expand regional capabilities to fight transnational 
organized crime and establish effective export control and non-prolif-
eration regimes. 
The second track we called “Nordics Plus,” which meant coordinat-
ing approaches with the Nordic countries, as well as Germany, Poland 
and the European Union on Russia/Baltic relations, a U.S. observer 
role in the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), energizing commercial 
activities in the region, promoting regional energy strategies, and urg-
ing Nordic/German mentor roles in NATO activities, including the 
creation and strengthening of the Baltic Security Assistance (BALTS-
EA) Forum of 14 Western nations, which was intended to help Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania develop their defense and eventually join NATO. 
We believed our Northern Europe Initiative and the European Union’s 
Northern Dimension could complement and reinforce one another. 10
The third track was to implement the kind of inclusive policy to-
ward Russia envisioned in the Baltic Action Plan. This included en-
hanced cooperation among embassies in the Nordic and Baltic states 
and Russia, engaging regional public/private policy makers, including 
Kaliningrad in regional cooperation, linking SEED/Freedom Support 
Act activities, promoting military-military cooperation with regard to 
the Kola Peninsula, responding to Russian proposals on confidence- 
and security-building measures, urging joint planning for Baltic ports 
and other infrastructure projects, regional environmental objectives 
through the CBSS, coordinating nuclear waste management programs, 
and promoting the U.S. role in the CBSS task force on organized crime. 
As Strobe Talbott put it, our goal was to encourage Russia, over 
time, “to view this region not as a fortified frontier but as a gateway; not 
as a buffer against invaders who no longer exist, but as a trading route 
and a common ground for commerce and economic development—in 
a word, that Russia will come to view the Baltics Hanseatically.”11 Pres-
ident Clinton and Secretary Albright believed that Russia would have 
to make that psychological and political adjustment itself, by its own 
lights, for its own reasons, in keeping with its own evolving concept of 
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its national interest. But we and our European partners could help by 
applying the general principle of inclusiveness. That meant involving 
Russia to the greatest extent possible in the commercial, political, envi-
ronmental and other forms of collaboration we were developing among 
the states along the littoral of the Baltic Sea. The Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council, the Council of Baltic Sea States, and the Arctic Council were 
models of what was required, and the United States would participate 
as appropriate.12 
The second initiative was to give our activities through the Baltic 
Action Plan a higher political profile via a U.S.-Baltic “Charter of Part-
nership,” to be signed by President Clinton and the three Baltic pres-
idents, affirming our common goal of fostering the deeper integration 
of the Baltic states into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream. 
Ron led the negotiating team, which I joined. Initially, each of the Bal-
tic states wanted its own bilateral charter; we had to convince them 
that a single document signed by four presidents conveyed a stronger 
message of support than three separate documents. 
On January 16, 1998 the four presidents signed the Charter of Part-
nership, otherwise known as the Baltic Charter—a political statement 
of common principles intended to guide the deepening of mutual co-
operation and advance common objectives, including, explicitly, “Baltic 
integration into the European and transatlantic institutions, such as the 
European Union, OSCE, the World Trade Organization and NATO.” 
While the Baltic Charter did not specifically provide a U.S. guarantee 
of Baltic security or NATO membership, it did confirm the Baltic re-
publics’ inherent right to choose their own security arrangements. At 
the signing ceremony, President Clinton left little doubt of his com-
mitment: “America is determined to create the conditions under which 
Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia can one day walk through [NATO’s] 
door.”13 
The goal of the Charter and accompanying measures was to help the 
leaders of these countries shift from a preoccupation that they might 
be left in some kind of a gray zone and instead focus on what they 
needed to do to make themselves the strongest possible candidates for 
future integration to European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. As Marc 
Grossman said, 
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This administration’s Baltic policy can be summed up in three 
words: Champion of integration. We want the United States to be 
the champion of integration of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into 
European and transatlantic institutions. That is what the Baltic 
Charter is all about…This is a race that the Baltic states have to 
run themselves. But they understand that this race is a marathon, 
not a sprint. The point is to stay in the race and finish. We can 
help coach them--and make it clear that one day we want them to 
successfully cross the finish line.14
The Charter created a Baltic Partnership Commission to advance 
the integration of the Baltic nations into transatlantic and European 
structures. The Commission continued efforts as set forth under the 
Baltic Action Plan. It sought to enhance regional cooperation by pro-
moting Baltic, Russian, and Nordic participation in regional and in-
ternational organizations. It quickly moved forward with a number of 
initiatives, for instance the Baltic-American Partnership Fund (BAPF), 
which was established by the United States Agency for International 
Development and the Open Society Foundations. Each organization 
initially provided $7.5 million to be spent over a ten-year period on 
the continued development of civil society in the Baltic countries of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.15 The three Baltic presidents jointly 
announced that they would establish national commissions to study the 
period of the Holocaust and of the totalitarian rule in each of their 
countries. The Pentagon worked with each Baltic state to establish 
long-term defense modernization plans that would help them devel-
op small but modern and capable militaries. The Administration and 
Congress also agreed to significantly increase security assistance for the 
Baltic states under the Warsaw Initiative program.
Triple Crown
As the NATO ratification debate proceeded, the Clinton Admin-
istration’s thinking was already shifting to what a larger NATO’s pur-
poses could be, and how NATO should relate to other instruments of 
U.S. engagement. Secretary Albright wanted forward thinking. In fall 
1997 I wrote a memo to her arguing that while the enlargement debate 
was likely won, size was not purpose. In future the Alliance would not 
only take in new members, it was likely to take on new missions. The 
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Alliance would need to maintain the Open Door and help to create 
conditions by which new members could add their strength to ours, 
while simultaneously aligning our NATO strategy with our overall ar-
chitectural effort to position the transatlantic partnership as a geostra-
tegic base from where we and our European partners, acting through 
and with our various institutions—including the EU—could address 
new threats to our common values and interests, many of which would 
come from outside of Europe. Albright liked the idea and asked me 
to follow up with Marc Grossman and Ron Asmus, with whom I had 
already been working closely. 
Albright then pushed these themes at the NATO foreign ministers 
meeting in December 1997. Even as the Allies signed the agreements 
with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to bring them into the 
alliance, Secretary Albright urged a wider NATO strategy to deal with 
other looming challenges, including the threat from nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons in the hands of terrorists or countries like Lib-
ya, Iraq and Iran. 
My boss Greg Craig asked me to prepare talking points for a new 
transatlantic bargain and to join him at the Secretary’s annual retreat 
with her senior advisors on January 9, 1998. There, together with Marc 
Grossman, we pitched our ideas. She was receptive and asked us to send 
her a more detailed outline. 
I worked with Ron and Marc to formulate a memo sent to Secretary 
Albright on January 15 proposing that the Administration use 1999 
to define a new transatlantic bargain for the 21st century premised on 
the need for the United States and Europe to work together in an ex-
panded transatlantic framework to solve problems both inside and out-
side of Europe. The premise of the strategy was two-fold: the United 
States remained a European power, and the transatlantic partnership 
remained America’s geostrategic base when it came to global issues. 
We prepared a speech for Secretary Albright before the New Atlan-
tic Initiative on February 9 placing NATO enlargement in the context 
of our broader goals for our relations with Europe. There, she said that 
It is my great hope that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
will be part of a transatlantic partnership that is not only broader, 
but deeper as well; a partnership that is a force for peace from the 
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Middle East to Central Africa; a partnership that has overcome 
barriers to trade across the Atlantic; a partnership strong enough 
to protect the environment and defeat international crime; a part-
nership that is united in its effort to stop the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction, the overriding security interest of our time.
However old or new the challenges we face, there is still one rela-
tionship that more than any other will determine whether we meet 
them successfully, and that is our relationship with Europe. The 
transatlantic partnership is our strategic base—the drivewheel of 
progress on every world-scale issue when we agree, and the brake 
when we do not.16 
The goal was to foster an inclusive, more self-confident and out-
ward-looking Europe as a strategic partner for the United States in all 
these areas. As we opened our institutions to new members, we needed 
to expand the scope of our partnership to new areas. 
Grossman billed this strategy as advancing the “Triple Crown” of 
mutual security, prosperity and democratic values. We identified three 
challenges that the United States and Europe had to address in coming 
decades. 
The first challenge was within Europe: to support the continuing 
integration of the continent and build a broader Euro-Atlantic commu-
nity, including new partnerships with Russia and Ukraine. The second 
challenge was between Europe and America: to deepen the bonds be-
tween our societies—the foundation of our relationship—as a positive 
force for change in the world. That meant building down commercial 
barriers to foster a closer, more open economic relationship, continu-
ing to foster people-to-people exchanges, and generating closer polit-
ical ties bilaterally and with the European Union. The third challenge 
extended beyond Europe and America: to improve our ability to deal 
jointly with challenges in the wider world—whether political, military, 
economic, criminal or environmental—that neither of us would be able 
to confront effectively alone. 
We viewed these goals as mutually reinforcing. A safer, freer, more 
prosperous Europe was more likely to be America’s global partner. And 
a more cohesive, outward-looking Europe that could act was more like-
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ly to be able to manage broad forces of change that could challenge 
stability, prosperity and democracy on the European continent. 
At its core, the Triple Crown was our effort to make more explicit 
and operational what was, for the first time in European history, broad 
and implicit agreement across most of the continent that our under-
lying task—and opportunity—was to create a secure and increasingly 
prosperous community of democracies. Defining security in this broad 
sense had enabled us to project a new vision for the United States and 
Europe building together a “cooperative security space.” This “com-
mon space” rested on a foundation of shared values, common norms 
of behavior and mutually-reinforcing institutions, and reached beyond 
the outdated frontiers of the Cold War. 
Under the Triple Crown strategy, each of the three major pillars of 
the architecture—NATO, U.S.-EU relations, and the OSCE—would 
need to undergo further adaptation to reposition the U.S-European re-
lationship so it could stabilize the European continent while advancing 
U.S. and European values and interests beyond Europe. The strategy 
required a new NATO with expanded missions, the reorientation of 
U.S.-EU relations to global challenges, and a retooled OSCE to pro-
mote democracy throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. Major summits 
were scheduled for each of these architectural pillars in 1999; the strat-
egy foresaw using the three summits—Grossman called it the ‘trifec-
ta’—to advance this new bargain.17
First, however, the U.S. Senate had to agree to let the Czech Repub-
lic, Hungary and Poland walk through NATO’s open door. As Jeremy 
Rosner recounts in this volume, the Administration mounted a major 
effort to secure a successful outcome. On April 29, 1998, by a vote of 
80-19, the U.S. Senate ratified the accession of the three countries to 
the North Atlantic Treaty. 
New Missions
Senate ratification was a new high in the Administration’s campaign 
to reposition the transatlantic partnership for a new era. The ratifica-
tion debates on each side of the Atlantic, however, revealed some po-
tentially dangerous faultlines when it came to perceptions of NATO’s 
purpose and its relevance to future security challenges. In essence, dif-
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ferences centered over the degree to which the Alliance should take on 
out-of-area challenges. 
President Clinton framed the issue in a speech commemorating 
the 50th anniversary of the Berlin airlift on May 13, 1997: “Yesterday’s 
NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomor-
row’s NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend 
against threats to our security from beyond them—the spread of weap-
ons of mass destruction, ethnic violence and regional conflict.”18
A new debate had emerged. Clinton’s ambitious vision for the Alli-
ance was overwhelming to those who believed that NATO’s singular 
mission was to stabilize the European continent and to provide a hedge 
against a possibly resurgent or instable Russia. Proponents of this view 
argued that NATO, at its core, was essentially an insurance policy. Se-
curing the territorial integrity of Europe and North America was an 
historic achievement. Alliances were inherently fragile, however, and 
doing more threatened strategic overload. Europeans who subscribed 
to this view were unenthusiastic about reorienting their militaries away 
from the traditional, less urgent and now relatively cheap mission of 
protecting European territory toward a more controversial, distant and 
expensive—if arguably more urgent—mission of addressing out-of-ar-
ea challenges. 
Having just become accustomed to the notion of a larger Alliance, 
many viewed this new debate as an attempt to shift the strategic goal-
posts. They argued that an effort to move NATO towards defending 
common interests underestimated current transatlantic problems, 
overlooked continuing dangers in Europe, risked the achievements 
of the past decade, and was yet another example of inconsistent U.S. 
priorities. Americans who shared this perspective added that the more 
successful the United States was in maintaining peace on the European 
continent at relatively low cost, the freer the United States would be 
to deal with security challenges elsewhere. Collective defense, together 
with enlargement, they said, was sufficient glue to hold the Alliance 
together. Their basic argument, to coin an old American homily, was 
“if it ain’t broke, why fix it?”
Others, primarily in the United States, argued that while NATO 
was not yet “broke,” it soon would be if Allies did not wake up to new 
dangers. The old glue was not enough; to survive, NATO needed to 
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be capable of addressing new sources of conflict, most of which were 
beyond Europe’s borders. They contended that in the new century 
the transatlantic community was more likely to face threats emanating 
from outside of Europe than from within it, whether posed by weap-
ons of mass destruction, threats of disrupted energy flows, or instabil-
ity in the former Soviet space or the Greater Middle East. A ballistic 
missile attack using an agent of mass destruction from a rogue state 
(concerns were growing about Libyan, Iranian and Iraqi capabilities) 
would be every bit as much an Article 5 threat as a Warsaw Pact tank 
had been two decades earlier.19 Similarly, non-Article 5 threats, if not 
addressed early and effectively, could grow into Article 5 threats. Bos-
nia and Kosovo were examples. NATO, they asserted, should be our in-
strument of choice when Europeans and Americans decided to address 
military security challenges together. That meant it would need to be 
further adapted to be capable of addressing a spectrum of Article 5 and 
non-Article 5 challenges.
A third line of argument began to appear that essentially called for 
a division of labor: Europeans should worry about security in Europe 
and Americans should worry about security beyond Europe. Republi-
can U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas (who, by 2017, iron-
ically, had become U.S. Ambassador to NATO) became a prominent 
proponent of this view as part of the ratification debate. 
The Clinton Administration believed the division of labor argument 
to be a false choice. It would leave the United States with the much 
more demanding and dangerous assignment. It would deprive Europe-
ans of a voice on out-of-area challenges and relieve them of any broad-
er sense of responsibility for common security dangers, even though 
Europe was just as wealthy and had similar global interests. It would 
also end America’s still fundamental role as a European power. It would 
reinforce European inwardness and resentment, exacerbate American 
tendencies to pull away from European concerns, and ultimately cor-
rode the Alliance.
For Washington, the real choice was not division of labor but a 
shared sense of risk and responsibility to respond to the challenges 
that faced the Atlantic community. The Clinton Administration want-
ed Europeans to step up and assume greater responsibility for security 
in Europe—but they also realized that the United States remained an 
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essential element of stability on the continent. Administration officials 
understood that by virtue of its global posture, Washington would 
need to assume much of the burden defending common interests else-
where—but they also realized that Europe was similarly challenged by 
such threats, and had resources and capabilities to contribute. Article 5 
was and should remain the heart of the Washington Treaty. But Allies 
had to recognize that Article 5 threats could come from sources beyond 
NATO’s immediate borders. 
“If you ask where U.S. and European forces could face conflict in the 
decades ahead,” Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering said, “the 
answer must include scenarios beyond NATO’s borders. During the 
Cold War, it made sense for Europeans to concentrate on the threat to 
their own territory and for the U.S. to assume the primary responsibil-
ity for defending common transatlantic interests elsewhere. But such 
an arrangement makes less sense at a time when the direct territorial 
threat to Europe has diminished, and when new threats to our common 
interests may come from beyond NATO’s immediate borders.”20
In short, ratification of NATO enlargement was an important step, 
but only a step, toward a new transatlantic bargain. The Policy Plan-
ning memo crystallized the debate and argued that on this fundamental 
question, NATO needed to continue to stabilize the European conti-
nent, but increasingly had to be prepared to address challenges ema-
nating from beyond Europe. The Secretary’s January 9 retreat clarified 
our need to move ahead with this adapted approach. Senate ratifica-
tion on April 29 enabled the administration to move forward with its 
broader vision for the transatlantic partnership, in which the two sides 
of the North Atlantic would continue to build a Europe whole and 
free while simultaneously developing the capacity to address challenges 
and threats from beyond Europe.21 The “trifecta” of major upcoming 
summits afforded an opportunity to further develop the mutually re-
inforcing nature of the institutional construct in ways that would not 
only address Europe’s security challenges, but also position the United 
States and Europe to deal with challenges of a broader nature.
Administration officials now began to articulate the Triple Crown 
message. Meeting with her NATO counterparts in Luxembourg in 
May 1998, Secretary Albright talked about the President’s desire to 
start a conversation on how we could best build a new and all-encom-
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passing Euro-Atlantic partnership for the 21st century—and the role 
NATO should play as a key pillar in that partnership. The essence of 
that vision was a deeper form of cooperation with a Europe that could 
act as a partner—on the continent, across the Atlantic, and in the wid-
er world. NATO would be the institution of choice when the United 
States and Europe had to act together militarily. The goal should be to 
create a larger, more flexible NATO committed to collective defense 
and capable of defending against a wide range of threats to our com-
mon interests, both on and beyond the European continent.22 NATO 
would need to develop the defense capabilities to provide the forces for 
Article 5 collective defense and non-Article 5 crisis response missions. 
Essentially, Albright was laying out the U.S. vision statement for 
NATO in advance of the Alliance’s 50th anniversary summit in Wash-
ington in April 1999. In our view it was essential to break through the 
perception that NATO was only about keeping Europe stable, and to 
get Allies to embrace the idea of a common transatlantic community 
defending common values and interests.
Secretary of Defense William Cohen forcefully elaborated on this 
approach at a NATO defense ministers meeting in Villamoura, Por-
tugal on September 24, 1998. The United States wanted to adapt 
NATO’s defense capabilities to provide forces for Article 5 collective 
defense and non-Article 5 crisis response missions. EAPC Partners 
should be involved as much as possible in Alliance activities, particular-
ly non-Article 5 missions. “Risks will remain unpredictable and multi-
directional,” Cohen said. “We must…commit ourselves to develop the 
defense capabilities required to carry out the full spectrum of existing 
and future missions.” That included addressing the threat posed by the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of deliv-
ery by both state and non-state actors, which, Cohen contended, “is 
arguably our most significant potential Article 5 threat.” 
Cohen argued that NATO’s new Strategic Concept, slated to be un-
veiled at the Washington NATO Summit, had to reflect the evolving 
strategic environment, building upon language from 1991 that stated 
“Alliance security must take account of the global context” and that 
“NATO must be capable of responding to multifaceted and multi-di-
rectional risks” if stability in Europe was to be preserved. “The crises 
will no longer come to us,” he said. “We must go to the crises….We 
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may operate as an Alliance, an Alliance with Partners, or NATO could 
provide forces to WEU for operations outside Alliance territory.”23 Co-
hen was quick to say that “this does not involve a global peacekeeping 
role for NATO,” but he underscored that “our history as an Alliance is 
clear proof that we have interests in common that go beyond Article 5 
defense of territory.”24 
Following these ministerial presentations, on October 28, 1998 I 
joined Grossman to present the Triple Crown concept to a “chiefs of 
mission” conference of U.S. Ambassadors posted throughout Europe. 
The upcoming summits (NATO, U.S.-EU and OSCE) presented a 
unique opportunity for the United States to articulate and build sup-
port for a new Euro-Atlantic partnership that would shape our political, 
economic and security interaction in coming decades. A Triple Crown 
task force was organized within the State Department to develop and 
integrate the substantive policy and outreach activities in the U.S. and 
Europe. I was asked to work with Grossman’s Principal Deputy Tony 
Wayne, and Ron Asmus as co-leader of the Task Force, also in my brief 
capacity as Acting Director of the Policy Planning Staff.25
Each of the three major pillars of the architecture—NATO, the 
U.S.-EU partnership, and the OSCE—now needed to evolve.
The United States presented a package of proposals for the spring 
1999 NATO Washington summit. They were designed to highlight its 
view of a new NATO for the new century, as set forth by Albright and 
Cohen. The core of the package was to be a new Strategic Concept that 
emphasized a larger NATO assuming new missions to project stability 
beyond its immediate borders as one central pillar of a new Euro-Atlan-
tic community.26 Reinforcing NATO as the institution of choice when 
North America and Europe decide to act together to address military 
security challenges would keep the United States engaged as a Euro-
pean power, while giving Washington credible and reliable partners to 
address security contingencies outside of Europe, and giving European 
countries a greater voice in U.S. regional diplomacy, for instance in 
the Middle East. NATO would have real and meaningful military mis-
sions securely tied to serious threats to Western vital interests, thereby 
renewing the Alliance’s sense of purpose. And transatlantic preventive 
diplomacy and deterrence strategy would be deeply connected to NA-
TO’s potential use of force and thereby strengthened.27 To meet these 
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goals, force structures and doctrine would need to be realigned. Eu-
ropean capabilities would also have to be improved, either as part of 
a NATO mission or in “separable but not separate” efforts to address 
security challenges should the United States, or NATO, choose not to 
be involved.
The other parts of the architecture also needed tending.
The United States, the EU, and the Struggle to be Strategic 
U.S.-EU summits were now held twice a year as part of the New 
Transatlantic Agenda agreed in 1995, and a vast range of operational 
dialogues now took place among U.S. and EU interlocutors from across 
many different government agencies. The EU was not only America’s 
major economic partner, it brought real resources to the foreign policy 
table, making some of Washington’s most important initiatives possi-
ble. U.S.-EU common or complementary efforts were beginning to 
show some effect, from promoting nuclear safety in Ukraine and Russia 
to responding to hurricane disaster in Central America and defend-
ing human rights in many parts of the globe. The EU’s $1.9 billion 
aid package for the Palestinians was fundamental to the Middle East 
peace process, and its aid to Eastern Europe—including Bosnia—was 
as large in real dollar terms as the amount America gave to Western 
Europe under the Marshall Plan. Together the United States and the 
European Union accounted for 90 percent of humanitarian aid around 
the world.28 
Nonetheless, despite best efforts, the U.S.-EU relationship had still 
not overcome its image as a technocratic exercise with an overabun-
dance of process disproportionate to actual output, a repository of is-
sues dealt with in rather ad hoc fashion by a range of disparate agencies, 
with little sense of urgency or overall direction. Priorities were often 
mismatched; the United States looked for efficiency and concrete out-
comes, while the EU sought legitimacy and symbolic U.S. validation of 
the ongoing process of European integration. Relations were beset by 
competitive impulses, underlying questions of trust, and mutual doubts 
about relative commitment and capacity. 
The U.S.-EU relationship was close, but it was not strategic, in the 
sense that partners would share assessments about issues vital to both 
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on a continuous and interactive basis; be able to deal with the daily 
grind of immediate policy demands while identifying longer-term chal-
lenges to their security, prosperity and values; and be able to prioritize 
those challenges and harness the full range of resources at their disposal 
to advance common or complementary responses. The U.S.-EU part-
nership simply punched below its weight.
In other regions of the world, the Clinton Administration was ad-
vancing an ambitious economic agenda; it was implementing NAFTA, 
seeking to open trade throughout the Americas, and advancing APEC’s 
goal to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacif-
ic region by 2020. The U.S.-EU New Transatlantic Agenda, in con-
trast, set forth a relatively modest objective of building down trans-
atlantic commercial barriers and addressing trade and investment 
obstacles case-by-case. Moreover, even this incremental approach had 
been completely overshadowed by EU fury with such U.S. laws as the 
Helms-Burton Act and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, U.S. challenges 
to the EU’s “banana and beef” regimes, and other disputes. 
Two U.S. Undersecretaries, Stuart Eizenstat and Thomas Pickering, 
the lead State Department officials driving the NTA process, sought 
to move the ball forward. I was involved in an internal working group 
that sought to give more substantive weight to our efforts to render 
the U.S.-EU partnership more effective. The premise of our work was 
that U.S. goals with respect to Europe—our most important trade and 
investment partner—should be no less ambitious than those in Asia and 
Latin America. 
One challenge was to make the global dimension of the U.S.-EU 
partnership more operational so that we could act more effectively and 
quickly together in fast-breaking crises; identify and manage our dif-
ferences before they impair our ability to work together; and, better 
anticipate and prevent emerging threats.29 We started work to advance 
this dimension of the relationship at the spring 1999 U.S.-EU summit 
in Bonn.
We were also ready to consider again a more ambitious economic 
partnership, perhaps even revive the idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade 
Agreement (TAFTA). We found an ally in Leon Brittan, the Europe-
an Commission Vice President and Commissioner for Trade, who by 
spring 1998 was ready to advance plans for a “New Transatlantic Mar-
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ketplace” (NTM). The NTM proposal envisaged a political commit-
ment to eliminate all industrial tariffs by 2010, create a free trade area 
in services, relax restrictions on intellectual property, remove technical 
barriers to trade through mutual product recognition and harmoniza-
tion of standards, and conclude a bilateral agreement on investment. 
The NTM proposal was adopted by the Commission on March 11, 
1998. If implemented, it would have represented a huge leap forward in 
EU-U.S. relations. In the end, however, Brittan was unable to find suf-
ficient support among EU member states. France was vociferous in its 
opposition, and Europeans were furious at U.S. sanctions legislation in 
the form of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato laws directed at Cuba and 
Iran/Libya, respectively, which had also affected European companies. 
The proposals also found only lukewarm support from the Washing-
ton trade establishment. Other trade disputes were weighing down the 
relationship, and Brittan’s plan ruled out audiovisual services and the 
possibility of negotiating agricultural subsidies, which would have been 
key incentives for U.S. support. 
In the end, the most we could muster was the Transatlantic Eco-
nomic Partnership (TEP), an initiative launched at the London U.S.-
EU Summit on May 18, 1998. Elements of Brittan’s proposals were 
salvaged, but the TEP was a watered-down version of the far more 
ambitious NTM. Work began to flesh out an action plan, which was 
launched at the U.S.-EU Summit in December 1998. The action plan 
initiated what were still relatively ambitious efforts to reduce barriers 
and improve regulatory cooperation in a dozen areas ranging from bio-
technology, services and food safety to trade-related labor and environ-
mental issues. 30
Defining the OSCE’s Niche
The OSCE was the third pillar of the architecture. Since the 1994 
Budapest Summit it had been engaged in three major ways. The first 
was via conceptual discussion of the European security model; the sec-
ond was through the growth and changing nature of its field missions; 
and the third was as a framework to accommodate Russian concerns 
and adapt the CFE Treaty to reflect post-Cold War realities.31
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Partially in response to Russian disappointment at not having the 
OSCE formally designated at Budapest as the leading European secu-
rity organization, the OSCE states launched an ongoing dialogue on a 
comprehensive security model for Europe in the 21st century. By 1996 a 
rough consensus had formed around a model of common and coopera-
tive security, in which interlocking institutions in the OSCE area would 
collaborate in a nonhierarchical fashion on the basis of comparative 
advantage. This approach reflected a general assumption that the major 
security problems Europe would face at the end of the Cold War would 
come from conflicts not between but within states. Ethnic and national 
minority issues and the disintegration of states were major challenges. 
The principle of cooperation among mutually reinforcing institutions 
became the central theme of the OSCE’s approach to the new security 
model for Europe.32
As these discussions continued, the OSCE’s niche in the evolving 
security architecture was being defined on the ground through the 
growth and character of its operations in the field, which significantly 
increased and deepened its conflict prevention and management role 
and capabilities. Field missions in Estonia and Latvia had helped ensure 
Russia’s continued fulfillment of its commitment to withdraw its mil-
itary forces from the Baltic states, a process that was essentially com-
plete by late 1994. The OSCE Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh 
and field missions in Georgia, Moldova and the Former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia remained busy. A field mission was established in 
Kyiv on constitutional law and economics. And as the war in Chechnya 
developed, Moscow surprised almost everyone by agreeing to accept 
an OSCE field presence in Chechnya in 1995. In January 1998 Belarus 
accepted the presence of an OSCE Monitoring and Advisory Group.33
Most significantly, after the Dayton Accords were agreed, the OSCE 
was entrusted—in tandem with the EU—with some of the most im-
portant aspects of post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction in the 
Balkans. The United States gave wholehearted support to the OSCE’s 
post-Dayton role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, overseeing elections 
and implementing the Dayton Agreement’s disarmament and confi-
dence-building provisions.34 An OSCE field mission was also estab-
lished in Croatia in July 1996. 
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The United States also used the OSCE as a platform to address 
some of Russia’s most pressing security concerns. For instance, Rus-
sia complained that the CFE flank agreement limits were outdated 
and hampered its response to the security problems presented by the 
conflict in Chechnya. In November 1995 the thirty states parties, led 
by the United States, agreed to consider revising the flank provisions, 
and in May 1996 adopted changes to the areas included as part of the 
flank and agreed upon what amounted to more generous allotments for 
Russia for permanent and temporary deployments of troops and trea-
ty-limited equipment in the region. The revisions were ratified by the 
U.S. Senate in a 100-0 vote, and went into force in mid-1997. Similar-
ly, various CFE review conferences had led to agreement to adapt the 
CFE Treaty from its now-outdated bloc-to-bloc structure to a system 
of national and territorial limits. Negotiations began in 1997. 
The next stage in the OSCE’s evolution would come at its Istanbul 
Summit, which was scheduled for fall of 1999. We began to lay the 
groundwork for the Summit. Our major goal was to solidify the OSCE 
as the institution of choice for conflict resolution, expansion and pro-
tection of democracy and democratic institutions, defense of human 
rights, and identifying and addressing economic issues that could lead 
to conflict and threats to security. We sought to promote new tools 
such as police monitoring to allow greater proactive use of OSCE insti-
tutions in situations that seemed headed for instability or conflict. We 
were also keen to encourage the continued use of OSCE field missions. 
Such missions could serve as useful platforms offering synergies among 
various institutions and NGOs active on the ground in conflict or 
post-conflict situations. All of this underscored our approach to build 
mutually-reinforcing, non-hierarchical relations among complementa-
ry organizations.
“Hallelujah!”
On March 12, 1999, I joined Ron Asmus, Dan Fried, a number of 
members of Congress, and Czech Foreign Minister Jan Kavan, Hun-
garian Foreign Minister János Martonyi, and Polish Foreign Minister 
Bronisław Geremek on Secretary Albright’s plane to the Harry S. Tru-
man Library & Museum in Independence, Missouri. There she would 
sign a paper formally acknowledging receipt of the documents of ac-
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cession by the three countries to the North Atlantic Treaty. Albright, a 
Czech-born refugee to the United States, chose the accession ceremo-
ny site to honor Truman, whom she often called “my first President,” 
and to affirm to the American public the importance of the transatlantic 
Alliance.
As each foreign minister spoke at the ceremony about the signifi-
cance of the moment, a palpable hush enveloped the room—but the 
underlying emotions were electric. Using different turns of phrase, 
each European spoke of returning home to a democratic community 
of shared values, and of their conviction that their tragic histories of 
oppression were finally at an end. Geremek, who as a leading Polish 
dissident in the 1980s had helped engineer the rise of the Solidarnosc 
trade union, declared that Poland was “no longer alone. Today it re-
turns where it belongs--to the free world.” Martonyi said the ceremony 
signified Hungary’s “manifest destiny to return to its natural habitat.” 
Kavan said “the Czech traumas of this century have now been relegated 
forever to history.”35
Then Albright strode to the table on which, in May 1947, President 
Truman signed legislation providing $400 million of aid to Greece and 
Turkey, thereby giving reality to the Truman Doctrine announced that 
spring, and on which, on August 2, 1952, he signed a NATO proto-
col which would have brought the Federal Republic of Germany into 
NATO as part of the European defense community. While that pro-
tocol never came into effect, its objective was realized when Germany 
entered NATO in May 1955.36 
Albright quickly signed the process verbal, attesting to the fact she had 
received the instruments of accession document. The Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland were now members of NATO. She captured the 
emotion of the moment by quoting what she called an “old Central 
European expression”: “Hallelujah.” 
The ceremony marked the culmination of years of intensive effort. 
Yet Albright was intent on making her audience understand that en-
largement was “only one element” of a larger goal. “NATO enlarge-
ment is not an event; it is a process,” she declared. She framed that 
process within our overall efforts to create a new structure of security in 
which NATO’s door would remain open, in which Russia and Ukraine 
and Europe’s other democracies could find a place, and in which the 
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interlocking institutions of Euro-Atlantic architecture would work to-
gether in mutually reinforcing ways. “Although NATO stands tall, it 
does not stand alone,” she said. “The EU, OSCE and NATO and its 
partners form the core of a broader system for protecting vital interests 
and promoting shared values.”
Such a structure would not only be essential to ensure European 
stability, it offered a foundation from which Europe and North Amer-
ica could address future challenges, such as terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction, that could emanate far from European shores. The 
Truman Library event marked “the end of one era and the beginning of 
another,” she told reporters. She used the occasion to turn attention to 
NATO’s upcoming 50th anniversary summit in Washington, at which 
the Alliance was slated to present a new Strategic Concept—a blueprint 
for NATO in the 21st Century.37
That blueprint would design an Alliance that was “not only bigger, 
but also more flexible; an Alliance committed to collective defense, and 
capable of meeting a wide range of threats to its common interests; an 
Alliance working in partnership with other nations and organizations 
to advance security, prosperity and democracy in and for the entire Eu-
ro-Atlantic region.” She reiterated that collective defense was the “core 
mission” of the Alliance. But she was quick to add that 
NATO’s founders understood that what our alliance commits us 
to do under Article V is not all we may be called upon to do, or 
should reserve the right to do. Consider, for example, that when 
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman signed the North At-
lantic Treaty, he characterized it as “insurance against all risks—a 
system of common defense against any attack, whatever its nature.”
During the Cold War, we had no trouble identifying the risks to 
our security and territory. But the threats we face today and may 
face tomorrow are less predictable. They could come from an ag-
gressive regime, a rampaging faction, or a terrorist group. And we 
know that, if past is prologue, we face a future in which weapons 
will be more destructive at longer distances than ever before.38
In April at the Washington Summit, Allies approved the blueprint 
for a new NATO engaged in new missions, with new members, and 
with stronger partnerships. The Strategic Concept described a larger, 
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more flexible Alliance, still committed to collective defense, but capa-
ble of meeting a wider range of threats to common Alliance interests. 
These included the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery, regional conflicts beyond NATO territory, and 
transnational threats like terrorism. The Strategic Concept recognized 
non-Article 5 crisis response operations as a “fundamental task” of the 
Alliance and made clear the expectation that such operations would be 
conducted with Partners. 
Aspirants had made a strong effort to push the Alliance to extend 
additional membership invitations at the Summit. There was no con-
sensus to do so, however. Instead, Allies adopted a U.S. proposal to 
develop with individual aspirants a Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
that could provide a clear roadmap for a strong membership candidacy. 
The Alliance would commit to setting out clearly the major military 
interoperability requirements for aspiring members, expect aspirants 
to step up to challenging defense planning targets, and provide candid 
feedback on progress.39 NATO leaders pledged to revisit the enlarge-
ment process at their next summit, which they said would be “no later” 
than 2002.
Integrating Southeastern Europe
By the time the Czechs, Hungarians and Poles joined NATO in 
March 1999, we had made considerable progress in our efforts to re-
vitalize Euro-Atlantic security architecture and position it to address 
future challenges. The Washington Summit unveiled a new NATO as 
part of that effort. 
Once again, however, Slobodan Milošević threatened to destroy 
what had been accomplished when he sent in troops and police to crush 
the mostly ethnic Albanian, mostly Muslim minority living in Kosovo, 
a province of Serbia. The OSCE, EU and NATO worked in concert to 
head off full-scale war in Kosovo: the OSCE mounted its largest field 
mission ever, the EU applied diplomatic pressure, and NATO threat-
ened to employ military force against Serbia unless it stopped violence 
against the civilian ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Milošević 
responded by stationing 40,000 troops in and around Kosovo. They 
began to move from village to village, shelling and shooting civilians 
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and torching their homes. Efforts by Allies and Russia to secure a peace 
agreement in Rambouillet, France collapsed a week after the accession 
ceremony in Independence, Missouri. One week later, NATO was at 
war.40 
Throughout most of the Administration I had been only tangentially 
engaged on Balkan issues. Holbrooke told me to work on NATO and 
the architectural elements of Euro-Atlantic security while he focused 
on Bosnia. He asked me to scout out possible sites for what turned out 
to be the Dayton Proximity Talks at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
and occasionally asked me what I thought as his team grappled with the 
“problem from hell.” Otherwise my focus was elsewhere. As Kosovo 
descended into violence, however, I was concerned that our overall ef-
forts would be sabotaged by continued Balkan turmoil. 
My concerns were shared by counterparts from Germany, who had 
assumed the rotating Presidency of the European Union in the first half 
of 1999 as well as the annual Presidency of the G8. In a series of calls 
with Markus Ederer, at the time head of the Western Balkans office in 
the German Foreign Office, we agreed that Western efforts to quell 
violence in this region of Europe had to be better aligned with our 
overall efforts to project stability across the continent. We had been ap-
proaching the region tactically; a more strategic approach was needed. 
The day NATO began its bombing campaign, in consultation with 
my colleagues in the European Bureau I wrote Secretary Albright a 
memo arguing that despite our best efforts we were destined to keep 
sliding from one conflict to another in the Western Balkans until we 
embraced a different approach to the region as a whole. We would win 
the war, I wrote, but victory would be hollow unless we and our Eu-
ropean allies were prepared to offer Southeastern Europeans the same 
bargain we had offered those in Central and Northern Europe—to 
stand with them on reforms and to keep the doors to our institutions 
open, if they created the conditions to make it possible someday to walk 
through those doors. 
At the time, this was a radical notion. Much of “mainstream” Europe 
still debated whether this region was truly part of Europe. The chronic 
violence plaguing the region was tragic, but was not viewed as directly 
relevant to European construction and integration. The dominant talk 
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in Western Europe and the United States was of “exit strategies” rather 
than sustained efforts at stabilization. 
We had to break this mentality. The Western Balkans were in fact 
part of Europe, and had to be offered the same perspective of inte-
gration as other parts of Europe—the alternative being more violence, 
conflict, and disintegration. Europe would not be secure, and would be 
unable to become the global partner we sought, until we transformed 
this region from a primary source of instability to a fully integrated 
part of the European and transatlantic mainstream. The only true exit 
strategy from the Balkans, I argued, was an integration strategy. 
This would require us to use our full diplomatic, economic and mil-
itary toolbox and draw on the interlocking institutional architecture we 
had created. NATO was important but insufficient. The OSCE would 
need to play an enhanced role. Most significantly, the European Union 
would need to agree that its own door was potentially open to Western 
Balkan countries. This might prove to be our biggest challenge, but it 
had to be done. Such an effort was not unlike the Marshall Plan, except 
this time the United States would not need to bear the financial burden 
alone or primarily. The European Union, our other partners in Europe 
and elsewhere, the international financial institutions, other interna-
tional organizations, and the private sector could and should carry the 
largest share of this effort. Our job would be to mobilize such efforts. 
I sent the memo to the Secretary under the heading “The Albright 
Plan.” She responded that she liked everything but the name. She asked 
to recast the memo—without the name—as a “night note” from her 
to President Clinton. The President immediately agreed to the effort. 
I was double-hatted, representing both her Policy Planning Staff and 
the European Bureau, to coordinate an overall U.S. effort at region-
al stabilization. I worked closely with Tony Wayne and Ambassador 
Richard Shifter, who had been instrumental in promoting a regional 
law enforcement initiative called the Southeast European Cooperative 
Initiative (SECI).
Tony and I asked Markus Ederer and Wilfried Gruber, who had 
just completed his term as German ambassador in Belgrade, to fly to 
Washington to review our next steps. In those conversations we agreed 
to use the German-American channel to build consensus, both among 
countries of the area and by major partners, including the Russians, 
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to a broad-based effort to stabilize the region, deepen cooperative ties 
among countries in the area, and to hold out the prospect of integration 
into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream. Germany would 
take the public lead in this effort, partly because senior U.S. officials 
were focused on the military campaign and partly because Germany’s 
EU Presidency would be essential to build support in the European 
Commission and among EU member states, and its G-8 Presidency 
could be used to draw in support from Russia, Japan, and the interna-
tional financial institutions. 
President Clinton fully embraced the concept and made it his own. 
In an April 15 speech in San Francisco to the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, the President framed the Kosovo campaign in the 
context of a U.S. South East Europe Initiative to strengthen overall 
Euro-Atlantic architecture, saying “we should try to do for Southeast-
ern Europe what we helped to do for Western Europe after World War 
II and for Central Europe after the Cold War; to help its people build a 
region of multiethnic democracies, a community that upholds common 
standards of human rights, a community in which borders are open to 
people and trade, where nations cooperate to make war unthinkable.” 
We then used the presence of so many leaders at the Washington 
NATO Summit April 23-25 to secure support for an urgent, broad-
based effort to stabilize Southeastern Europe and to give the people 
of that region a real perspective for integration into the European and 
Euro-Atlantic mainstream. By the time the military campaign in Koso-
vo would be over, we argued, a broader political/economic framework 
had to be in place that offered a means to set the entire region on a new 
course. We could not afford to keep sliding from one disaster to anoth-
er in the Balkans. We proposed immediate negotiations to secure a po-
litical commitment to a “Stability Pact” for the region along these lines. 
The response was overwhelmingly positive. Shortly thereafter, Tony 
Wayne and I led the U.S. team to negotiate the Pact with more than 
40 countries and international organizations—including NATO, Rus-
sia, the EU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the United Nations, 
the World Bank, the IMF, the European Investment Bank (EIB) and 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)—
at the Petersburg mountain retreat across the Rhine river from Bonn. 
Gruber, representing the EU Presidency, hosted the negotiations, with 
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Ederer energetically moving things forward, and German Foreign 
Minister Joschka Fischer lending needed political support to close the 
final deal. The document was agreed and finalized in early June, and 
then announced on June 10, the day NATO suspended air operations 
against Serbia. 
During the same period Yeltsin’s envoy Victor Chernomyrdin and 
Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari joined with Strobe Talbott to suc-
cessfully prod Milošević to stop his aggression. Talbott recounts that 
“Chernomyrdin would be the hammer and pound away on Milošević, 
and President Ahtisaari would be the anvil against who the pounding 
would take place, so that Milošević would know what he had to do to 
get the bombing stopped.”41
At its core, the Stability Pact was a bargain between integration and 
reform: the international community agreed to work to stabilize, trans-
form and integrate the countries of the region into the European and 
Euro-Atlantic mainstream; they, in turn, agreed to work individually 
and together to create the political, economic and security conditions 
by which this could be possible. It was a political initiative to encourage 
and strengthen cooperation among the countries of the region, an ef-
fort to promote stronger democracies, civil societies, market economies 
and respect for human rights, and a commitment to facilitate, for those 
who sought it, full integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions.42 No-
tably, Russia was one of the signatories. While our Russian colleagues 
evinced some heartburn when it came to the Pact’s language about 
“Euro-Atlantic integration,” in the end they agreed to it.
On July 30 President Clinton flew to Sarajevo to join the other lead-
ers of the participating and facilitating countries and organizations of 
the Stability Pact to 
reaffirm our shared responsibility to build a Europe that is at long 
last undivided, democratic and at peace. We will work together to 
promote the integration of South Eastern Europe into a continent 
where borders remain inviolable but no longer denote division 
and offer the opportunity of contact and cooperation…We also 
reaffirm the inherent right of each and every state participating in 
the Pact to be free to choose or change its security and association 
arrangements, including treaties of alliance as they evolve.43
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Following the Sarajevo Summit, German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder asked the head of his Chancellery, Bodo Hombach, to head 
overall efforts to implement the Stability Pact. Markus Ederer was his 
chief of staff and the key to the whole effort. I was asked to lead the 
U.S. government’s engagement, working with Miriam Sapiro, my Pol-
icy Planning colleague who had moved to the National Security Coun-
cil staff with James Steinberg. A wonderfully talented Foreign Service 
officer, Rosemary DiCarlo, joined the team and later succeeded me in 
the position. 
The Kosovo campaign and the accompanying Stability Pact un-
derscored the importance of the U.S-EU relationship as part of the 
evolving architecture. Through the Stability Pact the United States 
had pressed the European Commission and EU member states to ac-
cept, and also act, on the logic of their own approach to integration, by 
offering those aspiring to membership concrete perspectives that they 
could draw ever closer, and eventually join, the Union if they created 
the conditions necessary to walk through the EU door. Both in the Sta-
bility Pact agreement and in the Sarajevo Summit Declaration the EU 
committed to “making every effort” to assist those seeking integration 
into EU structures “to make speedy and measurable progress” toward 
that end.44 
Despite the best efforts of our German counterparts and also Euro-
pean Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten and his inde-
fatigable aide Edward Llewellyn, however, getting the European Com-
mission on board was a slog. I found myself flying as often to Brussels as 
to the Balkans to harangue EU colleagues to act on their commitment.
What seemed like an eternity from a U.S. perspective, however, 
was lightning-fast for the Commission. By the time we arrived at the 
OSCE’s Istanbul Summit in November, European Commission Presi-
dent Romano Prodi was able to announce that the Commission would 
devote close to 12 billion euros to Southeastern Europe over the next 
six years. For non-accession candidates in the Western Balkans the EU 
developed a new type of contractual relationship, termed “Stabilization 
and Association Agreements,” which provided for a closer association 
with the Union and a perspective of eventual integration.45
The European Union was beginning to define itself more expan-
sively and inclusively: in December it invited Romania and Bulgaria to 
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join Hungary and Slovenia, among others, in accession negotiations; it 
offered to include Turkey as a membership candidate; and it announced 
that as of 2003 it would be able to take in further new members. 
Within a year the Stability Pact had initiated a series of regional 
initiatives and secured substantial pledges of financial support from a 
range of countries and international financial institutions.46 By the end 
of the Administration’s term European allies and partners were con-
tributing more than 80 percent of the ground forces conducting peace-
keeping operations in the region. They were providing humanitarian 
and reconstruction assistance to the region in the form of “quick-start” 
projects worth more than $2.2 billion dollars that were earmarked to 
rebuild infrastructure, reopen borders, and disarm local militias. EU 
members were contributing 60% of the funds for Kosovo. The U.S. 
and the EU were also able to harness their combined influence to 
leverage additional financial support from international financial in-
stitutions; the World Bank, the IMF, the EBRD, the EIB were all in-
volved. These were all signs of a more balanced partnership in which 
the United States could exercise leadership but did not need to carry 
the biggest burden.47
Some observers and critics lost the forest for the trees, complaining 
about the Stability Pact’s plethora of “working tables” and initiatives. In 
many ways, it was our “Euro-Chart” in miniature. The essential point 
of the Stability Pact, however, was not to get lost in the process but to 
keep focus squarely on the basic bargain. From the U.S. perspective, 
the prime purpose of the Stability Pact was to apply the same logic of 
integration to Southeastern Europe as we had applied to Central and 
Northern Europe. We had gained broad recognition that the people 
of the Western Balkans were not only part of Europe, they had to be 
offered the same perspective of integration as those in other parts of 
Europe. They would need to make the hard choices for reform that 
could make that possible; we would stand by them as they did. The al-
ternative was more violence, more conflict, and further disintegration. 
The New OSCE
Post-conflict efforts following the Kosovo war, together with the 
Stability Pact mechanisms for Southeastern Europe, which were sub-
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sequently placed under the auspices of the OSCE, underscored once 
again the importance of that organization, and the opportunity to ad-
vance our Triple Crown effort at its summit in Istanbul in November 
1999. 
At Istanbul we sought to promote our concept of mutually-reinforc-
ing, non-hierarchical relations among the key institutions of Euro-At-
lantic architecture, and in this context to solidify the OSCE as the in-
stitution of choice when it came to conflict resolution, expansion and 
protection of democracy and democratic institutions, defense of human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, and identifying and 
addressing economic issues that could lead to conflict and threats to 
security throughout the Euro-Atlantic community. Negotiations on 
a new security model for Europe culminated in the elaboration and 
adoption of the comprehensive Charter for European Security at the 
Summit.48 As William Hill recounts, the push for an all-inclusive agree-
ment and document on European security was a logical outgrowth of 
and heir to the aspirations for an undivided Europe and comprehensive 
definition of security embodied in the Charter of Paris and other im-
mediate post-Cold War documents and proposals. In Istanbul, Clinton 
called the OSCE “a unique institution grounded in the principle that 
the root of human insecurity is the denial of human rights…the charter 
we’ve negotiated recognizes that the greatest threats to our security 
today are as likely to come from conflicts that begin within states as 
between them.”49
Building confidence and security within societies was what the OSCE 
had always done best. Election monitoring, peacekeeping, efforts to 
address trafficking, corruption, national minorities, and arms control/
verification were all important aspects. Perhaps the OSCE’s most vital 
work was being done through its field missions, including a high-pro-
file presence in Chechnya and the largest field mission of its history in 
Kosovo. We wanted to empower the OSCE to become more opera-
tional in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, management 
and resolution, and post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. In 
this regard, we sought to promote new tools such as police monitoring 
to allow greater proactive use of OSCE institutions in situations that 
seemed headed for instability or conflict. We continued to encourage 
OSCE field missions as “platforms” to synthesize the activities of inter-
national organizations and NGOs. 
370 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
Kosovo demonstrated that the OSCE needed to organize and de-
ploy its resources faster to areas of need. We proposed the formation 
of Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT), a re-
serve capability within participating states that would enable the OSCE 
to deploy experts in elections, law, media, administration and policing 
rapidly for more effective conflict prevention, crisis management, and 
post-conflict rehabilitation.50 
While the OSCE’s responsibilities extended from Vancouver to 
Vladivostok, in practice it had become increasingly focused in its op-
erational work in the Balkans. We wanted the OSCE to apply its tools 
throughout the broader Euro-Atlantic region, a point we underscored 
in our support for stepped-up OSCE engagement in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia.
We also sought to establish the OSCE as a comprehensive frame-
work in which arms control and confidence-building could be import-
ant elements of our strategy. This was important for the adaptation 
of the CFE Treaty, in which a system of national and territorial ceil-
ings replaced outmoded bloc-to-bloc calculations. The Adapted CFE 
Treaty was agreed at Istanbul, although NATO allies linked their rat-
ification to Russia’s commitment to withdraw its forces from Georgia 
and Moldova. A related advance came with agreement on the “Vienna 
Document,” a real expansion and deepening of the commitments of all 
OSCE states with regard to information exchanges, visits and inspec-
tions, and other transparency measures.51
These initiatives and others adopted in Istanbul laid the groundwork 
for a more action-oriented OSCE whose value added was that it could 
potentially deal better with conflicts within societies than others, and 
that was better equipped with relevant tools to do so. By the end of the 
Administration in 2000, the 25th anniversary year of the Helsinki Final 
Act, the OSCE had twenty missions and about 3,000 personnel in the 
field, and continued to break new ground with a broad and flexible 
array of tools for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-con-
flict rehabilitation. By the end of the Clinton Administration, William 
Hill could write that “the OSCE truly flowered…perhaps reaching the 
zenith of its activity and influence.”52 
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“Two Institutions in the Same City Living on Different Planets”
About this time Marc Grossman became Director General of the 
U.S. Foreign Service and Ron Asmus left the State Department. Sec-
retary Albright asked me to succeed Ron, to work now with James 
Dobbins in the European Bureau’s front office, with a portfolio that 
combined our continued work on regional political-military affairs and 
Nordic-Baltic issues while still overseeing U.S. efforts at Southeastern 
European stabilization and integration. When I found myself flying 
rather exotic routes from Tallinn to Thessaloniki or from Iceland to 
Istanbul, I couldn’t help thinking we truly were experiencing a new 
Europe.
As the Clinton Administration drew to an end, most building blocks 
of a new Euro-Atlantic architecture had been put into place, with one 
curious exception: the strange non-relationship between the primary 
institutions of the West, the European Union and NATO, which Rob-
ert Hunter often described as “two institutions in the same city living 
on different planets.”
Bosnia, Kosovo and a host of other crises underscored the need for 
improved European capabilities and better coordination mechanisms 
to deepen EU-NATO cooperation so that civilian and military efforts 
at crisis management worked more effectively together.53 We believed 
that American popular support for a continuing U.S. role in Europe 
was increasingly related to the perception that America’s European 
partners were willing and able to assume more responsibility not only 
for their own security but also for defending common interests of the 
transatlantic community in the wider world. A European defense initia-
tive that bolstered European capabilities, if developed with care, could 
be a possible expression of that commitment and be mutually reinforc-
ing with NATO initiatives. Common foreign and security policy was 
a logical next step in the European integration process and could help 
to avoid renationalization of European defense. U.S. support was also 
consistent with the premise of the Triple Crown strategy that the Unit-
ed States needed a strong and coherent European Union as a partner 
on the European continent and beyond.54 A more coherent and capable 
European profile could equip the EU to assume the lead in the Balkans 
or to engage, if necessary, in areas such as Africa, where the United 
States was unlikely to play a prominent role. The United States needed 
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to welcome enhanced European crisis management capabilities in situ-
ations where NATO—meaning, in practice, the United States—would 
decide not to become engaged. 
Even those who supported such efforts, however, were concerned 
that European force commitments and capability pledges too often 
tended to be little more than empty exercises in European self-asser-
tion. Americans across the board were both wary and weary of repeat-
ed European pledges that seemed to melt away with the next spring 
thaw. In American eyes, the EU effort not just to build a European 
Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), but to move to what would be 
called European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), was not just a 
narrow technical topic for policy wonks. It was emblematic of a far 
larger strategic debate about how—and even whether—Europe and the 
United States could tackle in more equal and balanced fashion the se-
curity challenges posed by the post-Cold War world. If ESDP and the 
Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy were developed in ways 
that truly created greater European capabilities, not just more Europe-
an process, they could be vehicles for a stronger, outward-looking Eu-
rope and a more balanced, global partnership with the United States.
The key was to shape and condition European initiatives so they 
would complement, rather than compete, with those of the Alliance. 
Meanwhile, French and British experiences in the Balkans and else-
where had laid bare key military deficiencies. Paris and London each 
realized they had to do something. Paris had long argued that the EU 
needed more muscular defense forces. The real change came from 
London. 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair had come to believe that Bosnia, 
Rwanda, and Kosovo were harbingers of a post-Cold War world in 
which the international community would be increasingly challenged 
to confront unprincipled actors who were engaging in wonton acts 
of ethnic cleansing and even genocide, and who believed they could 
use the principle of non-interference in a country’s domestic affairs to 
shield themselves from international intervention. Blair, appalled by 
the failure of the international community to stop the Rwandan geno-
cide, and having seen how the Bosnian tragedy had only been turned 
around by international intervention, was now frustrated by the threat-
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ened continued use of the veto by Russia and China blocking a U.N. 
Security Council Resolution on intervention in Kosovo. 
Blair was convinced that the United Kingdom had to be equipped 
to act. Britain’s Strategic Defense Review committed the UK to a real 
defense spending increase for the first time in 15 years. Britain was 
unlikely to engage unilaterally, however; it would need to work with 
others. Yet Blair believed that international mechanisms had to be fa-
cilitative; they could not be allowed to block what he deeply believed 
to be the moral imperative of humanitarian intervention. The UK and 
its European partners clearly needed to bolster their military capabili-
ties, and when they chose to deploy them, they needed to be able to do 
so via whatever mechanism might prove appropriate given the specific 
case at hand—through the U.N., through NATO, through European 
efforts drawing on NATO assets when NATO chose not to be involved, 
or, if need be, through the EU alone.
Traditionally, the UK had been hesitant to provide the EU with “au-
tonomous” defense structures. On December 4, 1998, however, Lon-
don and Paris took a decisive step at their St. Malo summit. They con-
cluded in a Joint Declaration that the EU “must have the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means 
to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises.” It was agreed that the EU should be able to act, 
whether using NATO assets or on its own “outside the NATO frame-
work.” The declaration also noted both that military action would take 
place “when the Alliance as a whole is not engaged,” and that these 
European capacities should be developed “without unnecessary dupli-
cation.” 55
The White House wanted a clear U.S. response to the St. Malo 
Declaration. It was important to support this new emphasis on bolster-
ing greater capabilities while ensuring that EU efforts could comple-
ment, rather than compete, with those of the Alliance. I was asked to 
draft an opinion piece; working with Deputy National Security Adviser 
James Steinberg and with Secretary Albright, the draft was massaged 
and appeared in the Financial Times on December 7 under the title 
“The right balance will secure NATO’s future.” The message: Clinton 
Administration support for greater European efforts would be condi-
tioned by what Secretary Albright termed the “three D’s:” no discrim-
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ination against non-EU NATO members, no decoupling of European 
and North American security, and no duplication of NATO’s operation-
al planning system or its command structure.56 
At the same time, the administration pushed hard for NATO to 
launch its own Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Washington 
summit four months later. The DCI was designed to improve Allied 
forces’ deployability, mobility, sustainability, survivability and effective-
ness. It identified some 58 areas in which Allies were asked to make 
concrete improvements in their forces to fill specific capability gaps. 
The collapse of the Rambouillet peace effort and the start of NA-
TO’s bombing campaign against Milošević reinforced Blair’s views. To 
press his case, Blair took the unusual step of flying to Chicago on the 
eve of the NATO Summit to set forth his doctrine of humanitarian in-
tervention. “The most pressing foreign policy problem we face,” Blair 
said before the Economic Club of Chicago on April 24, 1999, “is to 
identify the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in 
other people’s conflicts.”57 While framing the issue as a challenge for 
the U.N., Blair knew that Europe and the United States would have to 
be the motor behind new multilateral approaches to such issues. 
The Kosovo war was the third out-of-area conflict North America 
and Europe had faced in the 1990s; such challenges indeed seemed far 
more likely in future than traditional threats to the territorial security 
of the Alliance. Being equipped to address out-of-area challenges, how-
ever, was going to be much easier for the United States, whose forces 
had been built around power projection rather than territorial security, 
than for the Europeans, whose Cold War forces had been oriented the 
other way around. By and large Europeans were unenthusiastic about 
reorienting their military postures from protecting European territo-
ry—familiar but less necessary—to projecting force beyond their bor-
ders—controversial but more necessary. 
The Clinton Administration used these concerns to frame and guide 
its support for a more cohesive and responsive European foreign policy 
and above all, for more capable European defense. The Kosovo war af-
firmed to U.S. leaders and the U.S. military that not enough European 
armed forces were ready for the diverse, rapidly-evolving challenges of 
the post-Cold War world. In American eyes, Europe had been sluggish 
in its efforts to manage the shift away from the massed, terrain-based 
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forces necessary for the Cold War toward more mobile, deployable and 
sustainable forces and improved lift, logistics and intelligence capabil-
ities. Kosovo underscored European dependence on the United States 
for precision-strike capability, surveillance and intelligence assets, re-
fueling, lift, logistics, and high-end command and control systems. 
European forces would need to become more mobile, deployable and 
sustainable. “A central lesson” of the Kosovo campaign, Secretary Al-
bright and UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook warned, was that “not 
enough European armed forces are ready for the diverse, rapidly evolv-
ing challenges of the post-Cold War world. Too many are trained and 
equipped to defend against a threat that no longer exists.”58 
The widening capabilities gap threatened Alliance unity by widen-
ing the faultlines we had sought to repair as we crafted NATO’s new 
Strategic Concept. The U.S. military had been irritated that it had to 
provide 80 percent of the useful capability in the Kosovo air campaign, 
while needing to negotiate a consensus with 18 other countries on op-
erational methods. Unless the Europeans could bolster their capabili-
ties to fight alongside Americans, there was a danger that each side of 
the North Atlantic would address such challenges separately—the U.S. 
unilaterally, unconstrained by “war by committee,” the Europeans via 
the EU or perhaps not at all. 
The dangers were apparent. The United States was carrying virtu-
ally all the risk of defending common vital interests where they were 
now most threatened—beyond Europe’s periphery. To take just one ex-
ample, U.S. military plans included defense of Persian Gulf oil supplies 
without reliance on NATO Allies, even though the Allies depended 
more on Gulf oil than the United States. 
It was time to jettison traditional U.S. concerns about a stronger 
European profile. The danger was European weakness, not European 
strength. It was time to end the counterproductive competition that 
had long existed between the EU and NATO; Secretary Albright want-
ed a “true strategic partnership.” In a joint article, Secretary Albright 
and UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook affirmed that “NATO remains 
the foundation of the collective defense of its members,” but added it 
was important to craft “new arrangements to link the EU and NATO 
in unprecedented ways, laying the foundation for a true strategic part-
nership between the two key institutions of the West.”59
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Those new arrangements would mean that European contributions 
to NATO operations, in the Balkans and perhaps elsewhere, could be 
stronger and more effective. It meant that where NATO as a whole 
chose not to become engaged, the EU would be able to act in response 
to humanitarian crises, to provide disaster relief and also undertake 
peacekeeping tasks. It meant that European nations, inside and outside 
the EU, would be ready and able to offer forces for EU-led operations 
and be afforded the opportunity to participate, just as they had in NA-
TO-led operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. 
In such a context, Albright’s 3D’s could be addressed. To minimize 
duplication of effort, NATO had offered the EU assured access to 
NATO planning, which the EU welcomed. To address the danger of 
discrimination, the EU proposed new arrangements for close and con-
tinuous involvement of non-EU European allies. With such arrange-
ments in place, there was less risk that North American and European 
security would be decoupled. Europe’s contributions to NATO would 
be strengthened, relations between the European Union and non-EU 
European allies enhanced and Europe’s ability to support the activities 
of the OSCE and the U.N. improved.60 
The turnaround in British policy facilitated the transformation of 
the ESDI into the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at 
the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999. At Hel-
sinki leaders also announced a Headline Goal of bolstering European 
military capabilities with the aim of developing a future European Rap-
id Reaction Force by 2003 of 60,000 troops deployable in 60 days and 
sustainable for a year. It was intended to be a force capable of undertak-
ing the full range of so-called “Petersburg Tasks,” that is tasks ranging 
from rescue and humanitarian missions, through peacekeeping to that 
of combat troops in peacekeeping. By December 2000 forces to meet 
the Headline Goal were offered by EU countries, non-EU European 
allies and EU candidate countries. EU nations committed themselves 
to the capability improvements necessary to achieve the goal in full by 
2003. NATO and the EU would work together to ensure that shortfalls 
were met and that the planning to meet capability goals of both orga-
nizations was coordinated.
To highlight the changing nature of relations I had pressed hard for a 
joint session of NATO and EU foreign ministers while NATO foreign 
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ministers were in Brussels for their semiannual meeting in December 
2000. It was a bridge too far; EU qualms prevented a formal meeting. 
As one of our last acts in office, however, we managed a work-around: 
Canadian and European foreign ministers would host an informal fare-
well event for Secretary Albright. Her counterparts from both NATO 
and EU member states agreed. After five decades, the two institutions 
had finally come together, if only over dinner.
Conclusion
The Clinton Administration’s effort to recast Euro-Atlantic archi-
tecture for the post-Wall world went through three phases. The first 
was a period of distraction, division and indecision during the Presi-
dent’s first year in office. A decisive second phase, punctuated by war 
and then imposition of peace in Bosnia, began with the NATO Brus-
sels Summit in January 1994 and culminated in a flurry of summits 
in 1997 that resulted in special NATO partnerships with both Russia 
and Ukraine, internal and external adaption of the Alliance, including 
membership invitations to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, 
and enhanced political and military cooperation with NATO’s growing 
list of partners. The third phase, which lasted until the end of the Ad-
ministration, was again punctuated by war, this time in Kosovo, even as 
the Administration sought to equip NATO for new missions, further 
energize the OSCE, and build a more effective and outward-looking 
U.S.-EU partnership. 
As the 21st century dawned, the United States and its European 
Allies and partners had developed a Euro-Atlantic architecture of co-
operative overlapping, and interlocking institutions that enabled new 
members to walk through the doors of NATO and the EU in ways that 
were not at the expense of other states or institutions.61 A democratic 
peace had taken hold across much of the continent; Europe was more 
secure than at any time in the previous century. Yet Europeans were 
approaching with uncertainty and apprehension challenges of a gen-
eration. America’s European Allies were more prosperous than ever, 
but the benefits of that prosperity were not yet shared fully among all 
Europeans. The Baltic republics remained anxious about their future. 
Slobodan Milošević, whose toxic brand of nationalism had inflamed the 
Balkans, was out of power, yet tensions still afflicted the region. Europe 
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would not be secure until its northeastern and southeastern corners 
was transformed from sources of insecurity and instability into fully 
integrated parts of the European and transatlantic mainstream. And 
the transatlantic community’s efforts to develop a new and sustainable 
partnership with Russia—itself in the midst of a generational transfor-
mation—remained a formidable work in progress. 
The United States had a major stake in the outcome of these gener-
ational choices. During the 20th century American leaders learned the 
hard way that America’s interests are deeply intertwined with the secu-
rity and prosperity of Europe. Whenever we failed to make the invest-
ment required to protect those interests, we always ended up paying a 
higher price later. As the Clinton Administration left office, however, it 
was unclear whether the United States would sustain that investment. 
America, a European power? Today, the question mark has returned. 
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Chapter 16
Winning Congressional and Public Support 
for NATO Enlargement, and the Political 
Psychology of Collective Defense
Jeremy D. Rosner
The debate in the United States over ratification of the first post-
Cold War enlargement of NATO demonstrated the potential for the 
country to act in a bipartisan way to refresh support for the Alliance in 
a new security period. That decision in the late 1990s, endorsed by a 
broad range of groups and experts from both parties, seems far from to-
day’s polarized partisan environment, but suggests some paths toward 
political progress on current national security challenges. 
The Pivot from Policy Development to Ratification
By late 1996, NATO governments were moving toward consensus 
after a years-long transatlantic policy debate about NATO’s evolution 
after the Cold War. In the United States, after over three years of pol-
icy development, President Bill Clinton declared in October of that 
year that he and his administration were ready to formally invite Cen-
tral European states to the Alliance, to ensure “the Iron Curtain [is not] 
replaced by a veil of indifference.”1 He argued that enlargement would 
add capable allies to NATO, tamp down dangerous strategic insecurity 
in Europe’s center, and help define a new and workable relationship 
between NATO and Russia. 
But if there was support from policy makers, it was not clear there 
was equal support from NATO’s publics and legislatures. This was a 
particular question in the United States, given the U.S. Congress’s sub-
stantial, independent powers over foreign policy. 
To be sure, there were many signs U.S. ratification could succeed. 
NATO remained popular with the public, with 63% favoring a sus-
tained or increased commitment to NATO, according to an October 
1997 Pew Research Center poll.2 Presidents had rarely lost congressio-
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nal votes on major treaties and foreign agreements since World War II. 
NATO enlargement had been part of the “Contract with America” that 
GOP House candidates touted in 1994, and President Clinton’s Re-
publican opponent during the 1996 election, U.S. Senator Bob Dole, 
had also pushed for the idea. A “NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act,” 
endorsing the policy, cleared Congress with strong bipartisan support 
in mid-1996 and was signed by the Clinton Administration. In earlier 
times, the Senate had regularly given overwhelming approval to each 
previous request to add new members to the Alliance—Greece and 
Turkey in 1952; West Germany in 1955; and Spain in 1982.
Yet major uncertainties loomed:
• Although majorities of the American public after the end of the 
Cold War continued to say the United States should play an 
active role in world affairs, there had been a strong surge in the 
share who wanted more focus on domestic rather than global 
challenges. Reflecting this, Clinton had been elected promising 
a laser-like focus on problems at home.3 
• Similarly, although the public held generally favorable views 
about NATO, there was little public understanding of what it 
would mean to extend NATO’s robust security assurances to Po-
land, Hungary, and the Czech Republic—the first three states 
proposed for membership. 
• The Cold War’s end had emboldened Congress to challenge 
the executive branch more forcefully across a range of foreign 
policy issues, reflecting the historical norm that relative peace 
in the world means relatively less peace between Congress and 
the White House on national security.4 President Clinton had 
only with great effort won a November 1993 House vote on the 
North America Free Trade Act. By 1999, the Senate would fall 
19 votes short on approving the Comprehensive Test Ban Trea-
ty, with a 51-48 vote against ratification.
• This would be the first (and, even now, the only) time a Demo-
cratic president sought approval for NATO’s enlargement from 
a Republican-controlled Senate. That was the same partisan 
combination that led to defeat of the Treaty of Versailles after 
World War I. 
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• Republicans in Congress harbored particular animus toward 
this Democratic President. As during the Wilson Administra-
tion, animus toward the president was particular sharp from the 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—Henry 
Cabot Lodge in 1919, Jesse Helms in 1997—the committee of 
jurisdiction on a NATO enlargement vote. 
• Congressional Republicans had supported the NATO Enlarge-
ment Facilitation Act during the summer of 1996 partly to help 
Dole claim the issue as his own; but by early 1997 Dole had 
lost and it was Democrat Clinton pushing the idea as a signal 
initiative.
• Although support for NATO’s enlargement was broad, it was 
comprised of what political scientist George Grayson later called 
a “strange bedfellows” coalition, including Republicans and 
Democrats, defense hawks and human rights idealists, unionists 
focused on the brave actions of Poland’s Solidarity, and business 
leaders focused on the lure of new markets in Central Europe. 
Keeping this diverse coalition united was by no means assured.
For all these reasons, some foreign policy experts at the time doubt-
ed whether it would be possible to gain ratification. One said it would 
take a “feat of magic” given “skin deep” support for NATO, and a pub-
lic that had been reluctant to send troops to Bosnia or money to Mexico 
to relieve the peso crisis.5
Facing such danger signs, President Clinton and Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright decided to take special steps to ensure they would 
have the necessary public and congressional backing. They created a 
special office with the sole purpose of obtaining that support. It would 
be housed at the State Department, but “double hatted,” reporting 
directly to both the Secretary and National Security Adviser Samuel 
“Sandy” Berger. Berger and Albright’s Deputy Secretary, Strobe Tal-
bott, asked me to lead the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office (S/
NERO)—and, along with a gifted Foreign Service Officer (later U.S. 
Ambassador to Serbia and Pakistan) Cameron Munter, we began our 
work in early March 1997. A few weeks later, Albright and Talbott re-
cruited Ronald Asmus, a RAND analyst who was one of the intellectu-
al fathers of NATO enlargement, to be Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
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State for European Affairs, to lead the policy work on this effort, and 
Asmus became our close partner in achieving ratification. 
Defining Success: “A Good Win”
On one level, S/NERO’s goal was simple: getting the constitutional-
ly-required “two-thirds of the Senators present” to approve an amend-
ment to the North Atlantic Treaty. We knew that falling short of that 
goal would be a disaster. Woodrow Wilson’s failure to achieve ratifica-
tion of the Treaty of Versailles was not only a huge political setback for 
his administration and party; it also helped signal an American retreat 
from global affairs that would contribute to the worst moments of the 
rest of that century. We were determined not to permit a Senate defeat 
that would send a similar signal after the close of the Cold War. 
But from the outset, the Clinton Administration approached the 
ratification effort not simply as a quest for 67 votes and a legal hur-
dle for adding three countries to the Alliance. Rather, the ratification 
campaign represented a broader opportunity to sharpen the American 
public’s understanding of, and support for, the Alliance, and to ensure 
the public was ready to support the treaty’s security commitments, par-
ticularly toward new members, in a new era.
Public support had always been the critical variable at the core of the 
Treaty’s security guarantees. When Dean Acheson first explained the 
new Atlantic Alliance to the American public in 1949, he observed that 
the operation of Article 5—the Treaty’s central promise of collective 
defense—was “not a legalistic question.” He said it was rather “a ques-
tion of faith and principle,” linked to the “exercise of will.”6 It would 
ultimately be futile and dangerous to extend NATO membership to 
Central European states without ensuring the American public and 
Congress were truly prepared to treat an attack against one of them as 
an attack against all. A narrow victory in the Senate, or Senate consent 
without real public backing, would not suffice. 
These factors framed S/NERO’s work from the start. On February 
26, 1997, just days before joining the administration, I sent a personal 
note to Albright, Talbott, Berger, and Deputy National Security Ad-
viser James Steinberg, laying out what I felt should be the goals of the 
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ratification effort. I argued our goal should not only be a win, but “a 
good win.” 
A “good win” meant obtaining not just the constitutional require-
ment of two-thirds of the Senate, but a lopsided, larger-than-expected, 
and fully bipartisan margin. I argued we needed to show “broad, enthu-
siastic U.S. support, both to make the … security guarantees [to new 
allies] more meaningful, and to strengthen the U.S. as it pursues other 
foreign policy goals.”
A good win also meant that the victory could not come at the expense 
of other U.S. interests, including constructive relations with Russia. 
Clinton had staked a good deal on building closer ties to Russia and 
President Boris Yeltsin. A win on NATO enlargement would be under-
mined if pursued in a way that needlessly poisoned that relationship.
A good win also had to provide affirmation and political momen-
tum for the Open Door concept—NATO’s pledge that membership 
would remain open to qualified candidate states that were not in this 
first round of enlargement. I was confident that if we made the Open 
Door policy an explicit part of the debate and won strong Senate en-
dorsement, then votes on future rounds would be less controversial. 
This proved to be true.7
Finally, a good win had to involve the broad public, to the greatest 
extent possible. As a student of public opinion on national security, I 
knew that the public pays relatively little attention to most foreign pol-
icy issues, and that we would never make NATO’s enlargement a topic 
of conversation at most American dinner tables. But I argued we need-
ed to do all we could to take this issue to the public, and draw as many 
sectors of society as possible into the discussion. I felt the strength and 
legitimacy of NATO’s security guarantees partly depended on this.
The February 26 memo suggested several things were necessary to 
achieve a good win. As noted, the effort needed to be bipartisan; but 
I argued that the harder half of achieving bipartisan support lay with 
winning Republican votes: “While most of the votes we need to pick 
up…are from Democrats on the left, the most serious prospect for de-
feat entails a broad defection by Republicans on the right.” My reading 
of Stull Holt’s 1933 study Treaties Defeated in the Senate and other his-
torical analyses underscored that treaties in the 20th century had nearly 
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always been threatened by Republicans, not Democrats.8 Despite scat-
tered internal resistance to the idea of focusing the ratification cam-
paign more on wooing Republicans than Democrats, the President’s 
team ultimately sided with my recommendation.
Achieving a good win would also require deeply involving the Sen-
ate in the ratification process. Holt concluded that a key factor in the 
Senate’s rejection of the Treaty of Versailles was Wilson’s refusal to 
involve Senator Lodge and his colleagues more in the negotiations. 
My memo therefore urged the administration to invite the Senate to 
create a group that would have a real seat in the diplomacy, and it urged 
involving the House as well, since the House could play a major role 
in shaping this kind of national debate, even if it lacked a vote on the 
Treaty. 
My memo argued that another key to success was creating a tangible 
sense of momentum and inevitability. If the outcome of the vote never 
seemed in doubt, it would depress the energy of opponents, make en-
largement’s critics seem more fringe, reduce the leverage of Senators 
seeking amendments, and contribute to a broader public and interna-
tional sense that, at least in the United States, the wisdom of enlarging 
NATO was more a matter of consensus than dispute.   
The Ratification Campaign
There is neither space nor need to describe here in detail the specific 
steps the Clinton Administration took to achieve ratification of the first 
round of NATO’s enlargement. Several excellent books chronicle those 
actions, especially those by Asmus, Grayson, and James Goldgeier.9 Yet 
it is worth noting a few points about the effort, especially those aimed 
at “a good win.”
The importance of early diplomacy and signaling to Congress
Much of the work needed to ensure ratification preceded S/NERO’s 
creation. President Clinton had already signaled unequivocally to Con-
gress that NATO’s enlargement was a personal priority; he had stressed 
it during his re-election campaign and in his 1997 State of the Union 
address.10 In speeches and meetings with Congress, he and Secretary 
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Albright had clearly laid out enlargement’s strategic rationale. Albright 
and Talbott had succeeded in driving the Alliance to create the “NA-
TO-Russia Founding Act,” and they, along with others, managed to 
walk a fine line important for ratification politics. The Founding Act 
was positive enough toward Moscow that it reduced anxieties (mostly 
among Democrats) that NATO enlargement would antagonize Mos-
cow. But it also had enough red lines between Russia and NATO’s own 
decision-making that it minimized concerns (mostly among Republi-
cans) that NATO was giving Russia any kind of vote or veto. The State 
Department’s former Europe chief, Richard Holbrooke, had helped 
solidify the inter-agency consensus behind enlargement. All this laid a 
strong foundation for later success in Congress.
The Senate NATO Observer Group
The President’s top advisers quickly agreed with the idea of inviting 
the Senate to create an “observer group” to take part in the diplomacy 
that would precede ratification. Yet before they could act on this idea, 
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott on March 21, 1997 proposed the 
idea himself, in a Washington Post op-ed.11 This was a stroke of good 
fortune, since it put the Senate’s own stamp on the idea, and linked it to 
one of the Republicans most needed for success. Lott’s initiative meant 
that he would decide which Senators to involve, freeing us from that 
knotty question, given that multiple committees and individual Sena-
tors arguably had a stake in the issue. The Observer Group ultimately 
included 28 Senators, with an even partisan split, including key en-
largement supporters and opponents. 
There were some bitter early fights between the Observer Group 
and the administration over the Senate’s role in diplomacy, especially 
the degree to which it could access classified diplomatic cables. But 
over some months, the two branches built a satisfactory process of 
cooperation, and the Group contributed significantly to the Senate’s 
work. There were ultimately 17 meetings between the Observer Group 
and the President, members of his administration, or relevant foreign 
leaders. The administration also brought members of the Senate Ob-
server Group, along with House members, to NATO’s Madrid Summit 
in July 1997. 
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U.S. Committee on the Enlargement of NATO
In a saga filled with surprising turns, few were as unexpected or help-
ful as the appearance of Bruce Jackson. A central casting country-club 
Republican and Dole fundraiser, in October 1996 he reached out to 
NSC official (later U.S. Ambassador to Poland) Daniel Fried to offer 
the creation of an outside bipartisan committee to support the enlarge-
ment effort. Fried connected Jackson to me, and by the time S/NERO 
opened shop, the U.S. Committee on the Enlargement of NATO had 
become a vital part of the ratification effort. Jackson and his Republican 
co-leader, Julie Finley, hosted dozens of gatherings where members of 
Congress, staff, and journalists could meet visiting Central European 
leaders, and hear their case for enlargement first-hand. Jackson’s and 
Finley’s strong ties with Hill Republicans proved a key bridge across 
the aisle. The Committee ultimately ran ads in Capitol Hill newspa-
pers (including one with an iconic photo of Albright and Helms, on 
the same stage, beaming at each other and holding hands) in support of 
NATO’s enlargement.
Endorsements
An early and constant priority for S/NERO was getting endorse-
ments from a wide range of organizations and luminaries. That not 
only showed broad public support—and dispelled the canard that this 
was only an issue of concern to ethnic Central European voters—but 
it also made it easy for senators who were just learning about the is-
sue to be comfortable with it. We wanted to “close the off-ramps” for 
skeptical Senators by showing there was almost no segment of society 
that opposed the issue. Air Force Brigadier General Robert “Tip” Os-
terthaler spent weeks with S/NERO staff visiting leaders of veterans’ 
organizations to make the case for NATO’s enlargement. Munter flew 
uninvited to a meeting of the U.S. Conference of Mayors and came 
away with their endorsement. We ultimately obtained endorsements 
from over three dozen organizations—including the Veterans of For-
eign Wars, the American Legion, the AFL-CIO, the National Gov-
ernors Association, the American Jewish Committee, a range of state 
legislatures, three former presidents (including President Carter, after 
a direct pitch to him by Secretary Albright), and a wide range of nation-
al security experts and former officials from both parties.
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Editorial boards
The ratification strategy aimed to generate as much nationwide me-
dia discussion as possible. To that end, we mounted a broad outreach 
to editorial boards at both the major national newspapers and local pa-
pers. Administration officials fanned out across the country to make 
the case. It was an uphill effort: according to Grayson, of the 68 North 
American newspapers that ultimately took positions on the first round 
of enlargement, 34 opposed the initiative, another 13 called for delay-
ing the vote, and only 21 favored it.12 The negative balance underscores 
that ratification was hardly a forgone conclusion. Yet there were some 
notable successes: the Chicago Tribune reversed its position to favoring 
enlargement after administration officials reached out to members of 
the editorial board and helped them meet with key Central European 
leaders. 
The opposition
A final variable in the ratification effort was the nature of our op-
position—not something of our making, but important to the success-
ful outcome. The opposition benefited from some highly influential 
Senators, including some leading Republican voices on military mat-
ters, such as John Warner (Virginia), as well as respected voices on 
the Democratic left, including the liberal lion Senator Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan (New York). Opponents also had strength among promi-
nent foreign policy writers, including the legendary diplomat George 
Kennan, Johns Hopkins academic Michael Mandelbaum, and Thomas 
Friedman of the New York Times, whose paper was among the many 
opposing enlargement. The Cato Institute added a libertarian voice 
against enlargement, while Ben & Jerry’s co-founder Ben Cohen in-
jected passion and funding.
This was a powerful mix, and the opponents attacked NATO’s en-
largement with some challenging arguments. Moynihan and others on 
the left argued that enlargement would alienate Russia and could trig-
ger World War III. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger initial-
ly argued the administration had given too much away to Moscow in 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Senator Warner and former Senate 
Armed Services Chair Sam Nunn warned enlargement could degrade 
the Alliance by admitting weak militaries and indefensible geographies. 
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Peace groups and others on the left argued enlargement was a scheme 
to enrich U.S. arms makers. And a mix of left, right, and libertarian 
voices expressed concern over enlargement’s cost to the United States, 
which remained a muddled issue until the end (figures ranged from 
Cato’s estimate of $70 billion over a decade, to the administration’s 
estimate of $1.5–2 billion over the same period). Ben Cohen helped 
finance full-page ads in the New York Times and other papers across the 
country.
Yet the opponents never seemed to have any centrally organized lob-
bying effort, and ultimately never did much to grow their ranks. They 
did not create the kind of education effort for elites provided by the 
U.S. Committee to Expand NATO. They did not work to get resolu-
tions of disapproval from a broad range of civic organizations. All this 
meant that the ratification faced an opposition that was often articulate 
and quoted, but rarely organized or expanding.  
In the end, the Senate voted April 30, 1998, to endorse NATO’s 
enlargement, by a vote of 80-19 (Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona would 
have voted in favor, but had left to catch a flight). The lopsided margin 
obscures the clashes that endangered Senate approval until late in the 
game. The final days were spent combatting a series of hostile amend-
ments (it was hostile Senate amendments and “reservations” that sank 
the Treaty of Versailles in the United States). One by Senator John 
Ashcroft (Republican from Missouri) proposed to limit NATO’s mis-
sions to only defense of members’ territories, ruling out NATO’s in-
volvement in conflicts like Bosnia; Ashcroft’s provision was tabled by 
the Senate on an 82-18 vote. Another amendment, from Senator War-
ner, would have barred the admission of any other new members for 
at least three years; it failed, 59-41. Defeat of the Warner amendment 
was key example of the difference between a win and a good win. We 
could have accepted his proposed pause and still won admission for the 
first three states. But a good win, including robust endorsement of the 
Open Door policy, required defeating it.
Implications for the Future
Twenty years later, the first post-Cold War enlargement of NATO 
still seems an enduring success. It added new forces and capabilities to 
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NATO, strengthening the Alliance and the security of its members, 
including the United States. It created a process that continues to gen-
erate a magnetic appeal to those states still aspiring to membership, 
such as Georgia and Ukraine. It helped transform Central Europe from 
its historic role as a spawning ground for great power conflicts into a 
thriving area firmly anchored in the West, enabling roughly 100 mil-
lion people to enjoy more freedom, security and progress. Few if any of 
the dire predictions of enlargement’s proponents came true. There has 
been no evidence of NATO losing its military edge as the new states 
joined. There has been no explosion of America’s NATO-related costs. 
Contrary to the dire warnings of NATO enlargement’s fiercest critics, 
the 1998 vote did not trigger World War III.
As part of that overall effort, the U.S. ratification process in 1997-
1998 ultimately met our standard of “a good win.” The final margin 
was overwhelming. Support was solidly bipartisan. There was a real 
national debate, with a wide range of experts, interest groups, and me-
dia outlets taking an active part. The debate included an explicit re-
jection of efforts to shut NATO’s “Open Door” policy. That in turn 
helped make all three of the subsequent rounds of enlargement virtual-
ly uncontroversial within the Senate and the public. Public support for 
NATO has remained undimmed, even as America’s current president 
has tried to cast doubts on the Alliance’s utility.  
Yet some key questions about NATO’s enlargement linger. This 
is particularly true regarding the debate over whether enlargement 
pushed Russia away from the West. While Vladimir Putin and oth-
er Russian leaders often criticize NATO’s enlargement as threatening, 
there has been a surprising lack of high-quality, dispassionate research 
about whether this is just a talking point for them, or a genuine driv-
ing force behind Russia’s drift toward increased confrontation and au-
thoritarianism. Other authors in this volume contribute important new 
insights on this question, and hopefully their work will spur additional 
scholarship as well. 
It also is worth examining how it came to be that the first three 
post-communist countries admitted to NATO are now among the 
Central European states veering furthest from liberal democratic 
norms. Hungary is ruled by a strongman-leader who has villainized 
immigrants (despite their paucity in Hungary), fanned anti-Semitism, 
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suppressed media freedom, politicized the courts, and boasted about 
his illiberal model of governance. Poland is ruled by a party that has 
stacked the courts, politicized the public broadcaster, and imposed a 
government-sanctioned view of history. The Czech Republic has elect-
ed a prime minister who is a populistic oligarch. 
It was not supposed to be this way. During the ratification process, 
we argued enlargement would bolster democratic norms by requiring 
applicant states to address a range of issues regarding their democrat-
ic bona fides. We also argued NATO membership would more firm-
ly embed these countries within the liberal democratic culture of the 
trans-Atlantic community. 
The strong turn toward populism in the Central Europe’s first three 
NATO members may be a coincidence, and it is implausible that their 
political conditions would have been better had they remained outside 
the Alliance. But one experience a few years ago led me to wonder if the 
security that NATO has brought to Central Europe may have played 
a small role. 
In early 2014, 16 years after S/NERO concluded its work, and long 
after the Baltics and additional Central European states had also joined 
both NATO and the EU, I was advising an Estonian party on their 
campaign for the European Parliament. The party was settling on a 
campaign message that focused on domestic issues, although some in 
the Western-oriented party argued for more of a focus on national se-
curity. Then, in late February and early March, Russia forcibly seized 
Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula. Many in the party said, in effect, “Well, 
now we must focus on national security; all our voters will demand it.” 
I replied that this was an empirical question, and set up focus groups to 
assess reactions among the party’s rank-and-file.
We started our focus groups the way we begin virtually every group 
anywhere, with a broad question: how are things going in this country? 
Participants talked at length about bread-and-butter issues: employ-
ment, salaries, pensions, corruption, and the like. Not one person men-
tioned Russia or Crimea. Our moderator probed this striking omission: 
“What about Russia’s actions in Crimea? Does this concern you?” “Oh 
no,” responded a Tallinn man.  The moderator asked why not. He re-
sponded, “Well, now we are in NATO.”
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I was fairly stunned, and wondered whether Estonia was really as 
safe from aggression by its huge eastern neighbor as this Tallinn voter 
assumed. On one hand, I was glad that Central European citizens in 
these new NATO states felt safe, with a confidence that the Alliance’s 
Article 5 guarantees were meaningful. On the other hand, I worried 
that their perception of NATO’s protections might lead them to pay 
too little attention to security issues in their own countries’ politics, 
and wondered if this would leave more room for populist appeals on 
other issues. 
Obviously, there are bigger forces creating openings for populism, 
which has upended politics in the United States as well as in Central 
Europe, which faced these populist headwinds with less well-established 
democracies than many other countries. But it is worth exploring the 
potential linkages between NATO’s security guarantees and political 
dynamics within these states. And we should focus on how NATO (as 
well as other institutions, particularly the European Union) can con-
tinue to push to preserve liberal democratic norms among its members.
Closer to home, it is worth asking whether the successful 1998 rat-
ification effort provides a broader model for bipartisan cooperation 
in the United States on national security issues. The short answer is: 
partly. It would be a mistake to suggest there is any magic wand that 
can wave away the toxic air of division and recrimination that hangs 
over Washington. As many studies reveal, partisan polarization in the 
United States reflects myriad long-term trends, from a more politi-
cized mainstream and social media environment; to geographic sorting 
that has left more pockets of America either deep blue or deep red; to 
gerrymandering of congressional districts; to shifts in cultural beliefs. 
It is inevitable that these forces have made it harder to forge bipartisan 
support on national security issues, just as they have on most domestic 
issues. It also may be that the tactics that brought success in 1998 would 
not fare as well in this age of social media. 
Yet there were a few elements of the success on NATO’s enlarge-
ment that may hold some hope for progress, including:
• Build on successful institutions. Americans trust NATO. 
They did during the Cold War. They do now. This is a huge 
asset. During the ratification effort, we capitalized on that trust 
and the transatlantic values that helped build it. Even as Don-
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ald Trump reportedly has considered withdrawing the United 
States from NATO, public support for the Alliance has shown 
no signs of weakening, and bipartisan majorities in Congress 
have voted for resolutions reaffirming American support for 
NATO, and opposition to withdrawing from it. It may be that 
the enlargement debates helped to reinforce public and congres-
sional support for NATO. At a minimum, the strength of that 
support means that internationalists may do well to use NATO 
as a substantive and rhetorical starting point, where applicable, 
in building their case for other initiatives.  
• Take opponents seriously. During the enlargement effort I 
spent more time with Republican activists and members of Con-
gress than at any other time in my life. We were determined to 
win them over. We knew that required hard listening, bringing 
them into the diplomatic process, having real respect for their 
concerns, and taking serious steps to address their worries. The 
bipartisan success of recent congressional efforts on issues such 
as Russian sanctions and disapproval of Saudi Arabia’s war in Ye-
men suggest there may inherently be more room for non-ideo-
logical discussion and compromise on national security issues 
than on many domestic challenges like health care financing and 
reproductive rights. 
• Do not be overly cowed by public opinion—or Congress. 
Decades of studying and working the seams between public 
opinion and national security policy have left me impressed with 
the malleable nature of that ground. As some scholars have not-
ed, public opinion only rarely imposes binding constraints on 
the ability of a president to take action abroad. In the wake of 
events like the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and So-
malia, there were some good reasons that President Clinton and 
his administration could have spooked themselves into believing 
the public was unwilling to take on new security commitments 
abroad. It is good they did not. The public and Congress tend 
to judge national security pragmatically, more by results than 
ideology. Strong-willed presidents, with a clear plan, can usually 
get their way on national security if they act with confidence, 
clarity, and candor.  
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• Reach out to the public—and at least civil society. Although 
it may seem to contradict the previous point, there was great val-
ue in the effort the Clinton Administration made to take its case 
for NATO enlargement out beyond Washington. It is doubtful 
our efforts radically energized or changed mass public opinion. 
But the endorsements from a wide range of civic groups and 
meetings with editorial boards were quite important. In addition 
to “closing the off-ramps” for wavering senators, those efforts 
helped educate a key stratum of opinion leaders about NATO, 
its history, and its continuing relevance. It is a type of effort that 
can help bridge partisan divides across a range of national secu-
rity initiatives today.
There was much that was unique about the politics surrounding the 
1997-1999 ratification of NATO’s enlargement. The historical mo-
ment; the bipartisan genesis; the strange-bedfellows coalition of sup-
porters—these were all unusual and yet crucial to the outcome. The 
gusts of nationalism and protectionism blowing through American and 
global politics today make internationalist initiatives more challenging 
now in many ways. Yet the success of the ratification effort two decades 
ago helped establish an enduring point of relative consensus in the pol-
itics of American foreign policy and provides some guidance for how to 
sustain other internationalist initiatives in the years ahead.
400 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
Notes
1. Remarks of President W. J. Clinton to the People of Detroit; October 
22, 1996; https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961022a.htm. 
2. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Public and 
Opinion Leaders Favor NATO Enlargement,” News Release, October 7, 
1997.
3. Polling by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found the share of 
the public wanting the United States to “play an active part in world affairs” 
stayed nearly steady during this period, moving from 64% in 1986 to 62% 
in 1990 and 65% in 1994.  Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig 
Kafura, and Lily Wojtowicz, “America Engaged: American Public Opinion 
and US Foreign Policy (Chicago Council on Global Affairs: Chicago, 2018), 
p. 2. At the same time, however, there was an 18-point spike after the Cold 
War in the share of the public that agreed with idea that, “we should not 
think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our national 
problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home.” The 
share agreeing rose from 60% in 1985 to 78% in 1991.  “America’s Place in 
the World: An Investigation of the Attitudes of American Opinion Leaders 
and the American Public About International Affairs” (Times Mirror Center 
for the People and the Press: Los Angeles, November 1993), p. 31.
4. Jeremy D. Rosner, The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, 
and National Security (Brookings Institution: Washington, 1995).
5. Quoting Charles Kupchan, in Jeremy D. Rosner, “NATO Enlarge-
ment’s American Hurdle: The Danger of Misjudging Our Political Will,” 
Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996.
6. Dean Acheson, Speech on the proposed North Atlantic Treaty, March 
18, 1949, p. 14. Truman Library website: https://www.trumanlibrary.org/
nato/doc5.htm.  
7. During mid-1997, as the administration was preparing for NATO’s 
Madrid Summit and the decision about which states would first be added to 
NATO, the Romanian ambassador told me worriedly that if Romania were 
not made part of the first group of new Central European members then it 
would never gain membership. I responded that, to the contrary, if we did 
the first round right, Romania’s addition in the next round would be largely 
uncontroversial. On May 8, 2003, four years after we gained strong Senate 
approval for the first round of enlargement, the Senate voted to support the 
admission of Romania and six other states by a vote of 96-0. It is true that 
the intervening events of September 11, 2001 had strengthened the hand of 
the U.S. executive branch on national security issues; but the content of the 
Winning Congressional and Public Support for NATO Enlargement 401
debate on the second round of enlargement makes clear that the Senate felt 
many core questions on this issue had been settled in the 1998 debate. 
8. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1933).
9. Ronald D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself 
for a New Era, (Columbia University Press: New York, 2002); George W. 
Grayson, Strange Bedfellow: NATO Marches East (University Press of America: 
Lanham MD, 1999); James M. Goldgeier, Not Whether But When: The U.S. 
Decision to Enlarge NATO (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, 1999).
10. Transcript of Clinton’s State of the Union, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
ALLPOLITICS/01/31/sotu.clinton1997/index.html. James Lindsay and 
others have stressed the importance of clear signaling to Congress by presi-
dents and their administrations about their national security priorities. See, 
for example, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (The Johns Hopkins 
University Press: Baltimore, 1994).
11. Trent Lott, “The Senate’s Role in NATO Enlargement,” Washington 
Post, March 21, 1997, p. A-27.
12. Grayson, op. cit., 137.

Part IV
A Place for Russia?

Bill, Boris, and NATO 405
Chapter 17
Bill, Boris, and NATO
Strobe Talbott
Three consecutive American presidents—Ronald Reagan, George 
H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton—were a virtual tag team in dealing with 
the end of the Cold War and its aftermath. Reagan cultivated a produc-
tive relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the USSR. 
He was also the first to proclaim and forge a “partnership” between the 
superpowers.1 It was on Bush’s watch that the Berlin Wall collapsed, 
followed by the Iron Curtain, and the Warsaw Pact. That created the 
prospect, as he put it in 1989, of “a Europe whole and free.” 
The euphoria in Western capitals was not shared in Moscow. The 
unification of West and East Germany, in October 1990, meant that 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would encroach onto 
what had been part of the Soviet zone of domination. The Western 
Alliance was expanding while the Warsaw Pact was evaporating, and 
Lieutenant Colonel Putin was back in St. Petersburg having burned 
secret documents in the K.G.B. outpost in Dresden.
The Bush Administration tried to soothe Soviet anxieties by assuring 
Gorbachev and his team that there were no plans for NATO beyond 
the new eastern German border. 
As for Gorbachev and his aides, they were not concentrating on the 
future of the USSR’s erstwhile allies; instead, they were increasingly 
worried about the fate of the Soviet Union itself. So was Bush. He was 
worried about chaos all across Eurasia. 
After Bush flew to Moscow and Kyiv in the summer of 1991, he 
sensed that Gorbachev and the USSR might not be salvageable. The 
coup de grâce was a real coup against Gorbachev weeks after Bush’s 
trip. When Boris Yeltsin moved into the Kremlin in December 1991, 
Bush assured him that America would maintain the substance and spirit 
of “partnership” with the new Russian state and its first leader. 
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The Bond
When Clinton moved into the Oval Office, he picked up where Bush 
left off. He was prepared to do all he could to help Yeltsin’s economic 
and political reforms. Clinton had been a student of what used to be 
the Soviet Union. He made his first visit there in his early twenties, 
in Brezhnev’s “era of stagnation.” He recalled that young, liberal So-
viet citizens he met on that trip pined for the motherland to become 
“a normal, modern country.” He saw Yeltsin—and Gorbachev before 
him—as catalysts for the evolution.
Clinton devoted more of his time, energy, and political capital to 
Russia and Yeltsin than any other foreign nation or leader. They met 
during their overlapping terms in office eighteen times, nearly as many 
as all their predecessors going back to Harry Truman and Joseph Stalin 
combined.
Even during Clinton’s transition, he was fixated on the upheaval in 
Russia and its neighborhood. He was getting intelligence briefings in 
Little Rock on mounting opposition from the diehard parliamentari-
ans. “I don’t want to appear to be letting Yeltsin hang out there,” he said 
to me late in 1992, “naked before his enemies.”2 
Yeltsin was so desperate to get the transition between Bush and Clin-
ton off to a good start that he sent a letter urging the president-elect 
to attend a meeting in a third country before Inauguration Day. That 
was out of the question, but Clinton took Yeltsin’s impatience seriously: 
“His letter reads like a cry of pain. You can just feel the guy reaching 
out to us, and asking us to reach out to him. I’d really, really like to help 
him. I get the feeling he’s up to his ass in alligators. He especially needs 
friends abroad because he’s got so many enemies at home. We’ve got to 
try to keep Yeltsin going.”
Once Clinton was in office, he focused on Yeltsin’s economic re-
forms. If they failed, so would his political ones. He enlisted leaders 
in other capitalist democracies to join him in boosting the fledgling 
government in Moscow. 
After all, Clinton’s campaign-winning slogan had been “It’s the 
economy, stupid!” He was also the first U.S. president who would use 
his whole term to treat his counterpart in the Kremlin as a partner, 
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rather than an antagonist.3 In much of 1993, NATO as such was not 
high on either the U.S. or Russian president’s agenda, to say nothing 
about its expansion.
But others, in the United States and abroad, were already seized of 
the matter. The Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, and other Central Eu-
ropeans protested vehemently, as did their diasporas in the United 
States. By far the most persistent and passionate among them was Jan 
Nowak-Jeziorański, a Polish exile whom I knew when I was a reporter 
in Eastern Europe and he was at Radio Free Europe in Munich. His 
broadcasts made him a celebrity in his native land.
The three Baltic states were a special case. They had been illegally 
annexed by Stalin as part of his pact with Hitler in 1939, and the United 
States and other Western countries regarded them as occupied territo-
ries and never accepted them as a part of the USSR.
Clinton used his first summit with Yeltsin in April 1993 to finance 
repatriation of Soviet-era officers who had settled down into retire-
ment in what were now three new independent states. A month later, 
I met with Lennart Meri, the president of Estonia. His tone was one-
third grateful, one-third skeptical, and one-third downright sarcastic. 
It was, he said, welcome news that elderly pensioners were returning 
to Russia. Even so, he was looking down the road to when Russian 
troops might re-occupy his country since Yeltsin was sure to give way 
to a more traditional Russian leader. The only way to protect Estonia 
was with membership in NATO under the American nuclear umbrella. 
Russia, he said, was a malignancy in remission; the Yeltsin era was, at 
best, a fleeting opportunity to be seized before Russia relapsed into 
tyranny at home and conquest abroad.
That same month, Presidents Lech Wałęsa of Poland, Václav Havel 
of the Czech Republic, and Árpád Göncz of Hungary came to Wash-
ington and made a vigorous case to Clinton for their countries’ ad-
mission to NATO. There wasn’t much response from the press nor 
the Russian government. However, when I flew to Moscow for con-
sultations with Yuri Mamedov—my counterpart for all eight years in 
government—he remarked that it would be “discriminatory to Russia’s 
interests” if NATO included former Soviet allies, to say nothing of for-
mer Soviet republics.
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Throughout Clinton’s first year, he was weighing the decision that 
only he could make on NATO enlargement. One caveat that he in-
sisted on was that the post-Cold War NATO needed to be part of a 
number of new organizations that included the former Warsaw Pact 
members and the former Soviet republics, notably Russia. The hope 
was that, over time, Russia’s mistrust of NATO and the Central Euro-
peans’ mistrust of Russia would fade. The Bush administration had al-
ready laid the ground for that strategy by initiating a NATO-sponsored 
body called the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in 1991. 
In June 1993, I joined Secretary of State Warren Christopher for the 
annual meeting of the NACC in Athens. For the purpose of a photo op, 
it was impressive: foreign ministers of thirty-eight countries whose gov-
ernments—and militaries—had spent decades glowering at each other 
over the Iron Curtain were now gathered around a giant U-shaped 
table. They were thrashing out ways to cooperate on mutual interests 
with limited success. There was more squabbling than brainstorming.
Christopher spent much of the two days being accosted by Central 
Europeans wanting to know when they could join NATO, and An-
drei Kozyrev, Yeltsin’s foreign minister (and contributor to this proj-
ect), pleading for assurances that the U.S. was not contemplating en-
largement. In all those “pull-asides,” sipping strong bitter coffee, Chris 
could say nothing more than that the matter was under study. What he 
didn’t say—and shouldn’t have—was that Clinton was leaning toward 
expansion not just of NATO but also a wider security and political ar-
chitecture that included Russia and the other former republics. 
The Decision
The process that brought Clinton to a final decision required nu-
merous, diverse, and some disputatious discussions. Some in the Oval 
Office, some in the Situation Room, some in the East Wing, some 
on Air Force One, some over private meals, and—my least favorite—
post-midnight telephone calls that began with an operator saying, 
“Please hold for the President.” When that happened, I prayed that 
Clinton was on another call so I could get myself fully awake.
The overriding rationale was that while the Cold War was over, 
there were—and would continue to be—threats to peace and democra-
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cy in the Atlantic Community. Since that Community was expanding as 
former Eastern bloc states metamorphosed into capitalist democracies, 
so should the institutions that have undergirded it since the end of the 
World War II. The critical ones were the various early incarnations of 
the European Union, and the other was NATO. Had there not been an 
American-led Alliance, there would have been no integration—and, all 
too possibly, another catastrophic war.
There was a German-specific factor here. Helmut Kohl, the German 
Chancellor, along with Defense Minister Volker Rühe, was bound and 
determined, now that there was no Iron Curtain, to move the boundary 
of the “political West” eastward. Both were worried about instability 
on their borders and wanted reinsurance against a volatile Russia.
Clinton told me about Kohl’s view, and I had a chance to hear it from 
the Chancellor himself in Bonn. In addition to its internal demons, 
Germany had been cursed in the 20th century by political geography. 
Immediately to the east were Slavic lands, historically regarded more as 
Eurasian than truly or entirely European. As long as Germany’s border 
with Poland marked the dividing line between East and West, Germa-
ny would be vulnerable to the pathologies of racism and the tempta-
tions of militarism that can come with living on an embattled frontier. 
That frontier could disappear, he said, only if Poland entered the Eu-
ropean Union. His country’s future depended not just on deepening its 
ties within the EU but on expanding the EU eastward so that Germany 
would be in the middle of a safe, prosperous, integrated, and democrat-
ic Europe rather than on its edge.
“That is why Germany is the strongest proponent of enlargement of 
the EU,” Kohl said to me, and the EU would not accept new members 
unless they were in NATO: “That’s why European integration is of 
existential importance to us. This is not just a moral issue, it’s in our 
self-interest to have this development now and not in the future.”
Morality, however, is important as well, as leaders in Central Eu-
rope kept pounding into our heads. Their countries had suffered a bru-
tal 20th century: chaos during the First World War, Nazi occupation 
during the Second World War, the post-World War II “liberation” 
by the Red Army who turned them into vassal states for the Soviet 
Union—with the collusion of the United States and Britain at Yalta. 
Were they going to suffer triple jeopardy in the 21st century?
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There was another, more realpolitik concern in Washington and 
in Europe, including among the liberal presidents of the aspiring new 
NATO members. If the Alliance shut them out, there would be a dan-
ger that those countries would feel left to their own devices, including 
in dealing with tensions with their neighbors over ethnic and territo-
rial issues. At a minimum, they were likely to beef up their military 
to the detriment of their economy. Worse, if the Central Europeans 
were relegated to what they feared would be a “security vacuum,” they 
would turn inward for their salvation and resort to homegrown ethnic 
violence across borders of the sort that was happening in the Balkans.
And then, of course, Russians started using the phrase, not just “near 
abroad,” but “our near abroad,” which sounded like dog-whistling for 
revanchism. 
Those were the pros in the ongoing debates in and out of govern-
ment. There were, of course, cons, but the only one that Clinton really 
cared about was exacerbating Yeltsin’s already fierce political opposi-
tion. In a meeting in London with Yuri Mamedov in late August 1993, 
I gave him a heads-up that the issue of NATO expansion would be on 
the table in early 1994 when President Clinton made his first trip to 
Moscow.
Mamedov grimaced. “Only our worst enemies would wish that topic 
on us,” he said. “NATO is a four-letter word in Russian. Let’s concen-
trate merely on the difficult jobs—like Bosnia and Ukraine—and not 
assign ourselves Mission Impossible.” 
An hour later a news bulletin announced that Boris Yeltsin had told 
a press conference in Warsaw that Russia had no objection to Poland’s 
joining NATO. “In the new Russian-Polish relationship,” Yeltsin 
proclaimed, “there is no place for hegemony and one state dictating 
to another, nor for the psychology of the ‘big brother’ and the ‘little 
brother.’” 
He and Wałęsa signed a joint declaration affirming that Poland had 
the sovereign right to provide for its own security and that if Poland 
chose to join NATO, it would not conflict with Russia’s interests. 
Mamedov was thunderstruck. Some of his colleagues claimed that 
their president had been expressing his “private opinion,” not gov-
ernment policy. Others suspected that the Poles plied Yeltsin with his 
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favorite beverage. They denied it—their president used logic. If Po-
land was snubbed by NATO, it would have no choice but to enter a 
bilateral alliance with Ukraine. He would much prefer to join NATO 
and the European Union. Both were committed to cooperating with 
Russia. Why not make a deal before the issue blows up and politicians 
are screaming?
Apparently, Yeltsin bought it: Poland was indeed a free country 
now—it had broken out of the Soviet empire, just as Russia itself had 
done. Yes, NATO was anti-Soviet in its origin, but Yeltsin was anti-So-
viet himself. They shook hands and announced their agreement to the 
world. 
Poor Kozyrev and Defense Minister Grachev. They had to dou-
ble-team their boss and convince him that he was committing political 
suicide unless he rescinded the agreement with Wałęsa.4 They suc-
ceeded in getting him to sign a letter, drafted by the foreign ministry 
and sent to the leaders of NATO member states, suggesting that the 
Alliance and Russia would jointly guarantee the security of the Cen-
tral Europeans. It had a strong whiff of Yalta to the Poles and their 
neighbors. However, Yeltsin did not reverse the essence of what he had 
agreed with Wałęsa; in fact, his letter reaffirmed the right of any state 
to choose its own methods and associations.5 
Within weeks, Kozyrev’s and Grachev’s concerns were all too accu-
rate about the fury and strength of Yeltsin’s opponents. All hell broke 
loose in Moscow. Unreconstructed Communists, holed up in their of-
fices, sent armed thugs into the streets who killed several militiamen 
and later attacked the main television center, firing rocket-propelled 
grenades into the lobby, setting it ablaze. Rioters attacked government 
buildings, chanting “All power to the Soviets!” and carrying ham-
mer-and-sickle flags and portraits of Stalin.
Yeltsin ordered the ministry of defense to crush the uprising with 
tanks in the streets, shelling the parliament itself, and jailing the ring-
leaders. When Yeltsin addressed his nation, it was more of a dirge and 
regret: “Nobody has won, nobody has scored a victory. We have all 
been scorched by the lethal breath of fratricidal war.”
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When I saw Clinton in the White House as the crisis abated, he gave 
me a rueful look and a remark that snapped my head back: “Boy, do I 
ever miss the cold war.”
He didn’t, but he was all the more concerned about “Ol’ Boris” and 
his unpopular policies and his treacherous politics. Now that the an-
ti-Yeltsin forces had failed with civil war, they did much better for their 
revanchist cause at the polls. In parliamentary elections in December, 
the perversely misnamed Liberal-Democratic Party—headed by the 
virulent ultranationalist, Vladimir Zhirinovsky—triumphed in a parlia-
mentary election. The resurrected Communist Party, led by Gennady 
Zyuganov, also had a strong showing. 
These two setbacks for Yeltsin—and for Russia—highlighted anoth-
er reason for expanding NATO: the danger that Russia might break 
bad.
William Perry, the secretary of defense, along with General John 
Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were uneasy 
about expansion unless Russia regressed to its predatory ways. They 
hoped that a new and expansive organization, Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), created in 1994, would be a way of slowing down extending 
NATO itself. But when their Commander-in-Chief made clear in Oc-
tober 1993 that he wanted to open the Alliance to the Central Europe-
ans in his term, they saluted. Even though they were concerned about 
expansion, they could imagine the failure of Russian reforms. The Pen-
tagon, somewhat reluctantly, adjusted its policy and talking points to 
include a “hedge” against Russian regression. That didn’t help with our 
diplomacy with the Russians.
Yet Chancellor Kohl made the same point—in private—with inci-
siveness and foreboding: “New waves of nationalism are mounting in 
Russia. Seventy years of dictatorship have left the Russians in total ig-
norance of the world around them. Two generations couldn’t get out 
into the world. Russia has a surprisingly free press, but the people have 
no experience in forming independent judgments. Pressures are build-
ing. The Russians are frightened. This is key to Yeltsin’s psychology, 
and it reflects his people’s psychology. You can make bad politics with a 
people’s psychology—just look at 20th century Germany.”
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In conclusion, Kohl said Yeltsin might not be around too long, and 
we need to be wary about who might come after him. 
The Hard Sell 
Clinton used a tour in January 1994 to European capitals—Brus-
sels, Prague, Kyiv, and Moscow—to go public on his decision. All he 
said was that NATO was creating the PfP for countries to the east all 
the way through Central Asia, and the Alliance would bring in new 
members in due course. He made those announcements in Brussels 
(NATO’s headquarters) and Prague (an eager aspirant). That way, he 
had already delivered the bad news when he arrived in Moscow for 
a high-profile, good-news event that Yeltsin was hosting: the U.S. 
and Russian presidents had invited their Ukrainian colleague, Leo-
nid Kravchuk, for the signing of the “Trilateral Statement” that re-
moved all nuclear weapons from Ukraine in exchange for assurance of 
Ukrainian security and sovereignty.
Once the signing was over, Clinton had a private meeting with Yeltsin 
in which he went into his Boris-whispering mode: the two of them were 
going to work together on a new-age, capacious architecture, revolu-
tionizing European security, emphasizing cooperation, peacekeeping, 
and structures that would take account of Russia’s legitimate interests 
and aspirations. Yeltsin listened intently but saved his response for the 
press afterward. As we headed for the crowds, Clinton whispered to 
me, “Uh-oh.” 
Yeltsin’s news for the world started out upbeat and on script: the 
integration of former communist countries into the structures of the 
West was a fine objective, and Russia looked forward to being part 
of that process. But then he pulled a fast one: that process, of course, 
would culminate with a big-bang, all-together-now “integrated togeth-
er, in just one package … That’s why I support the president’s initiative 
for Partnership for Peace.”
Clinton demurred gently: the Brussels summit he had attended on 
this trip had made clear that NATO “plainly contemplated an expan-
sion.” That, he quickly added, was for the future, while PfP was “the 
real thing now.” 
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When Yeltsin came to Washington in September of 1994, Clinton 
had updated his step-by-step persuasion of Yeltsin: “Boris, on NATO, 
I want to make sure you’ve noted that I’ve never said we shouldn’t con-
sider Russia for membership or a special relationship with NATO. So, 
when we talk about NATO expanding, we’re emphasizing inclusion, not 
exclusion. My objective is to work with you and others to maximize 
the chances of a truly united, undivided, integrated Europe. There will 
be an expansion of NATO, but there’s no timetable yet. If we started 
tomorrow to include the countries that want to come in, it would still 
take several years until they qualified and others said ‘yes.’ 
“The issue is about psychological security and a sense of importance 
to these countries. They’re afraid of being left in a gray area or a purga-
tory. So, we’re going to move forward on this. But I’d never spring it on 
you. I want to work closely with you so we get through it together. This 
relates to everything else. When you withdrew your troops from the 
Baltics, it strengthened your credibility. As I see it, NATO expansion is 
not anti-Russian; it’s not intended to be exclusive of Russia, and there 
is no imminent timetable. And we’ll work together. I don’t want you to 
believe that I wake up every morning thinking only about how to make 
the Warsaw Pact countries a part of NATO — that’s not the way I look 
at it. What I do think about is how to use NATO expansion to advance 
the broader, higher goal of European security, unity and integration—a 
goal I know you share.”
Yeltsin was listening intently. “I understand,” he said when Clinton 
was done. “I thank you for what you’ve said. If you’re asked about this 
at the press conference, I’d suggest you say while the U.S. is for the 
expansion of NATO, the process will be gradual and lengthy. If you’re 
asked if you’d exclude Russia from NATO, your answer should be ‘no.’ 
That’s all.”
Just to be sure that Yelstin understood, Clinton promised him that 
U.S. policy would be guided by the motto, “the three no’s”: no surpris-
es, no rush and no exclusion.”
That evening, during a reception and dinner at the Russian embas-
sy, Yeltsin pronounced himself delighted with the working lunch and 
asked Clinton, as a personal favor, to attend the annual summit of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in early 
December in Budapest. Especially given how the day had gone, Clin-
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ton said “if it matters to you, Boris,” and “if there’s important business 
to do.” 
Sometimes a good deed does get punished. As promised, Clinton 
flew all night to Budapest for an event where he had no real role other 
than keeping close to his friend. Yeltsin, however, used the opportunity 
to throw a temper tantrum, excoriating the United States for throwing 
its weight around. What seemed to have sent Yeltsin into a tirade was 
the conflict in Bosnia. NATO’s use of force in Bosnia was its first time 
going into combat in its existence. The Alliance that had been created 
to defend Western Europe from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
was, with the Cold War over, stopping the first genocide in Europe 
since the Holocaust. For many Russians, however, Western forces were 
killing their fellow Orthodox Slavs. The headline out of the busted 
summit was Yeltsin’s warning that the world was “in danger of plunging 
into a cold peace.”
On Air Force One heading home, bleary-eyed and after letting off 
some steam, Clinton turned forgiving and philosophical. “I can’t stay 
mad at Boris for too long,” he said. “He’s got a tough row to hoe.” Clin-
ton mused a bit about Yeltsin’s quote of the day: “You know,” he said, 
“I’ve been thinking about that ‘cold peace’ line of his. If that’s what we 
end up with, it ain’t great, but it sure beats the alternative.”
Those of us on the Russia beat read into Yeltsin’s outburst an omen: 
his heroic efforts to maintain Russia’s partnership with the United 
States and its Allies might get increasingly difficult as long as NATO 
was at war in the Balkans.
Fortunately, that didn’t happen in 1995. U.S. and Russian diplomats 
were collaborating in the Dayton Talks on peace in Bosnia that would 
produce an agreement at the end of the year. 
Clinton, in Moscow for V-E Day in May, persuaded Yeltsin to be-
gin a NATO-Russia dialogue and join the Partnership for Peace. That 
was an important step for developing a NATO-Russia relationship in 
parallel with NATO enlargement. In the fall, the two presidents met at 
Hyde Park, New York, and agreed on the terms of Russia’s participa-
tion alongside NATO for keeping the peace in Bosnia. Secretary Perry 
and Minister Grachev worked out an agreement that a Russian unit 
would operate under U.S. command, not the four-letter word. 
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The Endgame
A partial hiatus settled in 1996 so that Yeltsin could get himself 
re-elected without too much ruction and criticism over the four-let-
ter word. (It was also the year that Yeltsin underwent quintuple bypass 
heart surgery while Clinton was winning his own second term.) With 
that stressful year behind them, they returned in 1997 to important, 
delicate, and—for Yeltsin, painful— issues. 
The knottiest was the eligibility of the Baltic states for NATO 
membership. Lennart Meri was unmerciful and passionate on that is-
sue. When it was clear that Estonia, along with Latvia and Lithuania, 
were not going to be in the first tranche of inductees, he went after 
me with vengeance. When dealing with him—which meant reiterating 
our commitment to the Baltics and being pelted with skepticism—he 
made me think of an Old Testament prophet who, unlike Moses, was 
determined to not just see the Promised Land in the distance but settle 
there for the rest of his life. He showed up in numerous cities where the 
negotiations were going on, stalking me just so I knew that there would 
be hell to pay if, as he put it, “my country is Yalta-ed.” 
Exactly the opposite happened. Rather than being sacrificed to Mos-
cow and Stalin like Central Europeans were at Yalta, the Baltics were 
Helsinki-ed by Clinton and Yeltsin. The venue of one of their most sus-
penseful and consequential meetings was in the Finnish capital, hosted 
by President Martti Ahtisaari in March 1997. (By appropriate chance, 
the Finns and Estonians are relatives, with similar languages.) 
Clinton was in a cast and on crutches from a knee injury several days 
before. “Still,” he said, “I’m going into this meeting with a lot more 
mobility than ol’ Boris. We’ve got to use this thing to get him comfort-
able with what he’s got to do on NATO.”
Clinton was armed with good news about a target date for Russian 
accession to the World Trade Organization and using the Denver sum-
mit in June to “look and feel more like a G-8 than a G-7.” He told the 
team in a huddle on the plane, “It’s real simple. As we push ol’ Boris 
to do the right but hard thing on NATO, I want him to feel the warm, 
beckoning glow of doors that are opening other institutions where he’s 
welcome. Got it, people?”
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The welcome dinner was ominous. Yeltsin was distracted, and pol-
ished off four glasses of wine and a glass of champagne. Afterward, 
Clinton said “It’s no good.” “Every time I see him I get the feeling that 
it’s part of my job to remind him that the world really is counting on 
him and he can’t go into the tank on us.”
During a strategy session with Clinton, Madeleine Albright, who 
became Secretary of State in 1997, and Sandy Berger, the national se-
curity advisor, I started to suggest some talking points about the Baltic 
states, but Clinton didn’t need either a script or a rehearsal.
The next morning, in a private meeting, Yeltsin seized the initiative: 
“The Helsinki Summit has got strategic significance not only for our 
two countries but for Europe and the world. It’s important so that in 
the future we won’t look back and say we returned to the cold war. 
Sliding backward is simply not acceptable…We were both voted into 
office for second terms, until the year 2000; neither of us will have a 
third term. We want to move into the 21st century with stability and 
tranquility… Our position has not changed. It remains a mistake for 
NATO to move eastward. But I need to take steps to alleviate the neg-
ative consequences of this for Russia. I am prepared to enter into an 
agreement with NATO, not because I want to but because it’s a step I’m 
compelled to take. There is no other solution for today.”
He had only one condition: Clinton had to promise that NATO 
would not “embrace” the Baltics. He proposed that they reach “an 
oral agreement—we won’t write it down. This would be a gentlemen’s 
agreement that won’t be made public.”
Clinton, looking relaxed, passed over the bizarre suggestion. In-
stead, he painted a rosy picture of a grand signing ceremony for the 
NATO-Russia charter: “You and I will be there to say to the world that 
there really is a new NATO and there really is a new Russia.”
“I agree,” said Yeltsin.
“Good,” said Clinton. “But I want you to imagine something else. 
If we were to agree that no members of the former Soviet Union could 
enter NATO, that would be a bad thing for our attempt to build a new 
NATO. It would also be a bad thing for your attempt to build a new 
Russia. I am not naïve. I understand you have an interest in who gets 
into NATO and when. We need to make sure that all these are subjects 
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that we can consult about as we move forward. ‘Consult’ means making 
sure that we’re aware of your concerns, and that you understand our 
decisions and our positions and our thinking. But consider what a ter-
rible message it would send if we were to make the kind of supposedly 
secret deal you’re suggesting. First, there are no secrets in this world. 
Second, the message would be, ‘We’re still organized against Russia — 
but there’s a line across which we won’t go.’ In other words, instead of 
creating a new NATO that helps move toward an integrated, undivided 
Europe, we’d have a larger NATO that’s just sitting there waiting for 
Russia to do something bad.”
“Here’s why what you are proposing is bad for Russia. Russia would 
be saying, ‘We’ve still got an empire, but it just can’t reach as far West 
as it used to when we had the Warsaw Pact.’ Second, it would create 
exactly the fear among the Baltics and others that you’re trying to allay 
and that you’re denying is justified.”
“A third point: the deal you’re suggesting would totally undermine 
the Partnership for Peace. It would terrify the smaller countries that 
are now working well with you and with us in Bosnia and elsewhere. 
Consider our hosts here in Finland. President Ahtisaari told me last 
night that we’re doing the right thing in the attitude we’re taking to-
ward the future of enlargement. He said that Finland hasn’t asked to be 
in NATO, and as long as no one tells Finland it can’t join NATO, then 
Finland will be able to maintain the independence of its position and 
work with PfP and with the U.S. and with Russia.”
“I’ve been repeating that I’d leave open the possibility of Russia in 
NATO and in any event of having a steadily improving partnership 
between NATO and Russia. I think we’ll have to continue to work this 
issue, but we should concentrate on practical matters. However, under 
no circumstances should we send a signal out of this meeting that it’s 
the same old European politics of the cold war and we’re just moving 
the lines around a bit.”
Clinton then explained that if Russia insisted on a legally binding 
treaty, opponents of the deal in the Senate would refuse to ratify it. 
Better, he said, was to settle for a political commitment of the kind the 
U.S. had been proposing as a charter.
“I agree,” said Yeltsin.
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Then Clinton circled back to Yeltsin’s proposed gentlemen’s agree-
ment. He said it “would make us both look weaker, not stronger. If we 
made the agreement you’re describing it would be a terrible mistake. 
It would cause big problems for me and big problems for you. It would 
accentuate the diminishment of your power from Warsaw Pact times. 
The charter will be a much more powerful and positive message. It’s 
without precedent, it’s comprehensive, and it’s forward looking, and it’s 
hopeful. It will move us toward a situation that’s good for both of us.”
“Bill,” said Yeltsin, “I agree with what you’ve said. But look at it from 
my standpoint. Whatever you do on your side, we intend to submit this 
document to the Duma for ratification. But the Duma will take two de-
cisions. First, it will ratify the document, then it will attach a condition 
that if NATO takes in even one of the former republics of the Soviet 
Union, Russia will pull out of the agreement and consider it null and 
void. That will happen unless you tell me today, one-on-one — with-
out even our closest aides present — that you won’t take new republics 
in the near future. I need to hear that. I understand that maybe in ten 
years or something, the situation might change, but not now. Maybe 
there will be a later evolution. But I need assurances from you that it 
won’t happen in the nearest future.”
“Come on, Boris,” said Clinton, “if I went into a closet with you and 
told you what you wanted to hear, the Congress would find out and 
pass a resolution invalidating the NATO-Russia charter. Frankly, I’d 
rather that the Duma pass a resolution conditioning its adherence on 
this point. I’d hate for the Duma to do that, but it would be better than 
what you’re suggesting. I just can’t do it. A private commitment would 
be the same as a public one. I’ve told you — and you have talked to 
Helmut [Kohl] and Jacques [Chirac], you know their thinking — that 
no one is talking about a massive, all-out, accelerated expansion. We’ve 
already demonstrated our ability to move deliberately, openly. But I 
can’t make commitments on behalf of NATO, and I’m not going to be 
in the position myself of vetoing any country’s eligibility for NATO, 
much less letting you or anyone else do so. I’m prepared to work with 
you on the consultative mechanism to make sure that we take account 
of Russia’s concerns as we move forward.” 
“Another reason why I feel so strongly: look at Bosnia. That’s the 
worst conflict in Europe since World War II. The Europeans couldn’t 
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solve it. The U.S. was finally able to take an initiative there, and Russia 
came in and helped. It took me years to build support. What if, some-
time in the future, another Bosnia arises? If the NATO-Russia under-
standing is done right, then Russia would be a key part of the solution, 
working with the U.S. and Europe. But if we create a smaller version of 
the larger standoff that existed during the cold war, there won’t be the 
needed trust. This process of integrating Europe is going to take years. 
We need to build up the OSCE. It’s not going to happen overnight. But 
if we make a statement now that narrows our options in the future, it 
will be harder to do the other good things we want to do.”
“I know what a terrible problem this is for you, but I can’t make 
the specific commitment you are asking for. It would violate the whole 
spirit of NATO. I’ve always tried to build you up and never undermine 
you. I’d feel I had dishonored my commitment to the alliance, to the 
states that want to join NATO, and to the vision that I think you and I 
share of an undivided Europe with Russia as a major part of it.”
Yeltsin, looking glum, went to his second fallback: “Okay, but let’s 
agree—one-on-one—that the former Soviet republics won’t be in the 
first waves. Bill, please understand what I’m dealing with there: I’m 
flying back to Russia with a very heavy burden on my shoulders. It will 
be difficult for me to go home and not seem to have accepted NATO 
enlargement. Very difficult.”
“Look, Boris, you’re forcing an issue that doesn’t need to drive a 
wedge between us here. NATO operates by consensus. If you decided 
to be in NATO, you’d probably want all the other countries to be el-
igible too. But that issue doesn’t arise. We need to find a solution to a 
short-term problem that doesn’t create a long-term problem by keep-
ing alive old stereotypes about you and your intentions. If we do the 
wrong thing, it will erode our own position about the kind of Europe 
we want. I hear your message. But your suggestion is not the way to do 
it. I don’t want to do anything that makes it seem like the old Russia 
and the old NATO.”
“Well,” Yelstin said, “I tried.”
That afternoon, at Clinton’s gentle insistence, he and Yeltsin re-
viewed how they would handle the press conference. Sandy Berger 
played a journalist throwing nasty questions at the two presidents. One 
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was, “Have you made any secret deals here in Helsinki?” (That was the 
fear of Lennart Meri and the other Baltic presidents.)
With a rueful smile, Yeltsin said, “My answer will be: ‘We wanted 
one, but we were rejected.’” 
Yevgeny Primakov, Kozyrev’s droll but canny successor as foreign 
minister, remarked, “Perhaps we should have one secret deal, and that’s 
to make Madeleine the next secretary general of NATO.”
As the two presidents got up to go face the press, Yeltsin grabbed 
Clinton by the hand, pumped it and said, “Bill, we have done powerful 
work.”
The way was open for a ceremony to activate the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act in Paris in May. The atmosphere among the sixteen 
Allied leaders, the president of Russia, and Javier Solana, the NATO 
secretary-general, was, on the surface, upbeat. But there was a touch 
of forced solemnity, and Yeltsin seemed strained. When he signed the 
document, he first took a huge breath, wrote his name with a flourish, 
then gave Solana a bear hug and a big kiss on both cheeks.
Clinton had already done his heavy lifting in Helsinki—and so did 
Yeltsin—clearing the way for a Madrid summit that would begin the 
process of admitting the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as 
NATO allies in 1999 and holding the door open for other Central Eu-
ropean applicants, including the Baltic states, in the years to come. 
Epilogue 
The 50th anniversary of NATO, in late April 1999, was held under 
a cloud. NATO was bombing Serbia because Slobodan Milošević was 
committing genocide in Kosovo. Clinton had hoped that Yeltsin would 
come for the event, but Yeltsin could not possibly attend under the 
circumstances. The theory going around Moscow was that NATO was 
using the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo as a trial run for a future 
war when the Alliance would separate Chechnya from Russia. 
On the last day of the NATO summit, Yeltsin had a telephone con-
versation with Clinton. There were forces in the Duma and the military, 
he said, that were agitating to send a flotilla into the Mediterranean in a 
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show of support for Serbia, and to provide arms to Belgrade, including 
anti-aircraft systems that would endanger NATO pilots. Yeltsin told 
Clinton he had already fired one commander in the Far East who was 
trying to mount a battalion to go to Serbia.
Yeltsin had two suggestions, one of which sounded like a demand. 
The easy first was to make Victor Chernomyrdin the delegate in the 
diplomacy over Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin was one of Yeltsin’s several 
former prime ministers who had a productive relationship with Vice 
President Al Gore.
Then came Yeltsin’s plea for a bombing pause. That was neither wise 
nor possible. The Allies at the meeting had just set firm conditions for 
a pause, and until Milošević met those, the bombing would continue.
Yeltsin exploded. “Don’t push Russia into this war! You know what 
Russia is! You know what it has at its disposal! Don’t push Russia into 
this!”
When Clinton heard the translation, he pursed his lips and furrowed 
his brow. He decided not to respond to what had come close to being 
a warning of the danger of nuclear war between the United States and 
Russia. Instead, Clinton chose to reiterate, in as positive a fashion as 
possible, the conditions for what Yeltsin wanted. The call, he said, had 
been helpful because it had “clarified” what would have to happen to 
bring about the pause. Clinton promised that Gore would call Cherno-
myrdin right away, and he would send me to Moscow to serve as a point 
of initial contact for the new U.S.-Russian initiative.
Suddenly soothed, Yeltsin pronounced himself satisfied: “I think our 
discussion was candid, constructive and balanced. We didn’t let our 
emotions get in the way, even if I was a little more talkative than you.”
“Goodbye, friend,” said Clinton, relieved to be able to end the con-
versation on that note. “I’ll see you.”
Of all Clinton’s conversations—face-to-face, or over the phone—
this was the most dramatic of all. In a matter of minutes, the Russian 
president was warning the American president that they were at the 
brink of war, then agreeing to a U.S.-Russian diplomatic channel to 
deal with Milošević.
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Chernomyrdin teamed up with President Martti Ahtisaari of Fin-
land, representing the European Union, and myself, representing 
NATO. In the ensuing weeks, Chernomyrdin and Ahtisaari pounded 
Milošević into submission. Neither Ahtisaari nor Chernomyrdin were 
citizens of NATO countries, but both of them hewed the NATO line. 
Milošević hoped that Russia would protect him in the international 
community, but Chernomyrdin convinced him otherwise. The two 
envoys had brought a document of capitulation, and Milošević finally 
accepted it. 
The bombing stopped. An international force, including NATO and 
Russian units, moved into Kosovo. Milošević, guilty of crimes again 
humanity, died in a prison cell in The Hague.
The bottom line: NATO had gone nearly 50 years never firing a 
shot or dropping a bomb in combat. Those munitions had been saved 
for the Soviet Army and its Warsaw Pact allies during the bad old days. 
NATO saw combat for the first time in the Balkans. Its presence there 
elided into a peacekeeping mission when and how it did because of the 
crucial and courageous role of Yeltsin. 
There was irony in tragedy. His opponents used the episode to help 
advance their campaign to ruin his vision for Russia, and their champi-
on would be Yeltsin’s handpicked successor. 
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Notes
1. Gorbachev first used the word partnerstvo to an American official in a 
meeting with Reagan’s Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William 
Crowe, on June 21, 1989. See Michael R. Beschloss’s and my book At the High-
est Levels: The Inside of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little Brown, 1993), p. 
83.
2. Most of the quotations from Clinton, Yeltsin, and others in this chapter 
are taken from my research and notes from my eight years at the State Depart-
ment and from my book, The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy 
(New York: Random House, 2002). 
3. Ronald Reagan came into office with Leonid Brezhnev on the other side 
of the hot line. George H. W. Bush in his early months in the Oval Office was 
cautious about embracing Gorbachev. Bush ordered what came to be known 
as the “pause” to make sure Reagan hadn’t leaned too far toward trust rather 
than verification. A factor was skepticism from Bush’s secretary of defense, 
Dick Cheney. During that time, Gorbachev was in despair that he had lost a 
friend in the White House. Bush was known in Moscow for attending funer-
als for Gorbachev’s predecessors—Brezhnev, Yuli Andropov, and Konstantin 
Chernenko. An intimate of Gorbachev told me on a visit to Moscow that Gor-
bachev mordantly suggested that Bush’s pauza was a signal that he was waiting 
for yet another funeral, “either physical or political.” Fortunately, Bush threw 
himself into efforts to help Gorbachev.   
4. See Andrei Kozyrev’s chapter for more on this episode. 
5. The right of any country to choose its security arrangements was a prin-
ciple to which Russia had already subscribed in several international covenants, 
such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE charter, which allows each 
state “to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in ac-
cordance with international law.” Gorbachev had used the same formulation in 
May 1990 when he agreed that a unified Germany should be allowed to choose 
its own alliances, opening the door for its membership in NATO. See also 
Ronald Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), pp. 37-40. 
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Chapter 18 
Present at the Transformation:  
An Insider’s Reflection on NATO Enlargement, 
NATO-Russia Relations,  
and Where We Go from Here 
Alexander Vershbow
It’s now twenty years since NATO’s first post-Cold War enlarge-
ment when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became the 17th, 
18th and 19th members of the Alliance in March 1999. This began a 
process that has added a total of 13 new democracies from Central and 
Eastern Europe to NATO’s ranks, with Northern Macedonia set to 
become the 30th member in 2019. 
NATO enlargement was only one dimension of U.S. and NATO 
policy at the end of the Cold War aimed at consolidating peace and 
security across Europe, overcoming the division of the continent im-
posed by Stalin at the end of World War II and ratified at the 1945 Yalta 
Summit. The enlargement of NATO membership went hand in hand 
with the forging of a strategic partnership with Russia, formalized in 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. A transformed NATO Al-
liance and an institutionalized NATO-Russia partnership were envis-
aged as the main pillars of a U.S.-led pan-European security system 
that sought to realize the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace 
first articulated by President George H.W. Bush and reaffirmed by 
President Bill Clinton.
The ensuing twenty years have witnessed a lot of second-guessing 
about the wisdom of the decision to open NATO to the East, with 
more and more critics arguing that it was the “original sin” that led to 
the confrontational relationship with Moscow that we are dealing with 
today. As a participant in developing and implementing NATO’s en-
largement strategy, I remain convinced that it was the right thing to do 
in rectifying the injustices of Yalta and setting Europe’s East firmly on 
the path of democracy and reform, rather than consigning these coun-
tries to a gray zone of instability and disintegration. At the same time, 
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the United States and its Allies went the extra mile to demonstrate to 
Moscow that NATO enlargement posed no military threat to Russia 
and to establish a framework for NATO-Russia consultations and co-
operation that is still functioning today. 
In saying this, I don’t deny that the West may have missed some 
opportunities over the years to cement a long-term partnership with 
Russia. We may have underestimated the psychological impact on 
the Russian people of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 and 
the break-up of the USSR in 1991, the economic collapse during the 
1990s, and the perception that the West no longer saw Russia as an 
important power.
But we shouldn’t buy the false historical narrative the Russians have 
been peddling in recent years about how we deliberately took advan-
tage of Russia after the end of the Cold War, how we sought to weaken 
or marginalize Moscow or allegedly encircled the country with NATO 
military bases poised for surprise attack. Nor should we dignify Putin’s 
claims that we are trying to organize a people’s revolution in Russia 
aimed at toppling his regime (as we supposedly did on Georgia and 
Ukraine). 
The record shows that, in fact, the United States and its Allies made 
an extraordinary effort to reach out to Russia as a partner—and even as 
an ally—after the end of the Cold War and achieved a lot in the years 
until 2014. In the NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO made unilateral 
commitments—still in effect today—to limit its deployment of nuclear 
weapons and combat forces on the territory of new members. These 
demonstrated that an enlarged NATO would not pose a military threat 
to Russia. Other factors played a larger role than NATO enlargement 
in the breakdown of the West’s relations with Moscow that culminated 
in Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine.
The goal of an integrated European security system, with a prom-
inent place for Russia, remains the right one, although it has never 
seemed as distant as it does today. Applying the lessons learned during 
the first round of NATO enlargement may help us in halting the fur-
ther deterioration of the West’s ties with Moscow and returning rela-
tions to the path of cooperation and partnership that both sides chose 
in the 1990s. 
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Hopes and Fears as the Cold War Ended
It is important to remember the historical context in which the 
NATO enlargement debate emerged. When the Berlin Wall fell in 
November 1989, I was serving as the Director of Soviet Union Affairs 
at the State Department. U.S.-Soviet relations had begun to change 
with the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev and his turn to reformist policies 
epitomized by the policies of glasnost and perestroika. In those days, we 
only joked about the Soviet Union reconciling with its arch-enemy, the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In December 1989, the invitation 
to the Soviet Desk’s annual Christmas party had on its cover a car-
toon depicting me on the phone with Soviet Ambassador Yuri Dubinin 
asking: “Let me get this straight, Mr. Ambassador. The Soviet Union 
doesn’t want to destroy NATO, it wants to join it?!” 
Merely two years later, however, as the new U.S. Deputy Permanent 
Representative to NATO, I attended the first Foreign Ministers’ meet-
ing of the new North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in Brus-
sels in December 1991. The NACC was the first body established by 
NATO for consultations with its former Cold War adversaries. During 
the meeting’s final moments, Soviet Ambassador Nikolay Afanasievsky 
announced that he couldn’t sign the communique, because his country 
had ceased to exist. He had just learned that the Presidents of Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus had signed the Belovezha Accords dissolving the 
USSR. Jaws dropped when, a few minutes later, the Chairman, NATO 
Secretary General Manfred Wörner, read out a telegram from Presi-
dent Boris Yeltsin declaring that the newly independent Russian Feder-
ation was interested in joining NATO.
This episode only confirmed that the glacial, predictable course of 
events that characterized the Cold War was a thing of the past. Indeed, 
history had gone into fast-forward mode—for better and for worse. 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the peaceful unification of Ger-
many within NATO, the emergence of democracy and civil society in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
itself were mostly good news. But we were also confronted with the 
tumultuous and violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani war over Nagorno-Karabakh, separatist move-
ments in parts of Georgia and Moldova, and upheavals inside Russia it-
self, including the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991. That 
428 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
and subsequent dramatic events, such as the shelling of the Russian 
White House in 1993 and the first Chechen War beginning in 1994, 
showed that the turn toward reform and democracy was far from irre-
versible. 
All these events made clear that we no longer had the luxury of 
standing on the sidelines and taking a passive, “wait and see” approach, 
simply reacting to events. Our shared interests with our traditional al-
lies, and our shared values with the forces for change in Europe’s East, 
demanded that we engage fully and seek to shape events in a pro-active 
way.
Some suggested that, with the disappearance of the threat of large-
scale aggression, NATO had fulfilled its purpose and could go out of 
business like the Warsaw Pact. But U.S. and Allied leaders recognized 
that Europe was still a dangerous place. The consolidation of democ-
racy in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union 
was far from assured. Instability in the Balkans and elsewhere along 
NATO’s periphery suggested that the mission of the Alliance needed 
to evolve to meet changing circumstances. And the peoples of Central 
and Eastern Europe themselves were desperately keen to join Western 
institutions as they sought to consolidate their own transformations, 
escape the shadow of Soviet domination, and rejoin the European 
mainstream.   
Rather than focusing solely on defense of NATO territory, the Unit-
ed States and its Allies agreed that NATO would need to go “out of 
area” in two ways: to reach out to its former adversaries to help them 
consolidate their reforms and avoid regional instability; and to use NA-
TO’s military power when necessary to deal with threats when preven-
tion failed. Rather than just defending its borders, NATO would need 
to “project stability” beyond its borders—still a key part of NATO’s 
mission today, even as collective defense has become job #1 once again 
in the face of Putin’s aggression.
First Steps
The first steps in this direction were taken by the George H.W. 
Bush Administration, which spearheaded the review of NATO’s Stra-
tegic Concept in 1991 and proposed the creation of the North Atlantic 
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Cooperation Council in 1991. President Bill Clinton, upon taking of-
fice in 1993, called for an early NATO Summit to build on these initial 
steps. It was in that year that the debate within the Administration, 
and within the Alliance heated up, as has been chronicled by James 
Goldgeier and the late Ron Asmus.1 
The 1994 Brussels Summit launched the Partnership for Peace 
(PfP), the highly successful program that gave an operational dimen-
sion to NATO’s interaction with Soviet bloc states and other interested 
parties, including neutral Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland. 
It offered participation in NATO training, assistance with defense re-
forms and guidance on achieving interoperability and standardization 
with NATO, creating a set of partners that could operate with NATO 
in future peacekeeping missions. It was promoted by its authors at the 
Department of Defense as an alternative to NATO enlargement that 
would enable us to put off the admission of new members until the end 
of the decade. It was welcomed by Russia in that light, with President 
Yeltsin telling Secretary of State Christopher, when he first presented 
the PfP proposal, that it was a “work of genius.”2  As former Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev recounts elsewhere in this volume, Yeltsin de-
liberately ignored the other half of Christopher’s message, that NATO 
was going to admit new members, if not immediately, then in the me-
dium term.
In any event, it became clear immediately after the Brussels Summit 
that President Clinton had a much more rapid timetable in mind. He 
declared publicly on several occasions in 1994 that the “time has come” 
to consider the “when and how” of NATO enlargement. He had been 
deeply affected by his first encounters with Václav Havel, Lech Wałęsa 
and other Central and East European leaders at the time of the opening 
of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993. They convinced 
him that he had to seize the opportunity to embed the new democracies 
in Western institutions, rather than risking that they would succumb 
to internal instability and militant nationalism as had happened in the 
1930s. Of necessity, this process would need to start with NATO, since 
the more extensive requirements for accession to the European Union 
meant that EU enlargement would proceed at a much slower pace than 
NATO enlargement.  
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From Partnership to Membership … and NATO-Russia 
Partnership
I joined the NSC Staff in June 1994 as Special Assistant to the Pres-
ident and Senior Director for Europe. I had been hired by National 
Security advisor Tony Lake, in part, because I was as forward-leaning as 
he and President Clinton on NATO enlargement. During the year be-
fore, when I was serving at the State Department as Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Europe, he also discovered I was a kindred spirit 
when it came to using NATO airpower in the service of diplomacy to 
end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
With Lake’s encouragement, and working as part of the self-styled 
NSC Troika with Daniel Fried, Senior Director for Central and East-
ern Europe, and Nick Burns, Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia, 
we set to work on developing a strategy for achieving the President’s 
vision. By the fall of 1994, the Troika had developed a roadmap entitled 
“Moving Toward NATO Expansion.”3 This short paper served as the 
vehicle for gaining interagency consensus.  It became the blueprint for 
efforts led by the State Department to build a consensus within NATO, 
described by Daniel Hamilton in Chapter 1 of this volume. 
The paper laid out the goals, rationale and timeline for a two-track 
strategy: on track 1, a process leading to an expanded NATO; and on 
track 2, a parallel process leading to an institutionalized partnership 
with Russia. The objectives were defined as follows:
• An integrated and inclusive security system for Europe, includ-
ing but going beyond NATO expansion, while ensuring a prom-
inent place for a democratic Russia.
• In the medium term, an expanded NATO, including the major 
Central and East European states who live up to our precepts, 
with the prospect of further expansion to others down the road. 
• In parallel, an institutionalized relationship between NATO and 
Russia, which could take the form of a charter or treaty (an “al-
liance with the Alliance”). It should include a mechanism for 
consulting with Russia on NATO-led military operations and 
other subjects, but without giving Russians a veto over NATO 
decisions.
Present at the Transformation 431
• The possibility of NATO membership for Ukraine and the Bal-
tic States would be maintained; they should not be consigned to 
a gray zone or a Russian sphere of influence. 
• New members would acquire all the rights and responsibilities 
of current members (full Article 5 guarantee) and would commit 
to eventual full integration in NATO’s military structures. Full 
integration would not be required at the outset, however, and 
there would be flexibility on operational issues such as stationing 
of foreign forces.
• NATO enlargement would take place in coordination with the 
enlargement of the EU but would not be delayed to match the 
EU’s likely slower timetable.
The rationale was set forth in these terms:
• To extend stability eastward and underpin the democratic re-
form process in Central and Eastern Europe, we needed to cre-
ate a perspective that Partnership for Peace will lead to NATO 
membership for some PfP members.
• To make sure that enlargement was not seen as directed against 
any country, the process would need to be developed in parallel 
with a long-term strategy toward Russia that included intensi-
fied partnership with NATO and development of other institu-
tions (CSCE/OSCE, G-8).
• The enlargement process would be evolutionary and mer-
it-based. It would be linked to a continued, robust Partnership 
for Peace as the mechanism both for preparing new members 
and for deepening relations with countries not yet ready for, or 
interested in, NATO membership.
• We would downplay the “insurance policy” rationale for en-
largement (i.e. as a strategic hedge against the return of a more 
aggressive Russia). 
• Indeed, the possibility of membership in the long term for a 
democratic Russia should not be ruled out explicitly—although 
this position, while supported by President Clinton in his talks 
with President Yeltsin, was not accepted by many Allies or by 
some parts of the U.S. government.
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The criteria for membership would not be overly specific, in con-
trast with the criteria for EU membership. There would not be an ex-
plicit checklist of military requirements; the focus would be on general 
precepts—democracy, market economy, responsible/good-neighborly 
security policies. On the military side, the general goal would be in-
teroperability with NATO forces, with the precise standards to be re-
fined as PfP evolved.
In terms of timing, the expectation was that the first explicit NATO 
decision to invite new members would be taken no sooner than the first 
half of Clinton’s second term (1997 or 1998), which would allow time 
for building consensus inside NATO, improving the readiness of can-
didates via PfP, and, most importantly, working with the Russians on 
a NATO-Russia institutional relationship. In the meantime, we would 
avoid speculating on which countries were likely to be included or ex-
cluded from the first round. 
Implementing the Roadmap
Over the next three years, the United States followed this roadmap 
almost to the letter, culminating in the signing of the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act in May 1997 and the decision to invite Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic as the first new members at the Madrid Sum-
mit in July 1997. While some in Congress, as well as East European 
émigré groups, pushed for a quicker pace, the Clinton Administration’s 
deliberate approach helped solidify Allied support and made it easier to 
gain Russia’s acquiescence. 
The process inside NATO went remarkably smoothly, thanks to the 
leadership of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana. During 1995, 
NATO conducted a Study on NATO Enlargement that forged Allied 
consensus on the precepts and criteria for considering new members.4 
The Study, completed in September 1995, declared that 1996 would 
be the year for “intensified dialogues” between aspiring members and 
NATO’s political and military authorities. This was the process for as-
sessing each candidate’s progress on political, economic and defense 
reforms, improving relations with neighbors, and establishing demo-
cratic civilian control of its military. 
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The only drama within NATO came at the very end of the process, 
at the Madrid Summit itself, when France, supported by Italy, pressed 
unsuccessfully to add Romania to the first group of new members. 
They argued that this was necessary to achieve greater geographic bal-
ance—despite Romania’s domestic instability. Although uncomfortable 
playing the “heavy,” the United States rejected the French demand, 
but agreed to language noting Romania’s progress as a face-saver for 
President Chirac. 
Reaching agreement with Russia was far more difficult. The nego-
tiations were complicated by the turbulence of Russian domestic poli-
tics, including Yeltsin’s uphill struggle for reelection in 1996, when he 
faced a formidable challenge from Communist Party leader Gennadiy 
Zyuganov. Yeltsin was disappointed that the United States had moved 
quickly beyond Partnership for Peace, pressing ahead with its enlarge-
ment agenda rather than delaying the admission of new members until 
the end of the century. He appealed to President Clinton to slow the 
pace and defer any decisions until well after the 1996 Russian presiden-
tial elections. 
Russian diplomats, while agreeing to the basic paradigm of a 
NATO-Russia charter and consultative mechanism to parallel enlarge-
ment, pressed the United States to renounce any deployment of nu-
clear weapons or conventional forces on the territory of new mem-
bers. Yeltsin personally appealed to Clinton to rule out the possibility 
of membership for former Soviet republics, including the three Baltic 
states. These former Soviet republics were a special case, since their 
forcible incorporation into the Soviet Union as part of the Nazi-Soviet 
Pact of 1939 had never been legally recognized by the United States.
In order to get its way on these issues, Russia played hard to get when 
it came to joining PfP, which the United States and its Allies argued was 
an essential mechanism for forging NATO-Russia military-to-military 
cooperation. During President Clinton’s visit to Moscow in May 1995, 
Yeltsin reluctantly agreed to sign the PfP Framework Document, more 
than a year after PfP’s establishment. But negotiations proceeded at a 
glacial pace as Yeltsin fought for his political survival.
The potential for NATO-Russia cooperation got a boost from the 
conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
the fall of 1995. Russia, having been a participant at Dayton as a mem-
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ber of the Contact Group, agreed in principle at the Clinton-Yeltsin 
October Summit in Hyde Park, New York, to deploy peacekeepers to 
the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR). While the Russians 
insisted that their forces in Northern Bosnia be formally under U.S. 
rather than NATO tactical control, the operation showed that Russia 
and NATO could work together on the ground to meet post-Cold War 
security challenges. 
The success in Bosnia gave impetus to the talks on what became 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act, which began in earnest after Yeltsin’s 
1996 reelection (a victory secured thanks to extensive U.S. and German 
support, both political and financial). While the official negotiations 
were headed by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, it quickly be-
came apparent that the Russians preferred to address the most sensitive 
issues bilaterally. With a NATO Summit scheduled for July 1997 to 
take the first decisions on enlargement, time was of the essence. Suc-
cess was achieved thanks to the high-level engagement by newly ap-
pointed U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and U.S. Deputy 
Secretary Strobe Talbott with Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, as 
well as direct engagement by President Clinton himself.5  
Getting to Yes with Russia
Albright and Talbott formed a “flying squad” of senior U.S. officials 
and experts to tackle the issues one-by-one with Russian leaders, in 
close coordination with Solana and the NATO Allies. I was proud to 
be part of the team as NSC Senior Director. My experience as a former 
Deputy Ambassador to NATO helped me to come up with creative 
solutions to address Russian concerns without crossing any U.S. or 
NATO redlines.
We managed to address the first of Russia’s concerns in December 
1996, with the NATO Allies’ decision that they had “no intention, no 
plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new 
members”—a unilateral commitment known as the “Three No’s.”6 
The Russians pressed for additional specificity that was ultimately re-
flected in the NATO-Russia Founding Act: “This subsumes the fact 
that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason 
to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those mem-
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bers, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities 
or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities.”
There were critics of the Three No’s, both in the United States and 
in Central and Eastern Europe, who argued that the new Allies should 
have the same rights and responsibilities as older Allies and not be sin-
gularized. But given the dramatically reduced threat since the break-up 
of the Soviet Union, Allies considered this to be a cost-free gesture. 
The United States and the other Allies did, however, reject Russia’s 
demand for a similar ban on the stationing of conventional forces on 
the territory of new members. In this case, they agreed that a total 
ban would render new members “second-class allies” and reduce NA-
TO’s ability to defend them under Article 5. But considering the virtual 
disappearance of a credible Russian threat of aggression against Allies 
in Europe, NATO did not see the need for a large U.S. conventional 
deterrent presence as had been maintained along the inner-German 
border throughout the Cold War. Defense and deterrence could be 
carried out via reinforcement rather than permanent stationing. How 
to reflect this without limiting NATO’s flexibility in the longer term 
was the challenge.
During one of the flying squad’s consultations with Secretary Gen-
eral Solana in Brussels in early 1997, I scribbled a sentence aimed 
at articulating NATO policy along these lines. Known as the “sen-
tence from hell,” this proposal, with minor modifications, became the 
NATO policy on stationed forces that was announced on March 14, 
1997: “In the current and foreseeable security environment, the Al-
liance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by en-
suring the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for 
reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of sub-
stantial combat forces.”7  
Although the security environment has changed dramatically since 
1997 and Russia has violated many of its commitments under the 
Founding Act, the March 1997 statement continues to guide NATO de-
cision-making, including on the scale of its enhanced Forward Presence 
battalions deployed in Poland and the Baltic states since 2017. If the 
Russian threat continues to grow, however, NATO may have no choice 
but to jettison this element of the NATO-Russia Founding Act and de-
ploy much larger forces and strategic enablers along the Eastern flank. 
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Russia was generally satisfied with the “sentence from hell” when 
it was presented by the “flying squad.” Although Allies refused to be 
more specific about the meaning of “substantial combat forces,” they 
did agree to clarifications requested by Primakov in the Founding Act 
on the conditions in which reinforcement could take place: “In this 
context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event 
of defense against a threat of aggression and missions in support of 
peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE gov-
erning principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted 
CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutu-
ally agreed transparency measures.”  For their part, Allies underscored 
that there was a trade-off: by foregoing large stationed forces, NATO 
would need infrastructure to support reinforcement.8 Russia conve-
niently forgets this point when complaining nowadays about NATO’s 
(still modest) infrastructure on the territory of new members. 
President Clinton personally rebuffed Yeltsin’s persistent demands 
that NATO renounce the possibility of membership for former Soviet 
republics. At their Summit in Helsinki in March 1997, Clinton argued 
that the West did not recognize the Baltic states as having been legiti-
mately part of the USSR, and that we could not in any case rule out any 
sovereign country’s right to join an alliance; this was a basic principle 
of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act that Russia had long accepted, and it 
had been reaffirmed in the Paris Charter of 1990. Clinton also argued 
that ruling out the Baltic states or Ukraine would mean foreclosing the 
possibility of Russian membership in the long term—a point import-
ant to Yeltsin who, despite various zig-zags, still believed in Russia’s 
Western trajectory. That settled it with Yeltsin, at least with respect to 
keeping NATO’s door open to the Baltic states. But the issue would re-
turn with a vengeance eleven years later, when Ukraine’s and Georgia’s 
pro-Western leaders pushed to join NATO’s Membership Action Plan.
With Russia’s main concerns resolved, the Founding Act was signed 
on May 27, 1997, and the Madrid Summit convened on July 8 to de-
cide on the first group of nations to be invited to join the Alliance. 
Both tracks of the 1994 Roadmap were now complete. A few weeks 
later, as I prepared for my onward assignment as U.S. Ambassador to 
NATO, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger sent the members of 
the Troika a copy of the Roadmap with the comment: “One for the 
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textbooks—a policy well-conceived, well-executed, and well-present-
ed. Congratulations!”
Kosovo: The First Test to the NATO-Russia Partnership 
I took up my duties as U.S. Permanent Representative on the North 
Atlantic Council on January 2, 1998. The Ambassadors of NATO’s 
three invitees, Karel Kovanda of the Czech Republic, András Simo-
nyi of Hungary, and Andrzej Towpik of Poland, sat to my left in the 
North Atlantic Council as observers pending ratification by NATO’s 
16 parliaments of their accession. It was exciting to work so closely 
with the beneficiaries of my work in opening NATO to the East. I also 
welcomed the chance to develop the new NATO-Russia partnership 
with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak, who had been one of my 
main interlocutors during the negotiations on the Founding Act. Little 
did we know that, within a year, NATO would be at war again in the 
former Yugoslavia—this time, over Kosovo—putting both the Alliance 
and the NATO-Russia partnership to the test. 
As a member of the Contact Group, Russia was part of the diploma-
cy that sought to press Serbian President Slobodan Milošević to grant 
autonomy to Kosovo. Moscow refused to push Milošević to compro-
mise Serbia’s sovereignty and agree to an international peacekeeping 
force, which the Allies judged essential to ending the violence and mak-
ing an autonomy deal stick. With Milošević hiding behind the Russian 
position, the Rambouillet negotiations broke down in failure. NATO 
then delivered on its threat to use force against Serbia to compel it to 
accept the terms it had rejected at Rambouillet. 
NATO—now including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Repub-
lic—acted without explicit UN Security Council authorization since 
Russia had made clear it would veto any resolution authorizing force. 
Russia responded by suspending its participation in the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council (PJC).
NATO-Russia cooperation survived the test of Kosovo, although the 
crisis left permanent scars.  Even with the PJC suspended, Russia (in 
the person of Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin) played a crucial 
role in the diplomacy that persuaded Milošević to back down, sparing 
NATO the need for a ground invasion of Serbia. After the air campaign 
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was over, Russia quickly returned to the PJC. And Yeltsin agreed to 
deploy Russian troops to the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), oper-
ating again under U.S. tactical control. Russian forces remained part of 
the mission until 2003. 
Russia Reacts Calmly to the Second Round of Enlargement 
Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, saw the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 
New York and Washington as an opportunity to build closer ties with 
the West as he consolidated power at home. At a special NATO-Russia 
Summit in Rome in May 2002, Putin and NATO leaders signed the 
Declaration on “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality” and estab-
lished the NATO-Russia Council to replace the PJC.9 Allies and Russia 
launched a series of joint counter-terrorism projects and continued to 
develop their dialogue and cooperation on a range of subjects, includ-
ing the conflict in Afghanistan, arms control, non-proliferation, theater 
missile defense, and civil emergency planning. 
While this upgrade in NATO-Russia relations was not explicitly 
conceived as a counterpart to further NATO enlargement, it helped 
Allies manage tensions over the second round. At the Prague Summit 
in November 2002, Allies invited seven Central and East European 
states to join the Alliance, including the three Baltic states together 
with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. I was Ambassador in 
Moscow from 2001 to 2005, and I heard few complaints about NATO 
expansion to the Baltic states as having crossed Russian red lines, either 
at the time of the Prague Summit or when the seven new members 
formally joined the Alliance in 2004. Putin described the further en-
largement of NATO as “counterproductive” but continued to take a 
pragmatic approach to relations with the Alliance.
New Challenges to West-Russia Relations under Putin
Relations between the West and Russia did begin to deteriorate after 
2002, but the causes were not related to NATO or NATO enlarge-
ment. The 2003 Iraq War, while conducted via a U.S.-led coalition of 
the willing rather than through NATO, rekindled Russian objections 
to operations launched without a U.N. Security Council mandate. 
Present at the Transformation 439
While Moscow had been assured that Kosovo was a one-time excep-
tion to the rules, prompted by an impending humanitarian disaster, the 
U.S. decision to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein suggested that 
the United States was making it a standard practice to bypass the U.N. 
Security Council, nullifying Russia’s veto power.
A second factor contributing to Putin’s suspicions was the Bush Ad-
ministration’s aggressive pursuit of ballistic missile defense (BMD) of 
the U.S. homeland, including a “third site” with installations in Poland 
and the Czech Republic. I recall accompanying Secretary of State Colin 
Powell to the Kremlin in December 2001 to inform Putin of President 
George W. Bush’s decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty. 
Putin reacted more with sorrow than anger at the time, and Russian 
experts accepted U.S. assurances that U.S. BMD plans were focused on 
defending against limited attacks by rogue states like Iran and North 
Korea and did not threaten Russia’s assured retaliatory capability.
As U.S. plans advanced, however, Putin became increasingly con-
vinced that the United States was seeking to negate that retaliatory ca-
pacity by deploying interceptors close to Russia’s borders, which Mos-
cow feared could embolden the United States to carry out a preemptive 
first strike. The fact that the third site would not, in reality, put the 
Soviet strategic deterrent at risk—because of its location and the small 
number (10) of interceptors—did not alter Putin’s perception that the 
United States was undermining strategic stability.
The third factor that contributed to Russia’s estrangement from 
the West was the Rose and Orange Revolutions in Georgia (2003) and 
Ukraine (2004). While the West viewed both as spontaneous popu-
lar rebellions against corrupt political leaders and, in the Ukrainian 
case, against Russian-backed efforts to steal the election on behalf of 
its preferred candidate, Putin saw things in a much darker light. These 
“color revolutions,” in his view, were special operations planned and 
financed by the United States aimed at undermining Russia’s interests 
in its “near abroad.”  The reformist leaders’ pursuit of NATO and EU 
membership only confirmed Russian suspicions that the West, led by 
the United States, was determined to tear these countries from Russia’s 
sphere of privileged interests. (This same perception influenced Putin’s 
harsh reaction to the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine in 2013 and the 
toppling of President Viktor Yanukovych.)
440 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
Another factor affecting Putin’s mistrust of the West was the wave of 
terrorist attacks that spread across Russia in 2002-2004. Putin seemed 
to see the hand of the United States rather than Chechen separatists 
and home-grown Islamic extremists as behind the attacks. I remember 
watching Putin’s chilling speech after the 2004 attack on the school in 
Beslan, North Ossetia. Clearly pointing his finger at the West, Putin 
said “Some want to tear off a big chunk of our country. Others help 
them to do it. They help because they think that Russia, as one of the 
greatest nuclear powers of the world, is still a threat, and this threat has 
to be eliminated. And terrorism is only an instrument to achieve these 
goals.”10  
U.S. criticism of the arrest of oil tycoon and political opponent 
Mikhail Khodorkovsky in November 2003 was also seen as confirming 
Western support for those seeking to weaken Russia and undermine 
the Putin system. 
In sum, by the time of his blistering, anti-Western speech to the 
Munich Security Conference in 2007, Putin had concluded that the 
West had become increasingly dismissive of Russia’s interests—circum-
venting its UN veto, undermining its status as a nuclear superpower 
with ballistic missile defense, fomenting pro-Western, anti-Russian 
movements in Ukraine and Georgia, and supporting forces seeking to 
destroy Russia from within. The fact that much of this perception was 
based on paranoia and worst-case assessments fed to him by Russian 
intelligence was beside the point. 
Bust-Up At Bucharest
None of these factors were the consequence of NATO enlargement. 
But when the Bush Administration came to the April 2008 NATO 
Summit in Bucharest actively supporting the inclusion of Ukraine and 
Georgia in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), Putin’s hostile reac-
tion should have come as no surprise. He was not assuaged by explana-
tions that MAP was not a guarantee of membership, since invitations to 
begin accession talks would require a separate, political decision by the 
North Atlantic Council. While Allies assured him that MAP was just 
the start of a more intensive phase of preparation, Putin couldn’t abide 
the symbolism—the M in MAP was the issue. 
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Moreover, in contrast with the strategy Washington had adopted 
during the earlier rounds of NATO enlargement, the United States and 
other supporters of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia had not developed 
a “Russia track” of measures to mitigate Russian concerns. Lacking a 
Russia strategy, President Bush and his team were unable to convince 
key U.S. allies to support MAP in the face of Russian objections. 
The resulting deadlock among the Allies at Bucharest led to the 
ill-conceived and hastily drafted compromise in which NATO lead-
ers refused MAP but declared in the Summit communique that “these 
countries will become members of NATO.”11 This was a far more cat-
egorical commitment than would have been the case had NATO de-
cided only to offer MAP to Ukraine and Georgia. Whatever Allies’ 
intentions at Bucharest, the Summit outcome contributed to Putin’s 
decision to launch the war in Georgia four months later. With Russia’s 
invasion and occupation of Georgian territory, Putin had effectively 
drawn the red line on NATO enlargement to the former Soviet Union 
that Yeltsin had been persuaded not to draw in 1997. 
One More Try under Medvedev
After the war in Georgia, Allies suspended the work of the NA-
TO-Russia Council for a few months, but business resumed after the 
“reset” in U.S.- and NATO-Russia relations in 2009. With Dmitriy 
Medvedev occupying the Russian Presidency, another attempt was 
made by NATO and Russia to develop a “true strategic partnership” 
at the 2010 Lisbon Summit, the last Summit attended by a Russian 
President. 
The flagship initiative was an effort to link NATO and Russian mis-
sile defense capabilities to create a cooperative system to defense against 
missile attacks by rogue states. This could have been a game-changer—
joining NATO and Russian capabilities to counter a real and growing 
common threat, and demonstrating that NATO’s missile defense capa-
bilities were not aimed at undermining Russia’s strategic deterrent. As 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, I was 
part of the U.S. negotiating team that pursued a bilateral missile de-
fense agreement in 2011 and 2012, and I supported the NATO-Russia 
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side of the negotiations in 2012 and 2013 as Deputy Secretary General 
of NATO. 
Although Allies put a bold proposal on the table,12 negotiations 
foundered by the end of 2013. With Putin back as President, it be-
came clear that Russia’s real goal was to convince the United States 
and NATO to cancel their planned missile defense deployments in Ro-
mania and Poland and rely instead on a Russian “sectoral” defense of 
NATO territory—a total non-starter.
The Arab Spring and NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya is where 
NATO-Russia relations really came a cropper. When Libyan dicta-
tor Muamar Qadhafi threatened to “kill like rats” tens of thousands of 
pro-democracy protesters in eastern Libya, Allies decided to intervene 
from the air to establish a no-fly zone and protect the Libyan people. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973 authorizing “all necessary mea-
sures”13 passed thanks to Russian President Medvedev’s decision to ab-
stain—presumably with the concurrence of then-Prime Minister Putin. 
As NATO bombing of Libyan forces escalated and Qadhafi was 
overthrown, Putin and other Russian leaders became convinced that 
NATO had exceeded that mandate. It looked again that the United 
States and NATO were circumventing Russia’s authority as a Security 
Council member as they had done in Kosovo and Iraq, with NATO 
becoming the instrument for regime change.
What Is To Be Done?
The breakdown in the West’s relations with Russia was not caused 
by the NATO decision in 1997 to admit new democracies from Central 
and Eastern Europe. Indeed, the first and second rounds of enlarge-
ment went smoothly because the Alliance—guided by creative U.S. 
leadership—made a concerted effort to develop a real strategic partner-
ship with Russia. This was not meant as compensation or a consolation 
prize but was an effort to ensure that a democratic Russia’s voice was 
heard in European security. 
Success was also achieved because NATO made a determined effort 
to allay Russian concerns about the military implications of enlarge-
ment. Even after the admission of the Baltic states to NATO in 2004, 
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Russia continued to reduce its forces along its Western flank.14 This 
reflected an understanding that NATO enlargement was primarily a 
political project, and that NATO was living up to its commitments in 
the Founding Act on non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the ter-
ritory of new members and on refraining from “additional permanent 
stationing of substantial combat forces.”
Relations between Russia and the West faced multiple challenges 
during President Putin’s first years in office, but these were not directly 
related to NATO. By 2007, Russia had become increasingly resentful at 
the West’s alleged disregard for Russia’s interests and increasingly par-
anoid about “color revolutions” as a catalyst for regime change in the 
“near abroad” and in Russia itself. Together with the lack of a “Russia 
track” to balance NATO’s MAP for Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucha-
rest Summit in 2008, this hardened Russia’s animosity toward the Alli-
ance. Today’s Russia is now ready to use force to block any former So-
viet republic’s path to NATO, and it has sought (albeit less successfully) 
to block further NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans, including 
an attempted coup on the eve of Montenegro’s accession in 2017. 
The prospects for overcoming Russian objections to Ukrainian and 
Georgian membership are dim as long as Vladimir Putin remains in 
power. For Putin, the future of Ukraine and other former Soviet re-
publics is as much about Russian domestic politics as it is about geopol-
itics. Putin fears the encroachment of Western ideas far more than the 
approach of NATO’s borders. He worries that, if Ukraine succeeds as 
a prosperous, democratic, pro-Western state, it will fall out of Russia’s 
orbit, foiling Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions and setting a dangerous 
example for the Russian people, who could be inspired to start a “color 
revolution” in Russia itself. Thus, to protect the Putin system at home, 
Putin is determined to destabilize Ukraine, make it an unattractive can-
didate for NATO and the EU, and discredit Western democracy more 
generally through interference, influence operations and information 
warfare.
Given this ideological dimension, the standoff between NATO and 
Russia cannot be easily resolved. The West and Russia have conflicting 
visions of European security. The United States and its allies want to 
restore respect for the principles of the Helsinki Final Act—sovereign-
ty, territorial integrity, no changing of borders by force, and respect for 
444 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
the freedom of all states to choose their security arrangements. Russia, 
on the other hand, rejects these principles and wants to pressure the 
West into accepting some sort of Yalta 2, a Europe divided into spheres 
of influence with limited sovereignty for everyone but Russia, and he-
gemony of big powers over small states. 
Until Russia itself returns to the westward path its people and lead-
ers chose at the end of the Cold War, our differences are likely to re-
main profound and the relationship largely competitive. The imme-
diate priority for NATO should be to bolster its deterrence posture 
and strengthen Allies’ resilience against cyber-attacks and information 
warfare. While Russia is unlikely to engage in direct military aggres-
sion against NATO, we cannot allow any possibility that Russia could 
attempt a limited land grab in the Baltic states using “little green men” 
as it did in Crimea.
NATO should not renounce its commitment to Ukrainian and Geor-
gian membership as a long-term goal, but we and our Allies must be 
frank with Kyiv and Tbilisi that membership is effectively on hold for 
the foreseeable future. In the meantime, acting through NATO and bi-
laterally, we should use all available means to strengthen Ukraine’s and 
Georgia’s security and preserve their independence short of providing 
security guarantees, even as we hold their feet to the fire on reforms 
and the fight against corruption. A prosperous, democratic Ukraine 
and a prosperous, democratic Georgia may be the best counterweight 
to Russian aggression in the long run, but training and equipping these 
countries’ armed forces with defensive weapons, and boosting their re-
silience against cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare, are also essential to 
help them defend themselves and prevent further Russian aggression. 
As for the future of NATO-Russia relations, a return to partnership is 
out of the question as long as Russia is flouting the principles it pledged 
to uphold in the Helsinki Final Act and the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act. The litmus test for any return to normal business (and for any 
lifting of sanctions) must remain an end to Russian aggression in east-
ern Ukraine and withdrawal of its forces in accordance with the Minsk 
agreements. Until then, the United States and its Allies should focus 
their dialogue with Moscow on ways to reduce the risk of incidents be-
tween NATO and Russia from escalating to an unintended conflict and 
to increase transparency and predictability of our military activities. 
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Conclusion
Our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace will remain incom-
plete as long as relations with Russia remain competitive and as long 
as Moscow seeks to deny its neighbors the right to choose their own 
future. But that should not diminish our pride in the progress we have 
made since the 1990s in enlarging the community of democratic na-
tions committed to ensuring one another’s security and united by the 
values of democracy, liberty and the rule of law. NATO’s Open Door 
remains the right policy to encourage all of Europe’s democracies to 
follow the path pioneered by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
when they joined NATO twenty years ago. 
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Chapter 19
Russia and NATO Enlargement:  
An Insider’s Account
Andrei Kozyrev
Russia versus NATO
When, led by the United States, European nations founded NATO 
on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, 
they made a major multinational political pivot in modern history. 
Parting from centuries-old efforts to gain territory and domination, 
they found their national interests in peaceful cooperation and prosper-
ity. That’s why emerging democracies want to join NATO. And that’s 
why the totalitarian Soviet Union opposed it, and now authoritarian 
Russia along with undemocratic politicians elsewhere try to subvert it.
When in April 1992 the president of Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel 
came to Moscow on an official visit, he had a brief chat with me away 
from the main action of the summit and explained the reason for join-
ing NATO in his distinctive concise, simple, but insightful way: “I am 
not a fan of the military. We just want to join the Western democracies 
full-scale. Don’t you?” That was the driving force behind the NATO 
enlargement, culminating in the first instance with the admission of 
Poland, Check Republic and Hungary in 1999: a process that has con-
tinued and is continuing ever since.
The Promise of the New Era
In December of 1991 the Russian Federation emerged not only as 
one of fifteen successor states to the collapsed USSR, but also as the 
continuation state that inherited membership in the U.N. Security 
Council and in all treaties, including Russian-American and multilater-
al treaties concerning nuclear weapons, most importantly in the Non-
proliferation Treaty as one of the five nuclear states. America and other 
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Western powers helped us to achieve that outcome. But despite this 
Great Power status, the new Russia had to make a determined effort 
to overcome its isolation from the most prosperous democratic coun-
tries, which was not determined by any treaty and simply represented 
the bad legacy of the Soviet past. And the inherited Russian hostility 
towards NATO was a key political barrier on its way to join the club of 
great nations to which it belonged by dint of its size, economic poten-
tial, history and culture. That hostility could be removed only together 
with the entire Soviet heritage that reformers in the Yeltsin govern-
ment tried to replace with political democracy and a socially conscious 
capitalism. My own credo was—and still is—that a democratic Rus-
sia would be as natural an ally of the United States and NATO as the 
tyrannical Soviet—or post-Soviet—system had been an enemy of the 
Western Alliance.
Already in December of 1991, the first popularly elected president of 
Russia, Boris Yeltsin, sent an open letter to the North Atlantic Coordi-
nation Council that reflected the Russian leadership’s view that NATO 
could turn from being an aggressive military machine to an alliance 
of peaceful nations based on common values. “On this basis of deep 
reforms and common values,” he wrote, Russia was eager to develop 
cooperation with NATO both in political and military fields. “Today 
we do not ask for Russian membership in NATO.” But, Yeltsin’s letter 
continued, he regarded it “as our long-term political objective.” 
There is a Russian saying that misfortune leads to fortune. Unfor- 
tunately, the text of the letter given to the press had a typo. The word 
“not” was absent. So, it read as “Today we ask for Russian membership 
in NATO, but regard it as our long-term objective.” The next day we 
issued a correction. Fortunately, this drew additional attention to the 
meaning of the document that in essence was the same with or without 
“not.” At that time no one except the bunch of discredited Commu-
nists challenged the concept directly. Some doubts were expressed only 
about the ability and good will of NATO to welcome Russia to the club.
Were we—the reformists around Yeltsin—delusional in our attempt 
to radically change the course of Russia? No. The mass movement rep-
resenting our base was called “Democratic Russia” and we counted on 
a number of fundamental factors summarized below.
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The Russian nation is based on European culture. Leo Tolstoy’s War 
and Peace is partly written in French. The first attempt to establish a 
European style democracy had been undertaken in 1917 after the col-
lapse of the tsarist rule, but it failed mostly because the provisional gov-
ernment inherited the backbreaking burden of World War I. When the 
second effort came, in 1992, the situation was radically different. No 
country was at war or even in conflict with Russia. Moreover, we count-
ed on support from the West, particularly from the United States—po-
litically, economically and strategically.
This bet was neither unprecedented nor unrealistic. Less than 50 
years earlier Winston Churchill had called on the West to stand up to 
the challenge of the “Iron Curtain” of Stalin’s domination, and America 
generously helped fragile democracies in Europe to survive and grow. 
Why couldn’t similar efforts be undertaken as Russia tried to get rid 
of the “Iron Curtain” once and for all? It would have been not only in 
best interest of America and its Allies, but existentially important for 
them. Behind the Curtain sat a nuclear-missile force able to destroy 
America that also could have been demolished had democracy taken 
hold in Russia.
Apparently, George H.W. Bush realized that. Welcoming Yeltsin in 
Washington DC in June 1992, Bush said he was “totally convinced” 
of Russia’s commitment to democracy and hoped to assist “in any way 
possible.” He appeared to have bipartisan support. Democrat Richard 
A. Gephardt, the House majority leader, said that Mr. Yeltsin “deliv-
ered a loud, clear message that if there’s going to be help, it needs to 
come now.”
Yeltsin, too, was straightforward. “I didn’t come here just to stretch 
out my hand and ask for help. No, we’re calling for cooperation … 
because if the reform in Russia goes under, that means there will be a 
cold war.” Unfortunately that warning became an omen and today it’s 
the reality.
To be sure, in 1992 tangible results were achieved in reducing the 
nuclear threat. The two presidents put Secretary of State Jim Baker and 
me in charge of that job. It was tough but rewarding, due to the profes-
sionalism, dedication and integrity of my counterpart. Not only were 
the numbers of nukes allowed for each party by the START II treaty 
2-3 times lower than permitted by the previous START agreement, but 
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also for first time ever Russia agreed to cut its superiority in intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles, supposedly the most destabilizing first strike 
force, and the United States did the same in sea-launched ballistic mis-
siles and strategic bombers. A political and legal international founda-
tion was laid for preventing proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons; 
over the ensuing years all were placed under control and gathered on 
the territory of the Russian Federation recognized as the only nuclear 
power among the post-Soviet states.
With regard to economic aid and assistance, however, America’s con-
tribution was much less impressive. While preparations for cooperation 
with Russia were in progress, President Bush was losing to Democrats 
in America. President Clinton was elected under the motto: “it’s the 
economy, stupid”—by which he meant the U.S. economy. His admin-
istration promised and did help us, but mostly through programs of the 
International Monetary Fund. These were conditional on the reforms 
the government in Moscow swore to undertake. But what Russia really 
needed was immediate aid to set up the reforms in practical manner.
Simply put, the social cost and complexity of the reforms were 
too heavy a lift for the government in Moscow without commensu-
rate Western assistance. Russian reformers were unable to provide 
sustained political leadership in the face of worsening pressure by re-
actionaries and nationalists. We failed for domestic reasons. We own 
historic responsibility for that. Yet, the West could have done more to 
prevent that failure. Soon a pattern was established of mutual financial 
and economic promises that were predictably unrealistic and thus po-
litically damaging. Something of the kind followed also in the foreign 
policy field.
Troubled Partnership with NATO
In the early 1990s, the rapprochement of Russia with the West and 
integration of East European states into Western economic institutions 
were accepted even by hardliners in Moscow. Yet, the adversary image 
of NATO was—and is—the last line of their defense, as it guaranteed 
them a privileged position in the power structure of the “ceased for-
tress,” whether it was called the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation. 
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To be sure, turning the two opposing military machines into al-
lies was a monumental task. Yet it could be achieved. Step by step the 
military and security forces of democratic Russia should have become 
partners of their Western counterparts in fighting common enemies 
like rogue states, terrorists, drug-traffickers and so on. Advocating this 
perspective, in December 1993 I won 70% of the popular vote in a 
competitive election for the parliament membership in the region of 
Murmansk, which included the major naval base hosting the core of 
Russian nuclear-armed fleet.
It was clear that my solution required the radical and resolute re-
form of the military and security services inherited from the USSR. Yet 
President Yeltsin chose a KGB-associated veteran, Evgeny Primakov, 
to be chief of the foreign intelligence service. He also appointed other 
heads of military and security government bodies who were personally 
loyal to him but hardly zealous reformers. He argued that change was 
a tough process; it should be carefully controlled to maintain stability 
along the way. That was true, but in my view, stability should have been 
pursued hand-in-hand with resolute and robust action to transform the 
old structures.
Bearing in mind the complexity of the NATO issues, I had a con-
fidential agreement to avoid radical public moves with Warren Chris-
topher, U.S. Secretary of State in first term of the Clinton Adminis-
tration. This was more or less similar to the kind of understandings 
I had with some Eastern European leaders who recognized that their 
desire to join NATO should be realized in stages and in consonance 
with Moscow. Slowly but surely, a discussion on finding a mutually ac-
ceptable solution between Russia and NATO gained steam.
Russia’s Bad Surprise For America
Lech Wałęsa, the President of Poland, was not a patient person. 
When President Yeltsin arrived in Warsaw on a hot August day in 1993, 
Wałęsa invited him to a late private dinner. After midnight Yeltsin woke 
me up. He could hardly utter an apology for the late call and handed 
me a piece of paper with ragged handwriting and his signature. It was a 
last-minute insertion for the joint Russian-Polish declaration that had 
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been prepared for a signature ceremony next morning. The paper en-
dorsed Poland’s aspiration to join NATO—right now. 
In my heart I welcomed Yeltsin’s addition. In my mind, though, I 
had no doubt that without any practical purpose the statement would 
wake up the sleeping dogs in Russia against NATO and those in East-
ern Europe favoring NATO. Like all East European nations, Poland 
would not be ready to join NATO earlier than in a number of years. In 
the meantime, Russia would have to work out its cooperation with the 
Alliance. 
Early at dawn the next morning, Defense Minister Grachev and I 
asked Yeltsin to have a more sober look at the matter. Then milder 
language was agreed with the Poles. The incident, including the “late 
night” formulation, leaked to the press, triggering a never-ending fire-
work of political agitation across the spectrum of conflicting opinions 
and interests in Russia and elsewhere. I had to apologize to my Ameri-
can colleagues and other partners who were caught off guard and who 
had not yet given any green light to Central and Eastern European 
states about NATO membership.
Most importantly, as a result of this story and the leak, we all lost 
the ability to address the matter calmly, without politicized domestic 
and international pressures. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary 
immediately demanded unambiguous responses from the United States 
and NATO on whether the Alliance was open to the new democracies. 
That amounted to an offer neither Washington nor Brussels could re-
fuse in the long run. Jittery politicians in the West spoke of an immi-
nent Russian threat, to the delight of NATO-fear-mongering hardlin-
ers in Russia.
Bridging the gap between Russia and NATO now became a burn-
ing task. Defense Minister Grachev visited Washington in 1993. He 
felt that the Pentagon was skeptical of NATO enlargement and pre-
ferred instead cooperation with Eastern Europeans and Russia through 
a mechanism called the Partnership for Peace (PfP). That was good 
news for Yeltsin, who now realized the hot nature of the problem and 
tried to push genie back into the bottle.
In October Secretary of State Warren Christopher came to Moscow 
as special envoy of the U.S. president to brief the Russian president 
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on the new NATO policy and test his reaction. He was accompanied 
by Strobe Talbott, who played an important role in bridging U.S. and 
Russian positions. This is how Strobe describes the meeting in his book 
The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy: 
Chris laid out our decision on NATO: we would not proceed im-
mediately with enlargement but concentrate instead on developing 
the “Partnership for Peace”…Without letting Chris finish, Yeltsin 
spread his arms and intoned, drawing out the words, “Genialno! 
Zdorovo!” (Brilliant! Terrific!). 
After “a brief review of other issues,” the meeting was concluded. 
Christopher repeats this story in his memoirs. Declassified documents 
from U.S. and Russian archives also show that U.S. officials led Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin to believe in 1993 that the Partnership for Peace 
was the alternative to NATO expansion, rather than a precursor to it.
After leaving the meeting with Yeltsin, however, the U.S. visitors 
provided to me an “unabridged” message: the new policy was not in-
stead of but rather a pathway to enlargement. Why at the meeting they 
switched to other issues without finishing their main presentation and 
clarifying the issue remained unclear to me. Allies were pleased by the 
news that Russia’s president praised the PfP, and it was adopted as the 
NATO strategy. Primakov told Yeltsin that Clinton deceived him to get 
NATO approval and that the PfP was a trick to draw East Europeans 
into NATO, leaving Russia in the cold. The Russian press increasingly 
shared this suspicion.
Yeltsin preferred to stick to what he heard directly from Clinton’s 
special representative and authorized me to sign up to the PfP on June 
22, 1994.
America’s Bad Surprise for Russia
Yeltsin then felt offended and betrayed when in December 1994 
NATO approved a policy that could be summarized in a simple for-
mula: the PfP “sets in motion a process that leads to the enlargement 
of NATO.” He was also enraged by Clinton’s recurring failures to con-
sult—in fact a “courtesy call” would do—in advance of the U.S. bomb-
ings of Bosnian Serbs under NATO auspices. That was interpreted in 
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Russia as a sign that Moscow was seen by Washington and Brussels as a 
second-rate partner. In response, Yeltsin spoke of a new “Cold Peace” 
at the summit of the 53-nation Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe.
To avoid the political firestorm igniting in Moscow, I worked stren-
uously to decouple the criticism of hasty enlargement from hostility 
toward NATO itself. “Hasty” was the key word meaning a tactical dis-
agreement with a friendly alliance on when best to accommodate its 
potential new participants. Without this word, Russian opposition to 
enlargement implied strategic confrontation with an enemy trying to 
advance to our very borders.
By the end of 1994, the hard-liners were winning the day in Moscow, 
as an old-style security and governing bureaucracy, intermingled with 
crony oligarchs, was perverting democratic and market reforms.
Those forces restored state-controlled monopolies in key sectors 
of economy and wanted to keep out Western competition. They fos-
tered ‘seized fortress” propaganda for the Russian people while they 
and their families were enjoying lavish lifestyles in London, New York 
and French Riviera. Yeltsin was yielding to their pressure. Already in 
November 1993 Primakov published a report that NATO was still a 
threat to Russia. In this vein, he insisted on changing the policy formu-
la on NATO from “No hasty enlargement—Yes partnership!” to the 
simple and bold proclamation: “No enlargement!” In early 1995 Yeltsin 
approved that change. Then he signed a program of modernization of 
Russian strategic nuclear forces.
The Bill–Boris Show
The historic opportunity for Russia to become a NATO ally might 
have still been saved had presidents Yeltsin and Clinton spoken more 
clearly and absolutely frankly to each other on the core of the matter 
and really worked at hammering out a solution. Yet, they were more 
fixated on representation, and were busy with the Bill—Boris amity 
show at their joint press conferences.
Apparently in an attempt to avoid the risk of adding the question 
“who lost Russia?” to his own domestic problems, Clinton preferred to 
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downplay and paper over the growing rupture in the very foundation 
of the structure of partnership, i.e. common values. Yeltsin escaped into 
Soviet-style doublespeak (only too familiar to a former party apparat-
chik), one for domestic and another for foreign audiences. Both fudged 
and left issues open to interpretation or to being resolved in the future.
During 1995 Bill urged Boris to sign a PfP program of cooperation 
and to send a military detachment, even autonomous and symbolic, to 
Bosnia, making the NATO operation there look acceptable to Russia. 
In exchange Clinton promised to support Yeltsin’s reelection campaign 
looming in 1996 with his less than 10% approval rating. Among oth-
er things, no visible steps would be taken towards NATO expansion 
during that year. This pathetic deal boiled down to mutual understand-
ing that Boris would actually run under anti-NATO banners (and the 
West would look away). None of this addressed the NATO enlarge-
ment conundrum between the United States and Russia.
And then, at the beginning of 1996, Primakov succeeded me (later 
he became the prime minister) and Grachev was replaced by an even 
more traditionalist general. Russia was turning away from Western 
common values.
In 1997 the “Founding Act” between NATO and the Russia was add-
ed to the pile of goodwill declarations implemented as halfheartedly as 
they were signed. Yeltsin, in his radio address to the Russian people on 
May 30, described the Act as an effort “to minimize the negative con-
sequences of NATO’s expansion and prevent a new split in Europe.” 
He then described the agreement—inaccurately, according to Western 
officials—as “enshrining NATO’s pledge not to deploy nuclear weap-
ons on the territories of its new member countries and not [to] build up 
its armed forces near our borders...nor carry out relevant infrastructure 
preparations.” Russia continued to strongly oppose NATO also when 
the Alliance stopped Serbian cruelties in Kosovo in 1999 shortly after 
admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as new members.
Conclusions and Outlook
The chance of alliance between Russia and NATO, which had 
opened in the early 1990s, was missed. Instead, the relationship de-
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graded into hostility, veiled by diplomatic niceties that were thrown 
away at a later stage.
While the West failed to seize the opportunity and some diplomat-
ic mistakes were made on both sides, the United States and NATO 
were on the right side of history by admitting new democracies to the 
Alliance and being willing to find an accommodation with Russia. It 
was Moscow that returned to its antagonism toward NATO, which has 
been intensifying ever since. Yeltsin’s chosen successor president, Vlad-
imir Putin, tried to hinder the West with a charm offensive in the early 
years of the 21 century and even hinted that Russia might join NATO. 
In the meantime, domestic anti-American and anti-NATO propaganda 
has continued to gain momentum. Today the Kremlin has left little 
doubt about its attitude toward the Alliance in words and in deeds.
NATO remains the main power to safeguard the liberal world or-
der. It is under attack from autocratic, populist and extremist forces 
who claim that the organization is outdated. The Kremlin’s champs 
and chumps in the West portray NATO as a bloc promoting American 
hegemony, expanding to the East and cornering Russia. It is reassuring 
however, that the U.S. Congress continues to display firm bipartisan 
support for NATO.
The prospects of a new opening in Russian–NATO relations will de-
pend on the resilience and firmness of the Alliance and on deep changes 
in Moscow’s domestic and foreign policy. I believe that sooner or later 
the Russian people will follow the suit of other European nations in 
finding their national interest in democratic reforms and cooperation 
with NATO and other Western institutions.
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Chapter 20
Russia and NATO in the 1990s
Andrei Zagorski
Several clichés have become established in contemporary narratives 
explaining the evolution of relations between Russia and the West and 
particularly Russia and NATO in the 1990s.
Contemporary Russian mainstream discourse builds on the thesis 
that, following the end of the Cold War, it was particularly the United 
States that sought to extend its sphere of influence by conducting a pol-
icy of subjugation, or re-subjugation of former Communist countries, 
not least by integrating them into Euro-Atlantic institutions, especially 
NATO. In a nutshell: 
Starting with the negotiations on German unification, the West 
systematically took advantage of Russia’s weakness. The West nev-
er acted in the spirit of the Charter of Paris, in which the indi-
visibility of security was a key concept. The West never tried to 
address security with Russia, only without it, or against it. The 
United States instead seized the opportunity to dominate interna-
tional affairs especially in Europe. […] The ‘common European 
home’ failed because the West was unwilling to build new, open 
security architecture—and to fulfil its promises.1 
In pursuing this policy, the West allegedly broke an earlier promise 
to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev not to extend the Alliance any 
inch eastward.2
In the West and particularly in East Central Europe, Russian re-
actions to NATO enlargement in the 1990s tend to be presented as a 
linear policy pursued by Moscow since the collapse of the Soviet bloc. 
After the dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact the Kremlin allegedly 
followed the Soviet so-called ‘Falin’ and/or ‘Kvitsinskii doctrine’—
seeking to prevent East Central European countries from joining oth-
er military blocs (with NATO being the most prominent candidate), 
or from acceding to other sort of arrangements that could lead to the 
stationing of foreign troops and of military bases on their territory.3 
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The projection of this policy into the 1990s builds on an understanding 
(widely represented among my contemporary students) that, after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new Russia pursued the same pol-
icy and vehemently resisted NATO’s enlargement.
There is a large body of evidence that seems to support this un-
derstanding. In his letter addressed to the leaders of major Western 
nations in September 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin strongly 
opposed NATO’s eastward extension and instead offered to provide 
East Central European countries common security guarantees from 
Russia and the West. Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev admitted the 
sovereign right of East Central European countries to join alliances of 
their choice, but insisted that Russia had a sovereign right to retaliate. 
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service was more specific in a public 
report released in November 1993, indicating that Moscow could re-
consider its obligations under the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe (CFE) should NATO extend eastward. Moscow also 
sought to persuade countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania or Slovakia, 
which early on appeared less determined to join the Alliance, to foster 
closer relations with Russia by offering them particular economic re-
wards.4 These and many other manifestations of Moscow’s anger with 
the emergence of NATO’s debate to open its door to the East are often 
seen as confirming Russia’s determination to resist the expansion of the 
political West into East Central Europe, which it, nevertheless, was 
unable to stop.
In this chapter I argue that none of those narratives, each implying 
a zero-sum game, correctly reflect policies pursued by either Russia or 
the West, or properly capture the highly dynamic and complex political 
processes that were involved with regard to managing NATO’s east-
ward enlargement. By reconstructing the main moments highlighting 
the evolution of Russia–NATO relations in the 1990s, I argue that this 
was anything but a zero-sum exercise. On the contrary, it in fact re-
mains a positive example of cooperative policies pursued by all parties 
leading to a successful joint decision-making by Russia and the West on 
an issue that was, admittedly, highly controversial.
This evolution should be understood against the broader back-
ground of both post-Communist Russian Westpolitik with the overall 
goal of integrating (or seeking some sort of association/affiliation) 
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with the “political West,” and the domestic political strife in a country 
where foreign policy issues played a significant role in the overall con-
troversies. One must also take note of Moscow’s strong interest to have 
a seat at relevant (institutional) tables to ensure that it would have a say 
as an equal partner in decision-making on major international issues, 
particularly on those relevant for Russia’s national interests.
Policy choices made in Moscow during the 1990s changed as the 
European landscape continued changing. Between 1992 and 1995, 
Moscow pursued its ‘first choice’ of strengthening the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, contemporary OSCE) 
as the most inclusive, truly pan-European security organization. With 
the beginning of the EU/NATO enlargement debates in 1993–1994, 
Russia, too, adapted by seeking to institutionalize and develop mecha-
nisms for political consultation, joint decision-making and joint action 
with both NATO and the EU—though, for many, this may have been 
only the second choice, or the ‘plan B.’ Moscow pursued this adapta-
tion without abandoning the overall goal of seeking association with 
the “political West.” This led to complex arrangements during the late 
1990s—ones that allowed the Kremlin and the NATO Alliance to co-
operatively manage the first wave of NATO enlargement, including the 
one in 2004, without jeopardizing Russia–West relations.
This chapter begins by addressing general issues relevant for the Rus-
sian policy toward the West, Europe and NATO in particular, before 
exploring Moscow’s policy choices at different phases of the evolution 
of the European landscape in the 1990s. In doing so, it concentrates on 
Russian policy choices of the early and mid-1990s, and those made at 
the end of the decade as the Yeltsin government sought arrangements 
with NATO based on a positive-sum assumption.
Background
With due regard to the highly complex and dynamic landscape of 
European and domestic Russian politics, four considerations appear 
crucial for understanding the evolution of Russian policy and choices 
that affected its relations with NATO all through the 1990s:
•	 First, the overall vector of the Russian policy toward an integration 
into, or association with, the “political West.”
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•	 Second, the search for an appropriate institutionalization of Rus-
sia’s relations with the West through different organizations giving 
Moscow a voice in joint decision-making on major international 
issues.
•	 Third, the highly dynamic and often dramatic political controversy 
in Russia challenging not only domestic but also major foreign pol-
icy choices made by the Russian Government.
•	 Fourth, the prioritization of the policy toward the post-Soviet 
space—the so-called “near abroad”—over many other directions 
of foreign policy.
Integration into or association with the West
The most important choice made by the Russian leadership with 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union was 
to favor a policy of integration into or association with the “political 
West” on the basis of shared values and interests which was expected to 
be framed as some sort of a ‘strategic partnership.’5 This choice antic-
ipated a gradual formation of a wider community of democratic states, 
including Russia itself, that would fit into the definition of a pluralistic 
security community in the sense of Karl W. Deutsch and stretch from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok. Russian diplomat Vladimir Voronkov, being 
an eye witness of that period of the Russian policy, explains it sim-
ply: “Russia was not really weak; it was rather seeking—like any other 
state—its own place in the world. Such a search for identity took place 
under the influence of the dominant trend in the Euro-Atlantic zone at 
that time—the willingness of the majority of post-Communist nations 
to join NATO and the EU.”6
Despite highly controversial foreign policy debates both within the 
Russian government and with the political opposition, seeking a close, 
or even an alliance-type relationship with the West was a deliberate 
choice of the country’s leadership, which it pursued all through the 
1990s (and a few years beyond).7 While anticipating the post-Cold War 
world to become polycentric with the increasing number of new ‘rising’ 
or ‘emerging’ powers seeking to assert themselves on the international 
stage, the first Russian foreign policy doctrine adopted in April 1993 
held that “Russia should firmly embark on the course of developing re-
lations with those countries that could help to achieve the priority tasks 
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of national revival, first of all with neighbors, economically strong and 
technologically advanced Western states and new industrial countries 
in various regions.” Crucially, that choice was explained by the fact that 
Russia and the identified group of states were committed to “shared 
values of the world civilization as well as shared interests as regards core 
issues of global developments, in particular, as far as the maintenance of 
international peace and security, ensuring success of Russian reforms, 
strengthening stability in regions going through post-totalitarian trans-
formation.”8 From this perspective, the West, including the United 
States and NATO, was not seen as an enemy or threat but rather as an 
eventual ‘strategic partner’ in assisting Russia’s own post-Communist 
transition toward a democracy and market economy.
It was clear from the very beginning that any proper integration with 
the political West would require progressive and profound convergence 
of Russian domestic political and economic systems with those of the 
West. As long as the vector of post-Communist transition in Russia 
would remain compatible with that of East Central European coun-
tries, the issue of a potential ‘eastward extension of the West,’ though 
important (not least in the context of domestic political strife), would 
not be central issue in Russia–West relations. That is because a trans-
formed Russia, so it was hoped, would after all itself become part of the 
“political West.”
Institutionalization of Russia–West relations
While seeking to develop relations of strategic partnership with the 
West, Moscow’s main concern was to identify appropriate options for 
institutionalizing this relationship in order to ensure that Russia would 
have a voice in decision-making processes. Acceding to a number of 
“Western” organizations and institutions both global and regional (Eu-
ropean), such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), the Council of Europe or the G7, 
was from the very beginning on the agenda of Russia’s Western policy. 
This of course was a path on which the Soviet Union had already em-
barked under Gorbachev.
The Yeltsin government pointed to an important ‘institutional gap’ 
that divided it from the leading Western nations. While post-Soviet 
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Russia as the USSR’s successor state remained a permanent member 
on the U.N. Security Council with veto power, a participating state of 
the consensus-based CSCE/OSCE, and, since 1993, was a member of 
the Contact Group on former Yugoslavia, it was not a member of the 
G7, of NATO, or of the European Union.9 The consequence was that 
Moscow was regularly confronted with a consolidated position of those 
groups of states after their joint decision-making process had been fi-
nalized, and was not itself part of that process. This is why Moscow 
sought to elaborate on inclusive institutional mechanisms that would 
give it a voice before final decisions would be taken in those groups.10
The objective of transforming the G7 into the G8 through the in-
tegration of Russia was formulated in the early 1990s, while the 1994 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union 
provided for a mechanism for intensive political consultations and 
decision-making. The issue of establishing a mechanism for Russia–
NATO political consultations grew in importance particularly against 
the background of the evolving enlargement debate.11 While admitting 
the possibility of pursuing different options ranging from membership 
through different forms of association to a ‘variable geometry’ of in-
stitutional solutions,12 the objective of Moscow was to form effective 
mechanisms for “joint decision-making by Russia and the West per-
taining to the use of force, if necessary, and joint implementation of 
such decisions,”13
Domestic political controversies
The strategic foreign policy choice seeking closer association of 
Russia with the West was from the very beginning part and parcel of 
domestic political strife. The opposition to Boris Yeltsin and his for-
eign minister Andrei Kozyrev rallied not only in the Parliament but 
reached out into various branches of the government, political and 
economic establishments. This included over time the growing oppo-
sition to NATO enlargement that consolidated itself as the discussions 
in the West matured from 1993 onward. This opposition ultimately 
manifested itself in the establishment in 1997 of a parliamentary ‘an-
ti-NATO’ group that included members of different factions in both 
chambers of the Federal Assembly and demanded that President Yeltsin 
take bold steps in order to arrest any extension of the Alliance into East 
Central Europe. In the few months from January through April 1997, 
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this group grew from 110 to 250 members and included four of six 
vice-speakers of the Duma and chairpersons of 17 of 28 parliamentary 
committees. It was definitely much larger, vocal and visible than the 
small parliamentary ‘pro-NATO’ group.
Russian public opinion was also divided on NATO, although pop-
ular anti-NATO mood was not as radical as the political opposition 
to Yeltsin. As shown in Figure 1, around 60 percent of respondents in 
surveys of the Levada Center tended to see NATO as a risk, if not a 
threat, to Russia in 1997–1999, while the number of those who did not 
remained under 30 percent. Figure 2 shows that the number of respon-
dents ready to support NATO membership for Russia never exceeded 
10 percent in 1996–1999 and continued declining thereafter. However, 
proponents of hard resistance remained a clear minority, too. The ma-
jority of respondents favored either simply staying away from any bloc 
policies, or developing a cooperative relationship with NATO.
Both the domestic political strife, in which the political opposition 
operationalized the NATO enlargement issue against the President, 
and inconclusive public opinion imposed significant constraints on 
Figure 1. Responses to the question: “Should Russia beware of NATO 
member states?”
Source: Levada Center, March 31, 2009, http://www.levada.ru/2009/03/31/otnoshenie-rossiyan- 
k-nato/. 
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Yeltsin leading up to the 1996 Presidential elections, not least consid-
ering the advance of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s nationalistic Liberal Dem-
ocratic Party and the Communists in the 1993 and 1995 parliamentary 
elections. It was clear that any conciliatory policy on NATO enlarge-
ment would boost the opposition. On the other hand, the possibility of 
a Communist or nationalistic backlash regarding NATO enlargement 
served as a plausible argument for Yeltsin to delay any formal decisions 
on NATO until after the Russian Presidential elections.
Prioritization of the ‘near abroad’
Russian policy toward the post-Soviet space was one of the most 
controversial themes during domestic political debates of the ear-
ly 1990s. The goal of consolidating New Independent States (NIS) 
around Russia (or consolidating ‘Eurasia,’ to put it in the language of 
the contemporary debate) was advanced particularly by the opposition 
as an alternative preferred path to the association of Russia with the 
political West.
Figure 2. Responses to the question: “What policy better meets 
Russia’s interest?”
Source: Levada Center, March 31, 2009, http://www.levada.ru/2009/03/31/otnoshenie-rossiyan- 
k-nato/. 
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Against the background of increasing differentiation among the 
NIS, Russia’s 1993 foreign policy doctrine became a compromise 
growing out of the domestic debate. It formulated the goal of main-
taining and strengthening the role of Russia in the post-Soviet space, 
developing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a ‘via-
ble intergovernmental framework,’ and the recognition by the West of 
Russia’s ‘special role’ in that geographic area. While intended to help 
increasing Russia’s political status in the world, it was also recognized 
that this policy could eventually become controversial with the West.14
This recognition led to the gradual development of the Russian un-
derstanding of what a new status quo in Europe should represent, while 
developing Russia’s relations with the West. On the one hand, it im-
plied a limit on Moscow’s policy, which sought to draw a ‘red line:’ the 
eastward extension of the ‘West’ (at that time primarily NATO, but the 
EU would not be excluded) should not continue beyond the western 
borders of the former Soviet Union. On the other hand, the focus on 
the post-Soviet space effectively implied that the East Central region 
that the Soviet Union had vacated at the end of the Cold war was large-
ly considered to have abandoned the Russian orbit, no matter whether 
the countries of the region would accede to Euro-Atlantic institutions 
or not.
The crux here was the fate of the Baltic states—being left in a sort 
of limbo. Although they were no formal part of the CIS, they were still 
considered by many to be part of the former Soviet space, and their 
integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions activated the same instincts 
particularly in the Russian domestic opposition as the discussion of 
eventual NATO membership for Ukraine in the late 1990s. Concerns 
raised by specific groups of the Russian establishment, and particularly 
by the defense community, added to the complexity of that debate.
This meant that, while not being seen as welcome, the integration 
of East Central countries into Western institutions would not be seen 
as an unsurmountable problem. The key concern related to the NIS, 
with the Baltic states representing a special and particularly sensitive 
case. The general expectation that could thus reconcile Moscow with 
NATO extension into the ECE region, including the second phase in 
2004, was that either the Alliance would commit itself not to cross the 
‘red line’ or, at least, that it would not cross it any time soon. As a senior 
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Russian diplomat put it in 2010, “NATO has already engaged all na-
tions possible…Other states cannot expect membership or do not seek 
it…It means that many countries in the Euro-Atlantic in the near fu-
ture, or even in the next few decades, will not be covered by the NATO 
and EU framework.”15 This was supposed to leave Moscow more time 
for the consolidation of its neighborhood by pursuing integration proj-
ects within the CIS.
Still, the objective of an association with the political West was not 
seen as being necessarily irreconcilable with post-Soviet integration, 
provided that the overall vector of post-Communist transformation of 
Russia and its neighbors would remain compatible with that of oth-
er post-Communist nations. In that case, the CIS, like the European 
Union, could represent another case of regional integration without 
challenging the concept of a wider Euro-Atlantic community from 
Vancouver to Vladivostok.16
It was also important that, during the 1990s, despite beginning de-
bate over the ‘near abroad’ doctrine, the West and the international 
community in general refrained from actively engaging in conflict res-
olution in areas of the former Soviet Union. Although, at various mo-
ments, the possibility of dispatching U.N. or OSCE peace operations 
was considered (in particular, in Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Karabakh), 
both organizations reduced themselves to sending smaller teams of 
monitors and did not really challenge Russian operations conducted ei-
ther on the basis of ad hoc arrangements, or under CIS auspices.17 The 
most urgent issues of Russian troop withdrawal from and integration of 
Russian minorities in the Baltic states were addressed in a cooperative 
way with the assistance of the OSCE and the United States.18 
Before the Door Begins Opening
In the early 1990s, when the prospect for any NATO enlargement 
remained still vague, the option of advancing the goal of integration 
with the West through further institutionalization of strengthening of 
pan-European institutions of the CSCE/OSCE on the basis of com-
mon values and goals enshrined in the 1990 Charter of Paris for a 
New Europe appeared plausible in Moscow. Russia was a full partic-
ipating state of this consensus-based organization, and the CSCE did 
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not trigger any anti-Western instincts in the post-Soviet Russian polit-
ical establishment—at least not yet. Embarking on that path, Moscow 
did not simply set forth the footprint of Soviet policy during the late 
Gorbachev era, it also seems to have overestimated its own ability to 
persuade the West and particularly to overcome U.S. skepticism with 
respect to the CSCE.
The CSCE was seen in Russia as a main framework for shaping the 
evolving complex European community of states and the central insti-
tution that granted Russia full involvement in European affairs. It was 
also considered as an inclusive overarching framework for the formation 
of the ‘Euro-Atlantic,’ and after 1991 the ‘Euro-Asian,’ communities of 
states. The Russian foreign policy doctrine anticipated that a CSCE-
based security architecture in Europe would provide a platform for co-
operation with the European Union, NATO, the Western European 
Union and the CIS.19 Having joined together with the former Warsaw 
Pact countries and NIS at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) in December 1991, Moscow cautiously explored the possibili-
ty of a NATO membership.20 However, before the enlargement debate 
began to take shape in 1993, the Alliance was really not seen as the top 
item on Russia’s agenda.
Moscow welcomed the 1992 Helsinki decisions which took the 
CSCE institutions and structures to a new level and identified it as a 
regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. It wel-
comed the progressive discussions of cooperative security within the 
organization and of the establishment of the CSCE Forum for Security 
Cooperation for this purpose and the strengthening of the CSCE Con-
flict Prevention Center.
In 1993 and 1994, Russia submitted proposals aiming at further 
strengthening the CSCE.21 They were followed by the introduction, 
in 1994, of a comprehensive “Program for Enhancing CSCE Effec-
tiveness.”22 In the Program, Moscow promoted the objective of giving 
the CSCE a central role in peacekeeping, strengthening of democracy 
and providing for security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. It 
anticipated to transform the CSCE into a fully-fledged, treaty-based 
regional organization partnering with the United Nations. The central 
element of the Program was the proposal to establish a CSCE ‘Ex-
ecutive Committee’ that would act in a similar way as the U.N. Se-
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curity Council does. It would consist of no more than 10 permanent 
and non-permanent members and take binding decisions following 
the consensus rule. This vision was based on a hierarchical approach 
to European security architecture, implying that the CIS, NACC, the 
EU, the Council of Europe, NATO and the WEU should act as equal 
partners while the CSCE would be given an overall coordination role.
Following an earlier Russian proposal of late 1993 that suggested 
shifting the NACC from NATO to the umbrella of the OSCE and, for 
this purpose, to open its membership for neutral and non-aligned Eu-
ropean countries,23 the Russian Program proposal was met with much 
skepticism, for different reasons. While any sort of subordination of 
NATO would be unacceptable for the Alliance’s members, small par-
ticipating states in particular feared that the establishment of a CSCE 
“Security Council” would undermine the consensus rule and thus min-
imize their impact on decision-making. Other countries, such as Ger-
many and the Netherlands, sought to offer alternative solutions that 
would strengthen the role of the organization.24 Russian proposals did, 
however, inspire a decision by the OSCE to begin a structured discus-
sion on a Common and Comprehensive European Security Model for 
the 21st Century. Yet, the debate on the ‘Model,’25 launched in 1995, 
resulting in the adoption of the 1999 OSCE European Security Char-
ter, unfolded already in a different environment—one that was already 
defined by the beginnings of the NATO enlargement debate, which 
no longer was about ‘whether’ but had now turned to ‘when and how.’
Anticipating Enlargement
It is often believed, that the Warsaw Declaration signed by Yeltsin 
during his visit to Poland in August 1993, in which he accepted Poland’s 
intention to join NATO “in the long term,” stating that it was “not in 
conflict with the interests of other states, including those of Russia,”26 
provided a boost to the discussion that had started months before. It 
served as the trigger for Moscow’s mounting official rhetoric against 
enlargement that would follow in the fall of 1993. However, the main 
purpose of that rhetoric seems to have been not to begin a campaign to 
stop the enlargement but, rather, to buy time to sort out other import-
ant issues of Russia-NATO relations—not least which steps would be 
necessary for Moscow to adapt to this trend.
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The most important question for Moscow was not “whether” NATO 
would enlarge, but “when” and “how”. The question was also whether 
Russia would be part of the process in some way, or would it be left out. 
The above-mentioned 1993 Warsaw Declaration by Presidents Yeltsin 
and Walesa itself put the prospect in a long-term perspective and made 
the membership option (for Poland) conditional on the formation of a 
pan-European security architecture, thus not entirely abandoning the 
policy of strengthening the CSCE, which Russia continued to pursue. 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev emphasized at that time that the 
problem was not the enlargement per se, but a premature or hasty en-
largement that would take place before other important issues had been 
dealt with. He did not exclude that, at some point in the future, either 
Russia would also join NATO, or both Russia and NATO would be-
come part of a pan-European security system. What he explicitly ruled 
out was an expansion of NATO that would categorically exclude, or not 
involve Russia.27
Moscow had to respond to the challenge of the post-Cold War Eu-
ropean order becoming increasingly NATO (and EU)–centric, for this 
would predictably lead to a progressive marginalization of the CSCE. 
At the same time Russia remained keen to ensure and appropriate-
ly institutionalize its own association with the “political West.” As a 
result, Moscow adapted to the new trend by abandoning its previous 
policy of concentrating on the CSCE—largely at the expense of the 
organization—and by seeking to institutionalize direct political con-
sultation and joint decision-making with NATO and the European 
Union. Recalling this period, Andrei Kelin admits that the interest 
in the OSCE gradually declined both in the West and in Russia. The 
agenda was dominated by concentrating on different platforms for the 
pursuit of Russian policy objectives in cooperation with NATO and 
the European Union.28
It remains open whether the changes in Russia’s policy toward the 
ineffective CIS integration by launching, in 1995, a ‘multi-speed’ in-
tegration approach, was part of its response to the beginning NATO 
enlargement, or simply coincided with it. Russia’s response to NATO 
was formulated in the context of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) pro-
posal advanced by the United States and NATO beginning in the fall of 
1993, and particularly after the program‘s launch in 1994. 
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In April 1994, President Yeltsin took the decision for Russia to join 
PfP. He did so with the support of the Ministry of Defense and the 
Security Council, against harsh criticism from the Russian Parliament. 
One month later, however, he appeared to make a U-turn, announcing 
during a visit to Germany that Russia would not sign the PfP Frame-
work without a special protocol. As it turned out, his statement did 
not herald a reversal in Moscow’s policy but, rather, a decision to insti-
tutionalize ‘special’ relations with the Alliance that would go beyond 
military-political cooperation provided for within the PfP program. 
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev 
clarified that Russia was prepared to sign the Framework Document 
together with an additional protocol or agreement to include detailed 
and reciprocal commitments of NATO and Russia in the political and 
military fields, and proposed to establish a mechanism for regular or ad 
hoc Russia–NATO consultations.29
In the event, on June 22, 1994, Kozyrev signed the PfP Framework 
Document on behalf of Russia. At the same time, at a press conference, 
a protocol on establishing a framework for enhanced political dialogue 
between Russia and NATO was presented.30 This document anticipat-
ed an institutionalization of information exchange, political consul-
tation, and the discussion of possibilities for cooperation in form of 
holding ambassadorial Russia-NATO “16+1” ad hoc meetings with the 
North-Atlantic Council or with the Political Committee. Following 
this, on July 2,1994, Russia submitted a very ambitious program for 
political and military cooperation with NATO.31 
In the course of the negotiations, two documents were worked out 
with the Alliance: a Russia—NATO individual program for coopera-
tion within the PfP and a document on broader cooperation including 
holding political consultations on a wide range of international secu-
rity issues. Both documents were expected to be signed on December 
1, 1994. But then Kozyrev declined from endorsing them at the last 
moment, referring to the decision taken by North Atlantic Council to 
commission a study that would spell out criteria for enlargement. That 
was seen as a principal decision to proceed with enlargement. Even if 
the decision not to sign the documents was initiated by Kozyrev, his 
proposal must have been approved by the President, who was concerned 
at that time that no formal decisions concerning enlargement would 
be taken by NATO before the 1996 Presidential elections in Russia. 
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No matter whether Kozyrev was instructed not to sign or whether he 
himself initiated that decision, it postponed the institutionalization of 
cooperation between Russia and the Alliance for two and a half years.
Negotiating Terms of Enlargement
As the first round of Eastern enlargement approached, Moscow con-
sidered available policy choices. Evgeniy Primakov, who in 1996 be-
came Foreign Minister, listed them as follows:32
1. To reject NATO enlargement and exclude any relations with the 
Alliance. This option was considered a road to nowhere or a re-
sumption of the Cold War.
2. Accept and not object NATO enlargement and, on this basis, seek 
an agreement that would govern Russia-NATO relations. This op-
tion was seen as a sort of capitulation that would not be accepted 
by the Russian public. 
3. Without abandoning the negative appraisal of the enlargement, 
seek a negotiated “minimization of negative consequences,” or re-
duce the damage for Russia’s security and interests.
Option 3 was the favored one. It implied that (largely for tactical 
reasons and domestic consumption) Moscow would continue rhetoric 
policy opposing the enlargement but, at the same time, seek to nego-
tiate a deal that would allow to establish ‘special relations’ with the 
Alliance.33 Also, for tactical reasons, Moscow decided not to raise the 
possibility of membership for Russia during these negotiations based 
on the understanding that raising this question would weaken the rhe-
torical part of its policy and could provoke a big-bang enlargement. 
However, even at this time, Moscow did not yet abandon the member-
ship option altogether.34 It remained on the agenda until 2002. 
This policy choice also anticipated that, prior to the enlargement, 
specific Russian concerns had to be addressed, particularly those raised 
by the defense establishment, and appropriate solutions identified and 
agreed upon. Like at the earlier stage, Moscow was also seeking estab-
lishing a mechanism for regular political consultations with NATO.
In particular, Moscow sought to:
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•	 address specific military issues that served for concerns in the con-
text of the enlargement, such as guarantees that neither nuclear 
weapons, nor foreign troops and respective military infrastructure 
would be permanently stationed on the territory of new members; 
agreement on the parameters for the adaptation of the CFE Treaty 
in order to exclude that the military power of NATO approaches 
Russian borders as a consequence of the enlargement;
•	 establish a consensus-based mechanism for consultations that 
would include Russia into joint decision-making on all issues that 
could affect its interest (effectively giving Russia a veto power on 
such issues);
•	 ensure continued transformation of NATO from being a collec-
tive defense alliance toward an organization addressing region-
al threats, first of all regional conflicts which were at the core of 
threats perceptions in the 1990s, and engaging in peace operations 
in cooperation with Russia;
•	 negotiate a legally binding document to be signed by heads of state 
or government.35
One of the key objectives of Moscow was to draw a ‘red line’ for 
NATO’s eastward extension: the Baltic states and any other post-Soviet 
states should remain excluded from NATO.36
At the initial stage, the discussion of those issues was supposed to re-
solve, in a sequential (rather than parallel) way, three problems: further 
transformation of NATO, institutionalization of cooperation between 
Russia and the Alliance, and enlargement.37
Intensive and complex bilateral consultations held in 1996 and 1997 
at the level of heads of state or government and especially of foreign 
ministers, particularly with the United States, France, Germany and 
the UK, as well as from January 1997 with NATO Secretary General 
Javier Solana, resulted in the adoption of several documents and de-
cisions. Those included, inter alia, the signing on May 27, 1997 the 
Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between 
NATO and the Russian Federation, and the adaptation of the CFE 
treaty in 1999 that met Russian concerns. Although not included into 
the framework of negotiations, the transformation of the G7 into the 
G8 by including Russia was also facilitated by seeking a broader ar-
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rangement with the West against the background of the latter’s exten-
sion to the east.
Most of concerns raised by Moscow at that time were addressed and 
resolved in a cooperative manner. The Permanent Joint Council, es-
tablished by the Founding Act, was supposed to “provide a mechanism 
for consultations, coordination and, to the maximum extent possible, 
where appropriate, for joint decisions and joint action with respect 
to security issues of common concern.” The document identified 19 
initial areas for Russia–NATO cooperation. Members of the Alliance 
stated that they had “no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy 
nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to 
change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy” and 
did “not foresee any future need to do so,” and that they had “no inten-
tion, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites 
on the territory of those members, whether through the construction 
of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage 
facilities.” They also stated that “in the current and foreseeable secu-
rity environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and 
other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, 
and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent 
stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely 
on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks.”38
The arrangement reached in 1997 paved the way to a swift adapta-
tion of the CFE treaty in order to acknowledge the disappearance of the 
Warsaw Pact (or of the ‘eastern group’, to put in in the CFE language) 
and to give effect to and operationalize the Alliance’s pledge that its en-
largement would not result in a concentration of troops or stationing of 
nuclear weapons at the borders of Russia. Moscow’s reciprocal commit-
ment not to permanently station additional substantial combat forces 
in Pskov and Kaliningrad regions was formalized in December 1999 in 
the context of signing the Adapted CFE Treaty in Istanbul.
Comparing this outcome with Primakov’s checklist of 1996 makes 
clear that only two of his objectives were not obtained at the end of 
1990s. 
First, the language of the Founding Act was explicit that its pro-
visions “do not provide NATO or Russia, in any way, with a right of 
veto over the actions of the other nor do they infringe upon or restrict 
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the rights of NATO or Russia to independent decision-making and 
action.”
Second, no explicit or tacit agreement was reached on a red line 
which NATO should not cross by next rounds. Since it was already 
clear in 1997 that this process would not be limited to the Czech Re-
public, Hungary and Poland, this produced uncertainty particularly 
with respect to whether the Baltic states would be able to join the Alli-
ance in the second round. However, the second round of enlargement 
in 2004 also did not generate a crisis in Russia–NATO relations, be-
cause both sides had a clear understanding of what they had agreed on 
and what they had not agreed on. 
The signing of the Russia—NATO Founding Act and the establish-
ment of the Joint Permanent Council operating at different levels and 
including political and military fields provided a significant boost to 
practical cooperation between Russia and the Alliance from 1998. In-
deed, it is one of few instruments still relevant and operational which is 
observed by both Russia and NATO, despite the dramatically changed 
security environment in Europe.
Conclusions
Neither NATO’s nor Russia’s policies in the context of the enlarge-
ment debate in the 1990s were based on a zero-sum game assumption. 
Although the emergence of a ‘NATO-centric’ European security ar-
chitecture was far from being Moscow’s first choice, it did not adapt 
a policy of simply resisting enlargement. Instead, it sought to develop 
and institutionalize political consultations and cooperation with the Al-
liance, identify and raise specific security-related concerns and jointly 
seek for cooperative solutions. Public rhetoric accompanying this pol-
icy served the purpose of making the arrangement acceptable to the 
Russian public which would support developing a cooperative relation-
ship with the Alliance.
Opening NATO doors for the enlargement in 1997/99 did not lead 
to a crisis in relations of the Alliance with Russia. Mechanism for co-
operation established by the Founding Act began bringing fruits. The 
first meeting of the Joint Permanent Council was held at the ministerial 
level in New York on September 26, 1997, and agreed on the program 
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for cooperation, including main themes for political consultation and 
directions for practical cooperation. In October 1997, first working 
groups were established. In March 1998, the Russian Permanent Mis-
sion at NATO was established. Russia and NATO agreed to exchange 
military liaison missions and agreed on the individual partnership pro-
gram for 1998 including the participation of Russia in more than 70 
events in 17 areas of cooperation, including 10 joint exercises.
In 1997–1998, political dialogue and cooperation between Russia 
and NATO expanded significantly helping to develop an atmosphere of 
growing openness and confidence between various agencies involved in 
projects. This experience also built upon positive cooperation between 
Russia and NATO in Bosnia (SFOR).
Russia–NATO relations only began deteriorating in 1999, not be-
cause of enlargement but because of NATO’s airstrikes against Yugo-
slavia between March and June 1999. The immediate reaction of Mos-
cow was to suspend its participation in the Joint Permanent Council, 
the implementation of all cooperative programs with NATO and any 
military-to-military communication at senior level. Although Russian 
‘sanctions’ targeting NATO at that moment did not last long, and Mos-
cow returned to cooperation, not least within KFOR in Kosovo, this 
was a moment when those opposing any rapprochement between Rus-
sia and NATO, Russia and the West, indeed those who failed to influ-
ence Moscow’s Western policy during the early 1990s, began increas-
ingly to have an impact on Russia’s course after 1999. The cooperative 
moment of the 1990s was passing, just as did Yeltsin, who passed the 
baton to Vladimir Putin. Times as much as leaders were changing.
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Chapter 21
Explaining Russia’s Opposition to NATO 
Enlargement: Strategic Imperatives, Ideas, or 
Domestic Politics?
Elias Götz
This chapter examines the sources of Moscow’s opposition to NA-
TO’s opening eastward. The topic is timely and important, not only 
because of the twentieth anniversary of the first post-Cold War round 
of enlargement in 1999, but also because of its prominent role in the 
ongoing “who lost Russia” debate among Western scholars.1 Previous 
studies have documented that from 1993 onwards large parts of the 
Russian political elite opposed NATO’s eastward expansion.2 But the 
sources of Russia’s opposition remain a matter of controversy. At risk of 
oversimplification, one can distinguish between three different sets of 
explanations in the existing literature: one group of scholars emphasiz-
es the role of strategic imperatives and national security considerations; 
a second group focuses on ideational factors such as Russia’s status con-
cerns and Cold War thinking; and a third group argues that Russian 
domestic political factors explain Moscow’s position best.
Based on the work of area specialists and newly declassified U.S. 
transcripts of the conversations (over the phone or face-to-face) be-
tween Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, I argue that Russia’s opposition 
to the first round of NATO enlargement was driven by the interplay 
of strategic imperatives and status concerns. Cold War memories and 
domestic political factors played only a secondary role. Of course, my 
findings are somewhat tentative as most internal policy documents, 
diplomatic cables, and records of high-level meetings—especially on 
the Russian side—remain inaccessible.
I begin in the first part with an account of the evolution of Russia’s 
stance towards the planned enlargement of the Alliance in the 1990s. 
The core of the chapter (sections 2-4) provides an assessment of the 
different explanations for Moscow’s resentment against NATO expan-
sion. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of what the findings 
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imply for the ongoing politico-historical debate about Russia’s relations 
with the West.
Yeltsin’s Russia and the NATO Enlargement Question
In late 1991 and early 1992, Moscow made it clear that it wanted 
to establish closer relations with the West. President Yeltsin and other 
high-ranking officials even aired the idea that Russia might someday 
join NATO. Meanwhile, voices in Central and Eastern Europe grew 
louder about seeking membership in the Alliance. The Kremlin, in re-
sponse, adopted an increasingly critical stance towards the ambitions of 
those states and NATO’s activism in Central Europe more generally.
This became clear in the summer of 1993. During an official visit to 
Warsaw in August, Yeltsin at first stated that he was principally not op-
posed to Poland’s membership in NATO. But, as soon as the president 
had uttered his words, the Russian Foreign Ministry qualified these 
comments, arguing that this applied only if and when NATO estab-
lished a special relationship with Moscow. A few weeks later, President 
Yeltsin sent a letter to the governments of the United States, France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom in which he declared, “In general, 
we advocate that relations between our country and NATO be a few 
degrees warmer than those between the Alliance and Eastern Europe.”3 
In the letter, Yeltsin also argued that “the spirit of the treaty on the 
final settlement with respect to Germany (…) precludes the option of 
expanding the NATO zone into the East.”4
By June 1994, Moscow decided that it would join NATO’s Partner-
ship for Peace (PfP) program. The Russian leadership believed that 
the PfP framework was an alternative to NATO expansion—or at least 
a venue to exert some influence on the decision about enlargement.5 
Soon, however, it became clear that the Alliance was seriously thinking 
about admitting new members from among the former Soviet satellites. 
In July 1994, when President Clinton addressed the Polish parliament 
in Warsaw, he emphasized that “no country should have the right to 
veto (…) any other democracy’s integration into Western institutions, 
including those ensuring security.”6 Clinton also reiterated the by now 
famous phrase that NATO enlargement was “no longer a question of 
whether, but when and how.”7 
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Notwithstanding Western assurances that expansion would not be 
directed against Russia, many policymakers and military thinkers in 
Moscow objected vociferously. In July 1994, for instance, President 
Yeltsin stressed in his private conversations with Clinton, “I have to say 
candidly, Bill, that with respect to Poland, the position they take on this 
[NATO expansion] does not correspond very closely with ours.”8 In 
December 1994, at a Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
in Brussels, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev unexpectedly announced 
that he would not sign the PfP accord out of protest against the initia-
tion of a new NATO enlargement study.9 A few days later, at the OSCE 
meeting in Budapest, President Yeltsin doubled down and warned that 
“Europe (…) is in the danger of plunging into a cold peace.”10
By May 1995, Russia did approve the PfP Individual Partnership 
Program. But it remained opposed to NATO expansion plans. One 
month later, in June 1995, the Russian Council on Foreign and De-
fense Policy issued a report, entitled “Russia and NATO,” capturing 
Moscow’s attitude towards NATO expansion, which, so the report 
held, might lead to the “first serious crisis in relations between Russia 
and the West since the end of the Cold War.” Furthermore, it argued 
that “especially in the United States, there is a desire to consolidate the 
geopolitical sphere achieved by ‘winning’ the Cold War.” The report 
also stressed that although the “interest [of the Central and Eastern 
European countries] are understandable and legitimate (…) Russia does 
not consider [membership in the Alliance] an optimum and well-bal-
anced response to their anxiety. If they join NATO, the security of the 
eastern and central European countries will be achieved at the cost of 
Russian security.”11
Russian elites clearly resented the eastward expansion of NATO and 
made this public. Some of the more hardline figures threatened to take 
all kinds of countermeasures, including the stationing of nuclear weap-
ons in western parts of Russia and Kaliningrad, withdrawal from arms 
control treaties, and even military actions in Eastern Europe. In private 
conversations with President Clinton, Yeltsin reiterated Russia’s con-
cerns about the prospect of a widened Alliance, but he did not issue any 
direct threats. Given Russia’s economic and military weakness, there 
was also little Moscow could do to prevent enlargement. So Russian 
negotiators tried to secure formal reinsurances that NATO would not 
station nuclear weapons, military infrastructure, and combat troops on 
484 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
the territory of new NATO members. As Russia’s new Foreign Minis-
ter Yevgeny Primakov declared in a 16+1 meeting with NATO in July 
1996, “moving up NATO’s infrastructure to our borders [is unaccept-
able]. On this basis, Russia is inviting NATO to conduct a dialogue, 
and now they have agreed to this.”12 Similarly, at the Helsinki Summit 
in March 1997, President Yeltsin made it clear that “[o]ur position has 
not changed. It remains a mistake for NATO to move eastward.” But, 
seeing he could not stop the process anyway, he added: “I need to take 
steps to alleviate the negative consequences of this for Russia. I am 
prepared to enter into an agreement with NATO not because I want to 
but because it is a forced step.”13
Seeking to allay Moscow’s concerns, the Alliance proposed to set 
up an institutionalized form of cooperation, which was codified in the 
NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and 
Security. The Founding Act entailed the creation of a forum for con-
sultation, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), and a non-binding decla-
ration (Article 4) that “in the current and foreseeable security environment, 
the Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by 
ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for 
reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of sub-
stantial combat forces.”14 
However, even after Moscow’s signing of the Founding Act in May 
1997, large parts of the Russian political establishment—including 
President Yeltsin and many of his associates—remained worried about 
NATO’s eastern extension. This was reflected in Russia’s revised Na-
tional Security Concept, which was published in December 1997. The 
Concept stated, “The prospect of NATO expansion to the East is un-
acceptable to Russia since it represents a threat to its national security.” 
The Concept also argued that “NATO’s expansion to the East and its 
transformation into a dominant military-political force in Europe cre-
ate the threat of a new split in the continent which would be extremely 
dangerous given the preservation in Europe of mobile strike groupings 
of troops and nuclear weapons.”15
In essence, despite repeated reassurances by Western governments 
and Clinton himself that NATO expansion was not directed against 
Russia, and despite intensive U.S.-Russian dialogue, many politicians 
and strategists in Moscow saw it otherwise, opposing the enlargement 
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outright. The question is, why? In what follows, I re-examine three 
prominent explanations in light of the evidence that has become avail-
able in recent years.
Russia’s Strategic Imperatives
Some analysts have argued that Russia’s opposition to the eastward 
extension of NATO was based on strategic imperatives and military 
security concerns. As Kenneth Waltz put it, “it is not so much new 
members that Russia fears as it is America’s might moving ever closer 
to its borders.”16 Likewise, Charles Kupchan warned already in 1994 
that “enlarging the alliance would alter the balance of power on the 
continent and make Russia feel less secure.”17 And Michael Brown cau-
tioned, “Russian leaders will see any form of NATO expansion (…) as 
a change in the balance of power and an extension of Washington’s and 
Bonn’s sphere of influence.”18
Indeed, as early as November 1993, Primakov, then head of the Rus-
sian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), warned that NATO expansion 
would “bring the biggest military grouping in the world, with its co-
lossal offensive potential, directly to the borders of Russia. If this hap-
pens, the need would arise for a fundamental reappraisal of all defense 
concepts on our side, a redeployment of armed forces and changes in 
operational plans.”19 Likewise, analysts in the Russian defense ministry 
were concerned that “when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Repub-
lic join NATO, the Alliance’s territory will expand eastward by 650 
to 750 kilometers. As a result, the ‘buffer zone’ between Russia and 
NATO would be substantially reduced.”20 And Defense Minister Pavel 
Grachev plainly stated, “if new members are admitted into NATO, 
Russia will have to take additional security measures.”21
Indeed, virtually all Russian defense planners opposed NATO’s east-
ward movement with reference to security concerns. One might say 
that this is unsurprising. After all, defense planners are paid to think in 
terms of worst-case scenarios. What is more, by playing up the poten-
tial threat posed by NATO expansion, Russian military officials might 
have hoped to advance the corporate interests of the armed forces, such 
as higher levels of defense spending and increased influence on foreign 
affairs. While there may be some truth to this argument—bureaucra-
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cies usually look after themselves—the significance of the Russian mili-
tary’s parochial agenda should not be exaggerated here, for two reasons.
First, existing research has shown that the military did not succeed 
in exerting significant influence on the Kremlin during the 1990s. As a 
RAND study concluded, “On critical resources issues such as the de-
fense budget, pay, and military housing, the top brass has consistently 
been short-changed and failed to achieve its main goals.”22 
Second, and more importantly, concern about the prospective east-
ward enlargement of NATO was shared across the political spectrum. 
For instance, Russian privatization mastermind Anatoly Chubais, a 
known pro-Westerner, stated at the 1997 World Economic Forum in 
Davos that with regard to NATO expansion, “for the first time in the 
last five years, I personally am adopting the same position as Messrs, 
Zhirinovsky, and Zyuganov.23 Similarly, the liberal opposition lead-
er Grigory Yavlinsky declared in 1998, “Talk that this is a different 
NATO, a NATO that is no longer a military alliance, is ridiculous. It is 
like saying that the hulking thing advancing towards your garden is not 
a tank because it is painted pink, carries flowers, and plays cheerful mu-
sic. It does not matter how you dress it up; a pink tank is still a tank.”24 
In other words, there was broad-based opposition to NATO expan-
sion among Russian policymakers of different stripes, even as there 
were frequent disputes on economic, social, and domestic political mat-
ters. This suggests that Moscow’s position regarding NATO expansion 
was shaped by structural or situational pressures rather than by the pa-
rochial interests of particular actors or institutions. 
To be clear, few policymakers in Moscow believed that NATO ex-
pansion posed an immediate threat. Only the most extreme hardliners 
feared that the Alliance would initiate military strikes on Russia in the 
near future. Nevertheless, NATO remained a politico-military bloc 
and thus a potential danger. As the abovementioned quotes indicate, 
Russian policymakers focused on capabilities rather than intentions. 
Intentions, after all, can be misrepresented or change over time. As 
President Yeltsin put it in a one-to-one meeting with Clinton in May 
1995, “It’s a new form of encirclement if the one surviving Cold War 
bloc expands right up to the borders of Russia. Many Russians have a 
sense of fear. What do you want to achieve with this if Russia is your 
partner? they ask. I ask it too: Why do you want to do this?”25 Likewise, 
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Russian Foreign Minister Primakov noted dryly, “For any reasonable 
politician, plans are a variable factor but potential is a constant factor. 
Having a powerful military bloc being formed on our borders or near 
our territory irrespective of whether it poses a threat today or not, is 
unpleasant. It is against our interests.”26 
Indeed, President Clinton himself reflected before the signing of the 
Founding Act, “they [the Russians] get our promise that we’re not go-
ing to put our military stuff into their former allies who are now going 
to be our allies, unless we happen to wake up one morning and decide 
to change our mind.”27 Seen against this background, it is not difficult 
to understand why policymakers in Moscow remained concerned about 
the long-term strategic consequences of NATO expansion, despite re-
peated assurances of Western governments that the Alliance’s move to-
wards the East was not aimed at containing Russia.
Moscow’s concerns were reinforced by the open-ended character of 
NATO enlargement. As the 1997 Madrid Declaration expressly stated 
(Article 8), “The considerations set forth in our 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement will continue to apply with regard to future aspirants, re-
gardless of their geographic location. No European democratic coun-
try (...) will be excluded from consideration.”28 
Indeed, already by the mid-1990s, Western analysts and policymak-
ers pondered publicly about the future inclusion of other Central and 
Eastern European countries, including some of the post-Soviet repub-
lics (in particular the Baltic states and Ukraine). This caused a shudder 
to run through the spines of Russian politicians. As Vladimir Lukin, 
the chairman of the Duma’s Foreign Relations Committee, declared, 
“if NATO expansion were to aim at ultimate membership for the Baltic 
States and Ukraine, without Russia, that would be utterly unacceptable. 
No Russian could possibly accept the presence of a potentially hostile 
NATO within striking distance of Smolensk.”29 Likewise, Foreign Min-
ister Primakov warned, “Russia cannot remain indifferent to the factor 
of distance—the Baltic countries’ proximity to our vital centers. Should 
NATO advance to new staging grounds, the Russian Federation’s ma-
jor cities would be within striking range of not only strategic missiles, 
but also tactical aircraft.”30 And Yeltsin’s foreign policy aide Dmitrii 
Ryurikov made it clear that if NATO included any “neighboring coun-
try” Russia would “revise its position towards the Western alliance.”31
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The list of such statements could go on, but the point is clear: gov-
ernment officials in Moscow were deeply worried about the possibility 
that NATO expansion’s open-ended character would lead to the ad-
mission of countries from the former Soviet area, an area that Moscow 
considered to be its direct sphere of influence—its real “near abroad”—
for historical, cultural, economic, and geopolitical reasons. Indeed, as 
the declassified memcons and telcons show, President Yeltsin repeat-
edly raised the issue with President Clinton. For example, at the Hel-
sinki Summit in March 1997, he emphasized that “one thing is very 
important: enlargement should not embrace the former Soviet repub-
lics. I cannot sign any agreement without such language. Especially 
Ukraine.”32 President Yeltsin also noted, “We followed closely Solana’s 
[the then-General Secretary of NATO] activities in Central Asia. They 
were not to our liking. He was pursuing an anti-Russian course.”33 And 
at the end of the Helsinki Summit, President Yeltsin even proposed to 
Clinton, “regarding the countries of the former Soviet Union, let us 
have a verbal, gentlemen’s agreement — we would not write it down in 
the statement — that no former Soviet republics would enter NATO. 
This gentlemen’s agreement would not be made public.”34 President 
Clinton rejected this politely but firmly. 
Clearly then, strategic imperatives were central for Russia’s resent-
ment to the first round of NATO expansion. The leadership in Mos-
cow was concerned especially about the possibility that NATO military 
infrastructure would be moved closer to the Russian border. Equal-
ly worrisome was the uncertainty about the long-term intentions of 
Western governments and their response to other aspirant countries 
given the open-ended character of enlargement. 
Ideational Factors
How then did ideational factors play into Russian behavior? Some 
observers highlight how Russian policymakers suffered from a Cold 
War hangover, meaning that Moscow focused on the United States 
and NATO as potential threats because of deep-seated mistrust born of 
the Cold War. NATO, after all, had been established as a military alli-
ance against the Soviet Union. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that 
Russia, as the principal successor state to the USSR, was opposed to 
NATO’s eastward extension. But the problem was also generational. As 
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many decision makers had grown up and been trained during the East-
West confrontation, vestiges of Cold War thinking were almost cer-
tainly present among parts of the Russian foreign policy establishment. 
As one observer put it, “present day Russian politicians and journalists 
are almost all themselves products of the USSR. A mistrust of Western, 
and especially American, motivations was inculcated in them during 
their childhood school days and in their early professional careers.”35
That said, there are also obvious difficulties with viewing Russian 
opposition to NATO expansion as a straightforward extension of a 
Cold War mentality. 
First, this line of reasoning cannot explain why resentment to 
NATO enlargement was shared across the political spectrum. As not-
ed, even reformers such as Chubais and Yavlinsky—certainly no Cold 
Warriors—opposed the Alliance’s enlargement. 
Second, such an explanation ignores the fact that Russia cooperated 
with NATO on a wide range of issues, from the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons to counter-terrorism and military crisis management. 
Take the war in Yugoslavia. Although Moscow opposed air strikes, it 
supported key UN resolutions against Serbia and worked with NATO 
on the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.36 This would have been un-
thinkable during the Cold War; and it shows that the Russian leader-
ship was willing to cooperate with the Alliance. 
Third, in the transcripts of the calls and personal conversations be-
tween Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton, there are no discursive structures 
reminiscent of Cold War thinking. To the contrary, both presidents 
were well aware of the shadow of the past and wanted to overcome it. 
And yet, Yeltsin opposed the Alliance’s enlargement. Thus, while the 
legacy of the Cold War most likely influenced Russian perceptions of 
NATO, it was certainly not the sole or even primary source of Mos-
cow’s resentment to eastward expansion.
A second variant of the ideational argument stresses the role of Rus-
sian status concerns. For example, Hilary Driscoll and Neil MacFar-
lane have pointed out that “[NATO] enlargement runs directly counter 
to commonly held Russian perceptions of themselves as a great pow-
er.”37 Taras Kuzio has similarly concluded that Russian resentment to 
NATO expansion can be attributed to “questions of coming to terms 
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with loss of empire and Great Power status.”38 And Peter Shearman 
has argued that “[t]he majority of Russians, the elite and the wider pop-
ulation, has been consistently opposed to NATO expanding closer to 
Russia’s borders, not out of any sense of direct military threat, but due 
to psychological factors linked to questions of prestige and identity.”39
The leadership in Moscow, no doubt, was status-sensitive. This was 
visible in President Yeltsin’s efforts to make Russia a member of the G7 
group of advanced industrialized states. Likewise, Yeltsin often referred 
to status concerns when debating NATO expansion (and internation-
al affairs more generally) with President Clinton. Yeltsin complained, 
for instance, that “Russia is not consulted on some issues but Russia 
is a great power.”40 He also demanded “to get a clear understanding 
of your [Clinton’s] idea of NATO expansion because now I see noth-
ing but humiliation for Russia if you proceed.”41 Moreover, he stressed 
that “Russia is a great power to be reckoned with and that no problem 
can be addressed without Russia.”42 In particular, President Yeltsin was 
concerned that the post-Soviet Russian rump state would be relegated 
to a second-ranked power on the European periphery without a say in 
the formation of the continent’s new post-Cold War order. 
What is more, several scholars have argued that the Russian elite’s 
conception of great-power status is bound up with a sense of entitle-
ment to a regional sphere of influence along its periphery.43 This helps 
to explain why Russian policymakers responded so strongly to NATO 
expansion’s open-ended character and the possibility that former Soviet 
republics would join the Alliance in the future.
To acknowledge all this, though, is not to say that Russia’s resent-
ment to NATO expansion can be solely explained by reference to status 
concerns. As described above, there were also strategic imperatives at 
play. Indeed, in situations when strategic imperatives conflicted with 
status concerns, the former trumped the latter. For example, Russia was 
initially hesitant to become a member of the PfP program, for several 
reasons. One was that the program treated Russia on par with other 
post-communist countries and did not provide Moscow with a special 
role. This challenged Russia’s view of itself as a great power. But, once 
Moscow came to regard PfP as a venue to influence and possibly hold 
up the process of NATO expansion (mistakenly, as it later turned out), 
status concerns were set aside and it decided to join the program.44 In 
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other words, status concerns are best understood not as the root cause 
of Moscow’s opposition, but rather as a reinforcing factor that ampli-
fied Russia’s strategically induced resentment to NATO’s eastward ex-
pansion.
Domestic Politics
According to some scholars, domestic political developments in 
Russia were the key driver for Moscow’s opposition to the planned en-
largement of NATO. For example, Allen Lynch has argued that “the 
communist-nationalist political opposition to Yeltsin’s government at 
home quickly realized that the prospect of NATO’s extension east-
ward could be exploited so as to undermine the government’s nation-
alist credentials. In response, Yeltsin just as rapidly moved to close the 
rhetorical gap with the communists, so that there is no longer a seri-
ous difference between government and opposition on the issue.”45 In 
this view, President Yeltsin started to oppose NATO enlargement—
not because of strategic imperatives and status concerns—but because 
the issue served to placate communist-nationalist forces at home who 
challenged his presidency. This was especially important after the De-
cember 1993 parliamentary elections, in which Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s 
right-wing party garnered 23 percent of the votes, not least due to his 
appeal among military servicemen.46 Yeltsin therefore decided to adopt 
a more assertive stance towards the West in general and NATO in par-
ticular to boost his nationalist credentials.
While intuitively appealing, this explanation is problematic for sev-
eral reasons. 
First, there is a timing problem. As indicated above, members of the 
Yeltsin government began to oppose NATO enlargement by mid-1993, 
that is, prior to the strong showing of Zhirinovsky’s party in Decem-
ber. Logically, therefore, the latter cannot have caused the former. Of 
course, Yeltsin had been under pressure from communist reactionaries 
and hardline nationalists since fall 1992. Thus, one might argue that he 
indeed had good reasons to placate nationalist voters in the run-up to 
the elections by adopting a tougher stance on NATO. If so, the gambit 
failed as right-wingers won almost a quarter of the votes. 
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Second, the underlying logic of the argument is built on shaky em-
pirical ground. As public opinion research from the time shows, the 
majority of Russian citizens were not particularly interested in inter-
national affairs. Instead, they were preoccupied with plunging living 
standards, rising crime, and increased social insecurity. Accordingly, 
ordinary Russians were largely apathetic on the issue of NATO en-
largement.47 Seen against this background, it is not at all clear why 
the Yeltsin government would have wanted to adopt a tougher stance 
towards the West for electoral purposes.
Third, and related, although there existed nationalist forces in Russia 
that stridently opposed NATO expansion, the domestic politics argu-
ment overlooks that there also existed a powerful counter-lobby. Com-
mercial and financial elites promoted close cooperation with the West. 
As James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul have demonstrated, “oil com-
panies, mineral exporters, and bankers (…) emerged as the main soci-
etal forces pushing for greater Western integration [in the 1990s].”48 
This begs the question: why would the Yeltsin administration want to 
placate nationalists while incensing the equally (if not more) powerful 
pro-Western lobby? The logic of domestic politics provides no obvious 
answer to this question.
Fourth, the memoranda of conversation between Presidents Yeltsin 
and Clinton do not support the thesis that domestic political calcula-
tions were the primary driver behind Moscow’s opposition to NATO 
expansion. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, as the say-
ing goes. Still, one would expect that President Yeltsin had disclosed a 
domestic political rationale for opposing NATO expansion in private 
talks with Clinton, especially since the two had a close personal rela-
tionship. Indeed, Yeltsin’s political survival and Russian elections fig-
ured prominently in their talks. But, apart from one passing comment, 
President Yeltsin did not link NATO expansion to his re-election cam-
paign or domestic politics more generally.49 This is surprising. Overall, 
then, while the domestic politics argument cannot be fully discarded, 
the available evidence casts considerable doubt on it.
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Concluding Observations and Implications
The interplay of strategic imperatives and status concerns goes a 
long way to explain Moscow’s resentment to the Alliance’s eastward 
expansion. By contrast, there is limited evidence that domestic political 
calculations were the principal cause for Moscow’s opposition. More 
specifically, my argument is that uncertainty about NATO’s long-term 
intentions and the possibility that former Soviet countries might join 
the Alliance in the not-too-distant future were the central drivers be-
hind Russia’s negative view on enlargement. These strategic imper-
atives were reinforced by a latent fear that NATO expansion would 
demote Russia to a second-ranked power on the European periphery. 
This conclusion implies that Russia would have objected to the east-
ward expansion of NATO no matter how the West would have pack-
aged or presented it. The ambition of Central and Eastern European 
countries to join the Western Alliance was seen in Moscow both as 
a challenge to Russia’s strategic interests and as a humiliation of its 
great-power status. 
Some observers have argued that the West should have made a se-
rious effort to integrate Russia into NATO during the early 1990s. 
Leaving aside the organizational and political challenges involved in 
embracing Russia as a full member, this would effectively have trans-
formed the character of NATO. NATO would have become a collec-
tive security organization—that is, a UN-style body on the regional 
level—rather than a collective defense alliance. Given the well-known 
problems of collective security organizations and the different outlooks 
of the United States and Russia, it is doubtful that this would have 
contributed to establish a more stable and lasting security architecture 
in Europe.
Another option was to keep NATO in place but without expanding 
its membership. This, in Moscow’s eyes, would have been a desirable 
outcome as Yeltsin kept telling Clinton, but it would have occurred at 
the expense, and over the heads, of the Central and Eastern European 
countries who were eager to join the Alliance. Moreover, large parts of 
the political establishments in the United States and Germany wanted 
to enlarge NATO towards the East, for a variety of economic, strate-
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gic, and ideological reasons. Why, one is left wondering, should these 
countries—and not Russia—set aside their interests? 
Some observers have criticized that the West took advantage of Rus-
sia’s weakness in the 1990s. That is correct, but misses the point. After 
all, the interests of states sometimes coincide and sometimes clash with 
each other; and in such situations the more powerful actor usually gets 
its way. This is a normal feature of international politics. It is likely, for 
example, that the Soviet Union would have acted in a similar way and 
extended the Warsaw Pact had it prevailed in the Cold War. 
Instead, I would argue that lack of power political considerations—
not their application—is one of the root causes of today’s crisis. During 
the 1990s, Western governments grew accustomed to take a weaker 
Russia for granted. Policymakers in Washington, Brussels, and else-
where forgot—so it seems—that the first round of NATO enlargement 
(as well as the second round) had been enabled by a highly asymmetric 
distribution of power. This changed, to some extent, as the increase in 
world energy prices and internal reforms under the Putin government 
led to the resurrection of Russian power in the mid-2000s. Accord-
ingly, Russia adopted a more assertive stance and pushed back against 
Western advances into the post-Soviet space. In my view, therefore, 
only an approach that takes into account the configuration of interests 
and power will lead to a more stable European security order and a less 
adversarial relationship with Russia.
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Introduction
NATO enlargement did not begin in 1999 with the accession of Po-
land, the Czech Republic and Hungary. There have been, to date, seven 
enlargements beginning in 1952 with Greece and Turkey and ending 
(so far) with Montenegro in 2017. Accepting new member states has 
been the norm rather than the exception as regards the judgment and 
strategy of the United States and Western Europe.
But the admissions of Central European countries in 1999 and of the 
Baltic states in 2004 were different. Greek, Turkish, West German and 
Spanish accession were during the Cold War. Including these states 
enhanced the power and deterrent capability of NATO vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union. The case for membership was overwhelming. Accession 
by Balkan countries in 2009 and 2017 had few military implications. 
They were contested by the Kremlin but, except with Montenegro, did 
not cause any significant controversy.
In comparison, the Central Europeans and the Baltic states were not 
just much closer to Russia. The Baltic states had been part of the So-
viet Union. All these countries were also formerly part of the Warsaw 
Pact, and had been deeply integrated into Soviet military strategy. Nei-
ther Mikhail Gorbachev nor Boris Yeltsin supported enlargement. The 
Russian Duma and the military were increasingly hostile. Against that 
background it is worth noting, however, that only moderate damage 
was done to Western-Russian relations in the immediate aftermath of 
the 1999 and 2004 enlargements. The Kosovo War, NATO air strikes 
in Bosnia, NATO air attacks on Qadhafi’s Libya in 2011 and ballistic 
missile defense programs caused much more serious controversy. Vlad-
imir Putin’s first public accusation of bad faith by the West in regard to 
NATO enlargement was not made until his speech to the Munich Secu-
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rity Conference in 2007 and then it was referred to in only a couple of 
paragraphs in a long speech with many other real or alleged grievances.
Background
The background to NATO enlargement in 1999 was, of course, the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War after 1989. It was 
a curious coincidence that these historic events occurred exactly 200 
years after the fall of the Bastille and the French Revolution in 1789. 
But in reality, 3 separate, though interconnected, events occurred in 
these momentous years. The Cold War ended; Communism, as an al-
ternative to Capitalism, collapsed throughout the Soviet bloc; and the 
Soviet Union, which was the Russian Empire, disintegrated being re-
placed by 15 independent states.
The United States and its European Allies had long sought, and 
worked towards, the peaceful end of the Cold War. Similarly, the West, 
obviously, hoped that, one day Communism would disappear but there 
was no expectation that that would happen in the foreseeable future. 
A Communist Party could, quite credibly, have remained in power in 
Russia after the end of the Cold War for many years.
Most extraordinary, and unpredicted, was the simultaneous disap-
pearance, at the end of 1991, of the Soviet Union, otherwise known 
as the Russian Empire. Today’s Russian Federation has, with the ex-
ception of the Kaliningrad enclave, European borders that are further 
from Western and Central Europe than they have been for centuries 
and are similar to those of Peter the Great’s Russia in the 17th and 18th 
centuries.
That loss of territory, rather than the end of the Cold War or the 
disappearance of Communism, is what President Putin finds most dis-
tressing and unacceptable. In 2018, when asked what Russian historical 
event he would like to change, he replied “The collapse of the Soviet 
Union.” In 2005 he had described that collapse as “a major geopolit-
ical disaster of the century”. He knows that modern Russia cannot be 
recreated with its previous boundaries but his annexation of Crimea, 
destabilization of eastern Ukraine and aggression towards Georgia are, 
in part, a consequence of his belief, and that of many Russians, that 
their nation’s security and realization of its destiny has been imperiled.
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It is worth reminding both ourselves and Putin that NATO was nei-
ther directly, nor indirectly, responsible for the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. That had never been part of U.S. or NATO strategy. 
Indeed, when it became clear that this was likely to happen Western 
leaders were disconcerted and uncertain as to what should be their 
response.
I served as Defense Secretary of the United Kingdom from 1992-95 
and as Foreign Secretary from 1995-97. I recall, and took part in, these 
debates both in London and at NATO meetings. While the British, 
and other Western governments, all recognized that the disappearance 
of the Soviet Union would dramatically weaken the risk of future ag-
gression by any government in the Kremlin it was felt that it would also 
create major new risks and uncertainties.
Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin were moderate leaders who were de-
termined to forge positive relations with the West and were anxious to 
modernize their countries and create open and more democratic soci-
eties. None of us knew who might end up as the leaders of an indepen-
dent Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus as well as other newly created states. 
Furthermore, these three countries, in particular, had large numbers of 
Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. Would they insist 
in holding on to them and becoming nuclear weapon states themselves?
These concerns even led to President George H.W. Bush visiting 
Kyiv, his address to the Ukrainian Parliament, and his unsuccessful 
attempt to persuade Ukrainian members of parliament to reconsider 
their demands for independence from Moscow. The Ukrainians, un-
impressed, have, ever since, referred to his visit as the “Chicken Kiev” 
speech.
German Reunification
During the first year after the collapse of the Berlin Wall the pre-
dominant issue for both the United States and the Soviet Union was 
not the future of NATO per se or of the former Soviet satellite states in 
Central and Eastern Europe.
Rather it was whether the two divided parts of Germany should 
be allowed to reunite and, if so, on what terms. It is highly doubtful 
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whether reunification could ever have been prevented given the enthu-
siasm of the East German people and of Chancellor Helmut Kohl for 
the merger of the German Democratic Republic with the Federal Re-
public. Margaret Thatcher tried to stop or delay it but found no allies.
It did not necessarily follow, however, that a reunited Germany 
would be able to be a member of NATO. That would extend NATO’s 
borders, for the first time, to the Polish border. Soviet consent for 
such an enlarged NATO was not only required for diplomatic reasons. 
There were still very large numbers of Soviet troops and weaponry in 
the former GDR. Their withdrawal back to the Soviet Union, and the 
timing of that withdrawal, would require Soviet consent which could 
not be assumed.
It was during discussions on the relationship of a united Germany 
to NATO that the issue of future enlargement of NATO to include 
member states of the crumbling Warsaw Pact was first raised. The ini-
tial exchanges were between the U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker 
and Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990. It appears that Baker gave 
assurances that NATO would “not move an inch towards the east” and 
that NATO expansion would not be approved of by the United States. 
It was also recorded that Gorbachev indicated that “a broadening 
of the NATO zone is not acceptable” and Baker responded “We agree 
with that.” The German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, 
had indicated a similar view saying that “NATO should rule out an 
expansion of its territory towards the East.”
The “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany” was 
signed in Moscow in September 1990. Its terms were consistent with 
a reunited Germany being part of NATO, including the territory of 
the former GDR. The United States, the Federal Republic and other 
Western signatories, for their part, accepted that, apart from German 
troops, no other NATO troops nor any nuclear weapons would be sta-
tioned in the territory of the former GDR.
It is undeniable that both Baker and Genscher indicated to Gor-
bachev that there was no interest in the expansion of NATO beyond 
the territory of the former GDR. It seems also to be the case that that 
was, at that time, the sincerely held view of the President of the United 
States and the Governments of other NATO members.
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However, these were incidental, verbal statements. They do not ap-
pear to have been replicated in any formal written exchanges between 
Moscow and Washington. Nor is there any reference to them in the 
Treaty that led to German reunification. Furthermore, I am not aware 
that Gorbachev sought any written statements or legally binding assur-
ances which were refused by the West. 
It is interesting, in this context, to compare the Treaty on German 
reunification with the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 which led to the 
Soviet withdrawal of all its forces from Austria. The Austrian State 
Treaty was signed in May 1955 by the USSR, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France and Austria. The issue of whether Austria 
would be free to join NATO or be neutral was not mentioned in the 
Treaty, though political union with Germany was forbidden. However, 
as soon as all Soviet troops had left Austria, the Austrian Parliament, 
in October 1955, declared permanent neutrality for the country which 
meant that it could not join NATO. It was well understood that the So-
viet Union would not have withdrawn from Austria if that commitment 
had not been given in advance.
While it would have been inappropriate to include, in a Treaty pro-
viding for German reunification in 1990, commitments that NATO 
would not seek, nor permit, further enlargement of the Alliance, there 
was no procedural nor legal reason why there could not have been a 
separate written assurance to that effect, at that time, between the So-
viet Union and the Western powers if both sides were in agreement. 
No such formal commitment was given. So far as I am aware, no such 
request was made by Gorbachev.
Polish, Czech and Hungarian Membership
The circumstances in which expansion of NATO was agreed in 1997 
and occurred in 1999 were fundamentally different to those of 1990 and 
this should be borne in mind when allegations of bad faith are made. 
Not only had the Warsaw Pact dissolved itself in 1991 but the Soviet 
Union had ceased to exist at the end of that year and had disintegrated 
into 15 separate states of which Russia and Ukraine were the largest.
In May 1990 Gorbachev had suggested to James Baker that a new 
security structure should replace both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
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However, the subsequent collapse of both the Warsaw Pact and the 
Soviet Union created a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope which had a profound impact on thinking in Washington. The 
new Russian Federation would not have been able to replace the Soviet 
Union by filling that security vacuum as they could never have received 
the consent of the newly liberated East Europeans and Baltic states. 
It also followed, that NATO, with or without new members, could, 
no longer, be presented as an anti-Soviet coalition. What, as a conse-
quence, became much more attractive was a NATO whose member-
ship would transcend the old boundaries and reflect a new Europe with 
shared democratic values and security interests.
U.S. and European views as to whether NATO expansion would be 
acceptable were also influenced by Yeltsin, who had become President 
of the new Russian Federation after the disappearance of the USSR. In 
speeches in Warsaw and Prague in 1993 he indicated that, based on the 
Helsinki Final Act, every state could decide, for itself, whether to join 
an alliance.
The Poles and others used Yeltsin’s remarks to put pressure on the 
West to allow them into NATO, alleging that it was now clear that 
Russia would be relaxed if they did. Yeltsin changed his position be-
cause of pressure from the Duma and Russian military, but by then the 
damage had been done.
Yeltsin, subsequently, argued for a new European security structure 
which would include Russia. He proposed that Russia should have a 
privileged relationship with NATO. This led, not to any offer to Russia 
of membership in NATO, but to the U.S. initiative of a Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) which would cover all European states including Russia 
and which could be a basis for possible long-term NATO membership. 
In January 1994 Clinton informed Yeltsin that he did not wish to speed 
up NATO expansion but that Russia could not expect to have a veto. 
The refusal to allow a Russian veto on enlargement was repeated on 
several occasions.
It needs to be borne in mind that while the Americans and Euro-
pean governments were changing their views on NATO expansion to 
the East the main pressure for enlargement was coming not from the 
existing members of NATO but from the Poles, Czechs and Hungar-
ians. This was partly because they were nervous that Russia, one day, 
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might again threaten their independence and freedom. But it was also 
their deep belief that their economic as well as their security interests 
required their full integration in both NATO and the European Com-
munity and that both of these objectives should be achieved as soon as 
possible.
They received strong support from Germany for these aspirations 
but other Western Europeans, including the UK, were more cautious. 
Most of the East and Central Europeans, apart from Poland, would 
bring little significant military capability to NATO, relations with 
Yeltsin might be damaged and London and other capitals were much 
more concerned about the collapse of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia 
than about NATO enlargement.
During my own years as British Defense Secretary and then Foreign 
Secretary, from 1992-1997 it was Bosnia and not NATO enlargement 
that dominated my time. There was not only concern that the war 
in Bosnia might spread throughout the Balkans but that Turkey and 
Greece might get drawn in. Géza Jeszenszky, the Hungarian Foreign 
Minister, visited me in London in December 1993 to lobby for NATO 
membership. In his chapter in this volume he has recorded that I “lis-
tened politely” to his words “but I saw that he remained skeptical.”
It was also a consideration that during these years the Russian For-
eign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, was helpful rather than obstructive as 
Britain, France and the United States sought to resolve the Bosnian cri-
sis. Russian support could not be taken for granted. Historically, they 
were very close to the Serbs and were strongly opposed to any use of 
NATO in air strikes against Milošević’s Bosnian Serb allies. I chaired 
the Lancaster House conference in London, in 1995 shortly after the 
Srebrenica massacres. The Americans, British and French were deter-
mined to use air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs if there were further 
attacks on “safe areas.” At Lancaster House Kozyrev could not support 
the use of NATO for this purpose but he was willing to abstain rather 
than wreck the unity of the conference. That co-operation was much 
appreciated.
However, it was the case that over these first few years after the end 
of the Cold War the interests and priorities of existing members of 
NATO and the new applicants were gradually coming into alignment 
in important respects.
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Despite the end of the Cold War the United States saw a continuing 
need for NATO not only to guarantee European security but as part 
of Washington’s wider determination to ensure the continuity of its 
own global leadership. That pointed not only towards maintaining the 
NATO alliance but also allowing new states, which now shared West-
ern values, to join if they so wished.
European members of NATO shared this view. They were not only 
sensitive to the enthusiasm of Poles, Czechs and Hungarians to join 
their ranks. They also remained very nervous that the political instabil-
ity and economic collapse that was continuing in Russia might lead to a 
power grab by extreme nationalist politicians who would have little in-
terest in Yeltsin’s reform agenda and desire to move closer to the West.
Furthermore, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the subsequent savage 
conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia as well as in the Caucasus was a remind-
er of how latent nationalist and ethnic rivalries in Hungary, Romania 
and elsewhere in Central Europe could lead to massive internal insta-
bility if the countries between NATO and Russia were left in a limbo 
outside both NATO and the European Community.
To those general considerations one other advantage of enlargement 
should be mentioned. Much has been made, over the years, of common 
membership of the EU being crucial to Franco-German reconciliation 
after centuries of mutual enmity. In a similar way Poland becoming a 
partner of Germany not just in the EU but also in NATO, was a histor-
ic change for the better.
The outcome of these developments was the invitation that was 
made at the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid to Poland, the Czech Re-
public and Hungary to join the Alliance which they did in 1999.
To try and reassure the Russians that the enlargement of NATO did 
not imply indifference or hostility to them a NATO-Russia Permanent 
Joint Council had been agreed before the Madrid Summit. This was 
accepted by Yeltsin but it is doubtful if he was very impressed. It had 
already been emphasized by the United States and others that Russia 
could not expect any veto either on NATO membership nor on NA-
TO’s actions out of area.
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Further Enlargement of NATO
In 2002, a further 7 countries, the Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, 
Slovenia and Slovakia were invited to join NATO. They did so in 2004. 
Croatia and Albania joined in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and North 
Macedonia is expected to become a member in the near future.
The most contentious of these admissions were the Baltic states: 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Unlike the other new members, they 
had formerly been part of the Soviet Union. Their acceptance into 
NATO was seen as a particular provocation by many Russians espe-
cially as it would bring NATO’s borders close to St. Petersburg. The 
Russians were reminded, however, that the forced annexation of the 
Baltic states into the Soviet Union by Stalin in 1940, during the Second 
World War, had never been recognized de jure by the United States, 
the United Kingdom and many others.
Quite apart from Russian hostility to their admission there was 
a serious debate within the Alliance as to whether NATO would be 
strengthened or weakened by Baltic membership. Joining NATO 
meant that the Baltic states would receive the same defense guarantee 
as any other member under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. But they 
would be at the geographic extremity of NATO territory, sharing a 
border with the Russian Federation and with only a relatively narrow 
corridor of land linking them to Poland and the rest of the alliance. 
Being very small they would be unable to add, significantly, to NATO’s 
military capability.
As the UK’s Defense Secretary, I shared these concerns. I had visited 
the Baltic states in 1993. While in Riga I met the President of Latvia 
who wanted to know when his country would be admitted to NATO 
and why there seemed likely to be such a delay. I had advised him to be 
patient and had pointed out that if anyone ten years earlier had predict-
ed that in 1993 the President of an independent Latvia would be dis-
cussing with a British Defense Secretary Latvia’s admission to NATO 
they would have seemed to be living in a world of fantasy!
Over the subsequent years Western leaders accepted that to make 
an exception of the Baltic states would be unreasonable and unwise. 
They would have become a no man’s land between Russia and NATO, 
like Belarus. They were non-Slav and, historically, part of Central Eu-
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rope. While their defense against serious Soviet aggression would be 
extremely difficult, that had been even more true of West Berlin during 
the Cold War. As with West Berlin it has been essential, in recent years, 
that NATO as a whole make clear to Moscow, unambiguously, that 
it takes its obligations to the Baltic states as seriously as to any other 
member.
The Baltics, especially Estonia, have been the victims of Russian at-
tempts at destabilization in recent years but, unlike Ukraine and Geor-
gia they have not lost control of any of their national territory. Being 
members of NATO must be, at least part of, the explanation.
Should NATO have refused enlargement to the East?
It was always open to NATO to refuse to enlarge the Alliance after 
the end of the Cold War. No country was guaranteed membership even 
if it met the normal NATO criteria of being democratic, respecting the 
rule of law and observing Western values.
The Alliance had to decide not just whether an applicant state wished 
to join and shared NATO’s values. A decision also had to be reached 
by NATO as to whether it was in the Alliance’s own interest to accept 
all new applicants or any one of them. Two questions, on this aspect, 
needed to be answered. 
First, would security in Europe, as a whole and for existing members 
of NATO, be enhanced or diminished by enlargement? The Alliance 
concluded that enlargement would enhance Europe’s security. There 
is little evidence to suggest that that judgment was wrong. The new 
members have been well integrated into the Alliance; there have been 
significant increases in their defense spending; and both old and new 
NATO members have responded well to Russian destabilization by 
agreeing robust forward positioning of a NATO presence in the Baltic 
states and Poland.
The other question that needed to be considered before accepting a 
new member state was whether NATO members, especially the Unit-
ed States, would be prepared to deliver the Article 5 guarantee, both 
in letter and in spirit, if the applicant state was subject to aggression 
by a third party. Delivering the Article 5 guarantee did not, automati-
cally, mean going to war if a member state was attacked but a military 
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confrontation with an aggressor was implied if other measures did not 
stop aggression. The worst outcome for NATO would be to promise 
an Article 5 guarantee to a new member state but not deliver it de-
spite aggression from a third party. There would not only be legitimate 
cries of betrayal from the country concerned. The whole credibility of 
NATO as a source of security for all of its existing members would also 
be gravely undermined.
It was for these reasons that despite being a strong champion of 
Ukrainian and Georgian independence I, and many other NATO min-
isters, have never supported their membership in NATO. It was never 
credible that, for example, Russian aggression towards Georgia over 
South Ossetia or against Ukraine in the Donbas would have led to war 
between Russia and NATO if Russia refused to desist. It is difficult to 
believe that these two countries could have been fully integrated into 
NATO or that the political will would have existed in the United States 
or Western Europe for an all-out war with Russia on their behalf. 
In contrast, any attack on NATO territory in Central or Eastern 
Europe would be a quite different matter as it would have been if there 
had been aggression against any member state during the Cold War.
Some have argued that the benefit of NATO membership would 
have been that Russia would never have risked aggression towards 
Georgia or Ukraine if they had become members of NATO. One can 
never know what might have happened but one should not enter into 
solemn treaty obligations, involving a potential declaration of war, 
based simply on an assumption that one would never be called upon to 
honor such obligations.
Would Putin be much friendlier to the West today if there had been no 
enlargement?
The admission of former Warsaw Pact states must have been a factor 
in Putin’s disillusion with the West, but the evidence points to enlarge-
ment being only one consideration and not the most serious.
The most virulent criticism by Moscow of NATO began with the 
Kosovo War when NATO planes bombed Serbia for over two months 
without any U.N. Security Council resolution and in the face of strong 
Russian protests. The bombing began 12 days after Poland, the Czech 
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Republic and Hungary joined NATO. There were riots outside the 
U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the Russians saw this as hard evidence 
that NATO, when the West so wished, would be an offensive not just 
a defensive alliance. 
The Kosovo war occurred while Yeltsin was still President. The use 
of NATO air power to help destroy the Qadhafi regime in 2011 caused 
equal anger with Putin and convinced him that the United States was 
determined to use NATO as a prime arm of its foreign policy and in a 
manner that would often be in direct conflict with perceived Russian 
interests.
NATO has declined to accept Ukraine and Georgia as new members 
but the United States had sought to propose otherwise at the Bucharest 
Summit in 2008. Their views did not prevail with other NATO mem-
bers but Putin has continued to believe that this might still happen. 
Putin also chose to believe that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 
2004 and the overthrow of Yanukovych in the Maidan in 2014 were 
orchestrated by the United States with the support of other NATO 
powers. That, and not earlier NATO enlargement, was the excuse used 
by Putin to try to justify the annexation of Crimea.
Should Russia have been offered membership?
A more intriguing question is whether a historic mistake was made, 
at the time of the NATO enlargement agreed in 1997, by not invit-
ing Russia, also, to become a member of NATO or, at least, to have 
a more formal relationship with the Alliance. Such a proposal might 
seem naïve and extraordinary today but it had some respectable advo-
cates at the time. 
Until the Madrid NATO Summit in 1997, which agreed to invite 
former Warsaw Pact states to join the Alliance, their remained powerful 
opposition to enlargement from within the U.S. foreign policy estab-
lishment. Shortly before the Summit a letter was delivered to President 
Clinton, arguing that NATO enlargement would be a historic mistake. 
It was signed by many luminaries including Robert McNamara, Gary 
Hart, Edward Luttwak, Paul Nitze, Sam Nunn and Richard Pipes. 
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The legendary George Kennan, who had drafted the Long Tele-
gram in 1946, described enlargement as the most fateful error in the 
entire post-Cold War era.
Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski took the opposite view. 
Kissinger was characteristically eloquent and blunt in his evidence to 
the U.S. Senate:
Basing European and Atlantic security on a no man’s land between 
Germany and Russia runs counter to all historical experience, es-
pecially that of the interwar period. It would bring about two cate-
gories of frontiers in Europe, those that are potentially threatened 
but not guaranteed, and those that are guaranteed but not threat-
ened … NATO expansion therefore represents a balancing of two 
conflicting considerations: The fear of alienating Russia against 
the danger of creating a vacuum between Germany and Russia 
in Central Europe.… I would strongly urge the Senate to ratify 
NATO enlargement.1
Those who opposed him argued that Russia was being humiliated. 
They suggested that enlargement to the east would be like the Ver-
sailles Treaty which had led to Hitler and another world war, whereas 
after 1945 Germany and Japan had, successfully, been brought back 
into the family of nations as partners and as new democracies.
Some suggested that if enlargement was necessary it should include 
Russia. Charles Kupchan of Georgetown University made that case. 
But there was a crucial qualification made by Kupchan. He wrote that 
“As long as Russia continues down the path of democracy”2 its mem-
bership of NATO would be appropriate.
As British Defense Secretary, in January 1994, I sent a paper to the 
Prime Minister, John Major, suggesting that, while it was unrealistic 
for Russia to become a member of NATO, a new category of associate 
member could be created to meet Russian interest in closer integration 
with Western security. This did not seem unrealistic to me at the time.
George Kennan made a similar assumption to that of Kupchan about 
Russia’s new democratic credentials. He argued “Russia’s democracy 
is as far advanced, if not farther, as any of these countries we’ve just 
signed to defend from Russia.”3 That might have been true in 1997. 
It has, certainly, not been true since Putin’s rise to power. Today, there 
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may still be more freedom in Russia than during Soviet times, but de-
mocracy and the rule of law are noted by their absence. Russia has re-
verted to an authoritarian dictatorship where the Russian people have 
little power to determine their ultimate destiny.
The reality is that, even in 1997, Russian membership of NATO 
would have been impossible unless the West could have accepted that 
NATO would cease to be a military alliance and become just another 
political organization like the OSCE. The Russians could never have 
accepted that their armed forces would become part of the Integrated 
Military Structure under overall American leadership. Even France had 
balked at that under de Gaulle.
Nor could NATO have accepted a Russian de facto veto on its opera-
tions which the Russians would have insisted on. If America was going 
to continue to guarantee the security of Europe it had to be through a 
NATO that could be used “out of area” as in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya 
without the need for the Kremlin’s consent.
If NATO had not enlarged, might Putin have permitted Russia to continue 
to move towards a more pluralist and democratic political system?
While Putin paid lip service to democratic values in his first years 
in power he soon lost interest. There is no evidence that supports any 
suggestion that NATO enlargement was relevant to his increasing au-
thoritarianism and hostility to democracy.
Yeltsin, and Gorbachev to some degree, appear to have been genuine 
in their desire to transform Russia into a democratic and pluralist soci-
ety. They were comfortable with Western values, which they felt could 
be adopted by post-Communist Russia.
Putin was different. It was not just his KGB background that ex-
plains his enthusiasm for centralizing power and eliminating organized 
opposition. The reality is that Gorbachev and Yeltsin, as reformers in-
terested in pluralism, were more unusual in Russian history than is Pu-
tin. He, rather than either of them, is the natural successor to the Tsars 
and autocrats of Russian history.
Many in the West assumed that as Communism collapsed the Rus-
sian people, and their leaders, would not only adopt a capitalist eco-
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nomic model but would be attracted to liberal multi-party democracy 
and a vigorous and independent civic society. 
That might have had a chance of happening if Yeltsin had nominat-
ed someone like Boris Nemtsov to succeed him. Fatefully, he chose 
Vladimir Putin instead. Putin’s immediate priorities were not to expand 
democracy. They were to rescue Russia from a descent into internal 
anarchy and to crush the insurgency in Chechnya. The more he con-
solidated his personal power the less he was interested in sharing it with 
the Russian people.
It is clear that whatever might have happened with regard to NATO 
enlargement would not have influenced Putin in his exercise of power 
within Russia over the last two decades.
Without NATO enlargement might Ukraine and Georgia not have been 
subject to Russian aggression and deprived of their territorial integrity?
There was little doubt that, after the overthrow of Yanukovych, the 
new Ukrainian Government would be fiercely pro-Western and aspire 
not only to membership of the EU but also of NATO.
Although membership, at least in the short term, was never like-
ly there had been some Western leaders advocating NATO member-
ship for Ukraine and Georgia. Putin’s fears were understandable even 
though his reaction was indefensible. 
The timing of the annexation of Crimea and the aggression in the 
Donbas were influenced by the downfall of a pro-Russian President in 
Kyiv but they were part of a much wider strategy already developed 
by Putin. Putin realizes that Ukraine can never be reabsorbed into a 
new Russian Empire. But he has long believed that it could be fatally 
weakened by loss of control of much of its territory bordering the Black 
Sea. Georgia has been suffering similar loss of its territorial integrity 
for years, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Putin had held those views for some time, but while Yanukovych was 
in power he felt he could rely on a compliant Ukraine without resorting 
to overt aggression. The Maidan in 2014 changed all that.
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Conclusions
There are fundamental, geopolitical considerations that help explain 
why NATO enlargement to the East was right and why we are highly 
likely to have very difficult relations with Russia for the foreseeable 
future. 
There was an assumption in the West that the collapse of Com-
munism, the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union would lead to a Russia that would recognize that it was no longer 
one of the world’s two superpowers and might, therefore, become “an-
other” European power like Germany, France or the United Kingdom.
But the Cold War after 1945 did not occur just because Moscow 
was ruled by Communists with a global, Marxist ideology. The So-
viet Union was also the successor to the Russia of the Tsars which, 
for several hundred years, had extended its territory, absorbed much 
of historic Poland as well as what are now the Baltic states, and during 
the nineteenth century, after the Congress of Vienna, exercised unprec-
edented power in helping determine the destiny of much of Europe.
Soviet leaders, ruling from the same Kremlin as the Tsars, inherited 
many of these aspirations and expectations. That, as well as a desire 
to spread Communism, explains why they enforced their control of 
the countries of Eastern Europe that they had liberated from the Na-
zis. When the Soviet Union disintegrated and old Russia reappeared 
it is hardly surprising that a new generation of Russians, and Putin in 
particular, should, in the absence of an ideology, have returned to tra-
ditional Russian nationalism which has characterized Russian history 
since the days of Peter the Great.
Indeed, it is arguable that even if Putin had been willing to allow 
Russia to evolve towards a democratic and pluralist society that might 
have been combined with an expansionist foreign policy not that differ-
ent to what we have experienced.
Russia, because of its massive size, its Orthodox Church, its Slav 
heritage and its Eurasian landmass can never be just another European 
country. It is quite possible that, whoever succeeds Putin in due course, 
will, like him, wish to see a Russia that has the power to limit the in-
dependence of its self-proclaimed “near abroad” and help direct the 
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future of Europe as a whole. That will make Russia an uncomfortable 
neighbor for the rest of Europe. 
This is the challenge we have faced not just from 1917 or 1945 but 
since the early nineteenth century. That should concern but need not 
depress us. It is worth recalling the remark of Lord Palmerston during 
the Crimean War:
The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always 
been to push forward its encroachments as far and as fast as the 
apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it 
to go, but always to stop and retire when it met with decided re-
sistance.
The West will need, both by diplomatic means and through NATO, 
not only to protect the independence of its member states but also to 
impress on Moscow the unacceptability of Russia seeking to limit the 
freedom of Ukraine, Georgia and other post-Soviet states to determine 
their own destiny. 
The British, French, Spanish and other former empires have gone 
forever. Russia, too, ceased to be an empire at the end of 1991 with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. It is time for the Russian Federation to 
recognize not only the letter but the spirit of that historic change.
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Chapter 23
Beyond NATO Enlargement to Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Hungary:  
A French Reappraisal
Benoît d’Aboville
It is well known that victory has many fathers and defeat none. 
The process of NATO enlargement was no different. Bill Clinton, 
Helmut Kohl, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, François Mitterrand, Marga-
ret Thatcher, Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, Václav  Havel, Lech 
Wałęsa, to name a few leading figures, without forgetting others who 
led democratic countries aspiring to join NATO, emerged as key play-
ers in a very personalized diplomatic process, involving a plethora of 
direct contacts and personal relationships. 
In France, given the political stakes, the issue became the domain 
of President François Mitterrand and his closest Elysée aides, espe-
cially Hubert Védrine and Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, a person-
al friend of the President, who had a good personal relationship with 
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Jacques Chirac, 
who succeeded Mitterrand in 1995 and who had previously been Prime 
Minister during the period of political “cohabitation” in 1986-1988, 
also focused on the issue. Both Mitterrand and Chirac were supported 
by a diplomatic establishment still wary of Moscow. Until the war in 
Bosnia, the military stayed largely on the margins.
Throughout the process France, as well as most of the other Allies, 
including the United States, sought to maintain the right balance be-
tween the candidate countries’ understandable impatience and the fear 
of weakening the reformist Moscow leadership under both Gorbachev 
and Yeltsin, which was seen as shaky and divided on the issue.1 
The risk of missing what was considered as an historic but perhaps 
fleeting window of opportunity was preeminent in the mind of Polish, 
Hungarian and Czech leaders, who were hammering the message in 
NATO capitals. 
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The situation in Moscow therefore became a constant preoccupa-
tion for Western leaders, and put them in a quandary. The aborted 
coup of August 1991 and the collapse of the USSR had served as a 
powerful reminder of the weakness of the Kremlin leadership. It was 
seen as a call for accelerating the opening of NATO up to the East. 
At the same time, Mitterrand and other Western leaders, at least until 
1994, remained cautious so as not to endanger the political survival of 
their Moscow interlocutors, who constantly reminded them of the stiff 
opposition they were facing. 
A Cautious Mitterrand
From the outset, Paris was convinced that once German reunifica-
tion had been achieved on Western terms, Washington would do ev-
erything to convince Moscow of the need for NATO’s enlargement, 
whatever the Allies might think or propose. Mitterrand himself shared 
this view and told Gorbachev so.
The inclusion of unified Germany within NATO—a remarkable 
achievement of President Bush and Secretary Baker and their teams 
in liaison with a determined Chancellor Kohl—led indeed to the Alli-
ance’s widening to Central and Eastern Europe, even if the two issues 
were separated at the start. The question was therefore not the end 
game, but the timing (the French were pleading for patience) and the 
framework. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) was considered the obvious place to host such a process, as 
Moscow was already a member. 
As those questions were obviously had great bearing with regard to 
the new organization of post-Cold War Europe and its implications for 
the future of NATO, it appeared quickly that Paris and Washington, 
while sharing the same views regarding the status of the reunified Ger-
many,2 did not have exactly the same priorities regarding a new political 
framework. 
France opposed the Soviet idea of a “neutralized Germany with no 
NATO military structures in the territory of today GDR.” In January 
1990 in Paris, Mitterrand reminded U.S. Deputy Secretary of State 
Larry Eagleburger that “it has always been the wish of USSR and it 
was unacceptable.”
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Within the German SPD, however, the same concept had long been 
advanced as a way to facilitate reunification. It was somewhat reintro-
duced into the debate by German Foreign Minister Genscher in his 
Tutzing speech of January 31, 1990.3 He was immediately opposed by 
President Bush, who convinced Chancellor Kohl to distance himself 
from his coalition partner. 
Mitterrand agreed with Bush, using the reasoning U.S. Secretary of 
State James Baker presented early to Gorbachev: would it not be better 
for Moscow to have Germany within NATO and therefore anchored 
into the West, rather than to have a loose neutral Germany, unhinged 
and likely to raise the anxiety of its neighbors? 
Mitterrand used the same line with Gorbachev when they met bilat-
erally in Moscow on May 25, 1990. Other schemes, denied of any prac-
ticality, were also proposed by Gorbachev during the same meeting, 
when he mentioned to a skeptical Mitterrand that Germany could be-
long either in both political camps or even adopt what the Soviet leader 
called “the French model,” i.e. a non-military integrated member with-
in the Alliance. Gorbachev even alluded to the possibility of the USSR 
being a member both of the still-existing Warsaw Pact and of NATO.
It puzzled many French observers that Moscow did not attempt to 
throw a spanner into the process at a time when it could have been still 
possible for the Russians to stop it. This view is shared by historian 
Mary E. Sarotte: “for a moment in February 1990 the Soviets could 
have made an agreement with Washington freezing NATO expansion 
to the East in not including East Germany within NATO. Gorbachev 
didn’t do it and the opportunity vanished.”4
Even so, it took four years more of intra-Alliance debates, the 2+ 4 
negotiations, and many bilateral discussions with Moscow to arrive at 
the point when the Central and East Europeans could be told that the 
question was no longer “if” but “when,” as President Clinton stated 
publicly after his January 1994 Prague lunch with the leaders of the 
“Visegrád” group—Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. 
Until 1997, the French were much less confident than the Ameri-
cans that the Kremlin would accept NATO enlargement sincerely and 
for the long term. They were not persuaded that President Clinton and 
the “Bill-Boris” personal relationship was the key to explain the weak 
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resistance of the Russian leaders. Paris indeed suspected that Moscow 
would sooner or later try every trick to derail the process, including, 
under various guises, by using the old theme of the “European Com-
mon House.” Hence the repeated French insistence to embed German 
reunification and the enlargement of NATO into a new general archi-
tecture of Europe, which, without isolating Moscow and giving it veto 
power, would not appear to exclude Russia from the “new Europe.” 
The Paris CSCE Summit of November 1990 was considered as a 
successful first step in this direction. But it was only by 1996 and with 
the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 that it was reasonably 
possible to put aside the prospect that a last-ditch change of heart of the 
Kremlin would endanger the process. 
Mitterrand knew, of course, that he did not possess any leverage with 
Moscow similar to that of the United States. The fact that Clinton 
had stated, right at the start of his first term, that his personal political 
priority was to build a new American-Russian relationship was reas-
suring for the men in the Kremlin. They thought that they could still 
count on Washington to consider Russia as the Great Power it had 
been until now, at the very moment they were discovering that they 
were losing their place and role in Europe (this is precisely what Putin 
would denounce later on in 2007 as Yeltsin’s fatal misjudgment). At 
the same time, they were expecting, as a quid pro quo, a massive influx 
of financial and economic aid to redress their floundering economy. 
They believed that Washington was the key. In point of fact, however, 
Washington resisted Helmut Kohl’s entreaties at G-7 meetings, con-
sidering that an unreformed Soviet system would not make good use of 
international aid.
Throughout this period, President Mitterrand remained convinced 
of the need of a cautious step-by-step approach to both NATO and EU 
enlargement. He spoke of a timeframe of “10 to 15 years.” His stance 
was utterly disappointing for the candidate countries. The issue would 
come to a head with them at the time of his ill-fated “Confederation” 
proposal. 
In addition to his personal tendency to put events in an historical 
perspective and thus, in his formulation, “give time to the time,” Mit-
terrand had two additional political motivations. 
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The first was that while NATO and EU enlargements did not need 
to proceed in lockstep, as everyone understood from the start, Central 
Europeans needed both security guarantees and urgent economic aid. 
The Germans, for obvious reasons, were especially keen in stabilizing 
their immediate neighborhood with the support of the European Com-
munity (EC). As early as 1992 the EC was already working through the 
Commission of Jacques Delors to develop a program to that end. 
For the French President, however, consolidating the EC in the 
wake of German reunification was a much higher priority than NATO 
enlargement. At the start, Mitterrand didn’t hide his concern about 
Bonn’s attitude: would reunification make Bonn less interested in the 
EC’s drive towards political union and the building of a European mon-
etary system? Kohl, who was keen about a deeper political union after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, soon reassured Mitterrand, even accepting 
an acceleration of the preparations for the European monetary union, 
for which Paris had been pushing. The Maastricht EU summit at the 
end of 1992 put to rest Mitterrand’s concerns. 
He remained much more worried about the implications of EU en-
largement rather than that of NATO, however. Premature accession of 
Eastern and Central European countries to the EU could, in his view, 
not only divert the political attention and diplomatic endeavors of other 
Europeans partners from this process, but also “dilute” the EU. More-
over, both Mitterrand and his successor, Jacques Chirac, suspected that 
London was using enlargement to slow down the European integration 
project and to continue to reduce it into a free market zone. For Paris, 
therefore, “deepening” of the EU had to precede its “widening.” As 
a result, the political and diplomatic work undertaken to implement 
deeper EU integration at summits in Maastricht in 1992, Amsterdam 
in 1997 and, for Chirac, Nice in 2000 would overshadow by far in Paris 
the concerns about NATO preparations for its own enlargement. 
As far as NATO was concerned, Paris also proposed “a renovation 
of the Alliance” as a prerequisite for its actual widening. Given France’s 
special position as a non-integrated Ally, Paris had a weak card. Never-
theless, France, under Mitterrand, and later more actively under Chi-
rac, tried to establish a link between its support for NATO enlargement 
and Allied agreement to recognize a “European pillar” within the Alli-
ance. It was a way to reconcile the French view that NATO needed to 
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renew and revamp its structures in view of broadening its membership 
with its aim of bolstering the European Defense and Security Identity 
(ESDI) within the transatlantic Alliance.
Mitterrand’s second political motivation for moving slowly on NATO 
enlargement stemmed from his personal conviction that NATO, having 
lost its military “raison d’être” after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, 
would also slowly lose its political relevance. At that time, NATO’s “ex-
istential problem” was indeed common talk in Europe, and not only 
in Paris. Most of the French political-military establishment was con-
vinced that, even with a different political role, NATO would remain a 
necessary military organization. Yet, Mitterrand’s personal views were 
more ambiguous. In 1999 he told a puzzled German President Richard 
von Weizsӓcker that, in his view, “there is a reality: NATO is fading 
away, and there is a virtuality: European defense is reinforcing itself.” 
In retrospect, President Mitterrand underestimated Washington’s 
willingness to act on what it perceived to be its strategic interest in 
giving a new role and saliency to NATO by enlarging it externally and 
renovating it internally. 
Already in 1989 President Bush had set forth the vision of a “Europe 
whole and free.” In 1994 President Clinton called for “a peaceful and 
undivided Europe.” For Washington, a “Euro-Atlantic approach” was 
not only the right solution to fill the new security and political void 
in Central and Eastern Europe, it was also a way to maintain a strong 
American presence on the continent, at a time when numerous voices 
in the United States were calling for a reduction of the U.S. troop pres-
ence on the continent after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. 
Much to the regret of Paris, the NATO London Summit in July 
1990 did not signal that the “Europeanization” of NATO, as advocated 
by France, could be part of the actual “renovation” of NATO. Allies in-
stead focused their attention eastward. At the NATO Summit in Rome 
in November 1991, the Allies offered institutional cooperation with the 
new Eastern Europe democracies through the creation of the North 
Atlantic Coordination Council (NACC), even if, at that stage, it was 
designed more as a framework for political dialogue than a program for 
preparation of a full-fledged adhesion. It would be later systematized 
with the institution of the Partnership for Peace (PfP). 
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In fairness, one should note that some “historic” members of the 
Alliance, such as the UK, Turkey, and parts of the German military 
establishment, as well as East Central European aspirant countries 
themselves, were concerned about the possible negative military impli-
cations of enlargement, the weakening of the Article 5 security guaran-
tee and the prospect of more problematic diplomatic management of 
a larger and less homogenous Alliance. This line would be later used 
by the opponents to enlargement during the ratification debates in the 
U.S. Senate in 1999, including by Henry Kissinger, U.S. Senator John 
Warner, and George Kennan. Those concerns, however, were not ex-
pressed in Paris. 
Paris and the “Kidnapped Europe” 
Mitterrand’s cautious approach toward the candidacy of Poland, 
Czech Republic and Hungary to join the EU and NATO was a para-
dox, given the President’s own personal history and the steadily grow-
ing sympathy expressed by the French public toward the cause of free-
dom and democracy in Eastern Europe. 
Especially since the 1970s, and even earlier, France had a tradition 
of hosting a very active community of intellectuals and dissidents from 
those countries, which Milan Kundera—himself a Czech émigré from 
the 1958 “Prague Spring” who had lived in Paris since 1975—described 
famously as the “kidnapped Europe.”
Pavel Tigrid, an aide to Jan Masaryk, a former employee of Radio 
Free Europe, and a close friend of Václav Havel, was a Paris publisher 
of a review entitled Svedectvi, which became the rallying point for the 
post-1968 Czech dissidents. Earlier, with the remaining press funds of 
the Polish Brigade, which distinguished itself at the Monte Cassino 
battle in 1944, a group of Polish intellectuals, meeting in Maisons Laf-
fite under the direction of Jerzy Giedroyc, had founded the magazine 
Kultura and began to send clandestinely to Poland the works of writ-
ers like Czesław Miłosz  (who later emigrated to California), Leszek 
Kołakowski (living in Oxford), Gustaw Herling-Grudziński (living in 
Naples), and artist Józef Czapski. Bronisław Geremek had been obliged 
to leave Poland at the time of the anti-Semitic purge of the hard line 
Natolin faction fighting Gomulka within the Polish Communist Party. 
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He took refuge in France and was given a post to teach at the College 
de France. The Hungarians could count on François Fejtő.
 Kot Jeleński and Georges Liébert linked the Paris émigrés with the 
Ford Foundation, the reviews Contrepoint and Encounter, Radio Free 
Europe and Radio Liberty, as well as international networks such as 
the Pen Club.5 Most importantly, in Paris, they were supported by a 
cluster of well-connected and influential French intellectuals, including 
the poet Pierre Emmanuel, Raymond Aron, George Nivat, François 
Bondy and Pierre Hassner. 
Following the Prague Spring and the first demonstrations by Soli-
darnosc, a growing fraction of French public opinion, beyond the Pa-
risian intellectual circles, had started supporting actively the quest for 
freedom in the East European countries. The reason was not only pop-
ular support for human rights and cultural freedom but because it was 
also a way for leftist intellectuals and politicians to demonstrate that 
they were breaking from the political grip of communism. 
For a long time, communism had held a stronghold on French cul-
tural life, as it had in Italy. The events in Prague in 1968 had a stunning 
effect, however, and deeply affected the liberal left. The repression and 
the ideological rigidity of the Soviet Communist Party, compounded 
by the behavior of a still-Stalinist French PCF party, unleashed a hem-
orrhage among the ranks of its sympathizers.6 In 1974 French public 
opinion was electrified by the appearance of Aleksandr Isayevich Solz-
henitsyn on prime-time television; Soviet dissidents became “des causes 
celèbres.”
The proclamation in Poland in December 1981 of martial law and 
the brutal repression of Solidarnosc added to the evolution of French 
public opinion. Traditional French sympathy for the Poles, reinforced 
by a large inflow of Polish workers from the 1930s, distant memories 
of French support for the Polish uprising of 1830, and the spontaneous 
rise of a wide network of supporters from Catholic and trade union 
associations, which clandestinely sent material help to Poland, made 
support of Solidarnosc a popular movement that could no longer be ig-
nored by French politicians.
Mitterrand himself had been involved in those debates as a mem-
ber of the Council of Europe. He had travelled extensively in Eastern 
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Europe as a participant in meetings of the Socialist International, a 
federation of European socialist parties where the German SPD had 
dominant influence. He supported Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, much to 
the consternation of the French foreign policy establishment, which 
was aware that until Mitterrand’s election in 1981 he had not yet dis-
tanced himself openly from Egon Bahr’s 1963 proposals for a progres-
sive evolution of Central Europe towards neutralization.
The idea had infuriated President Pompidou and Henry Kissing-
er, but at the time had been supported by several Central and Eastern 
European dissidents, including Václav Havel: the “Prague Appeal” of 
March 1985 called for the dissolution of the two Pacts and the with-
drawal of American and soviet troops. 
For President Mitterrand, who had in 1981 gambled on an electoral 
alliance with the French Communist party and included some mem-
bers in the government, support for freedom in Eastern Europe and for 
the dissidents was therefore not only a matter of personal conviction 
but also a way to distance himself from his temporary communist and 
leftist political partners. Mitterrand did not hesitate to take diplomatic 
risks to support the dissidents openly. 
In June 1984, during his first official dinner in the Kremlin Great 
Hall, Mitterrand stunned his Politburo hosts by not hesitating ask for 
the release of Andrei Sakharov. Later, on his first visit to Prague in 
December 1988, one year before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Mitterrand 
made his visit to President Gustáv Husák conditional on a guarantee 
that he could receive eight well-known dissidents, including Havel, at 
the French Embassy for a breakfast. Havel said that “he came to Palais 
Buquoy with his toothbrush,” expecting to be arrested by the police 
when he left.
Moscow was well aware of Mitterrand’s lack of sympathy vis-à-vis 
the USSR. He had campaigned against Giscard d’Estaing’s attempts to 
keep open the dialogue with the Soviet Union after the Afghan invasion. 
At the beginning of his term, Mitterrand expelled as spies 46 members 
of the Soviet Embassy in Paris.7 Therefore, there was never great con-
fidence from either side in the Paris-Moscow dialogue, even if Moscow 
feigned appreciation for the French position on NATO enlargement, 
which, as Russians confided on many occasions to other interlocutors, 
including Americans, “was different from that of Washington.” 
528 open door: nato and euro-atlantic security after the cold war
In his Moscow meeting with Gorbachev on May 25, 1990, Mitter-
rand tried to clarify his position: “I am perfectly aware that German 
reunification and its membership in NATO create very big problems 
for you. I am also experiencing difficulties in this regard but of a dif-
ferent order. This is why I am stressing the need to create security 
conditions for you, as well as European security as a whole. This is one 
of my guiding goals, particularly when I proposed my idea of creating 
a European Confederation. It is similar to your concept of a common 
European home.” He added, however, the question of reunified Ger-
many included as a whole within NATO: “France cannot allow itself to 
end up somewhere on the sidelines of the North Atlantic Alliance.” 8
The CSCE Gambit 
German reunification in 1990 came as a diplomatic surprise. It is 
important to recall, however, that for years the West had managed a 
successful policy towards the East. The principal instrument was the 
CSCE process, which had long involved the civil society and intellec-
tuals of the new democracies that were now aspiring to NATO mem-
bership. The history of EU and NATO enlargement cannot be totally 
disassociated from this context. 
Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was already a large consen-
sus, officialized in the Alliance’s Harmel Report of 1967, that the West 
should try to “Finlandize” Eastern Europe, as Lord Carrington used to 
say, and to “set a policy of controlled, peaceful and piecemeal chang-
es—one that would ultimately alter the face of Eastern Europe without 
triggering off the defence mechanism arising from the age-old Russian 
security complex,” as Theo Sommer, editor of Die Zeit, put it.9 
Indeed, from the first preliminary talks held in the Helsinki suburb 
of Dipoli in 1972 until the approval of the Charter of Paris in 1990, the 
CSCE process became one of the main themes of French diplomacy in 
East-West relations, for three reasons. 10
First, notwithstanding the fact that the alliances remained a reality 
during the negotiations, the CSCE became the first practical experi-
ment of a common European external policy, and a successful one at 
that. 
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Second, the CSCE was a daring experiment with a kind of modern 
“post-Westphalian diplomacy.” Through pan-European circulation of 
persons and ideas the aim was to counter the prevailing incarnation, 
among Warsaw Pact countries, of the old principle of cuius regio eius 
religio. 
Third, the CSCE process was not only about human rights, as has 
too often been presented. It also involved economic cooperation and 
security considerations. The latter aspect became the be main objective 
of French diplomacy at the Madrid Review Conference from 1980 to 
1983. 
In the United States, President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger, faced with Congressional opposition to “détente,” 
were tempted to belittle the importance of the CSCE process, their 
priority at the time being negotiations to reduce strategic arms (SALT) 
and conventional forces (MBFR).11 
The French, the Germans and other Europeans insisted on receiv-
ing precise commitments in the “Third Basket” of issues dealing with 
human rights, press and culture and freedoms. While Kissinger joked 
about the “swahili” of those detailed negotiations, the French were 
battling, among other measures, to secure the right to open “reading 
rooms” within French cultural institutes in East Central European 
countries that would be accessible to ordinary citizens. Before 1989, 
Havel himself valued his regular visits to the French cultural institute 
on Stepanska street in Prague. The widespread publication of the text 
of the Helsinki Act in “the principal journals” of all signatory coun-
tries, including those in the East, contributed to establish the creation 
of “Helsinki groups” of dissidents and encouraged contacts with civil 
society in those countries.
The Helsinki Final Act,12 the result of long and patient diplomatic 
work, was thus considered in Paris as a great success that should not be 
abandoned because of NATO enlargement. For the French, the two 
processes did not collide and could be complementary, especially be-
cause the CSCE, in spite of its imperfections and the cumbersome way 
it functioned, was still at the time of German reunification the only 
Europe-wide framework available. 
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A few days after the Berlin Wall fall, Chancellor Kohl seized the 
political initiative by presenting to the Bundestag 10 points the Ger-
man government intended to follow. Several of the points referenced 
an overall European process: (6) “the embedding of the future structure 
of Germany within the Pan-European process, for which the West has 
paved the way with its concept of a lasting and just order of peace;” (7) 
“openness and flexibility of the European Community with respect to 
all reformed countries in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 
naturally including the GDR;” (8) “energetic progress in the CSCE 
process using the forthcoming forums.”
Most importantly, the Helsinki Final Act stated explicitly that each 
nation had the right to choose its own military alliance or remain neu-
tral. At the crucial Bush-Gorbachev meeting in Washington on May 
31, 1990, President Bush, referring to the Helsinki Final Act, cleverly 
advanced the argument that a new united Germany would have the 
right to choose its alliance. Gorbachev could not find a way to object, 
much to the consternation of his delegation. 
When Boris Yeltsin visited Warsaw in August 1993, he would also 
acknowledge with Lech Wałęsa that the Helsinki Final Act recognized 
the right of all member countries to choose their alliance: it was im-
mediately interpreted by Wałęsa as the “green light” for Poland to be 
allowed to join NATO, even if, soon afterward, Yeltsin retreated from 
his position. 
During the 2+4 negotiations on German reunification, the Allies re-
peated that the “CSCE should be enhanced to ensure a significant role 
for the USSR in the new Europe.” Gorbachev came back repeatedly 
to the idea that “the CSCE be the principal mechanism to developing 
a new security order in Europe.” The London NATO summit in June 
1990 echoed the intent of the Allies to diversify and “strengthen the 
role of the CSCE.” 
In the same vein, Yeltsin told Clinton at their Halifax meeting in 
June 1995 that “NATO is a factor too of course, but NATO should 
evolve into a political organization.”13 Moscow was never able to make 
precise proposals, however, beyond the reference to the need of using 
the CSCE forum to negotiate the reduction of conventional forces in 
Europe.
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Negotiations to reduce Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) origi-
nated from a French initiative at the second CSCE Review Conference 
in Madrid. In November 1980 a proposal had been endorsed by the 
Atlantic Alliance with the aim to prepare a mandate for opening an 
alternative to the deadlocked MBFR negotiations in Central Europe, 
which had been going on for about a decade. Paris had long been hos-
tile to this pact-to-pact negotiation on troop reductions in a narrow 
band of territory in Central Europe. Paris became even more preoc-
cupied when NATO introduced what it called “option 3” dealing with 
nuclear-deployed weapons in the zone. The idea to introduce a new 
approach of conventional arms control in the CSCE framework raised, 
at first, American opposition. The human rights specialists worried, in 
the words of the head of delegation at Madrid, Max Kampelman, that 
“putting the elephant of security in the bathtub of human rights” would 
unbalance the whole process. 
There were also some reservations at NATO headquarters. The 
MBFR had been seen as an opportunity to establish contacts with the 
Warsaw Pact in Vienna and as a way to head off the Mansfield amend-
ment in the U.S. Congress, which threatened to reduce U.S. troops in 
Europe. A French proposal aimed, in fact, to kill MBFR and to start 
the conventional negotiations over again with a wider framework of 23 
countries, beginning with confidence-building measures, was therefore 
a priori eminently suspect.14 
However, even if some NATO delegates went almost apoplec-
tic during the intra-Alliance preparation of the negotiating package, 
which was further addressed at a Stockholm Conference in 1984, the 
approach succeeded and led to a complex agreement on convention-
al forces reductions and transparency measures. The CFE framework 
proved itself quite useful to settle the difficult issue of troops ceiling 
for reunified Germany. The adaptation of regional troop ceilings in 
CFE II would later take into account the massive conventional force 
reductions resulting from the end of the Warsaw Pact. Signed in No-
vember 1990 in Paris, the CFE treaty remained an element of the new 
European security architecture until Russia withdrew from it in 2008.15
The CSCE as a new pan-European security framework was also 
widely supported by the democratic opposition in Central and Eastern 
Europe. As the one institution to which they already belonged, and 
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with its focus on an all-European approach, it was natural that such a 
political forum should be attractive for them and that it could possibly 
be institutionalized. In Prague, Havel and his foreign affairs minister 
Jiří Dienstbier therefore proposed in April 1990 a permanent OSCE-
based “Security Commission,” which would replace both NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. It was obviously not acceptable for NATO and other 
East Central European countries. Havel demurred at a meeting of the 
Council of Europe in May. 
The idea of semi-permanent structures for the CSCE reappeared in 
the “Paris Charter for a new Europe,” signed at the Paris Summit of 
1990. This CSCE Summit meeting was considered a French success, 
but Mitterrand didn’t build on it. In the meantime, he had become 
wedded to his personal pet project: the “Confederation.” 
The Confederation: A Bridge Too Far? 
At the end of December 1989, Mitterrand surprised everyone by 
introducing a proposal for a new East-West forum, which he called 
the “Confederation,” whose link with the CSCE was ambiguous. The 
stated purpose was to develop concrete long-term cooperative projects 
in a flexible framework, allowing nations, firms, institutions to build 
bridges between the two sides. Those projects could be advanced with 
different combinations of participants (“variable geometry”) so as to 
avoid institutional rigidities. Military and security issues were not to be 
addressed in the Confederation. 
The subtext was that the Confederation would serve as a bridging 
mechanism between the present economic and social condition of aspi-
rants to the EEC and the ultimate date of accession to the EC, which 
Mitterrand saw as a more distant objective. It had also the purpose 
of harmonizing the various agreements between the concerned candi-
dates. Mitterrand had pointed out to Havel that accession to the EC 
(later EU) would require time; aspirants would need to meet the sub-
stantial conditions of the acquis communautaires. It was better to start 
with a series of practical cooperation initiatives, which could lead pro-
gressively to the required level of readiness to accession.
As soon as the details emerged, however, many began to question the 
very rational for this French proposal. The Germans started to distance 
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themselves from an initiative that they saw as duplicating the Second 
Basket of the CSCE and possibly complicating the ambitious national 
policy they were about to implement in an area in which Germany 
historically had been present. While the inclusion of the already weak-
ened USSR was mentioned (Mitterrand argued it was important “not 
to isolate them” just when the Soviet Union was being dismantled), 
U.S. participation was not anticipated, at least at the start: civil society 
representatives and economic actors would represent them. Washing-
ton was furious and began a campaign against the whole idea. The Eu-
ropean Commission was also worried about potential competition in its 
own area of competence. 
Havel, who at first applauded at the project and had agreed to host it 
in Prague, began to retract, not only because the United States would 
be absent, but also because of the negative reactions he was getting 
from around Europe. The legitimate suspicion that the Confederation 
was designed as a way station before enlarging the EC, or even worse, 
as a permanent holding pen, could only generate negative reactions. 
Mitterrand himself, to the utter dismay of his staff, bluntly confirmed 
these suspicions in a radio interview on June 12, 1991, on the very eve 
of the opening of the conference, and so, essentially, sank the whole 
idea. 
The ensuing debates in Prague were considered as “useful” but, as 
Havel put it at the closing of the conference on June 14, somewhat 
“futurologistic.” The small secretariat supposed to be created in Prague 
was forgotten and the follow-on anticipated for the conference attract-
ed no takers. Two months later, the attempted putsch in Moscow di-
verted attention from the already- stillborn Mitterrand project. 
The failure of the Confederation had no real political impact in 
France. By the end of the year the success of the Maastricht Treaty 
silenced the criticism of a bungled diplomatic venture. It could have 
been anticipated, but the personal involvement of the President and 
his close staff had made the forewarning of failure not an easy task for 
the diplomatic apparatus. It was a disaster for the influence of France in 
East Central Europe and had a lasting effect on Paris’ credibility as far 
as the EU enlargement was concerned. It would be up to Mitterrand’s 
successor, Jacques Chirac, to redress the negative impressions creat-
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ed, even at the price of a rather demagogic competition with Kohl for 
promising a fixed date for the accession of new candidates to the EU. 
Some diplomats argued that the Confederation could have played a 
useful role, and that it was a “good idea too soon.”16 Paris had however 
misunderstood that Washington’s policy toward the new Europe was 
not simply geared to preserving NATO and the U.S. military presence 
but to redefining American political influence on the continent. Trying 
to separate the two tracks was indeed consistent with the French view 
about the role of the EC, but was not acceptable to Washington. 
Bosnia and the NATO 1997 Madrid Summit:  
Who Would Be Next? 
The enlargement debate clearly could not be isolated from external 
crises. The Bosnian war, which began in 1991 after Slovenia and Cro-
atia unilaterally declared independence from the Yugoslav Federation, 
was critical. As Ron Asmus wrote: “NATO enlargement would never 
have happened absent the U.S. and NATO’s all-out and eventually suc-
cessful effort to stop the war raging in Bosnia.”17 
Bosnia had a decisive impact on the Paris-Washington relationship 
and on the way the French would see the need for NATO to adapt its 
structures and missions. While the Americans supported in principle 
the goal of European integration, they were determined to prevent the 
emergence of European security arrangements they feared could un-
dermine NATO and particularly arrangements related to the Alliance’s 
integrated military structure. Persistent endeavors by the French to 
raise the profile of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) 
within NATO were therefore not welcomed. Since France simultane-
ously was putting much needed troops on the ground in Bosnia and 
hinting at its rapprochement with NATO in military matters, Wash-
ington was also eager not to confront Paris directly. 
The Balkans were a huge shock for the candidate countries, who dis-
covered that the end of the Warsaw Pact was not the anticipated recipe 
for stability and democracy in Europe and that NATO and the EU, be-
cause of the Gulf War and then Bosnian crisis, were not prioritizing en-
largement in the way they had first assumed. The Bosnian wars would 
in due course represent an opportunity for some candidates to show 
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their contribution to NATO through the Partnership for Peace. A few 
of them sent small contingents to IFOR. Hungary distinguished itself 
by welcoming on its soil a useful logistical hub for NATO-led forces. 
When Jacques Chirac was elected President of France in May 1995, 
he found the Bosnian crisis on the doorstep of his mandate when Serbi-
an forces took hostage 300 UNPROFOR soldiers, including some from 
France. UNPROFOR, set up in 1992 at the level of 14,000 troops, had 
limited operational flexibility and few military powers, due to political 
constraints introduced by the U.N. Security Council. Chirac ordered 
immediately a strong military reaction by the French contingent, by-
passing U.N. local representative Yashusi Akashi. He also began, with 
the help of London and of a new European “Contact Group,” to de-
velop plans for a Rapid Reaction Force to try to contain the growing 
ethnic conflict between Serbs and Muslims in the Balkans. Eventually 
the French would deploy up to 7,000 troops and suffer one-third of the 
casualties. 
During President Chirac’s first visit to Washington on June 14, 
1995, he was able to convince the Clinton White House and the Con-
gressional leadership that the credibility of the West and NATO was at 
stake in this first open military conflict in Europe since World War II. 
It led to an important shift in U.S. policy.18 
In the wake of the Serb attacks on Sarajevo, widespread ethnic clean-
ing and the atrocities of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995, President Clin-
ton decided upon greater American involvement, but still without any 
troops deployed on the ground (save some special forces in Croatia). 
After the Dayton peace arrangement, when the conflict restarted 
in Kosovo, a massive NATO air operation began. For the first time 
since its creation, NATO was engaged into a real military operation. It 
proceeded with difficulties, especially regarding political control of the 
intervention by the North Atlantic Council. NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander (SACEUR), General Wesley Clark, would later complain 
about “waging a war by committee,” and objected to the way British 
General Michael Jackson disobeyed his orders to stop the rush of the 
Russian contingent towards Pristina airport; Clark was particularly in-
censed by Jackson’s comment that he didn’t “want to be the first to 
begin the Third World War.”19 
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The Europeans, who bore the brunt of military actions on the 
ground while the American were deployed in the air, were unhappy 
with the whole affair and the new mood indirectly affected the debate 
about NATO enlargement. 
It was unavoidable that the Balkans crisis would keep the French 
pushing the issue of the “European pillar” (ESDI) within NATO. Paris 
believed it had secured London’s support (as would later be confirmed 
in the French-British bilateral declaration at their St. Malo Summit on 
December 4, 1998). In exchange, France signaled its readiness to move 
closer to full integration into NATO military structures. In Paris, the 
Elysée had been convinced that progress had been made through con-
fidential Franco-American conversations throughout the spring and 
summer of 1996, including at a foreign ministers’ meeting in Berlin in 
early June. Therefore, Paris was severely disappointed by Washington’s 
negative reaction to new and ambitious French proposals to reorga-
nize NATO military commands, including that France would assume 
command of AFSOUTH in Naples, one of the two major NATO com-
mands in the Mediterranean area, from the United States.20 On August 
28 President Chirac made the tactical error to send a letter to President 
Clinton, detailing the proposals prepared by his staff, boxing himself 
into a hardline position. The letter would eventually leak.21 The Pen-
tagon, which was in no mood for any concessions to Paris, was infu-
riated. Chirac was extremely upset and made it a personal issue in his 
relationship with Clinton. Washington began to fear that the French 
would make enlargement hostage to the reform of NATO. It poisoned 
the atmosphere for preparation of the Madrid NATO Summit of 1997.
Meanwhile, the work within the Alliance on enlargement was con-
tinuing. In December 1994 the North Atlantic Council started a “pro-
cess of examination” inside the Alliance to determine how NATO 
would deal with enlargement. By fall 1995, based on a set of criteria 
set forth by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry (which came to 
be known as the “Perry principles”), Allies had agreed that candidates 
had to make commitments to democracy and market economy pre-
cepts, recognize the sovereignty of other countries, agree to NATO’s 
decision-making by consensus, develop interoperability, and to defend 
other Allies. 
Beyond NATO Enlargement to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary 537
The Russians were cooperative enough at the time, while still op-
posing the enlargement of NATO. They agreed to send a military con-
tingent to implement the Dayton Peace Accords, under the proviso 
that Russian forces would be under the “tactical command” of U.S. 
General George Joulwan in his U.S. role, rather than as Supreme Al-
lied Commander of NATO. 
The mood begun to harden, however, after the Russian Duma 
elections of December 1995, the reelection of Yeltsin in 1996 and his 
choice of the more conservative Yevgeny Primakov as Foreign Minis-
ter, replacing the Western-oriented Andrei Kozyrev. 
As Moscow was again presenting alternative plans for postponing 
the enlargement, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher respond-
ed by stating publicly in Prague the unwavering U.S. commitment. It 
was only after the Clinton–Yeltsin meeting in Helsinki on March 21, 
1997 that the Russians began to yield. 
Worried about the prospect that Yeltsin might not remain in power 
for long, and in order to consolidate this progress, Washington decid-
ed to accelerate the diplomatic processes, setting as the goal a NATO 
Summit in June 1997, in order to take into account the need not to 
weaken Yeltsin by the time of the Russian elections in 1996. 
Chirac was, however, still pleading to slow down the process, seek-
ing to reassure Moscow about the meaning of enlargement, now that 
fractures were appearing within the Russian leadership. 
Many in Washington shared this view of a “double track”—pushing 
for enlargement while trying to appease Russia with carrots of special 
arrangements. It was thus proposed to Moscow, as a demonstration of 
good will, that a “new relationship to NATO” would be announced. 
After intense discussions in and among European capitals and with 
Moscow, the “NATO Russia Founding Act” was signed in Paris on 
May 27, 1997. 
The Founding Act stated that NATO and Russia “do not consider 
each other as adversaries,” and intended to develop “a strong, stable 
and enduring partnership.” The Act went as far as to envision “goals 
and mechanisms of consultation, cooperation, joint decision-making 
and joint action,” and developing a broad program. 
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A key provision, which still resonates in the public debate more 
than two decades later, was a unilateral statement by NATO members 
that they “have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear 
weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change 
any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy—and do not 
foresee any future need to do so.” The Act also called for an adaptation 
of the CFE agreement to consider further conventional reductions. 
As far as the conventional posture was concerned, “NATO reiterates 
that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance 
will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the 
necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement 
rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat 
forces.” 
Having thought that they had placated Moscow, the Allies had to 
decide whether to select a broad number of candidates or only a privi-
leged few, and in the latter case, what to do with those not accepted in 
the next membership wave.  
At the May 29-30, 1997 meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Cin-
tra, Portugal, differing views were expressed. The United States was 
steadfast in its support only for Poland, the Czech Republic and Hun-
gary, excluding Meciar’s Slovakia from the first round. Italy, France 
and some other Allies declared themselves also in favor of including 
Romania and Slovenia, given their internal political evolution and the 
need not to consider in the first round of enlargement only a “German 
security belt.” The United States, in turn, was concerned that the larg-
er the first round, the more difficult it would be not to consider at the 
same time the Baltic countries. No agreement was reached. As Ronald 
Asmus recalled, “the Cintra meeting was a public relations disaster” 
and U.S. behavior was denounced in Paris “as hegemonic.”22 
Chirac, still bristling from the rejection of the French proposal 
about AFSOUTH, proved himself unyielding on including Romania 
at a June meeting with Clinton in the margins of the G-8 in Denver.
The NATO Madrid Summit on July 7-9 1997 opened therefore on 
a split: France and Italy, supported by 7 other allies, opted for a broader 
first round while the United States and 6 allies favored a smaller group 
of new members. Considerations about easier Congressional support 
for a limited number of candidates, the willingness to guarantee a sec-
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ond round later for those excluded from Madrid, and strong ethnic 
lobbying by Polish and Czech minorities in the United States were 
important factors for Washington. 
For Paris, close links with Romania and the wish to reestablish a bal-
ance between Central Europe and Southeast Europe was considered to 
be equally important. Italy was also keen to have Slovenia, a neighbor, 
on board. 
During the Madrid meeting Clinton was able to rally German Chan-
cellor Helmut Kohl to his side. After tense discussions, Clinton—who 
did not want to put Chirac into a difficult position (after he had recent-
ly lost parliamentary elections and was saddled with a “cohabitation” 
government largely hostile to a NATO rapprochement)—managed 
with the help of NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to obtain a 
presentational change of the final communique, which was a face saver 
for France and Italy. 
The option for a limited first round enlargement to the 3 Visegrád 
countries (minus Slovakia) was therefore adopted. As a way to demon-
strate that NATO was willing to keep “an open door,” NATO agreed 
to intensify its individual dialogues with candidate countries. As Daniel 
Hamilton recounts in this volume, as a complementary effort Wash-
ington developed a Northern European Initiative and in January 1998 
offered the three Baltic states a “Charter of Partnership.” 
The long battle of ratification in the U.S. Senate saw foreign policy 
establishment luminaries such a U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and John 
Warner, former defense secretary Robert McNamara, Ambassadors 
Paul Nitze and Jack Matlock, and Henry Kissinger criticize aspects of 
the Clinton Administration’s approach to NATO enlargement. George 
Kennan denounced NATO enlargement as an error of historic dimen-
sions. Eventually, however, as Jeremy Rosner recounts in this volume, 
the U.S. Senate voted 80 against 19 for the ratification on May 1, 1998. 
An amendment asking the candidates to first join the EU before joining 
NATO was defeated on the floor. Senator Warner’s amendment to de-
lay a second round of enlargement by three years received 44 votes, but 
was also defeated. At NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington 
on April 23-24 1999, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary made 
their official debut in NATO as full members. 
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In France, the three protocols of accession by Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary were ratified on June 19, 1998. While debates 
focused on the implications for Russia, the Kosovo crisis and the costs 
involved (they were differences between NATO’s estimates and those 
of the U.S. administration’s General Accountability Office), they did 
not attract much attention. The French debate about further NATO 
enlargement also remained low key in ensuing years for the next few 
years, unlike those about the accession of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe to the EU. 
Consequently, it was not surprising when the Prague Summit of No-
vember 21-22, 2002 formally endorsed the candidacy of a second group 
of candidates, including the three Baltic countries as well as Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Their accession was completed in 
May 2004. Albania and Croatia acceded in 2009 and Montenegro was 
admitted in June 2017.
Meanwhile, in the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, 
NATO had shifted its principal mission to the fight against terrorism 
and begun preparations to intervene in Afghanistan, where some can-
didate countries were already ready to deploy troops alongside the Alli-
ance. At the Prague Summit, the main issue for the French was no lon-
ger enlargement but the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) of 
some 21,000 troops that could be rapidly deployed. President Chirac, 
now in his second term, decided to participate in this initiative. For the 
first time, French troops were included into a NATO military force on 
a permanently rotating basis. He also offered to deploy French forces 
as part of NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan. 
By 2002, the element of excitement and novelty that had surrounded 
the entry of the first group of Central European countries had evapo-
rated. Each of the new candidates had gone through a long bureaucrat-
ic examination, often verging on the inconsequential.23 
Soon, however, the problem of the Ukrainian and Georgian can-
didacies would split the Alliance and show that it was easier to speak 
about a “NATO Open Door policy” than it was to implement its im-
plicit promise. 
At the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008, President George 
W. Bush pushed Allies to offer a Membership Action Plan to Ukraine. 
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A majority, including France and Germany, was not convinced it was 
wise to go beyond the NATO-Ukrainian Charter of 1997. This was 
not just because of worries about Russia’s probable reaction, but also 
because of divisions within Ukrainian public opinion at the time. The 
most important consideration, however, was that NATO was not, at 
that time, ready to provide a security commitment either to Ukraine 
or to Georgia. 
The dynamism of NATO enlargement in Europe was losing steam. 
Priority attention was devoted to NATO’s partnerships in the Med-
iterranean, the Middle East and the Gulf (the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative proposed at the Summit of June 2004), and in Asia. The very 
concept of membership and association with NATO was thus evolving. 
As shown in Iraq and Afghanistan, the new focus was consistent with 
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s preference for “coali-
tions of the willing,” given that the “mission determined the coalition” 
and not the reverse. 
At the same time, tensions grew between France and the United 
States due to the progress of the EU’s European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) and of the severe rift over the 2003 Iraq war. The idea of 
Europe “whole and free” and NATO unity would be forgotten during 
this diplomatic crisis. In fact, by an ironic twist of history, the Bush 
Administration considered NATO enlargement to be a useful weapon 
against the stubborn French.
Rumsfeld was increasingly annoyed by what he saw as “French 
machinations” when it came to the intra-Alliance dispute over Iraq. He 
decided to take the offensive. In an interview with a Dutch journalist on 
January 22, 2003, he divided NATO into a cantankerous “Old Europe” 
and a “New Europe” that he characterized as more loyal to the United 
States: 
Now you are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I 
think that it is old Europe. If you look at the entire NATO Europe 
today, the center of gravity is shifting to the east. And there are a 
lot of new members.24 
On February 5, 2003 Rumsfeld’s Assistant Secretary of Defense Pe-
ter Rodman wrote: 
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It is now clear that that our counterstrategy (against the French)—
bringing Central Europe and Eastern Europe in the game—is 
winning. Your reference to old Europe not only brought into pub-
lic consciousness what has been evolving for some time. When 
Central and Eastern Europe get into not only NATO but also the 
EU, the French game is over!25 
On February 18, 2003, in a letter to President Bush, Rumsfeld as-
serted that “France is clearly trying to destroy NATO, in favor of the 
EU.” 
A few days later, Central and Eastern European ministers from the 
self-designated “New Europe” published a letter of support for the 
U.S. position on Iraq in the Wall Street Journal, resulting in a strong 
French reaction. 
Richard Haass, then Director of Policy Planning at the State De-
partment, observed that U.S. efforts to forge alliances with the “new” 
members could “break up an EU already diluted by its own eastward 
enlargement.”26
It was up to President Barack Obama in Prague in 2009 to reverse 
this rhetoric and policy approach (which would however yet again be 
resurrected by his successor Donald Trump): “in my view there is no 
old Europe or new Europe. There is only a united Europe.” 
Some years thereafter, however, the Russian interventions in Georgia 
(2013) and Ukraine and Crimea (2014) were a wakeup call for NATO. 
A new and much more fundamental debate opened up about the 
cohesion of the Alliance. It was reminiscent of Alliance discussions in 
the 1970s between the Central European front and the flanks, albeit in 
a changed geostrategic context. The Baltic countries, Poland, Romania 
and Bulgaria, with the support of Ukraine, were understandably de-
manding military “reassurance” and a new set of priorities for NATO. 
While agreeing with the need to deal with those Allies’ security con-
cerns in Eastern and Central Europe, France and Southern European 
Allies called for renewed attention to the situation on the southern rim 
of the Alliance—the Mediterranean and the Sahel. In an era of global, 
regional and local instabilities, the growing issue was whether NATO 
should continue to deal primarily with threats stemming from Russia 
or those emanating from its southern and southeastern periphery.
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Who Lost Russia?
In contrast to the years when the West and Russia sought to find a 
role for Moscow as a partner of NATO in a new European order built 
around a larger NATO and a larger EU, today we are faced with a com-
plete turnaround in Moscow’s position. 
The shift was clearly expressed by Vladimir Putin in his speech at 
the 2007 Munich Security Conference, when, among other accusa-
tions, he lambasted the expansion of “NATO infrastructures” up to 
the borders of Russia. Putin claimed that the West had purposefully 
exploited post-Soviet Russia’s state of weakness and that the Alliance’s 
open-door policy vis-à-vis the East was in contradiction “with the as-
surances given at the time.” 
Putin’s 2007 revisionist views—constantly repeated since, and ap-
parently shared by a large segment of Russian society—represented a 
complete reversal of his proclaimed solidarity with America in the af-
termath of the September 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New 
York City and on the Pentagon in Virginia, and his promises to join 
George W. Bush in his fight against terrorism, including offering logis-
tical support for NATO’s Afghanistan operations, opening its airspace, 
and granting Allies the use of Russia’s Central Asian airbases.27 
From today’s perspective, it is perhaps hard to recall the positive at-
mosphere surrounding the first NATO-Russia Summit hosted by Ital-
ian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi at Pratica di Mare, near Rome, 
in May 2002. The Summit’s joint declaration stated that “today we are 
opening a new page in our relations, aimed at enhancing our ability 
to work together in areas of common interest and to stand together 
against common threats and risks to our security.” 
Such cordiality was short-lived. Within 5 years, Putin had grown 
hostile. NATO became “the enemy”—justifying in Putin’s mind a re-
balancing of forces in Europe that, he hoped, would provide Russia 
with a new security zone and sphere of influence beyond its current 
post-1991 borders. 
The Kremlin thus proved immune to the attempts of Obama Ad-
ministration in March 2009 to achieve a “reset” of the Russian-Ameri-
can relationship. The Western decision to intervene in Libya worsened 
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the relationship. Russia’s military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and 
against Ukraine in 2014 deepened the break. Putin even justified Rus-
sian actions by suggesting they were equivalent to the NATO inter-
vention in Kosovo in 1999. NATO-Russia Council meetings became 
largely irrelevant. 
Did Moscow feel it was deceived by the West on enlargement? Or, 
more simply, did it believe, at the time, that it would never come? The 
answer to each question is no. Russia accepted the new larger NATO 
and even worked together with it. 
The downward spiral in relations with the Kremlin since 2007 was 
triggered by a different series of events, including the planned deploy-
ment in Europe of missile defenses against a possible Iranian threat 
and, most certainly, U.S. and European support of the democratic 
movements in and around Russia. U.S. and EU help to the “Orange 
Revolution” and the later “Euromaidan” in Ukraine are the top items 
on Putin’s long list of grievances, due to the Kremlin’s fear of demo-
cratic contamination. 
In sum, Moscow’s change of course vis-a-vis the West, after 20 years 
of NATO enlargement and attempts to build a stable relationship with 
Russia, has led to a situation in which NATO has become both a pro-
claimed enemy and an alibi for the Kremlin’s revisionist policy.
It also highlights the fact that for the Kremlin, NATO has been the 
security institution with the most far-reaching influence on the remak-
ing of a post-Cold War order in Europe with which Russia has not yet 
resigned itself to live.
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Chapter 24
NATO Enlargement and Russia:  
A Military Perspective
Wesley K. Clark
While the work on NATO enlargement was rightly the business of 
policymakers and diplomats, the military was also involved, but always 
subordinate to civilian authority. And because the military goes into 
and out of policy positions, most officers have only an episodic under-
standing of the policy issues. That was certainly the case with me. 
When I served at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) from February 1978 through June 1979 as Assistant Execu-
tive Officer to NATO Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) Gen-
eral Alexander M. Haig, Jr., I did have visibility into some of the most 
sensitive and pressing policy matters. I helped write much of his corre-
spondence and speeches and traveled often with him. But it wasn’t until 
1994, fifteen years later, that I worked NATO policy in the Pentagon 
as the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, J-5. What follows are my 
impressions of NATO enlargement and our relationship with Russia. 
When I served at SHAPE in the late 1970s there was talk that at 
some point, NATO would perhaps take on new members. After West 
Germany had come Greece and Turkey. Spain was possible, also Swe-
den perhaps, or even Austria. Spain did in fact join NATO in 1982. Our 
primary focus, however, was on the problem of the new Soviet missile, 
the SS20, which was challenging NATO’s deterrent, and the NATO 
strategy of flexible response. 
For the bulk of the U.S. Army, even the so-called “heavy force,” 
which consisted of tanks, mechanized infantry, and self-propelled artil-
lery, and was in fact oriented to the NATO mission of deterring—or, if 
deterrence failed, defending—in assigned sectors in southern Germa-
ny, NATO and its issues were specialized problems that we occasionally 
studied in school. The U.S. Army was fully occupied recovering from 
the Vietnam War experience. We had become an Army of volunteers—
no draftees. We were constantly upgrading outdated equipment, ex-
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changing old tanks for new models, new trucks, new radios, and so 
on. We also brought in new training methods—everything from laser 
devices to explicit soldiering tasks to be tested by the units themselves. 
Though patriotic, we were non-ideological and non-political. 
From the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, the U.S. Army slowly 
upgraded our deployments, our doctrine and our equipment to respond 
to what we viewed as the growing Soviet threat. We stationed a new, 
separate armored brigade in Northern Germany near Hamburg and 
prepositioned several brigades worth of ready-to-go equipment in Bel-
gium so that reinforcements could be airlifted in and used to augment 
what was believed to be the sectors most vulnerable to a Soviet attack. 
We replaced our old doctrine of an active (elastic) defense with a con-
cept of fighting in-depth to disrupt the second echelon of the enemy’s 
attacking forces. We brought in the new Black Hawk and Apache Heli-
copters, M1 tanks, and M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicles. We struggled to 
provide the military backing for deterrence, and should that fail, to of-
fer flexible defense in accordance with NATO doctrine. Never did I see 
any plan to initiate an attack, nor even, in the defense, to counterattack 
with ground forces into East Germany or Czechoslovakia. The Army 
was prepared for the Cold War to last indefinitely, with soldiers and 
their families rotating into Germany from assignments in the United 
States and back every two to three years. 
By late 1987, however, even the officers in far-away Fort Carson, 
Colorado—where I was serving as Commander, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infan-
try Division—could sense strategic change. Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev had visited Washington, DC, and while he was being driven 
in a motorcade from Congress to the White House, he got out of his 
car, and, walking among the bystanders, was greeted with warm ap-
plause. Observing this on the evening news, I was unsettled—here we 
were, training to go to war in case deterrence failed, while in Washing-
ton it seemed that Gorbachev was greeted as a kind of hero. We were 
training in a generations-long effort to fight a country whose leader was 
welcomed by our own citizens as a hero? 
The American military was never anti-Soviet. Curious, respectful, in 
awe of the World War II experience would be the best way to describe 
our perspective. We studied what Soviet writings we could, historical 
and current, to understand Soviet military doctrine, and decision-mak-
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ing. We worried about Soviet technology—air-to-air missiles that 
could launch backwards, the incredibly maneuverable MiG 29, explo-
sive reactive armor on tanks, with automatic loaders, tanks that could 
“squat” and dig themselves in to lower their silhouettes, and so on. We 
trained against what we believed to be their tactics, constituting “ag-
gressor squadrons” for the Air Force at Red Flag, and a Soviet-styled 
“OpFor” at the Army’s National Training Center in the Mojave Desert. 
On a personal level, I had studied Russian at West Point and become 
somewhat fluent, read translations of Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky and Sholok-
hov, listened to Tchaikovsky, Prokofiev and Mussorgsky, and even trav-
elled as a tourist in the summer of 1964 to the Soviet Union, along 
with three other West Point cadets. We met young Soviet officers, and 
verbally jousted over the Olympics, the space program and other mat-
ters. We spent hours visiting Kazanskiy Cathedral, the Hermitage, Red 
Square, and debating Communism with our Intourist guide and with 
the curator of the Lenin Museum in Kiev. We left impressed and con-
cerned, but mostly with a warm feeling for the historic hardships and 
suffering of the people there.
The U.S. Army wasn’t “politicized” in the way that, for example, the 
Soviet and Chinese armies were. There were no commissars governing 
our appreciation of world politics. We considered ourselves “profes-
sional,” aiming for expertise in the use of weapons and forces, at the 
direction of the political leaders elected and appointed over us. 
By the late 1980s the Cold War was clearly ending. Gorbachev was 
struggling to reform the entrenched Soviet bureaucracy, and the Com-
munist idealism I had heard first hand in 1964 was long gone. The U.S. 
military was delighted with the end of the Cold War—we immediate-
ly got rid of the U.S. Army’s tactical nuclear weapons. We respected 
Soviet Marshal Akhromeyev and his personal relationship with our 
chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe and later 
General Colin Powell, and were saddened to learn that he had commit-
ted suicide. There was no sense of triumph expressed.
We were also distracted by the invasion of Panama, and subsequent 
actions in Kuwait and Iraq. In a personal meeting on a Friday afternoon 
in May, 1991, discussing Operation Desert Storm, the Undersecretary 
of Defense for Policy explained it to me this way: “…we learned we can 
intervene militarily in the Mideast with impunity—the Soviets won’t 
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do a thing to stop us.” This wasn’t anti-Soviet, but rather a recognition 
that the Soviet threat was a fading concern. 
When I arrived in Washington to become the J-5 in April 1994, the 
United States was engaged in multiple crises—a total embargo of Haiti, 
a crisis with North Korea about their possible reprocessing of spent nu-
clear fuel, NATO operations Deny Flight and Display Determination 
in the Balkans, which were designed to smother the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia, an unfolding humanitarian crisis and genocide in Rwan-
da, a continuing commitment to the Kurds in Iraq, an airlift to Beirut 
from Cyprus, as well as a dozen other pressing issues. Worse, there was 
no prepared national security strategy. Without a Soviet force to face, 
what was the purpose of the U.S. Armed Forces, and how should they 
be sized and equipped, and with what level of resourcing? 
In the midst of wrestling with these issues I was also charged with 
leading the first U.S.-Russian staff talks; someone previously had de-
termined that they would be held in Moscow, in early August, 1994. 
There was no agenda, and no precedent. 
Our Russian hosts from the Main Operations Directorate of the 
Russian General Staff were gracious but reserved. I met my counter-
part, Colonel-General Barynkin, the Chief of the Main Operations Di-
rectorate, and his boss, General Kolesnikov, the Chief of the Russian 
General Staff. The Defense Ministry was less impressive on the inside 
than its façade would have implied—large, high-ceilinged offices, but 
sparsely furnished, with threadbare carpeting. 
General Barynkin spoke no English, and my Russian had faded to 
little more than introductions and niceties. As we conversed through an 
interpreter, he stood by a five-foot-high globe in his office and slowly 
spun it around. “I can put my hand on any spot,’ he said, “and I will 
know what is happening there. Can you?” It was a boast and a chal-
lenge, I sensed born more of insecurity rather than curiosity. Not much 
different than listening in 1964 as Soviet lieutenants over a lunch table 
boasted that they had the first astronaut and the best astronauts.
On a warm afternoon in early August 1994, sitting across the con-
ference table and assisted by our defense attaché, we followed a loose 
agenda in the Staff talks, more of a get-acquainted than an effort direct-
ed at specific accomplishments. NATO was discussed, because NATO 
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was seeking to engage all the former members of the Warsaw Pact in a 
Partnership for Peace, and of course, the Russians were curious about 
NATO operations to support the U.N. in the Balkans. 
The United States had made no decision on NATO enlargement 
at that point, but all matters associated with NATO were met by the 
Russians with skepticism, resentment, and concern. In particular, I was 
asked, “When will your NATO ships be in our port of Riga?” I an-
swered, “I don’t know, but the more you ask that question, the sooner 
they will come.” (I had already heard from East European attaches in 
Washington their concerns about the Russians.) I left Moscow with 
the impression that whatever the friendliness between Presidents Clin-
ton and Yeltsin, these Russian military leaders would be difficult. But I 
would try to work it.
I invited Colonel-General Barynkin to visit me in Washington, and 
upon returning to DC, worked hard through the Russian Defense at-
taché to have him actually make the trip. He arrived in May 1995, pro-
testing, “I have never been west of East Berlin.” This, I thought, was 
precisely why it was important for him to visit us. 
We hosted a dinner for him, inviting several of the staff from the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the State Department, and 
the National Security Council (NSC) who worked Russian issues. We 
saw the sights in Washington DC, visited the 82nd Airborne Division 
at Ft. Bragg, got a briefing in Russian and a demonstration of several 
aircraft from the Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, 
and overflew the Atlantic Fleet at Norfolk on the way back to Wash-
ington. Barynkin looked enviously at the carriers and amphibs docked 
at the Navy base. Through the interpreter, he said, “I am in charge of 
nuclear weapons. Are you?” It was about insecurity, I felt. He departed 
with the Russian attaché to go to Brooklyn for a couple of days with 
the Russian community there. I later learned that he had been quite 
uncomfortable, even alleging that we had tried to entrap him with a 
beautiful Russian-speaking woman, OSD Russian expert Elizabeth 
Sherwood-Randall. 
I was invited back to Russia by another Russian, the deputy Chief of 
Defense, Colonel General Bogdonov. It was a reciprocal visit—a wel-
coming dinner, a sauna, a tennis game, a chance to test weapons, and 
various discussions. All good natured. General Bogdonov explained 
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that as a youngster he had almost starved in the postwar Soviet Union. 
At one point as a four year old they lived for a few weeks largely on 
green apples. We discussed a battle in Grozny, where he had played a 
part in the Russians’ unsuccessful push into the city in 1994. We talked 
about families and life. It was the kind of relationship with the Russians 
that most American officers had always sought—military leaders serv-
ing great countries, sharing the special bonds and common interests of 
the military profession, despite our separate loyalties. 
In October 1995, after the first few weeks of shuttle diplomacy with 
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke to end the conflict in the former Yu-
goslavia, I traveled with Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott to Moscow 
to share with Russia details of our negotiations, and to pave the way for 
Russian participation in the NATO peacekeeping force. While Secre-
tary Talbott visited the Foreign Ministry and Presidency, I went to my 
counterpart, Colonel General Barynkin. After I briefed the U.S. sev-
en-point peace plan, Barynkin observed, “You Americans are coming 
into our part of Europe, and you say you will be gone in a year, but you 
will not be.” I protested. “The Administration has testified before Con-
gress that the troop presence will last only one year,” I said, “and we 
intend to stick with that.” Barynkin wasn’t at all persuaded; he replied, 
“Please, we are Russians, we understand you.” Then he added, “but if 
we were in your position, we would do the same thing.” Nevertheless, 
we didn’t get a “no” from the Russian military—just their continuing 
sense of ownership and privilege in Eastern Europe. 
General George Joulwan, the NATO Supreme Allied Commander 
at the time, working under Secretary of Defense William Perry, final-
ized the details of Russian military participation within the peacekeep-
ing force planned to enforce Dayton peace agreement. The Russians 
refused to serve under NATO—NATO was the old enemy, the survivor 
of the Cold War struggle, and the threat to Russia’s future. In a meet-
ing with Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev and Secretary Perry, 
Joulwan persuaded the Russians to serve only under U.S. command—
exercised through Joulwan and by virtue of his dual responsibilities as 
U.S. Commander in Europe as well as NATO Supreme Allied Com-
mander. It fit together nicely with other efforts of President Yeltsin 
and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev to have Russia more engaged in 
Europe, while respecting the Russian institutional distaste for NATO. 
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Another factor was pressing in on our relationship with Russia, how-
ever—NATO enlargement. On Friday, before Labor Day weekend in 
1994, a speech prepared for Vice President Gore to deliver on Sunday 
in Berlin came through my staff for clearance. As J-5, we acted on behalf 
of the Chairman, General Shalikashvili, in clearing and coordinating 
important statements and policies. In scanning the speech, I noted that 
it called for NATO to admit new member states from Eastern Europe. 
My staff had flagged this as a problem. While I had seen no interagency 
policy discussion of NATO enlargement, it was known that both De-
fense Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili opposed such a policy. 
I lined out the offending sentences. That afternoon the speech came 
back through. Once again I struck the offending sentences. On Satur-
day morning the speech draft made a third trip through my office, and 
once more, the language on NATO enlargement had been reinserted. 
I struck it a third time and took the paper to General Shalikashvili. “I’ll 
take care of it,” he said. However, as delivered, the speech contained 
the offending commitment to expand NATO
Two weeks later incoming Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs Richard Holbrooke assumed duties and called a meeting to an-
nounce the new U.S. policy. The United States would support NATO 
enlargement. It was a surprise to the Pentagon, and to me. Richard 
Holbrooke was at his dramatic best, explaining not only a strategic 
rationale but underscoring it this way: “After Yalta, Senator Barbara 
Mikulski’s grandmother turned over the picture of FDR on her dresser 
and never looked at it again for her whole life. Is there anyone here who 
doesn’t believe this is the policy of the United States?” Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of Defense Joe Kruzel raised his hand, and attempted to 
discuss the premises, but Holbrooke brushed his question away. I raised 
my hand, and bluntly said, “No, I don’t think it is the policy...” I had 
expected some kind of a formal decision-making process, or at least a 
formal notification. 
There was a moment of stunned silence. 
“Anyone who questions this policy is disloyal to the President of the 
United States,” thundered Holbrooke, looking at me. He was accusing 
me of disloyalty? I felt my ears turning red. Reflexively, I moved to un-
zip my jacket, pushed back my chair, and replied something like, “How 
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dare you question my loyalty; this has nothing to do with loyalty to the 
President.”
For a moment it was heated and personal—he knew he had gone too 
far. But Holbrooke backed away, explained in a more conversational 
tone that in fact a policy decision had been made, and he had chosen 
this way, rather than a memo, to announce the decision. 
I returned to the Pentagon and reported the confrontation to Gen-
eral Shalikashvili, with some trepidation. But he was totally amused and 
smiling. “Wes, I have already heard from Brussels; they say you are a 
hero…” (presumably for standing up to Holbrooke).
A few hours later Holbrooke asked me and my staff to prepare the 
briefings for Allies on the why, how, and who of enlargement from the 
military perspective. 
No doubt my Russian hosts, from 1995 onwards, were well aware of 
the change in U.S. policy, but however much they might have resented 
NATO, and the humiliation of the Soviet Union’s demise, at the top, 
Russia’s leaders seemed to sing a different tune. President Clinton and 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin seemed almost chummy. Overall, Rus-
sian policy simply didn’t reflect the attitudes of the state institutions 
and especially the power ministries, and especially the Ministry of De-
fense and intelligence agencies. While I continued to repeat the U.S. 
position that NATO enlargement would help stabilize Europe, was 
therefore in Russia’s interest, and in fact NATO hoped that someday 
Russia itself would join NATO, it was clear to me when I spoke with 
Russians—their military attaché in Washington, Generals Barynkin 
and Bogdonov—that this wasn’t selling to my counterparts in Russia.
Nevertheless, extending stability eastwards was precisely what 
NATO was doing in Bosnia. Without the NATO commitment, and 
U.S. forces on the ground, there would have been no Dayton peace 
agreement. Without NATO, the U.N. was simply incapable of ending 
the war, and stabilizing the region. And despite all the dire predictions, 
there had not been a single incident of resistance, nor a single NATO 
casualty. Here was the proof of the value of NATO’s expansion “out-
of-area.”
When I assumed General Joulwan’s position as Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe in July 1997, the Russian peacekeeping mission 
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in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established and performing well. But they 
had begun downgrading the cooperation, replacing a prominent Rus-
sian three-star with a two-star, and reducing the level of forces. Rus-
sian General Anatoliy Krivalopov, formerly a leader of Russia’s strate-
gic rocket forces (which were now downsized), was newly assigned as 
Deputy Commander in charge of Russian Forces. The Russian forces 
consisted of a Russian motorized rifle battalion under the operational 
control of the U.S. division deployed across northern Bosnia-Herze-
govina. It seemed a remarkable transformation from the hostility of the 
Cold War—but the honeymoon ended just as I arrived. 
The day of my change of command, British forces in their sector 
of Bosnia had conducted the first arrest of indicted Serb war criminals 
Milan Kovačević and Simo Drljača. Kovačević had been the Mayor of 
Priedor and Drljača his police chief. Both were accused of imprisoning 
and abusing Bosniak civilians in concentration camps where many of 
them died. Drljača resisted arrest, shot at the British troops and was 
killed in an exchange of fire. Kovačević was detained. It was a deft mil-
itary operation, executed by British SAS following careful reconnais-
sance. Kovačević was swiftly helicoptered out and flown to the Hague. 
For NATO, and for British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the operation 
was a great success. But it stepped over the line that Serb President 
Slobodan Milošević had warned us about at Dayton: “Serb people do 
not like occupying power; NATO must not become occupying power.” 
It was more than a warning—it was a veiled threat. Now, NATO was 
behaving exactly like an “occupying power.” 
NATO’s action in arresting indicted war criminals broke with the 
understanding that senior U.S. generals had extracted from our po-
litical leaders—namely, that NATO wouldn’t undertake “police-type 
actions.” We would simply enforce the Dayton Agreement uniformly 
on all parties, and we had full legal authority to do that. But with the 
new leadership in the UK came a new resolve to do the right thing in 
supporting the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia. Pres-
ident Clinton didn’t disagree, and, over reservations by the military 
commanders, action began. At this point there was a secret list of twen-
ty-odd persons indicted for war crimes—and they were all Serbs.
From the beginning, the Russian peacekeeping force had been 
cleanly tucked in under command of the U.S. 1st Armored Division, 
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and then, as units rotated, 1st Infantry Division. There was full trans-
parency (so we believed) in all activities, with Russian liaison officers 
and the Russian commander attending all important meetings at the 
Division headquarters. The Russian battalion was located in the ethni-
cally-cleansed Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 
it forged a warm and reassuring relationship with the local Serb author-
ities and population and stayed away from potentially hostile Bosnian 
Muslims. 
When NATO, a few months into the mission in 1996, conducted a 
special operation targeting Iranian extremists in the Federation entity, 
there had been no problem with the Russians. These Iranians were 
“foreign forces,” not permitted under the terms of the agreement. But 
now, the introduction of classified planning cells, secret reconnais-
sance, and “snatch operations” conducted by special forces and directed 
against indicted Serb war criminals—and carefully screened from the 
Russian forces—put the Russian mission under stress from the locals as 
well as from Moscow. 
Within two days the Serbs struck back against NATO, with a se-
ries of less-than-lethal-force actions directed against NATO—broken 
windows, angry crowds, and so forth. It was clearly directed by Serb 
authorities. 
A few weeks later there was a complete orchestrated, non-lethal 
attack—rocks, mobs, threats, beatings—on U.S. forces in the city of 
Brcko. This might have intimidated a U.N. force, operating under 
limited authorities, but the U.S. division commander, Major General 
Dave Grange, was ready. In a series of moves he disabled the Serb radio 
station that was instigating the action, blocked and dispersed the mob, 
rescued a cut-off U.S. unit, and occupied key terrain, including a hill-
top on which a Serb microwave communications station was located. 
NATO proved it was not the U.N.—and this was a shot in the arm to 
the entire international community as they worked to implement the 
Dayton Agreement.
Then we received information that Milošević’s Serb intelligence 
agents were going to assassinate a somewhat progressive rival to Serb 
leader Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, at an election rally in Banja 
Luka. Their plan was that Karadžić’s (and Milošević’s) group would bus 
in several hundred thugs to contest the rally, cause a riot, and in the 
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confusion gun-down Plavšić. U.S. and British forces set up a series of 
road blocks on the route to Banja Luka, repeatedly halting and search-
ing the buses, until they arrived too late to impact the rally. Plavšić was 
saved, and Milošević and his Serb agents humiliated. A few weeks later, 
we confiscated the rifles and machine guns of the Bosnian Serb Special 
Police units and closed a few police stations, in a further demonstration 
of NATO power. The Russian battalion had no part to play in this.
In these ways, the NATO force in Bosnia became increasingly pro-
active in breaking the resistance to the implementation of the Dayton 
agreement. And as the alignment against Russian sympathies became 
clearer, so the pressures increased on my Russian deputy. We had cor-
dial discussions, lunchtime meetings, and shared visits to Bosnia. On 
one visit, the new Russian Chief of Defense, Colonel General (soon 
to be General) Kvashnin hosted me at the Russian battalion, where we 
inspected troops and equipment, and reminisced about our respective 
military careers. He had commanded a Soviet division in Afghanistan: 
“We always air landed troops at the tops of the mountains, and then 
attacked the bandits from above, but once your Stinger missiles arrived, 
that tactic became impossible, and we were lost.” I related my Vietnam 
experience—where I was hit by bullets from one of “his” AK-47 rifles. 
Olga, the Russian wife of a U.S. airman serving at SHAPE translated 
for us. It was the kind of military-to-military communication that could 
have fostered a strong and lasting professional military relationship.
As I traveled across Eastern Europe, however, I saw the fear that 
Eastern European governments had of Russia, and their determina-
tion to seek safety with NATO and the West. As the Foreign Minis-
ter of Bulgaria explained at a meeting in 1997, “Today Russia is weak, 
but someday it will be strong again, and before then, Bulgaria must 
be protected by NATO.” The Romanian Defense Minister angrily re-
called past Russian incidents of domination: “In 1878 we allowed Rus-
sian troops to pass through Romania, and they stole our province of 
Bessarabia.” OK, the East Europeans had long memories, some Amer-
icans chuckled later. But he wasn’t joking. Romania and Bulgaria, Es-
tonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and others, wanted NATO membership. 
They put their trust in the United States—our values, and our reputa-
tion as a reliable ally. 
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Meanwhile, the leadership in Moscow was also changing. Andrei 
Kozyrev had been replaced in early 1996 as foreign minister by Yevg-
eny Primakov. When Primakov became prime minister in September 
1998 he was succeeded by Igor Ivanov,  a man I had worked alongside 
at Dayton when he was the Russian representative to Ambassador Hol-
brooke’s team. He was pushing back more against NATO: “Under the 
terms of this Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, NATO 
could declare a crisis and deploy a division into Slovakia, threatening 
Russia.” Seriously? One little NATO division? I asked. Ivanov laughed; 
we had a personal relationship. And he knew better.
Control of the Russian Armed Forces was brought more under the 
control of the Russian intelligence agencies. My access to the Russian 
Chief of Defense was curtailed—no more spontaneous calls or friend-
ly conversations. My Russian deputy, clearly under instruction, began 
to question NATO actions more vigorously. “Why does NATO take 
sides against Serbs?” “Why do you like these Albanians?” I knew we 
were jeopardizing him personally, and our relationship with the Rus-
sians, and I tried to provide the rationale and facts to justify our actions 
as they unfolded, even before he had to come in and challenge us. It 
was painful to see the old Cold War lines of stress reemerging in his 
questions. 
Kosovo was a real dilemma for NATO. Although the region was 
90 percent or more Albanian by ethnicity, the minority Serbs held the 
power and worked to crush Albanian culture, rights and opportunities. 
President Bush had warned the Serbs in December 1992 that if they 
used force against the Albanian inhabitants, they would feel the weight 
of U.S. airpower. Holbrooke had tried to bring the subject into the 
agreements at Dayton, only to have Milošević refuse again and again to 
discuss Kosovo, saying this was an internal matter. 
The Albanian Kosovars themselves, however, had begun to organize 
into a militia force able to strike against the Serb police and military. 
Neighboring Albania, a member of Partnership for Peace, demanded 
consultations, and complained about Serb ethnic cleansing and Serb 
use of heavy weapons against civilians. NATO was fully occupied with 
its mission in Bosnia, but could it stand by and allow a repeat of the 
ethnic cleansing, and the waves of refugees again, only a hundred miles 
away in the region of southwestern Serbia known as Kosovo? 
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In late February, 1998, Serb forces had surrounded the farm belong-
ing to the Jashari family, assaulted, and eventually murdered some 60 
members of the family. Women and children were found lain out on 
the floor, shot in the head at close range. Macedonian President Gli-
gorov asked me to visit, and warned that there would be a much wider 
war in Kosovo. “These Albanians will fight back,” he said. 
NATO was in the process of preparing for its 50th Anniversary 
Summit in Washington, which would be held in April, 1999. Based on 
success in Bosnia, NATO authorities, and especially the U.S. leader-
ship, could see a bright new future for NATO, acting as a stabilizing 
force, even beyond the boundaries of NATO member nations. A new 
NATO Strategic Concept incorporating this purpose was being drafted 
for unveiling at the Summit. And yet, would that mean acting to halt 
Serb brutality and ethnic cleansing inside its own borders, in the region 
known as Kosovo? 
The Albanian Chief of Defense visited me in May, 1998. “We can 
see Serb mortar rounds falling on our Albanian villages in Western 
Kosovo,’ he said. 
As NATO concerns began to focus on Kosovo, and Serb ethnic 
cleansing there, my Russian Deputy brought more issues. “This KLA –
we know they are connected to Chechen terrorists.” “These Albanians 
are mostly criminals.” I’m sure these same kinds of arguments were 
made at the political level by Russia in NATO, where the Russians had 
privileged access to NATO representatives through the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act, negotiated in 1997 as a means of appealing to Russia. 
Former KGB agent Yevgeny Primakov, a man who had mastermind-
ed support to Palestinian terrorists in the 1970s, returned to the scene, 
as head of Russian intelligence and Foreign Minister, then as Prime 
Minister. His remarks in NATO meetings in 1998, and elsewhere, 
were the stuff of the Cold War—a beleaguered Russia, surrounded by 
enemies, Russia with no permanent friends, only permanent interests. 
While he was known and personally charming to NATO diplomats, he 
bristled with resentment and hostility in his public remarks. He even 
threw me a few hostile glances at meetings.
“What can we do about Kosovo?” I was asked by NATO ambassadors 
and foreign ministers. They wanted the Serb ethnic cleansing stopped. 
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I consulted with the Pentagon and the State Department. Then, with 
permission from the Pentagon, I went to the White House to sug-
gest the same general approach that had worked for Bosnia—NATO 
airpower and diplomacy. The Pentagon wasn’t happy about this—for 
them, the objective was budget growth and prepping for possible action 
against Saddam Hussein. Nevertheless, the White House prevailed in 
internal discussions. 
At the direction of NATO authorities, SHAPE was tasked with pre-
paring “concept plans” for possible intervention. My British Deputy, 
acting on instructions from the Ministry of Defense in London, chal-
lenged me, asking, “What are you trying to do?” But it was obvious that 
NATO could not stand idly by. 
On my visit to Moscow in the summer of 1998, General Kvashnin 
sat across the table, joined by someone from the Foreign Ministry and 
the intelligence services, as he argued, “You aim to take these coun-
tries in Eastern Europe away from us; they are our countries, and you 
want to sell them your weapons.” And, “you aim is to take our minerals 
and make us poor.” And the very charming Olga, the interpreter who 
accompanied me on the trip, divorced her American husband a few 
months later, when she was discovered to be a Russian spy planted in 
our headquarters.
By the autumn of 1998, some 400,000 Kosovars had fled their homes 
and were hiding in the rugged mountains to escape Serb special police 
efforts to arrest and eliminate the “troublemakers.” NATO had warned 
Milošević the violence must stop, had flown aircraft around Serbia’s 
northern and western periphery as a warning that NATO could re-
peat the types of airstrikes that had brought an end to the Serb siege 
of Sarajevo in 1995. And through the fall of 1998 NATO escalated 
the diplomatic pressure and threats. NATO Secretary General Solana, 
Chairman of the Military Committee Klaus Nauman and I traveled to 
Belgrade to dissuade Milošević. 
NATO’s statements and actions—my own headquarters was lead-
ing the planning effort—put my Russian deputy under severe pressure 
from Moscow. He delivered a GRU booklet purporting to prove that 
Albanians were really Chechens; it was so poorly done that even he 
couldn’t defend it. He was recalled by Moscow, in late 1998, returned 
briefly for a couple of weeks in early 1999, and then departed for good. 
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According to reports, he was held under house arrest for some time, 
and stripped of his pension, before being eventually released. 
The Serbs began their ethnic cleansing campaign anew in January 
1999. French-led negotiations at Rambouillet between the Serbs and 
Albanians failed in early March, 1999. Serbia then deployed more of its 
military forces into Serbia and intensified its activities there.
By the time we admitted Poland Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
to NATO on March 16, 1999, and then, a week later, began the air 
campaign to stop Serb ethnic cleaning in Kosovo, the NATO-Russian 
relationship was in tatters, and the U.S.-Russian relationship was sus-
tained only by President Clinton’s friendliness with President Yeltsin 
and Vice President Gore’s occasional collaboration on economic issues 
with Russian Vice President Chernomyrdin. 
NATO conducted its first airstrikes on the evening of March 24, 
1999. Political authorities were hoping that a day or two of strikes 
would convince Milošević to back down. But he didn’t. 
On Friday, March 26th, Hungarian Ambassador András Simonyi de-
livered a message from Hungary’s Prime Minister, young Victor Or-
bán: “Twice before in this century Hungary has joined an Alliance and 
then gone straight to war; both times it lost and was dismembered; 
please do not allow this to happen again.” 
At one point during the air campaign, as hundreds of thousands of 
Kosovar Albanian fled their homes to escape the Serbs, and NATO es-
calated its series of strikes, Russia threatened to sally forth its Black Sea 
fleet to impede NATO air actions—but after stern warnings by Deputy 
Secretary Talbott, nothing came of this. 
And in the midst of this was NATO’s 50th Anniversary Summit in 
Washington, and the unveiling of the new Strategic Concept. For 
NATO political authorities, and for the heads of state, the air opera-
tion was more than embarrassing. It was a stark challenge to the new 
Strategic Concept, a severe threat to NATO itself and even a personal 
political threat to heads of state. Certainly NATO could not afford to 
fail, but would the air operation succeed? Why was the United States 
so dominant in this operation? And, if ground forces were necessary, 
would they be provided? 
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The air actions continued for 78 days, steadily escalating in scope 
and intensity. Bulgaria and Romania allowed their airspace to be used 
by NATO and completed the encirclement of Serbia. Heads of state 
agreed to do “whatever was necessary to succeed,” thus authorizing 
planning to begin for ground operations. Eventually Russia agreed 
to participate with Finland in bringing to Serb President Milošević a 
proposal to halt NATO action and accept the NATO peacekeeping 
force which had been proposed earlier for Kosovo, in return for the 
withdrawal of all Serb military and police from Kosovo. On June 11, 
the day after the U.N. accepted the peace agreement and approved its 
implementation, the Russian military, in conjunction with the Serbs, 
made a belated effort to undercut the agreement. They deployed the 
Russian battalion by highway from Bosnia through Serbia to occupy 
the airfield in Pristina, Kosovo, in preparation for flying in reinforcing 
Russian airborne brigades. It was a well-televised crisis moment for 
NATO, and for me. But diplomatic and Presidential pressure on Russia 
blocked the reinforcing brigades, and the Russian battalion eventually 
moved out to a small sector of eastern Kosovo for peacekeeping duties 
in coordination with NATO. 
Some two months after the Summit, Kosovo was a crisis resolved 
and a NATO success won by diplomacy, as well as by airpower and the 
threat of a ground invasion. 1.4 million Albanians returned to their 
homes. And to this day, it marks NATO’s most successful action.
When new Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin visited Kyiv in 
November, 1999, for the inauguration of Ukrainian President Kuchma, 
he remarked in his speech, “Russia and Ukraine are more than broth-
ers, we are in each other’s souls.” The Polish National Security Advisor 
came later to warn me that now Russia’s aim was clear, to restore the 
Soviet space; already, he said, they have formed commercial companies 
to buy up electricity generating and transmission companies in Poland 
so they have control.” The new Romanian Defense Chief warned me 
that the Russians were distributing fake Romanian passports in Moldo-
va, attempting to instigate border riots and uncertainty, in an effort to 
block Romania’s eventual accession to NATO. 
In retrospect, NATO nations lacked the understanding, resources 
and will, to help transform Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
While the top leaders in Russia formed certain relationships with the 
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West, the efforts of transformation were too difficult and complex to 
be accomplished without far deeper and much more extensive engage-
ment by the West. And beneath the diplomatic exchanges and visits, 
the military and security services held the ultimate power in Russia. 
The historical legacy of antagonism to the West, resentment at the loss 
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet republics, and stubborn, deeply em-
bedded nationalism, and their own stubborn self-interest became the 
dominant factors in regenerating hostility. The situation was an eerie 
echo of Weimar Germany’s resentments after Versailles. 
NATO enlargement was nothing more than the inevitable response 
to Eastern European fears, while Europe and the United States, overly 
optimistic in the aftermath of the Cold War, were pushed by the col-
lapse of Yugoslavia to extend the zone of stability eastwards from the 
old Cold War boundaries. Had NATO failed to enlarge, it would have 
opened the door earlier to Russian efforts to restore Soviet space and 
Russian power in Eastern Europe. As it is, NATO enlargement has 
become a convenient excuse for the Russians to act out historic pol-
icies, and a whipping boy for disenchanted, overly idealistic Western 
strategists.
NATO did in fact extend stability eastwards and make possible an 
expansion of the European Union as well. 
Today both NATO and the European Union are challenged by re-
surgent nationalism, a sometimes-faltering European economy, an un-
expected security challenge in the form of migrants from the south, 
and increased Russian military and diplomatic pressure. In Afghani-
stan, NATO remains saddled with a military operation undertaken at 
U.S. urging without a plan or strategy for success. But if NATO and 
its partner organization, the European Union, can maintain their unity 
and resolve, and together manage the proper response to China’s as-
cending power, the gradual transformation of Eastern Europe and even 
Russia itself is indeed possible. To use Gorbachev’s phrase, “a common 
European home,” and a Europe whole and free, Atlantic to the Urals, 
is not yet out of reach.
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Chapter 25 
Responsibilities of Alliance:  
Czech, Hungarian, and Polish  
Contributions During and After  
NATO’s Kosovo Intervention
John-Michael Arnold
Introduction1
By joining NATO, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland as-
sumed new international responsibilities. As U.S. Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright explained in December 1997:
These nations are accepting a fundamental change in their nation-
al identities. For decades they looked to the free world for reassur-
ance and support in their struggles for freedom and independence. 
Now, for the very first time, they are accepting responsibility for 
the freedom and security of others. We will be counting on them 
to stand by us in our future hours of need, and when other nations 
look for our reassurance and support.2
At the event formally admitting the three countries to the alliance, 
held on March 12, 1999, the new members’ foreign ministers also re-
marked upon the duties that came with entering NATO. Jan Kavan 
of the Czech Republic emphasized that “we are prepared to fulfill our 
part of the responsibilities and the commitments of member states, and 
to meet all the obligations and duties which stem from this member-
ship.” Hungary’s János Martonyi stressed that “Hungarians know that 
membership in NATO is a combination of advantages to enjoy and 
obligations to meet.” The Polish foreign minister, Bronisław Geremek, 
assured that “Poland in the Alliance will be a good and credible ally for 
good and bad weather.”3 
The three new members confronted the realities of NATO mem-
bership immediately. Just 12 days after they joined, on March 24, 1999, 
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NATO launched Operation Allied Force, an air campaign against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which by then comprised only 
Serbia and Montenegro. NATO aimed to compel Serbia’s leader, Slo-
bodan Milošević, to reach a political agreement with the Kosovo Al-
banians that would arrest an escalating conflict in Kosovo and prevent 
further humanitarian abuses there.
Examining how the three new NATO members contributed to the 
Alliance’s Kosovo intervention, launched when the ink on their instru-
ments of accession was barely dry, offers a way to reflect upon the re-
sponsibilities of NATO membership. All three new NATO members 
met their alliance obligations during Operation Allied Force and all of 
them contributed meaningfully to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) peace-
keeping mission that followed. 
Section I provides background to Operation Allied Force and gives 
an overview of the intervention and its results. Section II details the 
contributions made by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
during the air campaign. Section III describes the contributions of the 
new allies to the aftermath of Operation Allied Force, both to KFOR 
and to the broader effort to integrate the Balkans into the Euro-At-
lantic community. The concluding section, Section IV, makes three 
major points: (1) NATO membership comes with real responsibilities; 
(2) since NATO is an alliance of democracies, there will be political 
debates within members about what is required of them during military 
interventions; and (3) due to the complex nature of such interventions, 
allies can contribute to them, and thereby fulfill the responsibilities of 
alliance, in many ways. 
I: Background to Operation Allied Force  
and Overview of the Intervention
By the late twentieth century, the Serbian province of Kosovo had a 
population of almost two million people, of whom 90 percent were eth-
nic Albanians.4 In 1989, Serbia’s leader, Slobodan Milošević, ended the 
political autonomy that Kosovo had long possessed.5 By diminishing 
the status of the predominantly Muslim Kosovo Albanians, Milošević 
portrayed himself as the avenger of a historic defeat suffered by a Serb-
led army in Kosovo in 1389 at the hands of the Ottomans.6 In late 
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1989, a group of Kosovo Albanians established the Democratic League 
of Kosovo (LDK), a movement that pursued Kosovo’s independence 
through a strategy of non-violence.7 
In this era, Yugoslavia as a whole was entering a period of dramatic 
upheaval. In 1991, the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia 
all declared their independence, then Bosnia followed in 1992. While 
Macedonia was able to exit Yugoslavia peacefully and Slovenia’s inde-
pendence led to a very brief struggle, Croatia’s move precipitated a war 
that cost 10,000 lives.8 The greatest bloodshed, however, occurred in 
Bosnia. Lasting from 1992 until 1995, the conflict there killed 200,000 
people. Muslim, Serb, and Croat military units were all guilty of abus-
es, but Serb forces were responsible for the overwhelming majority of 
atrocities.9 In late August 1995, NATO began serious air strikes—Op-
eration Deliberate Force—and, together with ground offensives by 
Croat and Bosnian Muslim forces, they pushed the Bosnian Serbs onto 
the back-foot militarily.10 That convinced Slobodan Milošević, the pa-
tron of the Bosnian Serbs, that it was time to accept serious diplomatic 
negotiations. American diplomat Richard Holbrooke orchestrated the 
resulting peace talks, which culminated in the signing of the Dayton 
Accords in late 1995. 
The old Yugoslavia had fragmented, but the Kosovo Albanians re-
mained stuck within Serbia, which itself was now only in a federation 
with the much smaller republic of Montenegro. Madeleine Albright 
later summarized the situation of the Kosovo Albanians in the second 
half of the 1990s, writing that: 
Kosovo’s Albanians looked around and saw that the Bosnians, Cro-
ats, Slovenes, and Macedonians had all left Yugoslavia to form in-
dependent states. The Albanians shared the same ambition but the 
Dayton Accords did nothing for them.11
With the Democratic League of Kosovo’s efforts to achieve indepen-
dence having made little headway, an alternative faction, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), embarked upon a violent guerilla campaign. 
The conflict between the KLA and Serb forces intensified dramatically 
in late February 1998 when Serb forces attacked KLA strongholds and 
killed 85 people, including civilians, in one week.12 
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During the following months, the United States worked alongside 
international partners to encourage a political dialogue between the 
Serbian government and the Kosovo Albanians. On the ground, how-
ever, the violence got worse. In July 1998, the KLA embarked upon 
a major offensive and Serb forces responded by targeting both KLA 
fighters and civilians.13 By October 1998, approximately 300,000 Koso-
vo Albanians were either internally displaced persons or refugees.14 
In mid-January 1999, Serbian forces massacred forty-five civilians 
in Račak, which precipitated an intensification of diplomatic efforts to 
resolve the conflict. In February 1999, the United States—along with 
France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom—convened a 
conference in Rambouillet, France, between the warring parties. Both 
the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians disliked elements of the political frame-
work they were asked to consider and the negotiations dragged on for 
weeks. Ultimately, the Kosovo Albanians signed a political agreement 
on March 18, 1999. Following that, the Clinton Administration sent 
Richard Holbrooke to Belgrade in one last attempt to get Milošević to 
sign the agreement, but he refused to do so.15
On March 24, 1999, NATO resorted to armed force to compel Ser-
bia to accept a settlement. Informed by events earlier in the 1990s, 
especially the West’s extreme tardiness in halting the carnage in Bosnia 
and the failure to do anything to stop the Rwandan genocide, NATO 
leaders decided it was better to act sooner rather than later. As Secre-
tary of State Albright said three weeks after the Račak massacre, “we 
learned in Bosnia that we can pay early, or we can pay much more later” 
and “the only reward for tolerating atrocities is more of the same.”16
During the 78 days of Operation Allied Force, NATO aircraft flew 
over 38,000 sorties, of which 10,484 were strike sorties.17 Alliance air-
craft hit tactical targets, such as Serb forces in Kosovo, as well as stra-
tegic targets across the Yugoslav federation. Despite NATO’s aim of 
preventing further outrages, the humanitarian situation on the ground 
actually got worse during the initial part of the campaign because Serb 
units intensified their expulsions of Kosovo Albanians.18 At the end of 
the conflict, over 800,000 Kosovo Albanians were refugees, while an 
additional several hundred thousand were internally displaced.19 NA-
TO’s demands for ending the air campaign included the withdrawal of 
all Serb forces from Kosovo, the deployment of a NATO-led peace-
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keeping force, and the ability for all refugees to return home.20 The 
shorthand version of these aims was to get “Serbs out, NATO in, ref-
ugees back.”21 
Following NATO’s late April 1999 summit in Washington D.C., 
several developments produced Milošević’s capitulation. First, the Al-
liance escalated its air campaign.22 Second, American and NATO mil-
itary commanders began preparatory assessments of a ground invasion 
of Kosovo, signaling to Belgrade that NATO might be willing to esca-
late beyond airstrikes.23 Third, President Yeltsin of Russia, which had a 
close relationship with Serbia, committed his country to working for a 
diplomatic end to the war.24 
Yeltsin’s eagerness to participate in the diplomacy of war termination 
set the stage for a series of meetings between Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
the Russian presidential envoy for Kosovo, U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott (representing NATO), and Martti Ahtisaari, the 
president of Finland, who represented the European Union (EU). That 
diplomatic troika met several times and, after strenuous efforts, devel-
oped a commonly-agreed list of terms that Milošević would have to 
accept to end the airstrikes.25 Those terms included all of the major 
objectives that NATO had established. On June 2, 1999 Viktor Cher-
nomyrdin and Martti Ahtisaari conveyed the terms to Milošević, who 
formally accepted them the following day. After NATO and Yugoslavia 
finalized the technical arrangements for a settlement, NATO ended 
Operation Allied Force on June 10, 1999.26 The U.N. Security Council 
passed resolution 1244, which authorized the deployment of a peace-
keeping force to Kosovo and put civil administration in the hands of 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UN-
MIK). The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) began its deployment 
on June 12, 1999.27 
II: Contributions of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic to Operation Allied Force
None of the new NATO members contributed combat aircraft to 
Operation Allied Force. That was hardly surprising because all were 
flying Soviet-made fighter and ground-attack aircraft—MiG-21s, 
MiG-23s, MiG-29s, and SU-22s—and the vast majority of those air-
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craft had not been modernized and were not interoperable with other 
NATO air forces.28 
Milada Anna Vachudová, an expert on post-communist Europe, em-
phasizes that Poland’s government was among the most politically sup-
portive of the intervention within NATO.29 Poland’s prime minister at 
the time was Jerzy Buzek, who had been in office since 1997 and led a 
coalition government of his own bloc, Solidarity Electoral Action, and 
the Freedom Union party. Opinion polls reported that a majority of 
Poland’s public approved of the air campaign.30 Despite such support, 
NATO did not have a need to request the use of Polish airspace.31 Jef-
frey Simon, an American expert on Central European militaries, notes 
that Poland provided NATO with one of its transport aircraft to help 
with logistical demands.32 Additionally, Poland sent 140 soldiers to the 
NATO-led Albania Force (AFOR), which provided humanitarian assis-
tance to Kosovar refugees.33
Hungary was a cautious supporter of Allied Force. Public opinion 
polls showed similar levels of popular support for the campaign as ex-
isted in Poland, with 53 percent of Hungarian respondents indicating 
their approval of NATO’s action in April 1999.34 Hungary was the only 
NATO member at the time that bordered Serbia. András Simonyi, 
Hungary’s first ambassador to NATO, recalls in this volume how the 
country’s government was keenly aware that its involvement in the op-
eration might cause Milošević to retaliate against ethnic Hungarians in 
Serbia.
On the opening day of NATO’s air campaign, Hungary’s parliament 
voted to make the country’s airspace and airfields available to its fellow 
allies.35 That same day, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—who had en-
tered office in 1998 and led the Fidesz party—assured the public that 
“NATO has so far not requested, nor will it in the future, armed partic-
ipation from Hungary and, for that matter, our country could not fulfill 
such an expectation in view of its special situation.”36 In April 1999, 
Hungary sent 35 public health specialists to assist refugees in Albania.37
Although Hungary did not directly participate in air strikes, the Al-
liance’s use of the country’s airfields contributed to combat operations. 
By the time of the Kosovo intervention, Hungary’s Taszár airbase, lo-
cated in the south of the country and just 40 miles from the border 
with Serbia, had become a major logistical hub for American troops 
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that were part of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.38 In support of 
that same operation, the United States had deployed unarmed Pred-
ator drones to Taszár, from where they flew reconnaissance missions 
over Bosnia.39 During Operation Allied Force, the United States used 
the Predators based in Hungary to conduct sorties over Serbia. The 
Predators provided intelligence that enabled strikes by manned aircraft 
against military targets.40 NATO also deployed KC-135 tanker aircraft 
to Hungary and they provided refueling to combat aircraft.41
In May 1999, as NATO escalated its air campaign, Hungary’s gov-
ernment assented to the basing of 24 U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 Hor-
net aircraft—a multi-role aircraft with strike capabilities—at Taszár.42 
That precipitated some opposition among Hungary’s public, with 
opinion polls finding that around two-thirds of the population opposed 
NATO’s launching of strikes directly from Hungary’s soil.43 László 
Kovács, the parliamentary leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party, pro-
posed prohibiting NATO strike sorties launched from Hungary, but 
the parliament failed to pass that measure.44 By May 25, the American 
“Hornets” had arrived and Foreign Minister Martonyi defended the 
decision to accept them, remarking: “This is exactly the kind of NATO 
we wanted to join 10 years ago, one that stands for a certain set of val-
ues. Now, NATO is fighting to defend those values.”45
The F/A-18s began flying combat missions several days later. As 
Benjamin Lambeth emphasizes in his study of the war, basing those 
aircraft in southern Hungary exacerbated the challenges faced by what 
remained of Yugoslavia’s air defense units. Those units now confronted 
NATO aircraft attacking from yet another launching point, in addition 
to those that had already seen considerable use, such as airbases in Ita-
ly.46 As one F/A-18 pilot deployed to Hungary commented at the time, 
“we’ll make Milošević feel like he’s in a box, with NATO staring at him 
from every side.”47 Of course, the strike missions flown from Taszár 
began just days before Milošević capitulated, but at the time the aircraft 
were moved there it was as yet unclear just so long Milošević would 
hold on. NATO’s decision to fly bombing missions from Hungary was 
one element of the steadily intensifying military and diplomatic pres-
sure that Milošević faced in late May 1999.  
Of the three new NATO members, the Czech Republic experienced 
the most contentious political debate regarding Operation Allied Force. 
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Opinion polls found that only 35 percent of the Czech public approved 
of the campaign.48 The year after the intervention, as part of a detailed 
study on Czech attitudes towards NATO, analysts Ivan Gabal, Len-
ka Helsusova, and Thomas Szayna asked Czech respondents whether 
“at the time we joined NATO, did you consider that by doing so we 
also took on such responsibilities as participation in Operation Allied 
Force?” Among the respondents, 34 percent reported that “I never con-
sidered something like that at all,” while 30 percent stated that “I did 
not expect something as intensive.”49 In the same study, the authors also 
emphasized that “a lack of consensus at the highest levels of the Czech 
representative bodies persisted throughout the entire Operation.”50 
On March 16, 1999, representing the Czech Republic for the coun-
try’s first time at NATO’s North Atlantic Council, Prime Minister 
Miloš Zeman of the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) stated that “the 
development in the Former Yugoslavia is particularly tragic” and add-
ed that “the international community must take a strong stand against 
aggression, violations of human rights and suppression of basic free-
doms.”51 Notwithstanding those words, Prime Minister Zeman was 
unenthusiastic about the air campaign.52 On the day the alliance’s op-
erations began, he remarked that “it is our obligation to proceed to-
ward this nation [Yugoslavia] in such a way so as to comply with our 
commitments arising from NATO membership and not to assume the 
position of troglodytes who believe that bombs will solve everything.” 
During the same statement, Zeman reminded the Czech public of the 
strong historical relations between the Czech people and Serbia, no-
tably including Yugoslavia’s opposition to the 1968 Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia.53 Within the Social Democratic Party government, 
Foreign Minister Jan Kavan offered public support for the air cam-
paign, but there was considerable opposition within the government 
and the wider party.54 
The second largest political party in the Czech parliament at the 
time was the center-right Civic Democratic Party (ODS). Its leader, 
Václav Klaus, also opposed NATO’s air strikes.55 Nevertheless, some of 
his party’s leading members, as well as some of the party’s local bodies, 
offered support for the military campaign.56 In the Czech parliament, 
two other opposition parties—the Freedom Union and the Christian 
Democratic Union-Czech People’s Party—also supported NATO’s 
campaign.57
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The most prominent supporter of NATO’s intervention, within the 
Czech Republic, was President Václav Havel. In a statement issued on 
March 25, 1999, he recounted Milošević’s mistreatment of the Kosovo 
Albanians and emphasized that Serbia had refused to sign the political 
agreement produced by the Rambouillet negotiations.58 Just days after 
the end of the NATO summit in late April 1999, President Havel ad-
dressed Canada’s parliament and offered a vigorous defense of NATO’s 
intervention, arguing that the alliance was “fighting in the name of hu-
man interest for the fate of other human beings.”59
Despite its political divisions over the issue, the Czech Republic still 
made limited contributions to the air campaign. The government ap-
proved NATO’s use of the country’s airspace and airfields on April 6, 
1999, a step that was also approved by the Czech parliament.60 Addi-
tionally, the Czech Republic deployed a field hospital and a transport 
aircraft to NATO’s humanitarian assistance effort in Albania.61
Towards the close of May 1999, Foreign Minister Jan Kavan joined 
forces with his Greek counterpart, George Papandreou, to offer a dip-
lomatic proposal aimed at ending the intervention. In Greece, only 
around 2 percent of the public approved of the air campaign.62 The 
“Czech-Greek Peace Initiative” was unveiled on May 23, 1999 and, 
among its provisions, it called for a 48-hour bombing pause and provid-
ed that most, but not all, Serbian forces would have to leave Kosovo.63
Foreign Minister Kavan emphasized that the peace plan was not 
meant to undermine other diplomatic efforts.64 Nevertheless, for the 
United States government, as well as for many others in NATO, the 
initiative was problematic because a bombing pause threatened to 
weaken the military and diplomatic pressure confronting Milošević. 
Furthermore, the very fact that two NATO members were putting for-
ward their own diplomatic initiative threatened to signal serious cracks 
in the alliance’s political unity, at a moment when NATO had a strate-
gic interest in showing Milošević that he could not hope to outlast the 
alliance. As it happened, the Czech-Greek peace initiative did not do 
serious damage to the campaign of coercive diplomacy because, as a re-
sult of the discussions between Chernomyrdin, Ahtisaari, and Talbott, 
Serbia was presented with a combined NATO-Russia-EU position just 
10 days after the Czech and Greek foreign ministers had proffered their 
own plan. 
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III: The New Allies’ Contributions to the Aftermath of 
Operation Allied Force
On June 10, 1999, the day Allied Force ended, European Union 
foreign ministers, together with counterparts from the Balkans region, 
and other nations such as the United States and Russia, announced that 
they would establish the “Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe.” 
Joining the ministers were representatives from a host of international 
organizations. All participants pledged to work on a collective strategy 
for achieving “lasting peace, prosperity and stability for South Eastern 
Europe.”65 The design of the Stability Pact was led by Germany, which 
held the EU Presidency for the first half of 1999, alongside the United 
States. For its part, the Clinton Administration helped to conceptualize 
the project, but deemed it appropriate for the European Union to take 
ownership of the initiative. 
The Stability Pact was formally launched in late July 1999 in the 
capital of Bosnia, Sarajevo, at a meeting attended by leaders from al-
most 40 countries.66 Launching the pact in Sarajevo, which had been 
besieged for the duration of the Bosnian war, underscored the goal of 
helping the region move beyond the horrors of its recent past. As Dan-
iel Hamilton, one of the authors in this volume and a U.S. State De-
partment official who worked on both the design and implementation 
of the initiative, said in congressional testimony: 
The guiding principle behind the Stability Pact is a bargain be-
tween integration and reform: the international community will 
work to stabilize, transform and integrate the countries of this 
region into the European and transatlantic mainstream; they, in 
turn, will work individually and together to create the political, 
economic and security conditions by which this can be possible.67
Hungary played a significant role in the Stability Pact. From the 
moment it joined NATO, Hungary had pledged that, because of its 
geographic location, it would try to help the nations of South East-
ern Europe to follow in its own footsteps and to integrate into the 
Euro-Atlantic community.68 Among its efforts as part of the Stability 
Pact, Hungary led an initiative known as the “Szeged Process.” That 
project aimed to strengthen the independent press in Serbia and it also 
tried to improve governance in that country by connecting members 
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of the Serbian opposition, specifically those in municipal government, 
with municipal leaders from other states in the region.69 Additionally, in 
April 2000, Hungary and the United States convened a conference in 
Budapest regarding efforts to further economic reform in South Eastern 
Europe and enhance the region’s integration into the global economy.70
In addition to Hungary’s active and enthusiastic role in the Stability 
Pact, it contributed to the KFOR peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, 
along with both the Czech Republic and Poland. All three countries 
already had experience of peacekeeping in the Balkans, having con-
tributed to the mission—known initially as the Implementation Force 
(IFOR), then subsequently the Stabilization Force (SFOR)—that de-
ployed to Bosnia in the aftermath of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords.71 
Poland began deploying troops to KFOR on June 23, 1999.72 Its initial 
contribution was to send a 800-personnel unit, comprising Polish sol-
diers alongside troops from Ukraine and Lithuania.73 Hungary’s initial 
troop contribution to KFOR was 324 soldiers, who began deploying to 
Kosovo on July 15, 1999.74 Also in July 1999, the Czech Republic sent 
124 troops to KFOR, a contingent that grew to 175 personnel by the 
end of that year.75  
The potential risks associated with participating in KFOR became 
apparent quickly. In December 1999, a Polish Captain was killed while 
handling a M-60 grenade rifle that had been confiscated during patrols 
near the Macedonian border.76 In early April 2000, after U.S. military 
police and Polish troops seized weapons from a Serb house, they were 
surrounded by 150 Serbs who refused to let the American and Polish 
personnel leave. After eight hours the standoff was defused, having re-
sulted in injuries to 11 American personnel and one Polish solider.77
KFOR remains deployed in Kosovo at the time of this writing. The 
overall size of the peacekeeping operation has been on a downward 
trend since 1999, with fluctuations based on conditions on the ground. 
Beginning in 2006, a United Nations-led diplomatic effort aimed to re-
solve Kosovo’s political status, but by the end of 2007 that process had 
failed to produce an agreement that the Kosovo Albanians, Serbia, the 
EU, Russia, and the United States could all agree upon.78 In February 
2008, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia and more than 
100 states now recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state.79 NATO decided 
that KFOR would continue to operate in Kosovo, in line with UNSCR 
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1244.80 Since 2008, KFOR has been reduced from about 16,000 sol-
diers to roughly 3,600 troops at the time of writing.
The Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland have each made sus-
tained contributions to KFOR. Table 1 shows, year by year, the troops 
contributed by each country, as well as the approximate total size of 
KFOR. The table also shows what proportion of KFOR’s overall force 
was represented by the collective contributions of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland. Ever since 2003, the combined deployments of 
these three allies have exceeded 5 percent of KFOR’s total force and for 
many years they have been significantly above that proportion.  
IV: Reflections on the Responsibilities of NATO Membership
Considering the contributions of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and 
Poland to Operation Allied Force and its aftermath, I reach three major 
conclusions. 
First, membership of NATO comes with real responsibilities. In his 
memoir, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) Gen-
eral Wesley Clark recounted a phone conversation that he had with the 
Hungarian Chief of Defense, General Ferenc Vegh, early in the Koso-
vo campaign. Clark wrote the following about the conversation:
I tried to imagine how he must feel; he and his wife had come for 
dinner just two weeks ago when we were celebrating Hungary’s ad-
mission to the Alliance. Welcome to NATO; you’re now at war!81 
On May 28, 1999, just 80 days after Hungary had joined NATO, 
American F-18s were taking off from Hungarian soil and bombing tar-
gets in a neighboring country. The United States and the other most 
powerful members of the Alliance are not the only ones who take on 
responsibilities to their fellow Allies through NATO. 
Second, because NATO is an alliance of democracies, there is the 
potential for serious domestic political arguments within member 
states about what is required of them during military campaigns. 
During the Kosovo intervention, there were significant debates in 
both the Czech Republic and Hungary. In the case of the Czech Re-
public, there were divisions about whether the Alliance should have 
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Table 1. Czech, Hungarian and Polish Contributions to KFOR
Year
Poland’s 
Troops in 
KFOR
Hungary’s 
Troops in 
KFOR
Czech  
Republic’s 
Troops in 
KFOR
Total of  
Poland, 
Hungary,  
and Czech  
Republic 
Combined
Approx. 
Overall 
Troop 
Strength 
of KFOR
Poland, 
Hungary, 
and Czech 
Republic 
Troops 
Relative 
to KFOR 
(%)
2000 763 325 160 1248 50,000 2.50
2001 532 325 175 1032 50,000 2.06
2002 574 325 400 1299 39,000 3.33
2003 574 325 409 1308 26,000 5.03
2004 574 294 408 1276 20,000 6.38
2005 574 294 410 1278 17,500 7.30
2006 312 484 500 1296 17,000 7.62
2007 312 268 445-501 1025-1081 17,000 6.36
2008 312 484 500 1296 16,000 8.10
2009 271 317 400 988 15,000 6.59
2010 226 243 393 862 10,200 8.45
2011 152 242 103 497 5,000 9.94
2012 295 245 7 547 5,000 10.94
2013 160 194 7 361 5,000 7.22
2014 228 201 7 436 4,700 9.28
2015 254 336 9 599 4,700 12.74
2016 240 357 11 608 4,700 12.94
2017 253 366 12 631 4,352 14.50
2018 240 373 9 622 3,642 17.08
Sources: KFOR Website, https://jfcnaples.nato.int/kfor, IISS Military Balance, Years 2000-2018, 
Reuters, September 2, 2009, NATO to Cut Troops in Kosovo Despite Unrest.
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been intervening against Serbia at all. In the case of Hungary, the most 
significant political debate concerned whether the country should al-
low alliance aircraft to launch bombing missions from Hungarian soil. 
The debates that occurred in these two new members did not make 
them exceptional; there were political debates and controversies within 
many members of the alliance regarding Kosovo. As noted above, polls 
found that only around 35 percent of the Czech Republic’s population 
approved of NATO’s air campaign. That was not that different from 
public opinion in a number of other allied states: only 42 percent of 
Belgium’s population approved; 41 percent approved in Portugal; 39 
percent approved in Spain; and only 2 percent of Greece’s population 
supported the air campaign.82 
Additionally, across NATO, there were various views about how the 
air war should be waged. For example, some allies had concerns about 
hitting certain targets within Yugoslavia. Meanwhile, in the United 
States, within both the administration and Congress, there were real 
concerns about whether to contemplate a ground invasion of Kosovo as 
a way to bring about Milošević’s surrender. Even the call for a bombing 
pause that was central to the Czech-Greek peace initiative, although it 
had the potential to undercut the diplomatic pressure that was building 
on Milošević, mirrored an idea that a number of other allies had advo-
cated previously.83 Debates about how exactly to meet the responsibil-
ities of alliance are something that comes with NATO’s character as a 
club of democracies. 
Third, what the new NATO members’ contributions to the Kosovo 
intervention demonstrate is that there are many ways Allies can meet 
their responsibilities during military campaigns. After all, interventions 
are complex and multi-faceted undertakings, whose success does not 
depend merely upon contributions that enhance the “tip of the spear.” 
In the case of Operation Allied Force, Hungary’s airfields were an im-
portant piece of infrastructure in NATO’s air campaign. Additionally, 
all three members contributed personnel to humanitarian assistance 
efforts for Kosovar refugees. Finally, and especially significantly, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland each made sustained troop con-
tributions to the KFOR peacekeeping mission. 
To illustrate the benefits to the United States of the Czech Repub-
lic’s, Hungary’s, and Poland’s involvement in KFOR, we can consid-
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er the year 2008, when the three Central European Allies collectively 
had 1,300 troops in KFOR, representing around 8 percent of the total 
force. That was close to the United States’ commitment of troops to 
KFOR that year, which numbered 1,640.84 That year was also one in 
which U.S. forces were carrying significant burdens around the world; 
there were 160,000 American troops in Iraq at the opening of that year, 
following the surge of 2007, and the United States had close to 25,000 
troops in Afghanistan.85 By sending 1,300 troops to KFOR, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland were helping to secure and sustain the 
victory NATO attained in June 1999 and lessening the troop commit-
ment that the United States had to make there. That same year, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland collectively had 2,600 of their 
troops deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq as well.86 
A recurring complaint heard during discussions about NATO in the 
United States is that America’s European Allies often do not contribute 
a fair share to the Alliance and they “free-ride” on the efforts of the 
United States. Such criticisms of America’s European allies are ground-
ed in the fact that a minority of NATO’s European members have met 
the alliance’s pledge to spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense. Addi-
tionally, during military campaigns, the United States has contributed 
the majority of capabilities. During Operation Allied Force, for exam-
ple, American aircraft flew 60 percent of the total sorties, 90 percent of 
the intelligence and reconnaissance sorties, and released 80 percent of 
the precision-guided bombs used.87 
Even so, American criticisms about the scale of NATO Allies’ con-
tributions can sometimes be too harsh. As the experiences of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland during and after the Kosovo inter-
vention showed, all allies take on responsibilities as a result of NATO 
membership. The three new members contributed to Operation Allied 
Force and, in an even more pronounced way, they helped to bear the 
burdens associated with the KFOR peacekeeping operation that fol-
lowed afterwards and that continues until this day. 
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Chapter 26
Renewing the Vows: NATO @70
Mircea Geoană
“Et Si Tu N’Existais Pas?” (What If You Didn’t Exist?)—this famous 
Joe Dassin song is a rhetorical question that we should ask ourselves 
about the present and future of NATO. A frantic conversation is under 
way in all possible formats and fora; time and energy are spent with the 
hope to find the miraculous cure to the current malaise and acrimony 
among key Allies, and to identify a miraculous solution to the current 
state of affairs in transatlantic relations. Reasons for concern abound 
from both sides of the Atlantic, rendering each of us weaker, to the 
satisfaction of our adversaries or competitors, who have been offered a 
“wild card” to re-enter the new Great Game.
NATO @70 should be more than just a celebration of past accom-
plishments. It should mainly be a realistic appraisal of the situation as 
it stands and of the few possible ways forward. We should not shy away 
from facing the reality: strong headwinds are facing our Alliance. If the 
hesitations to organize a proper NATO Summit on its 70th anniversary 
are any indication, imagine the difficulties to mobilize political energies 
for a new way forward. It is very good that London will host a special 
anniversary “Summit” at the end of 2019. But nice and well-scripted 
meetings cannot hide the truth: our Alliance is in crisis. Even the Mu-
nich Security Conference, the ultimate temple of transatlanticism, was 
engulfed in an exchange of jibes between American and German lead-
ers, much to the sarcastic delight of the Russian foreign minister. We 
just cannot afford to continue to prepare for NATO summits fearing 
that Alliance leaders will fail to agree on the major challenges facing us. 
Would it be too much to expect from our leaders to reconfirm in 
London the first paragraph of the Declaration adopted at the 60th 
NATO anniversary in Strasbourg and Kehl? 
We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, met today in Strasbourg and Kehl to cel-
ebrate the 60th anniversary of our Alliance. We have reaffirmed 
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the values, objectives and obligations of the Washington Treaty 
which unite Europe with the United States and Canada, and have 
provided our transatlantic community with an unprecedented era 
of peace and stability.1 
Or, to solemnly restate the (no longer so obvious) essence of our 
very existence? 
NATO continues to be the essential transatlantic forum for securi-
ty consultations among Allies. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty 
and collective defense, based on the indivisibility of Allied security, 
are, and will remain, the cornerstone of our Alliance. Deterrence, 
based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabili-
ties, remains a core element of our overall strategy.2
NATO’s Open Door policy has been a cornerstone of the transat-
lantic partnership. During the Cold War and after, the Alliance wel-
comed new Allies as different as Germany, Greece and Turkey, new 
members formerly belonging to the Warsaw Pact, and former Yugosla-
via’s new independent nations. 2019 is the 20th anniversary of NATO’s 
enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. It is the 15th 
anniversary of the enlargement to Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. And it is the 10th anniversary of 
the enlargement to Croatia and Albania. Accession of the Republic of 
Northern Macedonia, anticipated in 2019, may be considered as being 
part of the latter wave of enlargement, as the 2009 NATO Bucharest 
Summit extended invitations to the three countries, with the caveat 
that Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would 
resolved their dispute regarding the country’s name, which they have 
now done. 
Especially after the fall of communism, the rationale for the succes-
sive waves of enlargement was not as obvious as it appears today, main-
ly in the U.S. security, academic and political establishments. Each of 
these successive enlargements had a common thread, but also distinct 
conditions and significance. 
The first wave of enlargement to Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic was mainly about addressing the security architecture in Eu-
rope after German reunification and the demise of the Soviet Union. 
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The most ambitious enlargement to seven countries from the Bal-
tic to the Black Sea in 2004 was possible also because terrorist attacks 
on the United States on September 11, 2001 dramatically transformed 
American threat perceptions. The first invocation of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty’s Article 5, used as a sign of European solidarity with the 
United States and implemented in Afghanistan, pushed the Allliance 
toward an “out-out of area” stance. The terrorist threat became a dom-
inant factor in military planning and coalition-building in, and beyond, 
NATO’s membership and contributions. 
It is worth mentioning that the successful integration and smooth 
ratification in the U.S. Senate of the 1999 group of new Allies, as re-
counted by Jeremy Rosner in this volume, also played an important 
role in the “big-bang” approach to take in seven countries in 2004. 
In addition, the Russia factor continued to play a role, especially 
with regard to including the three Baltic republics, as did the logic of 
“unfinished business” from the 1999 enlargement, when Romania and 
Slovenia were considered but not invited. 
Over this time, European Allies have become more influential with 
regard to the decision-making process regarding enlargement. In the 
case of the 1999 wave, France pushed hard for Romania, yet failed in the 
face of U.S. and German opposition. By the time of the 2008 Bucharest 
Summit, it was the George W. Bush Administration that pushed hard, 
yet failed, to secure Alliance agreement to extend Membership Action 
Plans to Georgia and Ukraine in the face of strong German and French 
opposition. 
The inclusion of Balkan states in the 2009 enlargement can also be 
interpreted as a continuation of the NATO pacification effort after its 
involvement in the wars in Bosnia in 1994 and Kosovo in 1999, but 
also as a response to Russia’s resumption of a more aggressive stance in 
the region after its 2008 war on Georgia of 2008. That aggression has 
continued, marked by the 2014 annexation of Crimea, quasi-occupa-
tion of Eastern Ukraine, and military build-up in the Black Sea and the 
Eastern Mediterranean. 
How may the situation develop? Three main scenarios may be envis-
aged: a further degradation of the situation; a buying-time, wait-and-
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see, muddling-through approach; or, preferably, a wake-up call for a 
new chapter of transatlantic ties, adapted to our time.
The Worst-Case Scenario
Let’s take the worst-case scenario: what if NATO would cease to 
exist or to function properly? A crippled or dysfunctional Alliance is 
a remote possibility, but it cannot be completely ruled out. After all, 
nothing in life or history is inherently immune to changes that shifting 
circumstances may impose on any human, societal or political construct. 
Future generations will not necessarily receive a NATO certificate at 
birth, as our forefathers gave us. After all, the 30 years since the fall of 
communism have been more of an historical exception when it comes 
to the logic of Great Power confrontation, violence, and conflict.
A world without NATO? What if the United States decides to “go 
bilateral” by abandoning the multilateral framework that binds it to 
those some Americans consider to be ungrateful free riders? What 
would the impact be of such a huge vacuum on the world and on our 
interests? Is there a realistic and practical alternative? 
I use such a dire and apocalyptic scenario as a pretext to force us 
to think and act differently and to rescue not only “the-most-success-
ful-alliance-in-history.” but our civilization, our way of life, our free-
dom. Nature abhors a vacuum. What would replace NATO as the ul-
timate security arrangement? The most likely answer is that a web of 
bilateral and regional security arrangements would begin to form, as 
so many times before in history. The United States would probably 
enter into a logic very much to the liking of the current Administration: 
concluding a series of bilateral defense deals that would link bilateral 
security guarantees to preferential economic and trade arrangements. 
The example at hand is the future of U.S.-UK commercial and security 
arrangements after Brexit. 
Poland’s proposal for “Fort Trump” and the defense deal recently 
signed by the United States and Hungary are improvisational exam-
ples of a trend that could be consolidated and eventually become main-
stream. Nordic cooperation will inevitably strengthen, with Norway, 
Finland, Sweden, Iceland and Denmark finding even more common 
ground. After Brexit the United Kingdom will try to leverage its new-
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ly-found freedom by proposing bilateral/regional arrangements not 
only to the United States, India and Japan but also to those EU and 
non-EU countries in Europe and around the world who share import-
ant strategic, military and intelligence with their British counterparts. 
The Visegrád 4 could coalesce around Poland’s relatively robust de-
fense posture and will try to lure other Central and Southeast Europe-
an countries into variable geometry formats. The Polish Inter-Marum 
concept, resuscitated today in the Three Seas format, could conceivably 
become a framework in which countries between Russia and Germany 
come together in formalized security arrangements. Other European 
powers, large and small, could follow suit. European history is littered 
with similar efforts (Entente Cordiale, Little Entente), often with di-
sastrous consequences.
Countries with strong transatlantic inclinations and interests like 
Romania or Poland will continue to consider the link to the United 
States as their primary security insurance. Others in the region will 
try to hedge their security risks, as may already be seen. Germany and 
France will try to boost European defense initiatives and industrial co-
operation and attract as many current EU members as possible to join. 
A Franco–German “army” is not unthinkable after the signing of the 
Aachen/Aix-en-Provence new bilateral treaty.
The likely result of all this? The European security landscape would 
look more like Swiss cheese than a homogenous surface. Both the cen-
ter and the peripheries would become weaker, with Russia and possibly 
China offered an undeserved “terrain de chasse.” Turkey and possibly 
Greece would be more tempted to mitigate the political and economic 
risks and opportunities with closer ties to both Russia and China. The 
Western Balkans would re-enter the logic of Great Power competition, 
with complex consequences for the regional system of allegiances. Nu-
clear deterrence and anti-ballistic systems would continue to operate 
as a U.S. bilateral security anchor, with Romania and Poland in this 
category. The future of the Incirlik base in Turkey would come into 
question. 
Not only would Europe become weaker in such a scenario, so would 
America. No one can anticipate the future of Russian-Chinese cooper-
ation. A Russia-China “Kissinger” move, a tactical alliance to counter 
the dominant status of the United States, is not as unimaginable as 
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some American pundits profess. A coordinated offensive towards Eu-
rope and the South China Sea could be an interesting war game to 
analyze. 
A new OSCE-type arrangement with Germany and Russia at the 
core of a new pan-European security arrangement is a distinct pos-
sibility. After all, General de Gaulle was thinking of a Europe from 
the Atlantic to the Urals and some German leaders are again enter-
taining this idea. Speaking in favor of the Nord Stream II natural gas 
pipeline bypassing Ukraine, former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has 
expressed the clear view, popular in many business and political circles, 
that Germany needs Russian resources to continue to expand its eco-
nomic and export-oriented power house. After all, if America becomes 
mercantilist in its interpretation of international affairs, why shouldn’t 
Germany? 
The European Union itself would become the collateral victim of 
such a catastrophic series of events. Europe would return to its old 
habits. Old demons could resurface. 
Muddling Through
This is the most likely scenario. Incremental change should be tried, 
as Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute have proposed.3 Buying time 
is sometimes the wise thing to do. Elections in America are looming 
large. Most of the Democratic hopefuls call for strengthening the Al-
liance—some of out of conviction, others because they believe Presi-
dent Trump’s eclectic style of foreign policy and international affairs is 
vulnerable to Democratic pushback. Congress is and will continue to 
be active in this conversation a bipartisan way, including in the form of 
binding and non-binding legislation.
In this scenario, the Strategic Concept and other decisions adopt-
ed at previous NATO Summits would be carried out, if sometimes 
reluctantly. The 2024 target for all Allies to comply with the “Wales 
pledge” of 2% of GDP for defense would probably be met, with the 
caveat that some important European Allies will insist in introducing 
in the overall amount other budget items pertaining to cyber security 
(as Italy recently suggested) or peacekeeping or peace-building costs 
conducted outside NATO operations (as Germany insists). In terms 
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of procurement, the 20% target for new equipment could be met but 
with a caveat: those European Allies who possess national/European 
defense industry capabilities are likely to insist on an implicit or explic-
it “buy European” clause. Countries without such industrial prowess 
would continue to navigate (and mitigate) the growing competition in 
procurement between the United States and core Europe for military 
and dual-use equipment.
Even in such circumstances, the NATO’s ‘vows” would require a 
solemn reaffirmation of the sanctity of the Article 5 mutual security 
guarantee. The perception that NATO was a “paper tiger” Alliance 
would be likely to grow. Lack of Allied unity would be likely to boost 
the probability of new quasi-Article V Russian provocations.
In such a scenario, NATO would probably continue to invest in 
deterrence measures against Russia’s aggressive stance on the Eastern 
flank. Still, the Alliance would be marginally involved in the broader 
security and stability of the Southern neighborhood in Northern Africa 
and the broader Middle East. Terrorism would continue to be a menace 
to the transatlantic world and weak or accomplice states would contin-
ue to be targeted by ISIS and other radical Islamic movements. Russia, 
Pakistan and China would try to fill the void left by NATO’s withdraw-
al from Afghanistan, with implications for the balance of power for the 
rest of Central Asia and Eurasia as a whole.
The situation in the Black Sea would continue to be tense as Russia 
proceeded to modernize its capabilities. Turkey’s ambivalent stance on 
critical issues like Syria, and its flirtations with Russia and Iran, would 
also probably continue. The tensions between the United States and 
Germany, France and the UK over the Iran sanctions dossier would 
add to the mounting number of strategic uncertainties and security 
risks in the broader Black Sea, Caspian, Eastern Mediterranean and 
the Gulf areas. 
In such a context, it would be more difficult to achieve a common 
NATO response to Russia’s subversive measures in cyber defense, med-
dling in democratic processes, and use of energy as a political instru-
ment. Bilateral support for Ukraine and Georgia would continue, but 
would most probably stop short of a more formalized relationship with 
the Alliance. In the Western Balkans, Northern Macedonia’s accession 
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to NATO will help maintain the credibility of the “Open Door” policy 
for the region. 
NATO’s partnerships around the world would continue to operate 
but be more resource-constrained. If Brexit becomes reality, the Unit-
ed Kingdom would use its influence in NATO to stay relevant in con-
tinental European affairs. Under this scenario, the currently incipient 
European defense institutions would gradually evolve. Suspicion over 
the final motives of the much proclaimed “strategic autonomy” of the 
EU from the United States would continue to corrode bonds of trust 
among the key Allies. 
Lip service would be paid to streamlining Alliance decision-making 
processes, but with no measurable results. As long as Allies see eye to 
eye, NATO’s consensus rule serves to unify. In more tense situations, 
however, it could also play the opposite role. European Allies are right 
in criticizing the fact they found out from open sources that the United 
States decided to withdraw from Syria or Afghanistan. Americans are 
right to criticize some European Allies for free riding on the U.S. se-
curity blanket.
Failure to adapt to a changing world is also a form of incipient irrel-
evance. The old saying “out-of-area or out-of-business” will come to 
haunt us, as the attention of the United States (rightly, in my view) is 
moving toward the competition for supremacy with China. 
Back in Business: Ensuring Our Long-Term Security and 
Shaping the New World Order
The situation in NATO cannot be seen in isolation from the broader 
set of political, economic issues in transatlantic relations or from the 
overall state of world affairs. Neither Washington nor European capi-
tals will invest new energy in their relations until and unless each once 
again realizes one simple truth: we thrive together, or we falter alone. 
There is no other logical solution. The United States or Europe must 
put their resources together if either is to have any hope of maintain in-
fluence and relevance in our turbulent times. We might differ on many 
tactical aspects, but a reality test should represent a wakeup call for the 
Western world: we simply cannot afford to continue to diverge. What 
is to be done?
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Back to fundamentals: shared values and common interests
NATO is so much more than a mere security arrangement. It is 
the foundation of our free societies. The London anniversary Summit 
should solemnly reaffirm this indestructible foundation of our Alliance.
While America’s vital role should be reaffirmed by all Europeans, 
Washington’s Europe-bashing must stop. The United States and Eu-
rope are indispensable partners. This obvious reality is sometimes 
obscured by the raging conversation about the right balance between 
bilateralism and multilateralism, globalization and national interests. 
There is no possible way for the new or renewed world order to reflect 
and protect the interests of the West and of our democratic friends and 
allies around the world without America and Europe pulling togeth-
er their still plentiful resources. The rise of authoritarianism, closed 
societies and state capitalism cannot be fought by America or by Eu-
rope alone. Any additional wedge between the two sides of the Atlantic 
not only weakens our own hand, it plays directly into the interests of 
our rivals and real competitors. Values and interests inside the Alliance 
should be realigned. Differences in risk and opportunity assessment 
among Allies should be recognized and dealt with punctually. The 
“strategic autonomy” of Europe should be seen as a sign of emancipa-
tion not from America but from our own strategic impotence. A more 
assertive Europe is an indispensable ingredient in our common success 
and relevance in decades to come.
Reviving American leadership of the Alliance should go hand-in-hand with 
reaffirming the sanctity of Article 5
We should not shy away from recognizing the damage that state-
ments of President Trump have inflicted on Europe’s trust in the re-
solve of the United States in fulfilling its Washington Treaty obliga-
tions. At the same time, we should also not exaggerate the significance 
of those statements, because if U.S. efforts to extract a better “deal” 
from other Allies works, this would not be such a bad proposition—
maybe just the opposite. Meanwhile, Congress should pass legislation 
reconfirming unequivocally that there is bipartisan support for Arti-
cle 5 and America’s commitment to the Alliance as a whole. Congress 
should also continue to fund the “European Deterrence Initiative” 
against Russian aggression and expand it with new measures to counter 
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the non-Article 5 threats Russia has so viciously employed in cyber 
warfare, hacking and election meddling. The next NATO Strategic 
Concept review should be started in London in December 2019. Al-
liance leaders should expressly demand a tight schedule to upgrade of 
NATO’s strategic response to the deteriorating international security 
environment. This response should go beyond conversations about ca-
pabilities and burden-sharing. It should reconfirm and redefine the key 
role of NATO as the backbone of international security. New spending 
is critical to produce added NATO defense capabilities, including in-
telligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, cyber and digital technologies. 
European Allies must step up their game
Procrastination on the 2% of GDP for defense targets should stop. 
It is our continent and our nations who are the most vulnerable to a 
multitude of traditional and non-traditional security threats. The 2024 
deadline should be met by all Allies, from Germany to Canada and 
from the Netherlands to Italy and Spain.
The illusion that Russia is a threat only to Eastern flank countries 
should stop immediately. Russia’s return to the Middle East, its flirta-
tion with Turkey and Iran, its new assertiveness in the Arctic region, 
its ballistic posture in Crimea and Kaliningrad should be a strong in-
centive for all Allies to rouse themselves from strategic naivete, ambiv-
alence or mere wishful thinking. Russia is a threat. We all should treat 
it as such, without giving up on efforts to engage and de-escalate the 
current situation. 
Cold War rhetoric from Russia should not be reciprocated by the 
Alliance. But credible deterrence speaks more than a thousand commu-
niques. Energy diversification in Europe must continue. This is more 
than the mercantilist interest of the United States to export its energy 
bounty to Europe. It is a security issue. The solution is not to stop 
doing business with Russia but to stop putting them in a dominant, 
monopolistic position. This not only would reduce the capacity that 
Moscow has in (ab)using energy as a strategic lever, but is an indispens-
able part of any strategy that envisages a more constructive relationship 
between NATO, Europe, and the Russian Federation.
After Brexit, 80% of NATO’s defense spending will come from non-
EU Allies. Only by investing more—appropriating more resources to 
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NATO, strengthening the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PES-
CO), the European Defense Fund (EDF) and military mobility im-
provements—can Europe escape the strategic irrelevance it faces. Stra-
tegic prowess, strategic responsibility and specialization must become 
reality, and not just remain catchy phrases in speeches of European 
leaders.
NATO is so much more than Article 5 or the 2%...
Article 3 of the Washington Treaty stipulates that “The Parties to 
this Treaty (...) are determined to safeguard the freedom, common her-
itage and civilization of their peoples, founded on democracy, individu-
al liberty and the rule of law.” The erosion of democracy and of the rule 
of law is “the enemy from within,” inevitably producing a severe breach 
in the very foundation of the edifice on which the Alliance is built. 
NATO should emulate the way in which the European Union deals 
with democratic slippages of its members under Article VII of the EU 
Treaty and introduce a similar mechanism of scrutiny and correction. 
This is a difficult change to be introduced but a mechanism (indepen-
dent and/or with a peer review/Secretary General’s assessment) should 
be crafted and formally put on the table.
…but new, bold, measures are badly needed in order to keep the Alliance 
relevant in the 21st century
Restoring European defense strength and credibility will take more 
than grudgingly upholding the Alliance’s “Wales Pledge” for 2024. 
Here are a few suggestions.
• Implement an upgraded Quadrennial Defense Review, including 
a mechanism for peer and independent reviews. This should be 
announced on the occasion of the 70th anniversary and given as 
a task for the next NATO Summit. In addition to maintaining 
the commitment of appropriating 20% of defense spending for 
major new equipment and R&D of new capabilities, another 10% 
should be dedicated to countering the new array of threats. Na-
tional cybersecurity and (military) intelligence efforts should be 
included in the calculation of the 2% benchmark of NATO-relat-
ed expenditures, as some Allies suggest. European defense indus-
try concerns related to access barriers to the U.S. market should 
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also be addressed. More common ventures in traditional and new 
defense-related areas like A.I., robotics or outer space cooperation 
should be envisaged. The ultimate goal should be the creation of 
a transatlantic defense area, where cooperation and technology 
transfer should be the norm, not the exception. New spending is 
critical to produce added NATO defense capabilities, including 
intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, cyber and digital tech-
nologies. Transatlantic cooperation in these critical fields should 
be supported by the creation of a transatlantic R&D and Innova-
tion Fund/Trust. 
• Addressing vulnerabilities in the area of hybrid warfare should 
go hand-in-hand with active measures of deterrence of hybrid 
(sub-conventional) attacks short of the narrow Article 5 definition 
of an “armed attack.” Adapt traditional deterrence principles to 
the cyber realm. Cyber offensive options to deter Russia and Chi-
na have become a strategic necessity. 
• Containing Russia on the Eastern flank should include additional 
deterrence measures in the Black Sea, including by adding one 
more Multinational Battlegroup to the 4 decided for the Baltics 
and Poland. The NATO Readiness Initiative, which aims to pro-
vide 30 ready battle groups, air squadrons and naval combatants 
in 30 days should be complemented by a comprehensive Porcu-
pine Defense strategy as suggested by the Naval War College. 
• NATO should be winning the technology competition in the 
Digital Age—by aggressively investing in the NextGen of War-
fare and maintaining the lead in military and intelligence. The 
EU should emulate the U.S. system of R&D between military 
and civilian, business, academic actors.
• Establish an Eisenhower Fund for Military Mobility, Logistics 
and Resilience in Europe. Military mobility and logistics repre-
sent key components of NATO’s capabilities to operate, fight and 
deter. The shift from the doctrine of conventional war to out-of-
area operations led to a downgrade of NATO’s overall military 
mobility in the European theatre. Moreover, recent military ex-
ercises in Eastern flank countries revealed severe weaknesses in 
transport, infrastructure, logistics and supply chains, underlying 
significant practical obstacles in readiness and easily deployable 
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NATO assets in the region. The truth is that the “fine weather” 
atmosphere in which the last three rounds of enlargement took 
place inhibited the need to also invest in the density and quality 
of dual-use infrastructures and organic transport capabilities in 
Central and Southeastern Europe similar to how Western Europe 
invested in established routes during the Cold War. The 2014 
conflict in Ukraine was the turning point in military in contin-
gency planning aimed at ensuring credible and effective Article 
5-type operations not only for reinforcements but for proper 
combat operations.
• The meager quality of such infrastructure in the new member 
states represents a major liability, making military planners face 
the unpleasant reality of weak force sustainment, given untested 
supply lines and transport capabilities, all the way from the Baltic 
to the Black Sea. The situation is complicated by numerous oth-
er problems, such as the time needed to get national movement 
permits, the complexity of cross-border, multinational and EU 
regulations, and coordination of military transport with civilian 
transport routes. Vital infrastructure assets like bridges, tunnels, 
roads and railroads are antiquated and incapable of handling 
heavy military transports. The time has come to address this in-
tolerable situation. A number of ideas have been tested, including 
in the Three Seas format, but the level of resource needs requires 
bolder moves.
• Resilience in our societies should go beyond protecting physical 
infrastructures and coordination. NATO should define common 
standards for national resilience and clarify shared responsibilities 
for deterring hybrid attacks, where information-sharing and in-
vestment are paramount.
• The creation of the Eisenhower Fund (recognizing the role of 
the President in the founding of the Alliance on 1949) would rep-
resent the military and security equivalent of the Juncker Plan, 
introduced after the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009, 
with the European Investment Bank as the primary lender, in 
association with commercial banks and the private sector. The 
Eisenhower Fund would also focus its activities towards dual-use 
infrastructures and involve the private sector and a number of in-
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stitutional investors like the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
EBRD and OPIC/IFC. A portion of the next European Finan-
cial Framework (the 2021-2028 EU budget) should be dedicat-
ed to such dual-use projects, including in the energy sector. The 
European Defense Fund should also be significantly beefed-up. 
EU-NATO cooperation on this direction will prove critical, be-
yond the 2016 NATO-EU Joint Declaration on strategic partner-
ship and the EU and NATO Councils’ 34 new actions for coop-
eration. The new European Commission should revisit the Joint 
Communication of the current Commission and further clarify 
cooperation between military and non-military activities, expe-
dite military mobility, and ensure the necessary conditions for 
strategic pre-deployment of military forces and resources. The 
European Defense Agency should also play its part in ensuring 
the right synergies between military and non-military capabilities. 
NATO is more than our military. It’s about our people
Many in our young generations know nothing about the horrors that 
lead to the creation of the Alliance and of the array of global institu-
tions at the end of World War II. Employees at Microsoft refuse to 
work for applications that could be used by the military. We speak more 
and more of American values or European values, but not that much 
of Western values. Surveys indicate a very low desire among publics in 
some European countries to come to the rescue of other Allies in case 
of foreign aggression. The perception of the United States in Europe 
is deteriorating, and Europe is beginning to be perceived more as a 
competitor than as an indispensable ally. Investing in a new generation 
of transatlantic leaders and in the trust of our citizenry represents a 
priority as important as any of the critical issues tormenting our ties 
across the Atlantic. 
An ambitious Columbus Scholarship Program should be launched—a 
combination of Erasmus Plus (that allows exchanges of students and 
faculty) and the Fulbright/Rhodes Scholarship programs. Institutions 
like the German Marshall Fund of the United States should find a 
number of counterparts in Europe, with government and private sector 
support. 
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Renewing the Vows @70 should also mean strengthening the demo-
cratic nature of the Alliance and its democratic processes. The role and 
scope of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly should be enhanced. Na-
tional parliaments should appoint to the NATO PA the most relevant 
politicians. Formalism in the relations between the NATO General 
Secretariat should be replaced by permanent exchange of information 
and enhanced role for democratic scrutiny of the Assembly on the ac-
tivities and functions of the Alliance.
Out of area or out of business? NATO after Afghanistan
Ending the Afghan War is in sight and maintaining readiness of 
highly trained servicemen and women will be a challenge. A joint Spir-
it of NATO effort should be launched, using as a model the fantastic 
work of Spirit of America for U.S military personnel and diplomats. 
The entire southern neighborhood of NATO and Europe remains 
highly unstable. Further engagement of NATO in the Mediterranean 
Dialogue, established with seven of the partners in the region, should 
be broadened and deepened. Selectively, more of these partnerships 
should be brought up to the level of Individual Cooperation Programs 
(ICP) with Egypt and Israel, thus establishing long-term, structured 
and effective cooperation with these countries. Trust funds established 
for Jordan or Mauritania in previous years should be offered to all in-
terested Mediterranean Dialogue partners. The NATO training co-
operation initiative with partners in the Greater Middle East should 
be beefed up, with significant contributions from European allies and 
partners. A transatlantic stability and security toolbox for the Greater 
Middle East should be decided upon at the next NATO-EU Strategic 
Partnership meeting.
A NATO global partnership network?
The NATO Summit in 2008 welcomed the largest number of 
NATO partners to date. The Bucharest Declaration still stands and 
should be brought to the next level on the next appropriate occasion: 
“The Alliance places a high value on its expanding and varied rela-
tionships with other partners across the globe. Our objectives in these 
relationships include support for operations, security cooperation, and 
enhanced common understanding to advance shared security interests 
and democratic values. We have made substantial progress in build-
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ing political dialogue and developing individual Tailored Cooperation 
Packages with a number of these countries.” The significant contribu-
tions or support offered by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore 
or the Republic of Korea to NATO-led efforts in Afghanistan should 
not be wasted but used to step up a NATO global partnership network. 
The rise of a more assertive China will call on much closer cooper-
ation with democratic nations in the Indo-Pacific area. Competition to 
develop new technologies like A.I., cyber, robotics, quantum comput-
ing and biotechnology would mean a much closer cooperation between 
the United States and Europe. NATO should play its part in anticipat-
ing the next generation of warfare, not only in Europe but also in the 
Asia-Pacific. 
Missile Defense
Ballistic missile proliferation and the Russian build-up in Kalinin-
grad, Crimea and Syria pose an increasing threat to Allies’ forces, terri-
tory and populations. Especially after losing the INF Treaty and on the 
way to the renewal of the START Treaty in 2021, missile defense forms 
an indispensable part of the response to counter this threat. The sub-
stantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long-range bal-
listic missiles to be provided by European-based U.S. missile defense 
assets in Romania and Poland remains paramount, as an integral part of 
any future NATO-wide missile defense architecture. Bearing in mind 
the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO 
solidarity, options for a comprehensive missile defense architecture to 
extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise 
covered by the United States system should become a priority.
Conclusion
Restoring trust in the transatlantic relationship seems like a daunt-
ing task. Some suggest we should wait for the next American president 
and recognize that NATO as we knew it is “dead.” Others remind us 
that this is not the only difficult moment in the last 70 years of transat-
lantic relations and that we will eventually get over this one, too. Over 
time, even the most durable marriages lose some of the original magic 
and transform into a more pragmatic contract. If we were to renew the 
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vows at our 70th anniversary, what should we say before the high priest 
of history? That in complicated times, we are stronger together or we 
just give up? That what unites us is more valuable and enduring or what 
separates us? And, more importantly, that we have an obligation to the 
next generations to do whatever it takes to make sure they also will live 
in peace, freedom and democracy or they will go through the tragedy 
and destruction we thought over forever? 
And ask our current leaders to imagine the world without this formi-
dable alliance of democracies: Et Si Tu N’Existais Pas? 
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Notes
1. Declaration on Alliance Security Issued by the Heads of State and Govern-
ment participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg / 
Kehl on April 4, 2009, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_52838.htm. 
2. Ibid.
3. See the recent Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center Report,“An Alliance 
in Crisis,” conducted by Ambassadors Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute.
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